Was President Trump’s attack on Iran legal? Of course that’s been hotly debated all week long, and I think the answer based on the actions of all prior past Presidents, especially Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barrack Hussein Obama, is a resounding “yes!” — but today I want to show you something you might not be familiar with. Glenn Beck had renowned legal scholar Jonathan Turley on his show to discuss and debate the topic and one of the parallels Beck pointed out was Thomas Jefferson and the Barbary Pirates! I like to think I’m a student of history, but I didn’t know this one and I figured you might not either…. We talk so much about what the Founding Fathers would think or what they would do if they were here with us, but in this case we don’t have to wonder what they would do… In this case, we can talk about what Thomas Jefferson actually did under similar circumstances. Here’s a quick summary of the foreign issues that plagued the United States when Jefferson took office: After the American Revolution, the United States lost the protection of the British Navy, leaving American merchant ships vulnerable to the Barbary corsairs operating from the North African states of Algiers, Tripoli, Tunis, and Morocco. These states captured ships, enslaved crews, and demanded tribute or ransom for safe passage. In the 1780s, while serving as U.S. Minister to France, Thomas Jefferson confronted the issue when American vessels were seized. In 1786, Jefferson and John Adams met with Tripoli’s ambassador in London and asked why their ships were attacked despite causing no harm. The ambassador reportedly explained that, under their interpretation of Islamic law, it was justified to wage war on nations that did not submit and to enslave their people. This encounter convinced Jefferson that paying tribute would only invite more demands, though the U.S. initially lacked the naval strength to resist. Throughout the 1790s, Presidents Washington and Adams reluctantly paid large tributes to the Barbary states to secure American trade and free captured sailors. When Jefferson became president in 1801, Tripoli’s ruler Yusuf Karamanlidemanded even higher payments. Jefferson refused. Tripoli responded by declaring war in May 1801 by cutting down the American flagpole at the U.S. consulate. Jefferson sent a naval squadron to the Mediterranean, beginning the First Barbary War (1801–1805). Key events included: The USS Enterprise defeating a Tripolitan ship in 1801. A long U.S. naval blockade of Tripoli. The 1803 capture of the USS Philadelphia, followed by Stephen Decatur’s 1804 raid to burn the ship and prevent its use by the enemy. The 1805 capture of Derne, when U.S. Marines and allied forces marched across the desert from Egypt under William Eaton, marking the first U.S. land battle overseas and inspiring the Marine Corps line “to the shores of Tripoli.” Facing naval pressure and the threat of further attacks, Tripoli agreed to peace in June 1805. The U.S. paid $60,000 to ransom prisoners but ended ongoing tribute payments, marking a strategic victory for Jefferson’s approach of resisting extortion rather than paying it. The conflict strengthened the reputation of the U.S. Navy, boosted national confidence, and established an early precedent for projecting American military power abroad. A later conflict, the Second Barbary War in 1815, finally ended tribute demands altogether. The comparisons to President Trump and Iran are obvious — and confirms that President Trump acted exactly the same way Thomas Jefferson did: Parallels Between Thomas Jefferson’s Barbary Pirates Conflict and Donald Trump’s Approach to Iran The story of Thomas Jefferson confronting the Barbary pirates (from the semi-autonomous North African states of Tripoli, Algiers, Tunis, and Morocco) and Donald Trump’s approach to Iran (particularly during his presidencies, including the “maximum pressure” campaign, the 2020 killing of General Qasem Soleimani, and later escalations involving strikes on Iranian nuclear sites and leadership) share several notable parallels. These have been drawn by historians, legal scholars, conservative commentators, and even some Trump defenders when discussing presidential war powers and responses to hostile actors. Here are the key similarities: Rejection of ongoing “tribute” or appeasement in favor of confrontation Jefferson inherited a system where the U.S. paid substantial annual tribute (protection money) to the Barbary states to prevent attacks on American merchant ships—a policy he viewed as humiliating and unsustainable. He refused escalated demands from Tripoli’s Pasha Yusuf Karamanli in 1801, leading to war. Similarly, Trump rejected what he and supporters saw as appeasement under prior administrations (e.g., the Obama-era JCPOA/Iran nuclear deal, which involved sanctions relief in exchange for limits on Iran’s nuclear program). Trump withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 and imposed a “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign to choke Iran’s economy, denying it funds for terrorism, proxies, and nuclear pursuits—framing concessions or payments (direct or indirect) as encouraging aggression rather than buying peace. Response to state-sponsored threats against American interests and commerce The Barbary corsairs attacked and captured U.S. ships, enslaved crews, and disrupted trade in the Mediterranean, costing the young republic economically and in prestige. Jefferson saw this as an existential challenge to free navigation and national dignity. Iran, designated a leading state sponsor of terrorism, has targeted U.S. forces (e.g., through proxies killing Americans in Iraq), attacked shipping in the Persian Gulf, threatened allies like Israel, and pursued nuclear capabilities that could destabilize global security and energy routes. Trump’s policies (sanctions, Soleimani strike, later direct attacks) aimed to counter Iran’s “malign influence” and proxy warfare, much like Jefferson’s blockade and naval actions protected American commerce. Use of military force without prior formal congressional declaration of war Jefferson sent a naval squadron to the Mediterranean in 1801 with instructions for defensive (and later offensive) action, relying on his commander-in-chief authority after Tripoli’s de facto declaration of war (chopping down the U.S. consulate flagpole). Congress later authorized broader measures but didn’t declare war outright. Trump authorized the 2020 drone strike on Soleimani (justified as preventing imminent attacks) and subsequent operations (including strikes on nuclear facilities and leadership) without seeking a new declaration of war or specific authorization beyond existing AUMFs (e.g., 2001/2002). Defenders cite Jefferson’s precedent for unilateral presidential action against ongoing threats from non-traditional state actors. Preemptive or decisive strikes against key figures/threats Jefferson supported (and Congress later backed) operations like Stephen Decatur’s raid to burn the captured USS Philadelphia and William Eaton’s overland campaign to install a rival ruler in Tripoli—targeting leadership and assets to force compliance. Trump’s 2020 killing of Soleimani (head of the IRGC’s Quds Force, blamed for hundreds of American deaths) and later escalations (e.g., strikes killing Ayatollah Khamenei and regime figures in some accounts) were framed as removing high-value threats to deter future attacks, echoing Jefferson’s willingness to use force against pirate leaders and strongholds. Establishing deterrence through strength rather than negotiation alone Jefferson’s war ended tribute payments (though with a one-time ransom), proving force could succeed where payoffs failed, boosting U.S. prestige and naval credibility. Trump’s “peace through strength” approach sought to force Iran to negotiate from weakness (curtailing nuclear ambitions, proxy funding, and aggression), with supporters arguing it constrained Iran’s economy and capabilities more effectively than diplomacy without leverage. Historical precedent invoked for presidential authority In debates over Trump’s actions (especially Soleimani and later strikes), commentators and legal scholars (e.g., John Yoo) explicitly compared them to Jefferson’s Barbary campaign—highlighting early presidents’ broad commander-in-chief powers against non-state-like threats (pirates as quasi-state actors vs. Iran’s proxies/terrorism sponsorship) without needing Congress’s prior approval for initial responses. If you’re more of a visual learner, you can watch the full discussion here — it’s really good: Share!