Foreign Affairs The Endgame in Gaza The U.S. may not be able to influence the outcome of the Israel–Gaza war, but it can work to avoid some of the consequences. Credit: image via Shutterstock The world is a big, complicated thing, almost unfathomably old and full of surprises. There’s only so much you can expect from frail human agency in such a wild place. So that’s why we need to speak, realistically, about what’s going to happen in Israel–Palestine. American popular opinion may be souring on Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip; there may be real horror afoot there. But what happens has little to do with American popular opinion, or humanitarian concerns, or justice. Israel is going to annex Gaza. It is going to herd the Gaza Palestinians into the “humanitarian city” at Rafah. It will, more slowly, finish the work of annexing the West Bank. There is no interest in the two-state solution in Israel, and little more in Washington, and I somehow doubt that France is going to send troops to back their diplomatic posturing. It would take direct American intervention to prevent these things, and the American people have little will for intervening on the ground, let alone “for Hamas,” which is how such a move would be perceived. Nor would such a move be prudent. We need fewer Americans in the Middle East, not more. There are simply no plausible alternatives. Palestinian refugee populations have been enormously destabilizing to their host countries, and there’s no appetite in the region for them to be relocated. Egypt is desperately poor and run by a fragile junta; they have no interest in taking a large, disruptive Palestinian population. Jordan already has almost more Palestinian refugees than it can handle. The Gulf States? No room, no inclination. The pipe dream of relocating the Palestinians to Libya is so removed from reality that it boggles the mind: Libya is not a country, but an arena for a long-running civil war, and such a relocation would depend on American sealift capacity—logistically difficult and politically unimaginable. And then, once they’re there, what next? Libya barely has the infrastructure to serve its current inhabitants. Starving outside Tripoli is not appreciably better than starving outside Gaza City. It is staggering that allegedly functional adults outside of care homes could float such a preposterous fantasy with a straight face. So it’s going to happen, will we, nil we. What are we going to do about it is the relevant question. It’s not going to be popular with the rest of the neighborhood. If we would like to salvage what we can of our diplomatic leverage—and, realistically, we must start relying on diplomacy more and strength less in the Middle East if we want to make even a bare gesture toward contesting the Indo-Pacific—it’s necessary to put daylight between U.S. and Israeli policy. Ending military aid is the no-brainer first step. Israel is quite capable of fulfilling its war aims in Gaza without the carousel of corporate welfare for American defense contractors. Recognizing the Palestinian state would not change facts on the ground, but would be a handy piece of paper to hide behind when dealing with other regional actors. Similarly, insisting on humanitarian conditions would be worthwhile PR, although American leverage to enforce them will be minimal. Telling Mike Johnson to stop visiting illegal West Bank settlements might be in order, too. (Indeed, the executive branch could stand to be a little more jealous of its constitutional monopoly on foreign relations—why do congressmen get to freelance in sensitive diplomatic zones from Jerusalem to Taipei?) Israel would remain vastly superior to its neighbors in force of arms, but the U.S. would no longer have to deal with the constant diplomatic difficulty of being seen as the underwriter of Israeli aggression while trying to broker its own retrenchment from the region.  There are a variety of ugly things happening all over the world all the time. The difference between those episodes and Israel–Palestine is that the Burmese “democratic” government (or whatever remnant of it is still hiding from the junta) does not expect the U.S. to support its program of making the Rohingya a thing of the past, and the U.S. is not constantly pulled by a perverse magnetism and 20 years of bad policy into every squabble in Southeast Asia. (Not anymore, anyhow.) The American soul, nursed on decades of the ideology of “the good superpower,” is sick at the idea that nothing can be done to stop brutality, especially somewhere that has so obsessed our national consciousness for so long. But it is time to grow up. The U.S. can’t make Israel do anything in particular. But it can separate Israeli policy from American policy. Washing our hands and walking away is, grimly, the best plausible way forward for American national interests. This part of the world has little to do with us, and moral horror is not the basis for sound policy. What will happen will happen. It is our job now to make sure it’s not a problem for America. The post The Endgame in Gaza appeared first on The American Conservative.

