Despite a 60-day deadline and a 22-day extension, the terms of the U.S.-mediated ceasefire agreement between the Israeli and Lebanese governments remain unfulfilled. Nine months after the extension deadline, no evidence exists of a complete withdrawal by the Lebanese militia Hezbollah from southern Lebanon and its disarmament. An Israeli Defense Force (IDF) presence persists at five locations in south Lebanon while the IDF carries out periodic attacks on Hezbollah members and its remaining weapons depots. The Israeli-Lebanese ceasefire agreement does not fit neatly into the popular narrative about the Middle East. President Biden’s much-heralded ceasefire agreement in November of 2024 has largely become a ceasefire in name only. For Israel (who was decimating the militia when the ceasefire was announced), the agreement has produced less-than desirable results and realities; its shortcomings are as ironic as they are sad. The “ceasefire” provided some cover for Hezbollah to regroup and reassert its defiance of Lebanese sovereignty, created circumstances that allow Lebanese officials to drag their feet (once again) on the issue of disarmament and security, and generated conditions for the delegitimizing of Israel while failing to return all displaced Israelis to their homes and businesses in northern Israel. Fatefully, the ceasefire’s chief beneficiary has become the initiator of the 13-month conflict and the U.S.-designated terror organization, Hezbollah. The ceasefire saved the militia from further degradation. It alleviated some pressure on its crippled leadership and provided a bit of a reprieve and space for the militia to regroup and seek ways to rebuild. Why? Hezbollah is not a party to the ceasefire agreement. The ceasefire does not require Hezbollah to make any formal concessions or officially subject itself to systematic accountability. The onus is on the Lebanese state, and by extension the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), to ensure that the militia withdraws from southern Lebanon and is disarmed. Not surprisingly, after the ceasefire announcement, the militia utilized its decades-old playbook of feigning cooperation and conciliation, while indulging in further defiance. At times the political theater and media suggest a change in Hezbollah’s ways and the dissolution of the militia. Hezbollah politicians engage in talks with Lebanese politicians and officials. Reports appear about the militia’s integration (or at least some members) into the LAF, and how the militia will surrender its “heavy” weapons or disarm after Israel withdraws. However, every time Hezbollah’s leader publicly comments, the militia remains resolute in its beliefs and behaviors — unequivocal in its rejection of Israel; indignant about maintaining its weapons; and indifferent to the suffering and any future suffering inflicted on the Lebanese. Ultimately, the interests of Hezbollah supersede the interests of the Lebanese nation and state. Witness some of the words of its leader, Naim Qassem, over the last nine months. In January he remarked: The Resistance leadership is the one that decides when to resist, how to resist, the method of resistance and the weapons to use … there is no timetable that determines the Resistance’s work — not an agreement or the end of the 60-day ceasefire agreement. In September, Qassem maintained the indignation. We will not allow disarmament, and we will confront it with a Karbala-scale confrontation if necessary; this is an existential struggle, and God willing, we are capable of meeting it. Ridiculously, the ceasefire agreement tasks the spectacularly incompetent and unconscientious Lebanese state with bringing Hezbollah to heel. The Lebanese state is an exhibition of fecklessness. As demonstrated by the Israel-Hezbollah conflict, it repeatedly fails to provide security for its citizens. Justice is largely an anomaly. No one has served time for the deadly Beirut port blast in 2020 and over a dozen assassinations and attempts since 2004. The state cannot manage the country’s economy. Lebanon is experiencing the sixth year of a historic economic collapse and record inflation with no relief in sight. For years, the Lebanese state has relied on international handouts for items as essential as school books. The state cannot even provide basic services. Citizens receive only a few hours of electricity each day. The fecklessness of the state is fueled by a Lebanese society with little fealty to the “Lebanese nation.” Lebanon’s diverse sectarian identities (e.g., Shia Muslim, Sunni Muslim, Maronite Catholic, Greek Orthodox, and Druze) compete with or supersede Lebanese nationalism. As a result, the Lebanese are a fragmented society where little respect exists among citizens for the state let alone a willingness to invest or sacrifice on its behalf. Given the