Smoke rises from a reported Iranian strike in the industrial district of Doha, Qatar, on March 1, 2026. Mahmud Hams/AFP via Getty ImagesNearly 20,000 U.S. citizens have returned safely from the Middle…

President Trump speaks during a White House visit by Major League Soccer champions Inter Miami CF on March 5, 2026. Madalina Kilroy/The Epoch TimesPresident Donald Trump said U.S. military operations…

Flanked by members of the Congressional Hispanic Conference, co-chair Rep. Tony Gonzales (R-Texas) speaks during a news conference at the U.S. Capitol in Washington on Feb. 1, 2023. Alex Wong/Getty ImagesRep.…

Pastor and author Matt Smallbone spoke about the importance of talking to God, even when you're struggling with unanswered prayers.

OPINION The College Fix’s Simon Olech reports on American students’ views of Europe from his study abroad program in Austria. Source

The Debating and Political Society at Bangor University, located in Wales, recently refused to allow two prominent right-wing speakers from conducting a live Q&A session with students, stating to do so would allow “hate” on campus. Reform UK, a successor of the Brexit party, touts immigration controls, tax cuts, and deregulation. The proposed event included a Q& Source

Alliance Defending Freedom attorney says college was funding Pride Club, but not Christian group Atlantic Cape Community College recently changed a student club policy that banned funding for religious and political groups after a legal organization called it a violation of students’ First Amendment rights. The New Jersey public college’s Board of Trustees voted to revise the policy… Source

Degrees with median earnings below high school graduates could be cut An Indiana bill that would cut funding for “low-earning degrees” is now headed to Governor Mike Braun’s desk and, if signed, would take effect on July 1. An undergraduate degree is classified as having low earnings outcomes if, four years after graduation, the median earnings of its graduates do not exceed the median… Source

Foreign Affairs Five Reasons for Ukraine to Give Up Donbas Russia’s demands are unfair, but ceding territory in the east could help end the current war and prevent future conflict. A Ukrainian serviceman searches for land mines in a wheat field in Donetsk region on October 7, 2022. (Photo by ANATOLII STEPANOV/AFP via Getty Images) It is misleading when Western governments and the Western media say that Russia’s President Vladimir Putin has not made compromises and is unwilling to negotiate. Though Russia has not changed its essential goals since the start of the war, it has compromised significantly around the edges of those goals.  The concession not to object to Ukraine’s membership in the European Union grants the key wish of the Maidan protestors of 2014. Raising the ceiling on caps on the Ukrainian armed forces and the recognition that Ukraine deserves robust security guarantees, barring the presence of NATO member troops on Ukrainian soil, are large security concessions. Possible compromises on the postwar borders demanded at the beginning of the war are significant territorial concessions.  But Moscow has insisted that there can be no compromise on the entirety of Donbas and Crimea being part of Russia. That demand is a difficult one for Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky to acquiesce to, and it is unfair. But little in war is fair, and nothing in this war has been fair. It was unfair for the U.S. and NATO to lie about eastward expansion. It was unfair for the U.S. and NATO to ignore Russia’s security concerns, take core issues off the table, and refuse the request for diplomacy on the eve of the war. It was unfair for the U.S. to promise Ukraine as much as it needs for as long as it takes if they go to war with Russia and then to break that promise. And it was, of course, unfair for Russia to go to war with Ukraine. And it is especially unfair for Russia to compel Ukraine to cede land diplomatically that it has not lost militarily. Russia, though, has hinted at a willingness to exchange land outside the eastern Donbas that it has conquered for land inside Donbas it has not. Agreeing on borders after a war with mutual swapping of territory to make the borders coherent is not unheard of, and the failure to do so in the past has, at times, sown the seeds of future conflict.  