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Takimag My Reality TV Show: What Won’t They Say? Stephen Miller and Nicolle Wallace have something in common. Other than President Donald Trump supposedly finally ending his Iran War with a beautiful deal—a tremendous deal, an incredible deal, and could everyone please tell him that?—the president’s only other helpful move this quarter was to endorse Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton in his successful runoff against the incumbent Sen. John Cornyn. As Cornyn’s $92 million in attack ads painstakingly reminded voters, Paxton has been accused of: bribery, abuse of public trust and misappropriation, misusing state resources, obstruction of justice, making false statements, retaliating against whistleblowers, securities fraud, and adultery. And many of the accusations came from his fellow Republicans. It tells you something that, even running as an incumbent against a candidate with as many bullet holes as his opponent, and outspending him by more than 2-to-1, Cornyn was absolutely crushed by Paxton this week. The media will never tell you this, but vicious primaries against sitting Republican senators tend to have a common denominator. To wit: the Republican is a disaster on immigration. Cornyn was no exception. Which is why it’s surprising that we haven’t heard a peep out of Trump’s White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller. Just a week ago, Miller unleashed a barrage of abuse at Rep. Thomas Massie for voting against Trump’s Big Beautiful Bill because, as Massie explained, it also fully funded the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, used by the Biden administration to spy on and censor Americans. I, personally, would vote for an entire KGB to spy on Americans in exchange for a wall, but opposing the non-wall part of a bill that also funded the wall does not constitute siding with “foreign predators and criminal aliens,” as Miller claimed in one of his histrionic tweets. Massie has voted repeatedly to fund a border wall—at least when he wasn’t also required to vote for a domestic spy agency. In 2023, he was one of only five co-sponsors of the “Close Biden’s Open Border Act,” which would have provided $15 billion exclusively for a wall. This is in dramatic contrast to Cornyn, who has pushed for amnesty every year since at least 2013—except those years when he was about to face a re-election. His idea of a border bill was the one he proposed during Trump’s first year in office: In exchange for no employer sanctions and no worksite enforcement, his bill would have endorsed the construction of a whopping 40 miles of wall. So what’s with Miller? He may be good on immigration, but he’s got the loyalty of a rattlesnake. Recall that he abandoned his former boss and immigration ally, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions, the moment Trump decided to make Sessions the scapegoat for a problem of his own making. (Trump went on NBC News and told Lester Holt that it was his decision to fire FBI Director James Comey because of the Russia investigation, inevitably triggering a special counsel to revive the Russia investigation—which Trump then blamed on Sessions.) For 20 years, Sessions had been the sole voice of sanity on immigration in the U.S. Senate. Like the Little Dutch Boy who put his finger in the dike, saving his town from a catastrophic flood, Sessions spared our country from the Third-World flood long enough for Trump to come along, run on the issue, and win. In any other Senate office, Miller would have been responding to constituent mail. In Sessions’s office, he was a major policy advisor, whose detailed memo exposing the cons, tricks, and loopholes in the Floridian Sen. Marco Rubio’s amnesty bill did more than anything else to kill it. But he stood by, saying nothing as Trump cruelly assailed Sessions—even joining in the attack. After Sessions’s subsequent primary loss in his attempt to return to the Senate, Miller told reporters, while strolling down the White House driveway, that Sessions’s defeat was a “great victory for the country, a great victory for the president.” Maybe it was all worth it, now that Miller has a crucial perch in Trump’s White House. That’s a question for the philosophers. But it was definitely worth it for my Stephen Miller–Nicolle Wallace reality TV show! The idea is, contestants compete to see if there’s anything Miller and Wallace won’t say in order to keep their jobs. Wallace, you will recall, was part of the brain trust that picked Sarah Palin, then a little-known Alaska governor, to be Sen. John McCain’s running mate. As Palin’s primary assistant, Wallace immediately began leaking nasty stories about her to the press, calling her a “diva” and carping about her shopping sprees. As soon as Wallace failed at the job of getting her clients elected, she rushed to the New York Times to announce that she hadn’t voted for them, anyway. That reinvention set up Wallace perfectly for a host role on MSNBC, where, as a “former Republican,” she says things too crazy for a Democrat to voice. Like the girl who does the whole football team, she will do anything, say anything, to stay on TV—before being discarded. If David Duke bought MS-NOW and announced, “We’re going white nationalist,” she’d hand him her resume. Now, we just need a show title. I’m thinking, “Stephen, you’ve got the job,” or “Relax Nicolle. It’s getting embarrassing.” Or maybe, in Miller’s case, “Yeah, okay, it was worth it.” COPYRIGHT 2026 ANN COULTERDISTRIBUTED BY IMPOLITE DEBATES The post My Reality TV Show: What Won’t They Say? appeared first on The American Conservative.

