We are over halfway through the year, and Chinese military activity has been uncharacteristically low in the Taiwan Strait. This trend is unlikely to continue. Previous analyses by the Heritage Foundation allow us to make a prediction based on past events: Be prepared for the possibility of an increase in Chinese military activity. Over the past few years, Heritage Foundation scholars have tracked Chinese military presence and drills around Taiwan. Notable increases in military activity have predictably occurred in tandem with political activities for years. Chinese crossings of the unofficial “median line” in the Taiwan Strait—a commonly-understood boundary intended to separate the Chinese and Taiwanese militaries—have been rapidly increasing since 2020. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has long denied the existence of the median line, but previously Chinese forces had largely observed and respected it in practice. By one count, prior to 2020, the Chinese military had only crossed the median line four times. In August 2020, following a visit to Taiwan by then-Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar, two Chinese fighter jets crossed the median line. The following month, after a visit to Taiwan by U.S. Under Secretary of State Keith Krach, China sent an unprecedented force across the median line: 19 combat aircraft including fighters, bombers, and anti-submarine warfare planes. China’s Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman stated that the drills were aimed at deterring interference by “external forces” and Taiwanese separatists. An even more severe response followed then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan, when the PLA sent aircraft across the median line approximately 300 times. Even more importantly, the Pelosi visit marked the beginning of a “new normal” of elevated, coercive Chinese military activities around Taiwan. Screenshot of Chinese Military Activity Near Taiwan showing PLA activities from January 2025 to the present/The Heritage Foundation Why the Suppression of Chinese Military Activities? Last year ended with Beijing’s “Justice Mission 2025” exercises, which took place from December 29-30. A PLA spokesperson said that the exercises were a response to the December 18 announcement of a new U.S. arms sales package to Taiwan. China’s Senior Col. Shi Yi stated that the drills served as a “warning against ‘Taiwan Independence’ separatist forces.” However, the period between late January and mid-March 2026 saw a notable dip in total PLA activity, as highlighted in a Heritage Foundation analysis at the time. By late March, PLA activity levels around Taiwan began gradually increasing, though remaining below the average trendline. One theory is that this subdued activity was related to substantial purges in the Chinese military, exacerbated by concern over the growing prospect of a U.S. conflict with Iran, as U.S. troops began gathering in the Middle East. Another political factor may have been Cheng Li-Wun, leader of Taiwan’s main opposition party, accepting an invitation by Beijing to visit China in early April—the first visit made by a sitting Kuomintang (KMT) leader since 2016. The KMT Chairperson subsequently made a two-week trip to the U.S. in early June, and it did not appear to trigger any spike in total Chinese air force (PLAAF) and naval (PLAN) activities. Likewise, military activity remained low during the May 14-15 Trump-Xi summit in Beijing. Following that summit, PLA activity gradually increased, while remaining below average levels in 2025. There was a brief increase in PLA activity on June 4, featuring 25 sorties that crossed the median line, and 10 PLAN ships operating around Taiwan. This coincided with the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre. On that day, Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te stated, “I sincerely ​hope that ​China ​can face ‌up to the June 4 incident of 37 years ago, acknowledge the truth, ‌soothe the ​pain, and ​open ​the door ‌to reconciliation and dialogue.” Secretary of State Marco Rubio also released a press statement on June 3, noting: “On June 4, the world marks 37 years since the Chinese Communist Party ordered its troops to attack thousands of peaceful demonstrators in and around Tiananmen Square.” Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning responded, stating, “China is strongly dissatisfied and firmly opposed to the U.S. distorting historical facts, smearing China’s political system and ​development path.” However, the spike in PLA activities was short-lived. Regional engagements by American allies may also trigger PLA activity spikes. In late May, Japan and the Philippines announced negotiations to delimit their overlapping exclusive economic zones. China condemned the discussions as “completely illegal and void,” yet there was not a significant spike in military activities. On June 21, Taiwan announced live-fire combat drills, but that too saw only a modest spike in PLA activity that quickly returned to low levels. What to Expect for the Rest of 2026 We may see a spike in provocative Chinese Coast Guard activity moving forward. China’s Coast Guard announced on July 5 that its ships would conduct “law-enforcement patrols” east of Taiwan in the Pacific Ocean. This follows the introduction of a 2021 Chinese Coast Guard law that authorizes deadly force. After former Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s 2023 visit with U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, China’s Fujian Maritime Safety Administration announced a Taiwan Strait operation including patrols and “on-site [vessel] inspections.” In 2024, the CCG conducted an illegal boarding of a tourist boat near Taiwan’s Kinmen Island. The PLA has historically launched new exercises in response to the announcement of new arms sales, as was the case with Justice Mission 2025. We expect that trend to continue. Alexander Tah-ray Yui, the Taiwanese Representative to the U.S., when asked on June 11, 2026, about the pending $14 billion US arms sale to Taiwan, expressed confidence that the package would move ahead. A few key dates later this year could also affect the frequency of Chinese military activities in the second half of 2026. These include the possibility of several Trump-Xi meetings as well as key anniversaries. Given that the previous Trump-Xi summit took place among lower levels of activity, we may see similarly suppressed activity around China-U.S. summits. August 1, or the anniversary of the founding of the Chinese armed forces (PLA Day), is a day to watch, and PRC Founding Day on October 1 will closely follow Xi’s White House visit. In 2025, the eves of both PLA Day and PRC Founding Day saw increases in PLAAF and PLAN activity, as well as PLAAF sorties that crossed the median line. Taiwan’s National Day is celebrated on October 10. President Lai’s 2024 National Day speech caused a stir in Beijing. In it, he asserted that “the Republic of China [Taiwan] and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other” and “the People’s Republic of China has no right to represent Taiwan.” This prompted heavy criticisms of Lai by the PLA Daily, accusing him of advocating for a “new two-state theory.” The PRC initiated exercise Joint Sword-2024B in response, which practiced a “key port blockade,” and aimed to show that the PLA could block energy imports. It also saw the Chinese Coast Guard played a more prominent role in blockade operations. President Lai notably adopted a more moderate tone on his October 10 speech in 2025, emphasizing the economy, avoiding publicly naming external hostile forces, and avoiding the phrase “mutual non-subordination,” with cross-strait issues being brought up only toward the end of his speech. No Time for Complacency China’s creeping military coercion against Taiwan continues. However, thus far, 2026 has witnessed a relative lull in coercive Chinese military activities around Taiwan. This is likely driven by a combination of factors, from the ongoing Iran war to the relative diplomatic détente between Xi and Trump, from purges of Chinese senior military leadership to no announcement of new Taiwan arms sales, and Beijing courting the Taiwanese opposition KMT. However, we expect this lull to be temporary, and we expect the PLA to resume its elevated pace and continue to push boundaries in provocative new ways before the year ends.