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Politics Why Rachel Maddow and Bill Kristol Attended Cheney’s Funeral The neoconservative right has merged with the anti-Trump left. Twenty years ago, there was no greater villain to the left than Dick Cheney. The vice president was called a fascist. He was called a warmonger. He was called Hitler. He was the center and soul of left-wing derision and Democratic identity. Their ire? The George W. Bush administration’s 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, for starters, considered today to be one of America’s greatest foreign policy mistakes. Even a majority of veterans believe it was not worth fighting. Then there was the torture, the rampant due process violations, and the fact that Cheney’s advocacy for extreme executive power made him an enemy of the Constitution. Concerning Cheney and national depravity, there’s a lot to work with. The progressive pundit Rachel Maddow was once all in on this left-wing hate. She built her early career on it. Last week, Maddow attended Dick Cheney’s funeral. Cheney never apologized for or even said he regretted Iraq. He was seemingly down to torture until the day he died. Maddow was not at Cheney’s funeral to show grace to a once wayward man who had since repented. Independent journalist Glenn Greenwald noted of MSNBC’s biggest star, “Maddow’s career as a commentator began during Bush/Cheney, when she’d frequently compare Cheney to the worst monsters in history (I was on her programs when she said it).” Greenwald added, “For so many liberals, Cheney is now rehabilitated despite regretting nothing: solely for opposing Trump.” That’s it. Cheney was against Trump. In 2025, even for dead fascists, warmongers and Hitlers, that’s all it takes for the left to sing your praises. If this sounds simplistically silly, it’s because it is. Once Donald Trump finally replaced former villains Dick Cheney or George W. Bush as the Great Satan in leftist minds, there was virtually no self-awareness in Democrats’ drift into turning these neocon Republicans they once despised into heroes. Dubya gets the same love. In their blind hatred for Trump, mainstream Democrats also ended up becoming something closer to 2003-era Republicans in their foreign policy. One X user commented on the service for Cheney, “Anyone that attended Cheney’s funeral is going to be upset with an end to war.” Greenwald agreed, “Exactly: I bet if you were to survey the people in attendance at Dick Cheney’s funeral—from Rachel Maddow and Kamala Harris to Lindsey Graham and George W. Bush—opposition to ending the war in Ukraine would be close to 100%, if not unanimous.” He has a point. After “Resistance” posters and Covid-era virtue signaling got stale for the left, pro-Ukrainian yard signs and social media flag icons became as popular with Democrats as they were with Lindsey Graham. Democrats and neocon Republicans like Graham ended up with the same foreign policy. The former came to it as an emotional reaction to “America First” Trump. The latter just never changed, welcoming their reformed pro-war Democrats with open arms. To be fair, mainstream Democrat attitudes toward Israel and Gaza have varied. On the United States’ proxy war with Russia in Ukraine, they have not. The 2024 Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris not only received an endorsement from Cheney and his congresswoman daughter Liz; Cheney fille hit the campaign trail with Harris, seemingly signaling to the neoconservative foreign policy establishment that she was their gal. When candidate Harris repeatedly accused Trump of admiring dictators—that is, engaging in diplomacy as an alternative to war—she sounded like every GOP hawk who ever criticized Pat Buchanan, Ron Paul, or any other antiwar Republican. “Putin’s puppet” became an institutionalized Democratic attack on Trump. Maddow attending Cheney’s funeral wasn’t surprising or a departure for the current American left. It was, however, an indicator. She and the “War on Terror” Republicans in attendance weren’t simply friendly adversaries paying their final respects. They’re not adversaries anymore. This has been true for some time. J6 helped seal the deal. The “insurrection” mythology surrounding the January 6, 2021 Capitol Hill riots has been as important to Never Trump neocon identity as it has been to Democratic identity. Dick Cheney was on the Never Trump and Democratic side of that event. Donald Trump was on the other side. That line has long been crystal clear, at least on the Never Trump–Dem side—that it was an organized attempt by MAGA forces to overthrow democracy—even if that view is not based in reality. But the reality of J6 as an actual insurrection was always beside the point. Political identity, and reinforcing it—Never Trump/Democrats good, MAGA bad—was the entire point. Hence, longtime Democrat Rachel Maddow accepted the invitation to “maestro of terror” Republican Dick Cheney’s funeral. Bill Kristol was there too. Anyone who has followed politics for any amount of time would expect the neocon scion to be at the funeral service of the most impactful neoconservative of the 21st century. Kristol had wanted a U.S. war with Iraq since the 1990s, and 9/11 finally gave his small band of neocons an excuse to lie their way into it. Team Cheney ultimately delivered it. Cheney is unquestionably their hero. Kristol is a Democrat now. He appears to be pro-choice these days. He’s flipped on immigration. The former Weekly Standard editor recently endorsed New York City’s socialist mayor-elect. So Kristol has definitely changed some of his beliefs in joining his new party. On foreign policy, Bill Kristol has never budged any more than Dick Cheney did. Both were always for all U.S. wars, anywhere, for any reason, by any means, no matter how much death or damage was wrought. War is the goal. It is who they are. Their beef with Trump—in the most basic, concrete terms—is that he poses a threat to their mission at times. Democrats hate Trump so much they now dismiss this evil, finding common cause with neocons in more ways than one. President Donald Trump and Vice President J.D. Vance were not invited to the former vice president’s funeral. They wouldn’t have belonged, even if it is unusual for a sitting president and vice president to be excluded from such a service. But Rachel Maddow belonged at Dick Cheney’s funeral. The left she represents belonged too. The post Why Rachel Maddow and Bill Kristol Attended Cheney’s Funeral appeared first on The American Conservative.

