My colleague Roger Kaplan recently wrote an excellent review of the PBS documentary, The Last 600 Meters, which is an excellent description of the battles of Najaf and Fallujah during the Iraq war. The primary assault troops in both battles were U.S. Marines, and the primary figures in the narrative are Marines whose tales are told in their own words. The program is gripping and vivid. It is “must-see” viewing for anyone interested in what really happened in the war. (RELATED: Rolling Them Up in Iraq) Marine Corps tactics in those battles were not an accident. The Corps had been carefully refining its approach to urban warfare since the events in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993. Through wargame simulations and physical experimentation culminating in the 1998 Urban Warfare experiments in cities such as Charleston, SC, Jacksonville, FL, and Oakland, CA, the Marine Corps developed new tactics and technologies designed to limit both U.S. and civilian casualties while inflicting unacceptable losses on the enemy. (RELATED: Real Leadership in the Unsung Men of the Armed Forces) These efforts resulted in a philosophy called the “Three Block War,” where Marines were taught to be prepared to fight high-intensity battles in one part of a city, do police-like peacekeeping in another, and humanitarian operations in yet a third. This was particularly important in Najaf, where the Grand Mosque, sacred to Shiite Muslims, was s key objective for both sides. It was critically important to U.S. planners that the U.S. forces not further anger the Shiite majority of the country. The Second Battle of Fallujah was not a Three Block War. American psychological operations effectively caused the vast majority of civilians to evacuate temporarily to refugee centers on the outskirts of the city with the clear message that anyone choosing to stay did so at their own risk. Then the Americans began an urban brawl reminiscent of Stalingrad or Hue City. The disproportionate casualty rate of American to enemy casualties to that of the enemy was a testimony to the thoroughness of Marine Corps preparations. Discerning viewers will note the key role played by Marine Corps armored vehicles — particularly tanks — in the Fallujah fight. The infantry marines used the tanks as rolling pillboxes to cover their maneuver. They also skillfully used snipers and heavy engineers to support them, and that combined arms cooperation is vividly illustrated. (RELATED: US Marine Leader Misread History and the Patterns of Conflict) Today, however, the Marine Corps lacks the tanks and heavy engineers to fight another Fallujah-like battle. Today, however, the Marine Corps lacks the tanks and heavy engineers to fight another Fallujah-like battle. The Sniper School, which produced the expert marksmen so critical to countering Islamist guerrilla snipers, has been closed. If today’s Marines were committed to an intense urban battle, they could not replicate Fallujah. (RELATED: The Feather Merchants: Senior Leaders Subverted the Marine Corps) The reason for this drastic decline in capabilities is a radical shift in the Marine Corps’ mission focus that began in 2019. The then-commandant — General David Berger — decreed that the Marine Corps would put its primary focus on assisting the Navy in gaining control of the South China Sea in any future conflict with the Chinese. He envisioned small units of Marines occupying small islands in the South China Sea, firing missiles at Chinese warships in a defensive concept called Force Design 2030 (now just Force Design). (RELATED: We’ll Need Innovation to Fight China, But Will We Have it?) To buy the new equipment needed to implement this new strategy, Berger divested the Corps of all of its tanks, heavy engineers, and reduced other aviation and field artillery capabilities. The elimination of the Sniper School remains a mystery to informed observers because it was such an incredibly small line item in the Marine Corps budget. (RELATED: The Marine Corps Has Gone Off the Rails) Force Design has come under increasing criticism from retired and active duty Marines — writing anonymously — as well as informed military critics. Its overall effectiveness, logistics sustainability, and the survivability of troops engaged have been systematically eviscerated with very little credible pushback from the current Marine Corps Leadership. However, the current commandant is obviously feeling the heat. He has drastically reduced the number of regiments originally designed to be converted into Littoral Combat Regiments, designed to support Force Design. He has also cancelled the buy of the increasingly vulnerable Tomahawk cruise missile system, and there are rumors that he will also revisit the procurement of the near-obsolete NEMESIS anti-ship missile system. (RELATED: The Best Birthday Present for the Marine Corps) Unfortunately, there are no plans to replace the lost armor and heavy engineer systems lost and the Sniper School remains closed. The capability to wage urban combat in the Marine Corps has reverted roughly to what it was in 1921, with light infantry assaulting heavily fortified positions without adequate combined support. Marine aviation can help, but its capabilities have also been severely curtailed. Even if it started to rebuild its combined arms team to 2018 levels today, it would take a decade. Worse still is the psychological impact. After six years of fostering a defensive mindset, one wonders how that will impact the traditional offensive mindset of the Marine Corps that has been manifest in places like Tripoli, Montezuma, Iwo Jima, and — most recently — Najaf, Fallujah, and Ramadi. In the documentary, one can see on the faces of the young Marines the eagerness and determination to close with and destroy the enemy. The only time the Marine Corps units have ever been forced to surrender was when they were forced into defensive situations against impossible odds at Wake Island and in MacArthur’s failed defense of the Philippines. I don’t think the damage will be permanent if it can be reversed soon, but it must be reversed. Recently, the Marine Corps celebrated its 250th birthday. I sincerely hope it will see another 250, but it cannot afford another six such as it has endured since 2019. READ MORE from Gary Anderson: The Best Birthday Present for the Marine Corps US Marine Leader Misread History and the Patterns of Conflict The Counterattack on Bad Bunny Half-Time Gary Anderson was the chief of staff of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab during the Urban Warfare Experiments.