Foreign Affairs Trump’s Russia–Ukraine Diplomacy Is Good. Here’s How It Could Be Better Experts highlighted challenges and shared recommendations for achieving peace.  (Photo by TOM BRENNER/AFP via Getty Images) President Donald Trump’s Russia–Ukraine diplomacy has sparked much criticism. Typically, the critics who grab the most attention are those who accuse the White House of being “pro-Russian.” This has been the case especially following the leak two weeks ago of the administration’s 28-point peace plan, which was dismissed as a “wish list” for Russia’s Vladimir Putin and a “surrender” document for Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky. Given this one-sided political discourse, many experts who favor constructive U.S. diplomacy with Moscow devote precious time to defending the administration’s efforts. But they have their own criticisms of those efforts, as well as recommendations for how best to achieve peace. To better understand this neglected point of view, I reached out to four U.S.-based experts and one former Zelensky aide, all of whom take what I consider a balanced, pragmatic view of the conflict.  The U.S.-based experts’ insights collectively pertain to three obstacles to settling the war: 1) The Trump administration’s failure, at least early on, to assemble a dedicated negotiating team; 2) obstructionist Russia hawks in Washington (including at the White House) and in Europe who oppose any peace deal that Moscow might accept; and 3) the inherent difficulties of resolving the war given the gulf between Russia’s and Ukraine’s negotiating positions.  Experts emphasized or at least alluded to the absence of a well-coordinated U.S. negotiating team that could do the long, difficult work of conflict diplomacy. Emma Ashford of the Stimson Center said the administration’s biggest mistake has been “engaging in high-level summit diplomacy before the working-level details are hammered out.” Similarly, Jennifer Kavanagh of Defense Priorities, while praising the administration’s devotion to finding peace even amid “unfair criticism,” said the war was too complex to be resolved “with a few high-level summits.” Rather, “a sustained process for working through the issues at the core of the conflict is needed.” Anatol Lieven of the Quincy Institute said the Trump administration had complicated matters by failing “to unify its negotiating team.”  But the failure to assemble a strong negotiating team may have derived, in part, from external political pressures, according to the Quincy Institute’s George Beebe, a former director of Russia analysis at the CIA. Beebe pointed to “Russiagate,” the scandal from Trump’s first term in which the president was falsely accused of colluding with Moscow to steal the 2016 election. As part of that sordid saga, Trump’s own officials, including Fiona Hill and Alexander Vindman, depicted him as being easily manipulated by Putin. Consequently, Beebe said, Trump in his second term has been wary of bringing in Russia–Ukraine experts he doesn’t already know. Without a strong bench of experts, Beebe said, the White House team was unduly influenced by outgoing special envoy Keith Kellogg, who saw Putin as an imperialist looking to grab more land. Beebe said Kellogg didn’t understand that the Kremlin genuinely perceived an “existential threat” in Ukraine’s growing partnership with NATO. Thus, Kellogg mistakenly believed that tightening sanctions on Russia and boosting military aid to Ukraine would lead Putin to reconsider the invasion. Ashford intimated that another hawk, even more central within Trump’s orbit, possibly has hindered the peace process: Marco Rubio. As secretary of state and national security advisor, Rubio is arguably the second-most powerful person in the U.S. government, and Ashford said that “the U.S. secretary of state may oppose a deal.” This assessment comports with claims by senators that Rubio privately told them the 28-point plan was a “wish list” for Russia, which discredited