Foreign Affairs A Realist Critique of U.S.–Iran Relations The American affinity for force could overwhelm the diplomatic path to a durable resolution. (CARLOS BARRIA/POOL/AFP via Getty Images) The current trajectory of U.S.–Iran relations epitomizes the perennial tension between idealistic ambitions and realist constraints that has long characterized American foreign policy in the Middle East.  As we witness the Trump administration’s renewed “maximum pressure” campaign alongside simultaneous diplomatic overtures, we are reminded once again that geopolitical realities often trump ideological preferences. The apparent contradiction in President Donald Trump’s approach—combining harsh sanctions with direct negotiations—reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of how effective coercive diplomacy actually works.  The recent U.S.–Iran negotiations initiated in April 2025, following Trump’s letter to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, occurred alongside the restoration of maximum pressure policies. This dual track reveals the persistent American belief that economic punishment can somehow create the conditions for meaningful diplomatic breakthrough. History suggests otherwise. The original JCPOA succeeded precisely because it offered Iran tangible relief from sanctions in exchange for nuclear constraints. By maintaining maximum pressure while demanding nuclear concessions, the current approach creates perverse incentives that make Iranian compliance less likely, not more. The American bombing of Iranian nuclear sites in June 2025 represents a dangerous escalation that fundamentally undermines the prospects for negotiated settlement. Military action against nuclear facilities, regardless of tactical justifications, signals that Washington views Iran primarily through a security lens rather than as a potential diplomatic partner. This militaristic approach reflects broader American tendencies to substitute force for statecraft. Rather than creating leverage for negotiations, military strikes typically harden positions on both sides and make face-saving compromises more difficult to achieve. The Israel–Iran dimension adds another layer of complexity that American policymakers consistently underestimate. Trump’s announcement of a ceasefire between Israel and Iran suggests recognition that regional conflicts cannot be separated from bilateral U.S.–Iran relations. Yet the pattern of American policy continues to prioritize alliance solidarity over strategic coherence. A genuinely realist approach would recognize that Israeli and American interests regarding Iran, while overlapping, are not identical. Israel’s existential concerns about Iranian regional influence may conflict with American interests in regional stability and nuclear non-proliferation. Managing this tension requires acknowledging that unwavering support for all Israeli positions may not serve broader American strategic objectives. Iran’s nuclear program remains the central issue, but American discourse continues to frame it in absolutist terms that make negotiated solutions nearly impossible. The demand for complete nuclear rollback, combined with maintenance of sanctions, ignores the basic reality that Iran developed its nuclear capabilities precisely as leverage against such pressure. A more realistic approach would acknowledge that some Iranian nuclear capability may be inevitable and focus instead on establishing robust monitoring and verification mechanisms that provide adequate early warning of any weapons program. The goal should be managing the nuclear issue, not eliminating it entirely. The effectiveness of sanctions as a policy tool has been oversold in American strategic thinking. While economic pressure can create costs for target states, it rarely produces the kind of fundamental policy reversals that American policymakers expect. Iran has demonstrated remarkable resilience in adapting to sanctions, developing alternative economic relationships and domestic capabilities. Moreover, the broader international community shows increasing fatigue with American secondary sanctions that constrain their own economic opportunities. European, Chinese, and Russian resistance to American Iran policy reflects not just disagreement about Iran specifically, but broader concerns about American economic coercion as a tool of foreign policy. A genuinely realist approach to Iran would begin with a clear-eyed assessment of American interests and capabilities. The United States has legitimate concerns about Iranian regional behavior and nuclear activities, but also has limited ability to fundamentally reshape Iranian domestic and foreign policies through external pressure alone. This suggests several policy adjustments: Differentiated engagement: Rather than treating all Iranian activities as equally threatening, American policy should distinguish between core security concerns (nuclear weapons development, direct threats to American personnel) and broader regional competition that may be manageable through diplomatic means. Conditional reciprocity: Instead of demanding unilateral Iranian concessions, Washington should develop packages of mutual concessions that address both countries’ core concerns. This might involve nuclear constraints in exchange for sanctions relief, or regional behavioral changes in exchange for diplomatic recognition. Alliance management: American policy should acknowledge that complete alignment with Israeli preferences may conflict with broader regional stability. This requires honest conversations with allies about trade-offs and priorities. Realistic timelines: Fundamental changes in U.S.–Iran relations will require years, not months, to achieve. American political cycles create pressure for quick results that work against the patient diplomacy required for durable agreements. The current moment presents both opportunities and risks for U.S.–Iran relations. The willingness of both sides to engage in direct talks, despite ongoing tensions, suggests that diplomatic pathways remain open. Nevertheless, the simultaneous escalation of military and economic pressure creates crosscurrents that could easily overwhelm diplomatic progress. Success will require Washington to abandon the fantasy that pressure alone can produce capitulation and embrace the more complex reality that sustainable agreements require mutual accommodation. This may be politically difficult in the American context, but it represents the only realistic path toward managing one of the most consequential relationships in contemporary international politics. The alternative—continued cycles of escalation and crisis management—serves neither American interests nor regional stability. A mature foreign policy would recognize these limitations and adjust accordingly. The post A Realist Critique of U.S.–Iran Relations appeared first on The American Conservative.