The real unfairness is the demand for Ukraine to cede territory at all, because it is illegal under international law to acquire territory by force (though Russia would claim that the land was acquired by the will of the people as expressed by a referendum and not by force). Article 2.3 of the UN Charter demands that member states “settle their international disputes by peaceful means,” and Article 2.4 requires all members to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” This norm has no exemptions and cannot be modified, including, according to the International Court of Justice, in self-defense. Though it is undeniably unfair for Ukraine to have to cede all of Donbas to Russia, there are five practical reasons for it to do so. The most urgent is the need for Ukraine to end this war. The loss of Ukrainian lives is horrific and unsustainable. Ceding the last 10 to 14 percent of the Donbas could be part of the key to doing that. Russia has two core goals in this war: preventing NATO from absorbing Ukraine and protecting ethnic Russians in Donbas. The first has been achieved. That leaves the second. After the diplomatic betrayal of the West and the resultant failure of the Minsk Agreements that would have given the Donbas provinces autonomy within Ukraine, that left, from Russia’s perspective, incorporating the region within itself. That goal now seems nonnegotiable. Yielding to it could end the war. The most practical reason is that Ukraine can cede Donbas to Russia diplomatically, or they can lose Donbas to Russia by war. The outcome is inevitable; the choice is real. The Donbas will be lost, but it is better to lose it with no more loss of life if possible. The third reason is that a border drawn at the west of Donbas makes ethnic and historical sense. Ukraine has always been a nation divided. Northwest and central Ukraine has historically oriented its gaze westward to Europe; southeast Ukraine has historically oriented its gaze eastward to Russia. Elections and culture have traditionally reflected this divide. Though pushing a boundary beyond the Donbas makes no ethnic or cultural sense, drawing it at Donbas does. And arguably it reflects the will of the people as expressed in multiple referendums going back to the ’90s. It might also prevent Ukraine from slipping back into civil war once the international war with Russia is over. Ceding the Donbas to Russia might also go some distance in accomplishing Ukraine’s need for security guarantees. The need for Ukraine to acquire security guarantees against Russian attack is now demonstrably clear. But Russia attacked based on its perception of an existential threat posed by NATO and possible war in the disputed territory of the Donbas and Crimea if Ukraine became a member of NATO. Removing those causes reduces the odds of future Russian attack. Ceding the Donbas, along with Crimea, which already seems to be conceded, could be not just a key to ending this war, but a key to preventing future war. There are other ways in which ceding the Donbas to Russia could help Ukraine to better move forward. A sovereign Ukraine on 80 percent of its original territory integrated with the West with membership in the European Union could be sold, very plausibly, as a victory for Ukraine. But Ukraine can only clear a path to EU accession by conforming with the organization’s requirements for guarantees of freedom of religion and linguistic diversity. The monist vision of what it means to be Ukrainian, with its suppression of the language, cultural, and religious rights of ethnic Russian citizens of Ukraine, dominates in Ukraine and has only gotten stronger since the war. The path to EU membership could be facilitated by allowing the separation of predominantly ethnic Russians in the Donbas.  For similar reasons, ceding Donbas to Russia could help a sovereign Ukraine avoid immediately descending back into the same civil strife that preceded the war with Russia in which the enemy is internal ethnic Russians. And finally, the de jure recognition of the Donbas as Russian could help prevent the stage being set for future battles of a Donbas that has only de facto been recognized as under Russian control. De facto recognition allows for negotiations down the road. But it could also allow for conflicts down the road.  It is unfair for Ukraine to be forced to agree to losing all of Donbas to Russia because it is against international law to acquire territory by force. But there are many practical reasons why ceding the Donbas to Russia could benefit Ukraine by ending the war without unnecessary additional deaths and by moving into a future integrated with Europe and with greater security against both external and internal conflict. The post Five Reasons for Ukraine to Give Up Donbas appeared first on The American Conservative.