Foreign Affairs How Brazil’s Left-Wing Leader Might Help Trump End the Iran War An obscure document from 2010 could be shaping U.S. diplomacy. (Photo by Iranian Presidency / Handout/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images) Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan flew to Iran in 2010 and persuaded the Islamic Republic to ship 1,200 kilograms of its enriched uranium—which accounted for roughly 70 percent of its stockpile—to Turkey in exchange for fuel rods to be used for a medical research reactor. The terms of that deal, signed by the foreign ministers of Iran, Turkey, and Brazil in Tehran on May 17, 2010, required Iran to deposit their enriched uranium in Turkey, where it would remain under IAEA observation. “We went there to convince Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Ali Khamenei,” Lula recently said of the deal, referring to Iran’s president and supreme leader at the time. “And after two days, we reached an agreement, one that was based on a handwritten letter that Barack Obama sent me.” Though approved by President Obama, Lula’s efforts were then rapidly thwarted by the Israel lobby and their allies at Hillary Clinton’s State Department, which successfully lobbied Congress to levy sanctions against Iran, scuttling any deal. Had the Obama administration accepted those terms, the nuclear question that drives Israeli policy—and therefore U.S. policy—toward Iran, might have been resolved even without the Iran nuclear deal that Obama secured in 2015 and that President Donald Trump withdrew from three years later. Instead, Obama’s diplomacy with Iran was criticized by the Iran hawks and the Iranian nuclear issue, never fully resolved, became a pretext for the ongoing war, which will enter its fourth month this week. On May 7, one day after meeting Trump at the White House, Lula held a press conference at the Brazilian embassy in Washington and told reporters he had handed Trump a physical copy of that aborted 2010 agreement. “For the second time,” he said, “I presented him with the agreement that Brazil and Turkey brokered regarding the Iranian nuclear issue.” The terms now under negotiation, mediated by Pakistan, bear a close resemblance to what Lula handed Trump. Trump’s most recent stated preference is for Iran’s enriched uranium to be destroyed in place, inside Iran, or else “at another acceptable location,” under IAEA supervision. Drop Site News reported last week, citing a senior Iranian official, that although Tehran will not consider nuclear issues until after a first-phase agreement to end the war is signed, Iran would be willing to suspend enrichment above 3.6 percent for 10 years and dilute its existing higher-enriched uranium inside the country under international supervision, terms close to what Trump is now offering. It is too early to say whether the emerging framework will hold, and too murky to assess what role, if any, Lula’s presentation of the 2010 document played in Trump’s change of mind. But the trajectory of the negotiations has moved toward Lula’s long-preferred terms regardless, away from maximalist demands for dismantlement and unconditional surrender of Iran’s stockpile, and toward the supervised, sovereignty-preserving framework he carried to Iran in 2010 and to the Oval Office earlier this month. Lula has spent his third term positioning Brazil as a Latin American power capable of acting independently of a regional order defined by Washington—championing BRICS expansion, promoting de-dollarization, condemning the U.S.-backed Gaza genocide—gestures that have earned him confrontations with Israel and a recalled ambassador, but little else. On Iran, for the first time, Lula may now finally have a material outcome to show for his foreign policy efforts. It would only be the latest reversal of fortune for the seasoned Brazilian leader, who had arrived in Washington facing the most serious challenge to his power in years. After months of economic struggle, a running conflict with the Trump administration over tariffs and the imprisonment of Trump-family ally Jair Bolsonaro, and a corruption scandal involving Banco Master—one of Brazil’s most elite banks, found to have funneled millions to the families of allied politicians including Lula’s chief justice and chief censor Alexandre de Moraes—polls showed the Brazilian president tied or trailing Senator Flávio Bolsonaro ahead of elections in October.  Three weeks later, the crisis has largely inverted for Lula. The Banco Master corruption scandal, which had seemingly solidified his defeat in the upcoming election, has now instead consumed his leading opponent, with viral reporting by The Intercept Brasil revealing that Flávio Bolsonaro had solicited more than $10 million from Banco Master’s now-arrested owner, Daniel Vorcaro, to fund a hagiographic film about his father starring Jim Caviezel. The Trump and Lula governments, meanwhile, are now reportedly close to resolving their tariff dispute, with Brazil’s Minister of Development and Trade Elias Rosa saying on May 20 that the two countries are “moving toward an agreement.” And the Wall Street Journal reported days after Lula’s visit, that the Trump administration was preparing to temporarily reduce tariffs on beef imports by executive order, a major win for Brazil’s beef lobby, which had urged Lula to raise the issue with Trump. If Lula’s 2010 proposal shapes U.S. diplomacy with Iran, it would be only his latest political victory, and could prove his most impactful yet. The post How Brazil’s Left-Wing Leader Might Help Trump End the Iran War appeared first on The American Conservative.