the document in the eyes of many. (The White House denied these claims.) The experts pointed to Europe as an obstacle to the Trump administration’s peace efforts. Ashford said that most European capitals believe Ukraine can get a better deal later (so it should resist an ugly deal now). Kavanagh detected a more cynical motivation in Europe’s strategic thinking around Ukraine. “Europe is happy to see the war continue since it gives more time for them to rearm,” she said, referring to European efforts to build forces in anticipation of U.S. retrenchment and escalating Russian revanchism. Beebe was even more scathing. He pointed to a “Coalition of the Unwilling” that he said comprises “diehard elite Atlanticists in Washington and Europe” who struggle to accept the end of U.S. primacy and to see the necessity of compromise with Russia. “Can Trump overcome the Coalition of the Unwilling in Europe and Washington to forge and implement a settlement of the Ukraine war?” Beebe asked. “Getting Russia and Ukraine to compromise with each other may prove easy by comparison.” Notwithstanding that wry humor, all the experts were attentive to serious difficulties of resolving the war, and more than one highlighted seemingly incompatible demands of the belligerents. Lieven pointed to Russian demands that he said are nonstarters for Kiev and Europe, namely, “withdrawal from the remainder of the Donbas [eastern region] still held by Ukraine; a formal ban on Ukrainian NATO membership; and an explicit ban on Western troops in Ukraine.”  Ashford identified an even more fundamental dispute: “Russia still does not recognize Ukraine as a fully sovereign country, and Ukraine wants its territory back, along with the freedom to pursue its own foreign policy.” Kavanagh assessed that Moscow, because of its battlefield advantages, isn’t ready to stop fighting, while Kiev isn’t ready to do so since it sees the conflict as “existential” and doesn’t trust that a peace deal will hold.  Still, the experts did not discount the possibility of peace. Kavanagh said Washington lacks the leverage to force Kiev and Moscow to make a deal, but that the war likely will end “in the next year or so,” and possibly in the spring. Importantly, Kavanagh assessed that getting to peace in the next few months would require Washington to “exert some pressure” on Kiev “even if it makes the settlement seem imposed.”  Ashford adumbrated a likely deal, which she said is coming into view: “some recognition of Russian territorial control (at least de facto) and some restrictions on Ukraine’s ability to join NATO, matched with the ability for Ukraine to arm itself for future deterrence.”  The person who provided the most comprehensively positive assessment of Trump’s diplomatic efforts was Iuliia Mendel, a former press secretary for Zelensky and current critic of the Ukrainian government. Trump, she said, “has steadfastly championed an end to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.” For all the complaints about Trump’s transactional approach, Mendel said, “no viable alternatives have emerged, save for the endless invocation of unattainable ideals and the hollow vow to ‘stand with Ukraine as long as it takes.’” Mendel offered a decidedly unromantic view of the conflict, which she noted involves “unrelenting death, devastation, economic ruin, rampant wartime corruption, and egregious human rights abuses.” While any likely peace deal won’t be flawless, she maintained, the alternative is much worse. To help Ukraine avoid that worse alternative, Trump might turn the insights reported above into actions: sustaining a diplomatic process led by trusted negotiators; distinguishing between honest critics and saboteurs who oppose any deal Moscow might accept; and nudging Kiev to make concessions that, however painful, are likely needed to end a war that is devastating Ukraine. The post Trump’s Russia–Ukraine Diplomacy Is Good. Here’s How It Could Be Better appeared first on The American Conservative.