Foreign Affairs Trump’s Peace Plan is a Lifeline for Zelensky The deal safeguards a sovereign, Western, and militarily capable Ukraine. (Photo by AMAURY CORNU/Hans Lucas/AFP via Getty Images) The 28-point peace plan that was primarily negotiated by U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff and Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev grants Russia the two key goals for which it will not stop fighting the war until it achieves. The framework plan states that “Ukraine agrees to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO, and NATO agrees to include in its statutes a provision that Ukraine will not be admitted in the future.” And it allows Russia to protect the rights and safety of ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine by granting Moscow de facto control of Donbas. But the framework agreement is also a lifeline for Ukraine and the president who is standing on the precipice that makes peace possible. Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, is in a difficult place. When, after being elected in 2019, he tried to negotiate peace that would have given autonomy to the Donbas region but not given Donbas to Russia, nationalists defied him and even threatened him with his life. Zelensky may face an even more difficult situation now. After all the suffering and loss of life, the peace plan requires him to cede all of Donbas to Russia, including the roughly 14 percent that Ukraine still controls, as well as the parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia that Russia currently controls.  If Zelensky makes the choice that is seen by the nationalists as capitulation, his life and the peace plan are at risk. Unless, of course, there is no choice. The aggressive manner in which President Donald Trump’s team presented the plan to Zelensky allows him to save himself and the possibility of accepting the peace by allowing him to present the situation as one in which he had no choice. He can claim to have done all he can do to improve the plan by negotiating firmer sovereignty and security, while having no choice but to accept the plan. The lifeline is provided by the “aggressive timeline” and the consequences of saying no. The Trump team gave Zelensky only days—until Thanksgiving—to accept the plan; though, they have said that the deadline could be extended “if things are working well,” and Secretary of State Marco Rubio has treated the deadline as movable. The original ultimatum would have worked better: If they do not accept the plan by Thanksgiving, the U.S. will end military and intelligence aid to Ukraine. “Now is one of the most difficult moments in our history,” Zelensky told the nation in a video address. “Now Ukraine may face a very difficult choice: either loss of dignity or the risk of losing a key partner.” If Ukraine refuses to make concessions and turns the deal down, they would face “an extremely difficult winter, the most difficult, and further risks.” The president might have added further loss of life and land because the war is not going well for Ukraine. The framework agreement provides a lifeline, not just to the president of Ukraine, but to Ukraine. A chorus of critics in the West have tried and convicted the plan—often before they saw the actual draft—as demanding no concessions from Russia and total capitulation from Ukraine. That was not true at the time, and it may be less true now. The American negotiating team stressed that the framework is a “live document” that can still take all positions into account. Since that time, as a result of further discussions with the Ukrainian negotiating team, an “updated and refined peace framework” has been drafted, but not revealed at the time of writing. According to a statement issued by the White House, the Ukrainian delegation has “affirmed” that “based on the revisions and clarifications presented… their principal concerns — security guarantees, long-term economic development, infrastructure protection, freedom of navigation, and political sovereignty — were thoroughly addressed during the meeting” and their “core strategic requirements” have been addressed. There are now reports, which have not been verified, from the Ukrainian delegation that “very few things are left from the original version.” Let’s hope the revisions don’t doom the effort to find peace. The original proposal confirms Ukraine’s sovereignty and anchors it firmly in the West. Russia would concede the right for Ukraine to join the European Union and grant it “preferential access to the European market while this issue is being considered.” This amounts to a significant concession over an issue that played a key role in the 2014 crisis that led to the Maidan revolt and, eventually, the coup. Though the territorial demands made of Ukraine in the agreement are important and painful, they too conceal a lifeline. They allow Ukraine to remain a sovereign nation within the boundaries of the territories that are home to a majority of people who wish to