Politics Trump May Miss His Principled Opponents His new friends are not only his adversaries of yore, but the obstacles to policies he wants now—particularly peace in Iran. (Photo by Win McNamee/Getty Images) On the surface there are no three politicians more different than John Cornyn, Thomas Massie, and Bill Cassidy, the three Republican lawmakers whose current stints in Congress were recently ended by President Donald Trump. Massie is the only one of this trio who might have a political future. Although he lost by nearly 10 points, he won a shade more than 45 percent of the vote to Cornyn’s 36 percent and Cassidy’s just under 25 percent. But the truth is, Trump has never cared much for either the GOP establishment institutionalists like Cornyn and Cassidy or the strict constitutionalists of Massie’s ilk. While they are coming from radically different places both in terms of policy and institutional power (one faction ran the party for decades, the other was a rump within it long before Trump), they both are always telling Trump he can’t do stuff. The main innovation is that, almost midway through Trump’s second term, even as the rest of the electorate turns against him, he has convinced the Republican base that these are equivalent examples of the kind of principled loserdom the party turned to him to reject 10 years ago. During the Tea Party era in the years before Trump, the Massies of the world were increasingly defeating the Cornyns and Cassidys in Republican primaries (and conventions). In 2026, the president doesn’t have much use for either of them. In the process, Trump has tamed the Freedom Caucus, that group of recalcitrant House conservatives that effectively ended multiple Republican speakerships. Some establishment figures have proven malleable enough to make peace with Trump as well. Cornyn and Cassidy belatedly tried. But will the old guard that made their peace with Trump be willing to make peace, with Trump? Not if that means ending the war in Iran, it seems.  When the latest reports came that Trump was once again looking for an exit, Sen. Roger Wicker of Mississippi wasn’t pleased. “The rumored 60-day ceasefire — with the belief that Iran will ever engage in good faith — would be a disaster,” Wicker posted on X. “Everything accomplished by Operation Epic Fury would be for naught!” Sen. Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, the Trump buddy who has already gone on record saying Republican congressional majorities should be sacrificed in Iran, sounded a similar note. “It makes one wonder why the war started to begin with if these perceptions are accurate,” Graham wrote, referring to limits to what can be realistically achieved in Iran within a timeframe that American people will tolerate. He seems close to an epiphany, but then comes the second part: “I personally am a skeptic of the idea that Iran cannot be denied the ability to terrorize the Strait and the region cannot protect itself against Iranian military capability.” The White House seemingly recognizes the gulf between Graham and reality. One official told the Washington Examiner’s Byron York that Graham’s view  “is always that the cost is worth the benefit. And that’s just not how the president sees these things.” This official concluded that Trump and Graham have “a fundamentally different way of thinking about things, a fundamentally different bias.” Historically, that has been true—until, it seems, fairly recently. Now it is the hawks who are telling Trump he cannot do something that he clearly wants to do. Will he find them as inconvenient as libertarian congressmen and Senate parliamentarians? Does he not see that Mitch McConnell, Liz Cheney, Adam Kinzinger, and most of his original GOP tormentors hail from the uber-interventionist wing of the party? Or, having alienated the last Republicans who might actually support his diplomacy, does Trump now have nowhere else to go? For various reasons, Tulsi Gabbard and Thomas Massie will soon be gone from Washington, at least for the foreseeable future. Lindsey Graham is likely to remain. This may have looked to Trump like clearing barriers to action just a few weeks ago. But the obstacles may soon come from the company Trump currently keeps. If Trump can bring the war to a just conclusion, hopefully erstwhile allies who have long been supportive of that goal—mostly because they opposed going to war in the first place—will not embark on a revenge tour of their own. The better course in this instance would be for them to remain annoyingly principled. The post Trump May Miss His Principled Opponents appeared first on The American Conservative.

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