Tennessee’s Not-So-Special Special Election

Random Outrage

Foreign policy Kiev Shouldn’t Get U.S. Security Guarantees Fighting Russia over Ukraine isn’t remotely in America’s interests. (Photo by TOM BRENNER/AFP via Getty Images) Despite the Trump administration’s claim to put the United States first, its Ukraine peace plans risk putting America last. For years, even before he became president, Donald Trump criticized the Europeans for free riding on the U.S. Today he has apparently proposed adding Ukraine as another defense dependent, with a possible trigger for war against nuclear-armed Russia.  The administration’s recent 28-point plan, criticized for leaning toward Russia, bars Kiev from joining NATO but offers “reliable security guarantees” instead. Although Trump officials did not detail the U.S. role, they promised “a decisive coordinated military response” in response to renewed Russian military action. The European response added a “U.S. guarantee that mirrors Article 5.”  French president Emmanuel Macron has been particularly insistent that Washington put American wealth and lives on the line, stating that “the absolute condition for good peace is a set of very robust security guarantees and not paper guarantees,” including from the U.S. The 19-point U.S.-Ukraine draft has not been published but likely moves toward the latter. Presumably these issues were discussed in Monday’s Moscow meeting between Russian president Vladimir Putin and U.S. emissaries Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, which revealed continuing disagreements on major issues. For America, the details of a guarantee are the most important provision in any agreement. Not even Trump’s predecessors Barack Obama and Joe Biden, whom the president regularly accuses of weakness, were willing to make such a needless concession to the feckless Europeans.  That Kiev wants the American people to be ready to fight and die on its behalf is no surprise. Ukrainians have suffered greatly in a terrible war. Continuing combat is prodigiously consuming Ukrainian lives and wealth. However, alliances should be based on security, not charity. Although the conflict is a humanitarian tragedy, Ukraine’s future, and especially the details of any settlement, such as who controls the Donbas, are not vital U.S. concerns. Of course, Kiev is not alone in its desire for support. Much of the known world—almost every European nation, most of the Middle Eastern royals, and the richest Asian states—remains on the U.S. defense dole. The wealthiest, most advanced foreign states continue to mimic suckling babies years, even decades, after the initial crises in which they first became reliant on Washington. America’s defense of Europe is at 80 years and counting. Although the early U.S. republic aggressively overspread the North American continent, it was initially reluctant to risk its citizens’ lives and wealth in other nations’ wars. That barrier was breached by President Woodrow Wilson, more delusional megalomaniac than charismatic idealist, as he has been typically portrayed. World War I was an idiotic imperialist war in which the U.S. had no stake. However, Wilson was determined to remake the world. Which, unfortunately, he did, disastrously. His intervention wasted more than 117,000 American lives and resulted in another, even greater conflict. As Ferdinand Foch, the French general who served as supreme allied commander, described the botched Versailles Treaty ending the war: “This is not a peace. It is an armistice for twenty years.” Successive U.S. administrations avoided the continent, soon wracked by communism, fascism, and Nazism. Even the Europeans were ultimately unwilling to defend Wilson’s and his allied compatriots’ handiwork, hence “appeasement.” World War II was the tragic but predictable outcome. The U.S. was dragged into the resulting imbroglio. After dispatching the horrific Third Reich, what remained of Europe faced the triumphant Soviet Union, headed by an even bloodier dictator.  So, Washington stayed that time. However, America’s continuing military presence, through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—which would have been more accurately named the North American Treaty Organization—was intended to be only temporary, until Western Europe recovered economically. Dwight Eisenhower, no left-wing peacenik, said in 1951: “If, in ten years, all American troops stationed in Europe for national defense purposes have not been returned to the United States, then this whole project will have failed.” Seventy-four years later U.S. forces are still there and, if most Europeans have their way, will still be there in another 74 years, and probably beyond.  At least Washington then treated alliances as serious. They were extended to countries thought to be strategically important. There was Western Europe, which the U.S. had just fought to liberate, as well as South Korea and Japan, client states acquired in the aftermath of the same conflict. Security commitments also typically resulted from formal treaties, negotiated with other governments and ratified by the U.S. Senate. Multilateral agreements with less important participants, most notably the Baghdad Pact/CENTO, SEATO, and ANZUS, were looser and weaker. In recent years, Washington has treated military commitments like hotel chocolates, to be placed on every guest’s pillow. In recent years NATO has inducted military midgets, such as Albania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia, with no strategic significance. Imagine trying to explain why an American soldier, airman, sailor, or Marine died for what amounts to little more than a celebrated movie set. Moreover, presidents have added informal guarantees without congressional approval—to the Mideast monarchies and even quasi-states, such as Rojava, the Kurdish region in Syria. Of late Trump has unilaterally declared America to be the guardian of absolute monarchy in the Middle East, turning the U.S. military into a modern Janissary Corps to serve thousands of dissolute kings, emirs, and princes in Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Can the rest of the Persian Gulf be far behind? Yet one issue upon which presidents Barack Obama, Joe Biden, and, until now, Donald Trump agreed was not to make Ukraine a defense dependent. Although they proved unwilling to revoke President George W. Bush’s ill-considered promise to add Georgia and Ukraine to NATO, they also refused to induct either country. Successive administrations, warned by American intelligence officials and diplomats, recognized that would be a red line for Moscow. And neither the U.S. nor any other alliance members was willing to go to war for Ukraine.  