stay in Ukraine. And they allow Kiev to relinquish regions the continued control of which would likely lead to a continuation of civil war after the war with Russia is over. The territorial demands contain at least two concessions from Russia. The first is that Moscow agrees to de facto recognition of the lands they control rather than the de jure recognition they had been demanding. The second is that Ukraine cedes only part of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia provinces. Territory in those two regions will be frozen along the line of contact, and Ukraine will not be forced to withdraw from the land in those regions they currently still hold. Russia has also made cultural concessions. In order to protect Ukrainian citizens who are ethnic Russians, Moscow had demanded that Russian be an official national language of Ukraine and that recognition be granted to the Russian Orthodox Church. These demands have been replaced by gentler demands, which should partially tame the nationalist reaction, that “Ukraine will adopt EU rules on religious tolerance and the protection of linguistic minorities.” This lifeline should be seen, not as a Russian demand, but as a requirement for European membership that falls far short of Russia’s demand. Some of Ukraine’s most important demands for a peace plan were in the area of security. Kiev wanted assurances that they would not be vulnerable to future Russian invasions. The framework agreement, at least in its original form, firmly closes the door on Ukrainian NATO membership. But Ukraine was never going to get NATO membership anyway, and they were prepared to concede this in the first days of the war.  But Ukraine does receive from Washington, for the first time, some measure of security guarantee. The agreement states that “Ukraine will receive reliable security guarantees,” including “a decisive coordinated military response.” Axios has reported that the U.S. presented Ukraine with a side draft agreement that specifies that a “significant, deliberate, and sustained armed attack” by Russia on Ukraine “shall be regarded as an attack threatening the peace and security of the transatlantic community,” suggesting a NATO Article 5-like promise. If true, that would amount to a major concession by Russia. The Wall Street Journal reports that according to a copy of the side draft agreement that they have seen, the security guarantee includes “intelligence and logistical assistance” or “other steps judged appropriate,” but “doesn’t commit the U.S. to provide direct military assistance.” The security stipulations in the framework agreement contain a second Russian concession cloaked as a Russian demand. It limits the Ukrainian Armed Forces to 600,000 personnel. Western officials and media have been all over this point, deriding it as a violation of sovereignty and the attempted neutering of Ukraine. But they miss the point. The limitation is nearly a carte blanche because Ukraine is incapable of sustaining a force of that size during peacetime. At time of war, they would circumnavigate the limitation by calling up reserves. At the Istanbul talks at the beginning of the war, Russia was demanding an 85,000 limit; Ukraine was asking for 250,000—the Trump plan gives Kiev more than twice that, with a drawdown of 25 percent or less from a war-time level of 750,000-800,000. At 600,000 troops, if Ukraine could actually achieve that level, they would be the largest European army outside of Russia. France’s armed forces, at roughly 200,000 would be half the size of Ukraine’s, with the UK’s 184,000 and Germany’s 181,000 being smaller still. Following the latest round of talks, the Ukrainian delegation is claiming that the U.S. is now willing to walk back the 600,000 cap on troops. The final painful concession for Ukraine to swallow was the agreement that “all parties involved in this conflict will receive full amnesty for their actions during the war.” This concession has been presented as another act of painful capitulation in the face of Russian atrocities. But, according to The Wall Street Journal, far from being a Ukrainian concession, it was a Ukrainian lifeline. Originally, the draft had “called for an audit of all international aid Ukraine had received.” But, fearing further exposure of corruption, it was the Ukrainian side that asked for the amnesty, according to a senior U.S. official. There is no doubt that, after nearly four years of war, the peace agreement is painful for Ukraine to accept. But it is also a lifeline that gives Zelensky a way to say yes when a no would threaten the chance to end a war that is only going to lead to further loss of life and land. It leaves a sovereign Ukraine, with 80 percent of its territory, including the territories that wish to stay and won’t continue the civil war, that is firmly anchored in the West, with security guarantees and the largest armed forces in Europe. The post Trump’s Peace Plan is a Lifeline for Zelensky appeared first on The American Conservative.

