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Trump’s Backyard Imperialism Won’t Work
Foreign Affairs
Trump’s Backyard Imperialism Won’t Work
The White House isn’t prioritizing challenges—it’s stretching the military thin.
Just over one month after his National Security Strategy promised to “reassert and…restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere,” President Donald Trump made good on this commitment with a daring military raid to arrest Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in the early hours of Saturday morning. Trump told the American public later that day that the United States would “run” Venezuela and its oil industry for the foreseeable future.
The operation has been widely praised by Trump’s supporters. Even traditionally anti-interventionist voices found something to like, viewing the use of American military power close to home as a significant improvement over decades spent spilling blood and treasure in faraway lands and justified given that Latin America falls in the traditional U.S. sphere of influence.
But even those enthusiastic about Trump’s readiness to prioritize challenges in the Western Hemisphere should have concerns about U.S. military action in Venezuela and the imperialistic agenda Trump laid out for the region in its aftermath.
For starters, in principle, a “hemisphere defense strategy,” like the one Trump’s National Security Strategy seems to aspire to, would see the United States “pivot home.” This means the U.S. military would increase its activities and presence in the Western Hemisphere while also decreasing its footprint, or at least its commitments, in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.
But this is not what’s happening.
The United States has, certainly, increased its activities in Latin America. The steady state military presence in the region now includes at least 10,000 personnel, dozens of fighter aircraft, and over 10 percent of the U.S. Navy. However, Washington has failed to reduce military commitments elsewhere.
The United States retains at least 80,000 forces in Europe. Many of these soldiers are still involved in supporting Ukraine, including by providing intelligence, logistics, and training assistance worth at least tens of billions per year.
In the Middle East, U.S. military presence and involvement has increased since Trump returned to the White House. More aircraft and warships have been deployed to the region, and the United States has participated in both the direct defense of Israel and the bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities, perhaps not for the last time.
The United States has not pulled back in Asia either. Despite widespread speculation that Trump seeks a grand bargain over Taiwan, his administration has not given any sign that it plans to back away from its efforts to deter China from seizing the island by force.
Simply put, the turn in U.S. foreign policy toward the Western Hemisphere does not represent (so far) the long-awaited transformation that America First “restrainers” have hoped for. Instead, it is yet another manifestation of the same old American pattern: the addition of new military commitments without shedding old ones. We cannot praise the administration’s military activity in Latin America as somehow better than expending resources in the Donbas or the deserts of the Middle East—because under Trump, the United States is doing these things too.
There are other reasons Americans supportive of the Trump administration’s focus on the Western Hemisphere should still be wary of its direction going forward—including Trump’s threats of military action against Colombia, Cuba, and Mexico.
Trump is right that in recent decades Washington has not focused enough on the Western Hemisphere, and he is right to be concerned about issues like drug trafficking, cartel violence that spills into the United States, and unchecked immigration flows. Irritation with encroachment by China and Russia into Latin America is overblown but not totally dismissible. But none of these problems have the military solutions that Trump imagines.
Drug smuggling and migrant flows toward the United States are law enforcement challenges, which should be dealt with using police, Customs and Border Patrol, and the Coast Guard—not military threats or signature strikes on boats in the waters of the Caribbean. Experience has shown that efforts to use military force to slow the production and flow of drugs typically fail or make the problem worse. The same is true of military efforts to go after cartels. Instead of making these same mistakes again, the U.S. should be partnering with local law enforcement and working to increase their indigenous capacity in relevant areas.
Similarly, military coercion cannot compete with (much less eliminate) China’s growing economic stake in the region unless U.S. firms are willing to make comparable, sustained investments. In other words, U.S. economic might, not military strength, is the key to the American preeminence, influence, and wealth that Trump seeks in the Western Hemisphere.
Finally, arguments that Washington can “do what it wants” in America’s backyard are misplaced and worrisome. This line of thinking implies that the bar for the use of military force should be lower in the U.S. near abroad than elsewhere, and that Washington should be unafraid to act militarily in this region because it can do so with impunity.
This is backwards. The United States should be more careful and judicious with its use of military force close to home than it is elsewhere. After all, if a military intervention goes wrong (as so many U.S. efforts have) it will be much harder for Washington to seal the U.S. homeland off from the consequences. If Venezuela ends up being the next Libya, for example, regional instability will rise, drug flows and violence will increase, and opportunities for Chinese involvement could grow. These outcomes will undermine Trump’s broader domestic and foreign policy agendas while also doing direct harm to U.S. interests.
It is not a contradiction to be supportive of Trump’s long-time promise to focus attention closer to home in the Western Hemisphere and simultaneously disappointed with the attack in Venezuela or worried about Trump’s ambitious military plans for the rest of the region.
American interests in its near abroad are paramount, but existential threats are few. A “pivot home” that keeps America secure does not need to be—and indeed should not be—militaristic or imperialistic in nature.
The post Trump’s Backyard Imperialism Won’t Work appeared first on The American Conservative.
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