However, over the last decade the allies effectively added NATO to Ukraine rather than Ukraine to NATO, which had a similarly negative impact on relations with Russia, encouraging Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. Also important was the allied war on Serbia over Kosovo, which poisoned Russian public opinion toward the West. Although Putin’s wanton aggression was unjustified, allied officials bear significant blame for recklessly ignoring abundant warnings of what was to come. Trump understands the problem of bringing Kiev into NATO. That would end any discussion of a peace settlement, given Moscow’s consistent refusal to accept such a result. In August the president insisted on Truth Social: “NO GOING INTO NATO BY UKRAINE.” Yet the administration appears to be pursuing the same course under another name. Presidential envoy Steve Witkoff argued “that the U.S. and other European nations could effectively offer Article 5-like language to cover a security guarantee.” He even believed, apparently incorrectly, that the Russians would find that acceptable.  Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky spoke with Trump, announcing that “we also discussed positive signals from the American side regarding participation in guaranteeing Ukraine’s security.” He wanted European leaders “involved at every stage to ensure reliable security guarantees together with America.” In fact, all most Europeans care about is Washington’s participation. A European Commission statement, from that body’s president, Ursula von der Leyen, and the heads of seven European governments, declared, “We are clear that Ukraine must have ironclad security guarantees to effectively defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity. We welcome President Trump’s statement that the U.S. is prepared to give security guarantees.”  Although Trump never specified what he meant, before meeting Putin he told reporters that “he was open to the ‘possibility’ of security guarantees for Ukraine, ‘along with other Europe and other countries’.” The Telegraph was more specific, reporting, “The U.S. has offered Ukraine NATO-style security guarantees in the event of a peace deal, though Kiev would not officially join the bloc. It would mean that the U.S. and Ukraine’s European allies would be obliged to respond to a future attack on Ukraine, in a pledge similar to the Article 5 mutual defense clause that underpins NATO.”  Nor has the president mentioned congressional approval of a new military commitment. The Founders believed that decisions over war and peace were too important to leave up to one man. So, too, is the issuance of a guarantee that would commit America to go to war. Surely there should be a debate over when to risk American lives, wealth, and—in a world with ever more nuclear weapons and ICBMs—the nation’s very survival. Particularly problematic is the idea of a sort-of NATO provision. There is little reason to believe that European leaders are serious about keeping their military commitments. When asked to provide peacekeeping troops at war’s end, many European leaders began running from the room. Washington would likely find itself largely alone in any future war for Ukraine, when America’s allies suddenly discovered that they were “busy.” At least a formal alliance guarantee would theoretically oblige the Europeans to participate to a similar degree.  Still, the details of the particular promise don’t much matter. Ukraine is not worth war to America. It certainly is not worth war against a nuclear-armed power over what the latter views as existential interests. That’s why no president implemented the Bush administration’s pledge to include Kiev in NATO. And if Ukraine isn’t worth going to war today, it won’t be worth going to war tomorrow.  Indeed, the case for continuing America’s European defense dole expired with the Soviet Union’s collapse. Russia is a declining power, its weakness evident in its continuing slog against Ukraine. Moscow poses few threats against Europe let alone the U.S., which remains the most secure great power ever. Indeed, absent the ongoing war, Moscow would be more inclined to align with the West against China. Moreover, the Europeans are never likely to be serious about security so long as they can count on America. Sure, they recently promised to spend more on their militaries—ten years hence, conveniently after Trump has left office.  Ukraine is a continuing tragedy. However, while advocating for peace the president must keep the U.S. out of the conflict. That includes any renewed fighting in the future. It is Europe’s turn to take over its own security. Tragically, Woodrow Wilson demonstrated the danger of needlessly going abroad in search of monsters to destroy. When it comes to war, America should come first. Especially in a world in which nuclear-tipped missiles can bring war home. The post Kiev Shouldn’t Get U.S. Security Guarantees appeared first on The American Conservative.