Foreign Affairs Trump’s Ukraine Proposal Is the Least Bad Option An imperfect peace is better than a worsening war. To paraphrase a viral retort from 2023: What did you think ending the Ukraine war meant? Vibes? Speeches? Essays? At some point you need an actual deal. What has been lost in the noise surrounding the Trump administration’s proposed peace plan is the recognition that the bargain at hand accomplishes the primary objective: It ends the war. Moreover, it preserves a sovereign Ukrainian state and establishes a U.S.-backed security guarantee reflecting the strongest commitment Kiev might expect to receive from the West. The proposal delivers a generous reconstruction package, serious investment in critical Ukrainian infrastructure, and key stabilization mechanisms governing nuclear safety and food exports. These are real, tangible achievements. And yet we need not pretend that this is a perfectly balanced settlement. The terms favor the side that is and has been winning the war. To be clear, it neutralizes Ukraine’s NATO ambitions, locks in territorial gains for Russia, and reintegrates Moscow into something resembling the polite society of Western powers through sanctions relief, economic partnership, and an invitation to rejoin the G8. But why this deal? And why now? Much will be made about Trump’s impatience with Volodymyr Zelensky or affection for Vladimir Putin. Already, allegations have emerged that sections of the proposal have been translated directly from Russian demands. But the fact remains that time is not on Ukraine’s side. Wars of maneuver reward the side with agility and morale. Wars of attrition favor the combatant boasting better manpower and industrial output. Over the past three years, the battlefield has shifted decisively toward Russia. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s demography has been decimated. Its energy grid is shattered, Western stockpiles have shrunk, and foreign funding has dried up. The latest corruption scandal in Kiev only compounds the problem. That members of President Zelensky’s inner circle are now implicated in the largest corruption investigation since the war began—allegedly laundering more than $100 million from the state-owned nuclear power company amid rolling blackouts—is certain to weaken Kiev’s bargaining position with allies and adversaries alike.  To demand a better deal is to assert improved leverage which, in turn, requires better battlefield prospects. If Washington or Brussels wanted materially better terms, Ukraine would require some combination of additional manpower, more shells, a defensive air umbrella, or a willingness on the part of NATO to directly escalate against Russia. Considered in that order, these aims are either impossible, infeasible, unimaginable, or absurd. Ukraine cannot mobilize additional recruits because its population is exhausted. Western lines of ammunition production are stretched. A defensive air umbrella would require NATO forces to enter the conflict directly and such escalation carries the very real risk of nuclear confrontation with Russia. In an alternate timeline, perhaps a better peace was possible. Think back to 2022. Ukraine had secured victories around Kiev, Kharkiv, and Kherson. With Russia on its heels, Zelensky might have negotiated from a position of relative strength. The Istanbul framework, established that spring, envisioned neutrality but traded nonalignment for a full Russian withdrawal to pre-invasion lines and a process to address Crimea. Policy—especially of the sort that determines the high politics of war and peace—often involves selecting the least bad option at a moment of opportunity. Late 2022 presented such a moment. Instead, leaders in Washington and London could taste victory. Expectations swelled in Kiev. The good guys were on the march. But since Ukraine’s failed offensive of 2023, the war has progressed in the other direction. The hotly anticipated push toward Melitopol and Tokmak demonstrated the basic and unfavorable structural conditions of the war. Ukraine sustained severe losses while Russia’s layered defenses held. Western armor could not break through fixed lines without air superiority. Ammunition shortages crippled operational tempo while manpower scarcities bled Ukrainian armed forces dangerously thin. Speeches, sanctions packages, and expressions of solidarity have yet to reverse this reality.  None of this is meant as a criticism of the Ukrainian people, who have fought gallantly and endured barbarity. But from the perspective of the Trump administration, or any policymaker willing to put America first, the national interest cannot be ignored. The past three years of war have depleted U.S. ammunition and air defense stockpiles faster than our defense industrial base could replace them. Beyond these material shortfalls, the war has also dominated strategic attention and political deliberation to the detriment of other pressing matters. The termination of hostilities would allow Washington to begin setting its own priorities rather than reflexively responding to crises on the outer edges of the European security perimeter. For an administration elected in part on its promise to reduce foreign entanglements and restore focus at home, closing out the largest land war in Europe since 1945 is an important imperative.  As such, realism provides clarity. A settlement secured after three years of attrition will not resemble the deal Ukraine might have had when it held the initiative. But the question confronting us now is not whether the agreement is perfect. Rather, are the alternatives worse? Keep fighting? Toward what end? To endure more casualties, greater destruction, and dwindling American support in hope that a weaker position will yield a better deal at some later date?  Nor should ending the war be confused with rewarding Moscow. To the contrary, Russia will emerge from the carnage having absorbed catastrophic casualties, a battered economy, and a severely degraded international standing. Ukraine, for its part, and despite the bruising it has taken, will arise stronger, better armed, and more fully integrated into the West economically. A more stable and sustainable future awaits. In the meanwhile, war rarely rewards wishful thinking. The window for the better deal came and went. What remains is the difficult choice between an imperfect peace and a failing war. Ending hostilities now is the only path to avoiding something worse. The post Trump’s Ukraine Proposal Is the Least Bad Option appeared first on The American Conservative.

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