Foreign Affairs Why Zelensky Should Fear His Own Former General Valery Zaluzhny looks to be maneuvering to replace Ukraine’s wartime president—perhaps with America’s support. The former commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian armed forces penned an article and posed for Vogue Ukraine in late July. Though the article appeared in the magazine’s 2025 Leaders edition, Valery Zaluzhny nowhere declared an intention to run for Ukraine’s leadership, nor has he declared an intention to run at any other time. But, perhaps, he did not need to. The article was an apparent rebranding effort. Appearing in a tailored suit instead of the battle fatigues Ukrainians are used to seeing him in, Zaluzhny humanized himself. He discussed his childhood and never mentioned his rise through the ranks nor his battlefield strategy in the war with Russia. Rather than citing military strategists or military historians, Zaluzhny cited Vasyl Alexandrovich Sukhomlynsky, a Ukrainian intellectual and educator who stressed beauty and nature, the preciousness of human life, and the sanctity of bringing joy to others. Zaluzhny set his happy childhood against the backdrop of Sukhomlynsky’s teaching that “the years of childhood are, first of all, the education of the heart.” Sukhomlynsky, he explained, taught that childhood is when “moral qualities, emotional intelligence, and the ability to empathize develop.” These are very different words and a very different tone than Ukrainians are used to hearing from their heroic military commander. Zaluzhny carefully cast himself as a man of the people. “I was born in 1973 in an ordinary Ukrainian city, in an ordinary Ukrainian family,” he wrote. He grew up in a home where “[e]veryone in our family spoke Ukrainian” and in a village where “many Ukrainian songs were sung.” He grew up in his “grandfather’s modest house,” where there was not “a single Russian book.” In his childhood, Russian was the language of the bullies in the city; in his adulthood, Russia is “the most brutal enemy since fascism.” Zaluzhny placed great emphasis on “the people who are united in the state of Ukraine.” Though the translation is, at times, difficult, he seems even to have made a concession to Ukraine’s ethnic Russians, holding up the hope of a future that is “not a monopolar totalitarian one” and “at least with a chance for democratic values.” This tone and these apparent concessions depart from the monoculturist language of Ukrainian governments since the 2014 coup that have attempted to erase any whiff of Russian language and culture. For the most part—though again, translation is difficult—the content of Zaluzhny’s article is uninspiring. As for structure, Zaluzhny presented 10 lessons Ukrainians have learned “over the past extremely difficult years.” Though one might expect more from a former top general, the lessons include items like “[y]ou need to be friends with your neighbors,” “you need to be able to defend yourself from those who don’t want to be friends,” and “[t]he most precious resource in war is people.”  One gets the impression that the point of the piece was not the somewhat clichéd content but the reframing of Zaluzhny as a humble and thoughtful man, plus of course the photos, which were taken by Ukrainian fashion photographer Anna Daki. After over a year of capably but quietly serving as ambassador in London, Zaluzhny has burst back onto the Ukrainian scene with an article and photo shoot that reintroduced him to his compatriots, not as the rough general of Ukraine, but as a relatable man of the common Ukrainian people who, unlike Zelensky, is capable of wearing a tailored suit, rather than military fatigues. This reentry of Zaluzhny could not have been timed more harmfully for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who, for the first time since the war began, is facing resistance, embarrassment, and protest at home and fierce criticism in Europe. It is easy to forget now that, before the war, Zelensky was not popular. In 2021, polling showed that his popularity was in rapid decline. According to some polls, the Opposition Platform for Life, a party that Zelensky would ban after the Russian invasion, was ahead of him. Once the war started, Zelensky recast himself from the anticorruption fighter who would make peace with Russia to the heroic wartime leader. His popularity soared, at one point peaking at 84 percent. Lionized as a Churchillian leader, Zelensky ascended to the Ukrainian pantheon when he spurned a U.S. offer to help him escape, delivering the Hollywood-style quip, “The fight is here. I need ammunition, not a ride.” It’s a great line, but Zelensky may not actually have said it. According to The New York Times, “The Biden team considers the story apocryphal… but was impressed by the mythmaking, which is a common tool of war.” As the conflict dragged on, opportunities for peace were passed up, and Ukrainians suffered at the hands of a mightier neighbor, Zelensky’s popularity began to fall. A Gallup poll taken near the end of 2024 showed a steep drop from 84 percent to 60. Meanwhile, Zaluzhny was establishing himself as a capable military leader and overtaking Zelensky in popularity.  