Foreign Affairs What Does an America First China Strategy Look Like? Neither Cold War pieties nor “everything all at once” is a viable approach to multipolarity. In the coming weeks, the Trump administration will release new National Security and Defense Strategies. These documents are the best opportunity for the White House to articulate a coherent China strategy.  The first Trump administration marked a turning point in American strategy toward China: It closed the era of engagement and opened one of unbridled great power competition. But 10 months in, the second administration’s approach to China is in flux. Some actions are Jacksonian, short, and sharp: strongarming Panama to push China out of the canal and imposing shock-and-awe Liberation Day tariffs. Some are focused on the long game of great power competition: announcing a new “Golden Dome” strategic missile defense system, keeping the commitment to sell nuclear submarines to Australia, and coordinating with allies to reduce technological dependencies on China. Meanwhile, President Donald Trump’s own impulses are transactional: trading tariffs for trade deals, selling China advanced chips in exchange for rare earths, and limiting engagement with Taiwan to cultivate goodwill with China’s leadership. Is the U.S. trying to contain Chinese power or dig in for a long competition? Is it decoupling from China or renegotiating the terms of engagement? Will it confront or accommodate? So far, the answer seems to be everything all at once. The October trade agreement between Trump and China’s President Xi Jinping is a welcome step towards stabilizing the commercial side of the relationship. But it is subject to annual renewal—a fraught endeavor so long as it is unmoored from a broader concept of U.S. interests and objectives. If America First is about putting the interests of the American people above legacy commitments to a fading international order, what does that require from its China strategy? In short, three things: balancing against China, not aiming for its defeat; elevating flexible, pragmatic policymaking toward both China and its neighbors; and investing to maintain America’s technological edge and industrial independence.  Some GOP strategists look at China and envision maximalist endgames such as restoring U.S. primacy or playing to win a new cold war. Others steel themselves for intense, open-ended great power competition in defense of a set of commitments inherited from the 20th century. These views are foolish. China is no longer a rising power—it is fully risen, with greater economic, technological, and military might than the Soviet Union ever had. It is not going to collapse or submit to U.S. leadership. This is not a calamity. The United States was created to “secure the blessings of liberty” for its own people, not to burden them with the costs of interminable great power competition. Doing that requires new (or perhaps old) concepts of defense policy and foreign relations. The temple of GOP foreign policy, divided though it may be, still coheres in favor of resolve and peace through strength. For 35 years those impulses have been directed towards dominance and pursuit of military overmatch right up to the frontiers of our adversaries. Today, the fiscal costs and military risks of that approach far exceed the benefits to the American people. The United States does not have and cannot regain dominance in China’s neighborhood. Attempting to do so would only fuel tensions that endanger our homeland. Instead, “peace through strength” should be channeled to sustain a balance of power centered further from mainland China, where American power projection is still potent and survivable. They will deter us as much as we deter them. That won’t be satisfying to policymakers clinging to early 21st-century concepts of American power, but it will prevent China from dominating its region. And that is enough. As Secretary of State Marco Rubio told an interviewer in January, the world is multipolar. By virtue of its messiness, multipolarity generates greater opportunities to maneuver. So America First should be a creative, dynamic enterprise. In Asia, as in Europe, injecting flexibility into U.S. foreign policy requires a clear-eyed reassessment of our rigid alliance system. Simply put, the U.S. should reduce its dominance over its own coalitions. Since every U.S. ally needs us more than we need them, pulling back will cause them to self-help through higher defense spending and greater intraregional cooperation. U.S. policymakers should not default to paranoia if its allies seek bilateral détentes with China. The current Sino–Japanese dispute is a reminder that poor allied relations with China can harm U.S. interests as well.  