Foreign Affairs Iran’s Hezbollah Support Could Snarl U.S. Diplomacy Regional partners’ hardline stance on the Lebanese group is endangering American negotiations with the Islamic Republic. Credit: image via Shutterstock Recent developments draw attention to the “special relationship” that exists between Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah. Despite—or perhaps because of—the heavy blows that have been dealt to the Iranian-led “axis of resistance,” Tehran appears firmly committed to this relationship. This is bound to cause tensions with the Trump administration, not least given its “extra-special relationship” with Israel and its close ties with Saudi Arabia, both of which are staunch enemies of Hezbollah.  Notwithstanding these American alliances, however, escalation with Iran over Hezbollah makes little sense in terms of American interests.   The latest developments related to the Iran–Hezbollah special relationship trace back to the Lebanese cabinet’s recent approval of a plan to disarm the Lebanese Shiite movement by the end of this year. Iran came out strongly against the Lebanese government’s decision, with opposition to the move being voiced from the highest echelons of power in the Islamic Republic. Ali Akbar Velayati, who serves as advisor to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, told Tasnim News Agency that “the Islamic Republic of Iran absolutely opposes the disarmament of Hezbollah.” Following these statements, Iran’s newly appointed Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani made a visit to Beirut.  During the visit, Larijani took direct aim at the U.S.-sponsored plan to disarm Hezbollah.  “We don’t support foreign orders through which a certain timetable is specified” he stated in reference to the plan. The senior Iranian official’s agenda in Lebanon included a rare meeting with the Lebanese Shiite movement’s leader, Sheikh Naim Qassem.  Following Larijani’s visit, Qassem delivered a fiery speech, declaring that Hezbollah will not hand over its weapons so long as Israel continues its military operations against Lebanon and its occupation of Lebanese territory.  That Lebanon was Larijani’s second trip abroad since taking up his new post—after neighbouring Iraq—speaks volumes to the importance Tehran attaches to its alliance with Hezbollah. This firm show of support is noteworthy in that it reflects the failure of the Israeli-initiated “12-Day War” to force Iran to rethink its special relationship with the Lebanese Shiite movement, notwithstanding the heavy losses it incurred during that war. This should come as little surprise, given the strong ideological and strategic foundations of Iran-Hezbollah ties.  Ideologically, the roots of these ties can be traced back to a region called Jabal Amil in modern southern Lebanon. After proclaiming Shia Islam the official religion of Iran, the Shiite scholars of Jabal Amil were instrumental to Shah Ismael I’s efforts to spread the Shiite faith under Safavid rule at the dawn of the 16th century. These historical religious bonds are believed to be reflected today in the Islamic Republic’s special relationship with Hezbollah. The Lebanese Shiite movement is also the first party outside Iran to have adopted the concept of Wilayat al-Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist). Introduced by the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, this concept states that the Waliy Faqih (Guardian Jurist) is the highest Muslim authority, represented by the Iranian Supreme Leader. Since the death of Khomeini, this title has been held by Khamenei.  Notwithstanding the close ideological ties between Tehran and certain Iraqi factions, Hezbollah is also regarded as the only Shiite movement in the Middle East that fully commits to the ideals of the Iranian Islamic Revolution.  Despite being badly battered following the two-month-long full-scale war with Israel late last year, Hezbollah remains an important strategic ally for Iran. This owes largely to the fact that the two main regional players that pose the greatest threat to the Islamic Republic are Israel and Salafi-jihadi terrorists.  Having Hezbollah completely out of the picture by stripping it of its weapons would likely further increase Israel’s appetite for another round of full-scale conflict with Iran. Hezbollah also appears to be seen by Iran as the only thing standing between a further expansion of Salafi-jihadism from Syria into Lebanon. This was evident in Velayati’s remarks regarding the disarmament of the Lebanese Shiite movement.  “The US and Israel believe they can bring another al-Jolani (aka Ahmad al-Sharaa—Syria’s interim president) to Lebanon, as they did in Syria,” said Velayati in his interview with Tasnim.  “But there is no chance that someone like al-Jolani will succeed in taking control of Lebanon, because most Lebanese know that Hezbollah is the protector of their security against terrorists such as ISIS, al-Jolani, and Israel,” he added. Importantly, this comes as Iran released an intelligence assessment warning of the threat posed by Syrian-based jihadis to the Iranian homeland.  Given these realities, taking a more forceful approach towards the disarmament of Hezbollah is likely to jeopardize any chances of a potential deal between Iran and the United States while increasing the likelihood of war.  It would therefore be prudent for the Trump administration to ease its pressure on the Lebanese Shiite group, not least given that the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons is of minimal importance to American interests. Unlike Salafi-jihadi groups that led the United States to wage its Global War on Terror following the Al Qaeda attacks on 9/11, the Lebanese Shiite movement has never targeted the U.S. homeland. Nor is there ample evidence to suggest that Hezbollah is actively plotting such attacks. An American intelligence assessment released earlier this year made a passing reference to the group, merely stating that it “has continued to pursue limiting targeting of primarily Israeli and Jewish individuals in and outside of the Middle East.” By contrast, the assessment devotes relatively large sections to Salafi-jihadi groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda, warning that both organisations have the U.S. in their crosshairs. Nevertheless, the prospects of Washington adjusting its policies accordingly appear dim. This owes to the enormous influence exerted not only by Israel but also Saudi Arabia over the Trump administration’s policies in the Middle East.   This was evident when Trump announced during his visit to Saudi Arabia earlier this year that he would remove the sanctions that had been imposed on Syria.  The announcement came at the behest of the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman, who also arranged and attended the meeting between Trump and al-Sharaa during the US president’s Saudi visit. Saudi Arabia harbors an outright hostility towards Hezbollah that arguably rivals that of Israel’s. A Wikileaks cable revealed that Saudi Arabia presented the U.S. with a plan in 2008 to form an Arab force backed by NATO to destroy Hezbollah, only to be rebuffed by American officials. In 2017 the Kingdom summoned Lebanon’s then–Prime Minister Saad Hariri to Riyadh, where it forced him to announce his resignation. According to various sources, Saudi Arabia took this measure because Hariri was reluctant to pursue confrontation with Hezbollah. All indications are that Saudi Arabia is now hardening its stance against Hezbollah even further. This has been most noticeable in the media coverage of Saudi-affiliated outlets. In July the Al-Arabiya and Al-Hadath channels quoted anonymous sources as saying that the Lebanese Shiite movement was ready to confront the Lebanese state. Hezbollah firmly denied these reports, accusing the media outlets of spreading fake news with the aim of destabilizing Lebanon. Meanwhile, Al-Hadath reported in April that Hezbollah was smuggling weapons through the Beirut port. Lebanon’s Minister of Transportation and Public Works flatly rejected these claims, citing lack of evidence. There is every reason to believe that Riyadh enjoys an outsized influence over Washington’s Lebanon policy through U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack. The Saudis may even have played a role in the U.S. envoy’s plan to disarm Hezbollah by the year’s end.  A close personal friend of Trump’s, Barrack is known for his close ties with Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states. In 2019 he openly defended the Kingdom against accusations regarding the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.  A hardline stance on Hezbollah is likely to constrain American diplomacy in the Middle East for the benefit of Israel and Saudi Arabia. Policymakers in the U.S. would do well to tread with caution—irrespective of what our regional partners may want. The post Iran’s Hezbollah Support Could Snarl U.S. Diplomacy appeared first on The American Conservative.