Foreign Affairs War on Iran Will Squander America’s Military Edge The U.S. can sustain combat operations for a long while—but Americans won’t be safer afterwards. Early Tuesday morning, President Donald Trump lashed out at those arguing that the United States would soon run out of missiles to fuel his war of choice in Iran. “The United States Munitions Stockpiles have at the medium and upper medium grade, never been higher or better…Wars can be fought ‘forever,’ and very successfully, using just these supplies…” he posted on Truth Social.  Trump is right about one thing. Lack of U.S. weapons will not be a constraint on the fighting in Iran. Stockpiles are not unlimited, but they are plenty deep to allow the military to fight for as long as Trump chooses. But Trump’s war will still do long-term damage to U.S. military power, creating an extended period of vulnerability that the United States will struggle to overcome.  The Trump administration may believe that its combat operations in Iran are a powerful manifestation of American military dominance, but in the end, this war is likely to accelerate the overdue death of the American imperial project, possibly on terms quite unfavorable to the United States and its allies.  Concern about the depth of U.S. missile arsenals has been on the rise since 2022, when the conflict in Ukraine reminded policymakers and military analysts about the massive defense industrial demands of modern warfare. These concerns did not stop the Biden administration from draining U.S. stockpiles, however, by providing over $100 billion in military aid to Ukraine and doubling down on military assistance to Israel after October 7, 2023. The Trump administration’s exploits in the Middle East in 2025—against the Houthis and in the 12-Day War—put additional pressure on U.S. magazine depth, depleting supplies of some of the most advanced U.S. weapons, including Tomahawk missiles and THAAD and Patriot air defense interceptors. The revelation that the United States expended 25 percent of its THAAD missile holdings defending Israel in June 2025, for instance, triggered alarm bells for U.S. officials and the general public.  Still, warnings that the United States will run out of missiles in Iran or predictions that relative magazine depth will be the war’s decisive factor go too far and fundamentally misunderstand the risks and costs of the new war in the Middle East. It is indisputable that the United States has limited quantities of its most advanced and exquisite precision and air defense missiles, including Patriot and THAAD interceptors, the new Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), and Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles. But the Pentagon’s supplies of less advanced munitions are deep and can be replenished relatively rapidly, especially if financing is available.  The United States has large stockpiles of Small Diameter Bombs and Joint Direct Attack Munitions that turn cheap bombs and missiles into precision weapons and even more substantial supplies of gravity bombs which lack precision targeting but can still hit and destroy hardened targets. These weapons are all that will be needed once the United States establishes air superiority, a level of control Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth suggests the U.S. military may already have.  When it comes to air defense, the United States also has a diversity of options, including several variants of Standard Missiles and Sea Sparrows for protection of naval assets and AIM-120 and other air-launched missiles that can be fired by fighter jets. Efficient counter drone systems are in shorter supply, but even here, the U.S. military has a growing number of choices, including laser-guided weapons such as the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System, that offer low-cost solutions for Iran’s large supply of Shahed drones. The bottom line is that the idea that the United States will be forced to cease combat operations in Iran because it has no more missiles or interceptors is unrealistic. However, as supplies of the best munitions dwindle, the Pentagon will have to prioritize targets and accept more risk in both its offensive and defensive missions. It will have to tolerate higher levels of civilian collateral damage and lower air defense interception rates, which will mean more U.S. casualties and damage to U.S. military hardware. While this is far from ideal, it will allow the Trump administration to continue the war for as long as necessary to achieve something that it can declare a success.   But the ability of the United States to keep fighting the war does not mean that rapid expenditures of expensive U.S. weapons in the Middle East—a region where the United States has few strategic interests—and against Iran—a nation that poses no threat to the U.S. homeland—will not have costs for the United States. It absolutely will. Most eyes are focused on the short-term implications of the fighting in Iran, but it is the longer lasting geopolitical costs—costs that will weaken the United States for years if not decades to come—that matter most. While U.S. missile and air defense interceptor stockpiles will likely last through this war, they will have to be rebuilt afterward—along with the arsenals of Gulf partners. Already high demand for Patriot missiles is likely to skyrocket, along with orders for counter drone systems and offensive munitions of all kinds, as states (including the U.S.) try to fill gaps revealed by the current round of fighting.  This spike in U.S. requirements and the needs of Middle East partners could not come at a worse time. Today, European allies, fearful of the threat from Russia, are looking to acquire U.S. munitions in large quantities. Ukraine is almost wholly dependent on U.S. air defense for protection of civilians and critical infrastructure. And allies in Asia are also looking to increase their own purchases of U.S. air defense and missile systems with an eye on China’s rising military power.  These demands and those of the U.S. military can be addressed, but only with immense amounts of time and money. For some weapons, the limit is production capacity. For others, the issue is that high cost and limited budget space constrain what the United States and U.S. clients can feasibly purchase at a given time. Once this war ends, long backlogs of orders are likely, especially for weapons that the U.S. military needs most. The most exquisite weapons require long lead times, can take years to build, and single points of failure can derail production schedules at almost any time. The inevitable result is a prolonged period of strategic vulnerability for the United States, one that will ripple across its network of allies and partners. During this period, Washington will face a stark geopolitical reality. U.S. military forces abroad will be more exposed and less protected than they are today. If a conflict were to erupt in Europe or Asia—even one that the United States managed to stay out of—the U.S. ability to secure American bases and materiel could be constrained. Its ability to support weakened allies and partners would be even more limited. In a post-Iran war future, Washington will have to make harsh choices. It will have to decide whether to keep its global military footprint and accept the higher risk to its forces and assets or to reduce its global presence to protect U.S. assets and personnel. At the same time, commitments that the United States made decades ago will be largely insolvent.  For at least a period of several years, the United States will likely not be able to defend Taiwan if it were to be attacked. European allies, also weakened by lack of U.S. military supplies, will similarly be left to fend for themselves. More immediately (as soon as next month), Washington’s ability to support Ukraine’s air defense and munitions needs will be reduced, with possible implications for its ongoing war against Russia. Over time, U.S. allies will move away from the United States, perhaps permanently, building their own defenses and finding new partners. For those that have long argued for U.S. global retrenchment, this outcome may not be entirely unwelcome. But there is a meaningful difference between a retrenchment made by choice and managed to protect U.S. interests and one forced on the United States after a wasteful war that consumes what remains of U.S. global military advantage.  The latter case offers no guarantees that the United States will be able to protect its interests abroad and ensures a loss of strategic flexibility that will leave Americans less safe. Most importantly, in the event of a future crisis that does have implications for Americans, there is no guarantee that the United States would be positioned or equipped to respond. The result could be damage to U.S. economic interests or even the physical security of the homeland—the exact opposite of “America first.” Therein lies the ultimate irony: A war fought as a needless display of American military hegemony is ultimately likely to destroy the very hegemony it sought to entrench. The post War on Iran Will Squander America’s Military Edge appeared first on The American Conservative.