Maintaining geopolitical flexibility necessarily puts ideology in the back seat. The U.S. cannot afford to build “coalitions of democracies” to compete with China when those coalitions have a negligible impact on the balance of power and alienate potential partners that fall short of some arbitrary ideological standard. Instead, it should cooperate narrowly with non-democracies and ambiguously aligned countries, such as India and much of ASEAN. The greatest prize in this category is Russia, our only rival that spans the European and Asian theaters. Nearly four years of war in Ukraine have revealed the limits of the Sino-Russian “no limits” partnership both in terms of China’s material and diplomatic support. No American grand gesture can pry Russia away in a “reverse-Nixon,” but just as U.S. policy drove the two states together, a less assertive U.S. posture in Europe could, over time, induce the Kremlin to distance itself from China. Achieving that is worth the effort.  Faced with a global balance in which it is not dominant, the United States must increasingly reconcile its national interests with those of rivals, not just deter and moralize. U.S.–China tensions over trade and technology are intertwined with and fueled by political differences: over ideology, the structure of the Asian security order, U.S. alliances, regional arms buildups, and the fate of Taiwan. Putting America First requires searching for ways to ease these differences, such as bilateral nuclear arms control and downplaying “democracy vs. autocracy” rhetoric.  Regarding Taiwan, the starting point should be unsentimental: It is not vital to the regional balance of power. Acknowledging that does not mean the U.S. should abandon Taiwan or end its efforts to deter a Chinese invasion. It does mean the U.S. should do everything it can to lower the risk of war in the Strait and accept that Taiwan is not worth jeopardizing America’s Pacific forces or homeland in a war. An America First China strategy places as much emphasis on assuring China that it does not need to invade (for fear of imminent Taiwan independence or otherwise) as it does the kind of military deterrence Washington obsesses over.  That said, political engagement is not the same as groveling for deals. U.S. policy toward China should obey Nixon’s version of the Golden Rule: do unto others as they do unto you. When China plays hardball, the U.S. should reciprocate—and then some. Finally, on the issue that has grabbed all the headlines during Trump’s fifth year in office: America First should regard tariffs as a tool, not an end. The end is an independent U.S. economy open to the world but never wholly reliant on any one nation—least of all China—for critical inputs. If the U.S. chooses an economic war of attrition, China has a proven track record of forcing its population to endure levels of hardship that an American president could never replicate while staying in office. Therefore, an America First China strategy must view economic competition as a marathon that will be won through domestic innovation and industrial policy, not punitive tariffs. Success means maintaining technological leads over China in a range of key sectors and systematically eliminating supply chain chokepoints that give rivals leverage over America’s most critical industries. Trade deals, nearshoring, and last-minute negotiations to keep components flowing are not substitutes for reliable production at home. Export controls will play a supporting role, but the true source of American economic greatness remains domestic innovation. If the U.S. cannot innovate at home—through private sector dynamism, access to export markets, targeted industrial policy, R&D at top universities, and, yes, top talent from around the world, we will lose the tech competition.  An America First China strategy accepts the durability of Chinese power. Instead of burdening the American people with decades of brinksmanship and containment, it strives for a balance of power underpinned by interest-based coalitions, prudent U.S. power projection, and strategic compromise. America First prizes flexibility over nostalgia for a dying “liberal order.” It ruthlessly re-evaluates which U.S. commitments advance its interests, ends those that do not, and, when necessary, redefines U.S. interests themselves. The post What Does an America First China Strategy Look Like? appeared first on The American Conservative.