By December 2023, polling by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology showed that trust in Zelensky had dropped to 62 percent while 88 percent of Ukrainians trusted Zaluzhny. Internal polling suggested an even bigger gap, pegging the net level of trust in Zelensky at 32 percent versus Zaluzhny’s 70 percent. The Economist suggested that Zelensky “would lose a future election by 30% to 65% to Valery Zaluzhny.” A former senior official in Zelensky’s government claimed that “[p]rivate polling, which I have seen, now puts his support below 10 percent.” Sociologist Volodymyr Ishchenko told me, “The polls I have seen gave Zelenskyi 16 percent of electoral support.” The New York Times reported in February 2024 that “Mr. Zelensky’s ratings had fallen while General Zaluzhny had retained consistently high levels of support. General Zaluzhny’s high standing with the Ukrainian public led to speculation that he could be a prospective challenger to Mr. Zelensky in future elections, prompting some in the country to regard them as political rivals.” It is at that point that Zelensky fired Zaluzhny and exiled him to London as Ukraine’s ambassador to Britain. Zaluzhny was neither the first nor the last threat to Zelensky to be eliminated. When Viktor Medvedchuk’s Opposition Platform party showed signs of passing Zelensky in the polls at the start of the war, the Kremlin-friendly politician was sanctioned and arrested, and his party was banned. Later, other serious political rivals, former President Petro Poroshenko and former adviser Oleksiy Arestovych, were also sanctioned. Ischenko told me that some readings of polls show that Zelensky would probably also lose to Kyrylo Budanov, the chief of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense. Budanov recently told an interviewer that Zelensky tried to fire him nine times but was prevented by pressure from the American embassy in Kiev. The situation for Zelensky may only get worse—much worse. With the real possibility of the collapse of the Ukrainian armed forces on the horizon, dreams of NATO membership dashed, the prospect of European Union membership receding to a later and later date, and unpopular forced conscription, Zelensky’s near deified status is fading and the president may soon appear to many Ukrainians as a villain.  Zelensky’s image was only tarnished further by his signing a law that terminated the independence of Ukraine’s most important anticorruption agencies and then being forced to back down and sign a law reversing that legislation after protestors filled the streets of Ukraine. It was the first time Zelensky had been called out by Ukrainians and European elites and the first time he had been forced to reverse course on a significant political matter. But the damage to Zelensky’s reputation had already been done. The anticorruption agencies had been investigating senior officials, members of parliament, top ministers, and people in Zelensky’s inner circle. His move to protect them had the appearance of corruption and authoritarianism. A former senior official in Zelensky’s administration told The Spectator that Ukrainian officials have come to believe that Zelensky is “prolonging the war to hold on to power.” The Spectator also reports that surveys find that “70 per cent of Ukrainians also believe their leaders are using the war to enrich themselves.” But the timing of Zaluzhny’s Vogue Ukraine feature is not just bad because of the trouble that Zelensky is now facing at home. It came out on the heels of reporting that the U.S. sees Zaluzhny as the best potential leader to replace Zelensky in a coup. On July 18, the veteran journalist Seymour Hersh, who has sustained an uncanny track record for being proved right even when his reporting is at first dismissed, wrote that “Zaluzhnyi is now seen as the most credible successor to Zelensky.” That is not news. But then Hersh dropped his bombshell. “I have been told by knowledgeable officials in Washington that that job could be his within a few months.” Hersh says that “Zelensky is on a short list for exile, if President Donald Trump decides to make the call” and that U.S. officials told him that if Zelensky doesn’t leave voluntarily, “‘He’s going to go by force.’” Days later, Russia’s foreign intelligence service, in what could be real or could be disinformation, added to the story. They claim to have information that representatives of the U.S. and U.K. held a secret Alpine meeting with the head of the Office of the President of Ukraine Andriy Yermak, Budanov, and Zaluzhny to discuss “[t]he prospects for replacing V. Zelensky as the head of the Kyiv regime.” At that meeting, the Americans and British allegedly “announced their decision to nominate Zaluzhny for the post of President of Ukraine.”It is in this context that Zaluzhny’s feature in Vogue Ukraine and its rebranding of Zaluzhny broke in Ukrainian culture. Zaluzhny could not have been unaware of the context, raising the questions of why he wrote this article and had that photo shoot published now—and whether Zelensky needs to be very afraid. The post Why Zelensky Should Fear His Own Former General appeared first on The American Conservative.

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