circumstances, environment, and history is anyone really expecting that the Lebanese state and, by extension, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), to suddenly excel at securing territory, removing a seasoned militia from a specified territory, preventing it from returning to the territory, and disarming it? There is a greater probability that it will resemble the Iraqi army after it first confronted ISIS. Have they forgotten that the LAF required Hezbollah’s assistance to eliminate an ISIS force located in a limited area along the Lebanese-Syrian border in 2017? Will enough Lebanese soldiers suddenly and repeatedly put their lives on the line for a nation they have little affinity for, particularly when some soldiers will confront members of their sect that they maintain a deeper attachment to? Is more U.S. funding of the LAF, on top of the billions of dollars provided over the years, including paying of soldiers’ salaries, going to make a difference? Furthermore, does the Lebanese government and the LAF have the focus and patience to effectively complete a systematic and methodical process? The latest U.S. proposal to bring the ceasefire to fruition gives the LAF until December 31 to accomplish a job it failed to complete in the last nine months. Are four additional months going to reverse long-term attitudes, deep-seated behaviors, and a seemingly hollow institution? The state’s track record with carrying out policy is poor. Let’s not forget that the Lebanese state agreed to the same task in 2006 when it accepted UN Resolution 1701 and failed to honor its word. Inexplicably, the U.S.-mediated ceasefire agreement assists Hezbollah’s defiance and the Lebanese state’s fecklessness because it formalized a sharp contrast in the verification of actions for the involved parties. The IDF withdrawal from south Lebanon is precise. International observers can immediately report any Israeli violations, but the same cannot be said about the Lebanese government and its dealings with Hezbollah, the aggressor in the conflict. No one knows exactly who and how many Hezbollah members remain in southern Lebanon, not to mention who comes and goes. Israel continues to target militia members in the withdrawal area. Complicating matters further is south Lebanon’s demographics. Hezbollah militia members can simply remove their fatigues and, as Shia, claim to be part of the largest community indigenous to southern Lebanon. Who is going to contest these claims? The Lebanese state? Also unclear is how much weaponry Hezbollah retains, where it is located, and whether Hezbollah is rearming. How does one determine that a militia is disarmed if one cannot determine the number of weapons? Given its continued defiance about surrendering its weapons, it is hard to imagine that Hezbollah will reveal the locations of all its weaponry or cease rearming itself. Sadly, the sharp contrast in efforts to verify each side’s ceasefire compliance hamstrings and hurts Israel while empowering Hezbollah and its supporters. Due to the continued failings and delays of the Lebanese state to bring Hezbollah to heel, Israel’s security is left to chance if it does not act. Any action to strengthen or ensure its security (maintaining troops in Lebanon) makes Israel look like the non-complaint aggressor. It contributes to Israel’s deteriorating international image of uncooperativeness in regards to the conflict in Gaza. To add insult to this injury, as of July 29 Israeli “noncompliance” has not even facilitated the return of 26 percent of the 60-80k Israelis to their homes and business in northern Israel who were displaced by the conflict with Hezbollah. Instead, the maintenance of Israeli troops in Lebanese territory breathes life back into the delusions about the necessity of Hezbollah’s militia. Many Lebanese maintain that Israel seeks to occupy and undermine Lebanon in its quest to create a “Greater Israel.” Somehow, they think Hezbollah’s arms will still deter this despite the militia having sparked two devastating wars. The periodic Israeli attacks on Hezbollah assets also resuscitates the Lebanese belief about the ineffectiveness of the Lebanese state vis-à-vis Israel. The state’s historic feebleness contributed to the popularity of the slogan: Army, People, Resistance. The slogan added legitimacy to Hezbollah’s weapons as being another layer of defense for Lebanon. After 25 years, the very weapons that have endangered the lives of every Lebanese on a daily basis, will still somehow bring Lebanon peace and security? The Israeli-Lebanese ceasefire agreement does not fit neatly into the popular narrative about the Middle East — America acquiesces to Israeli demands (i.e., Gaza) and acts on behalf of Israeli interests in the region (i.e., Iran). Eleven months after its inception, the ceasefire has failed to guarantee security at Israel’s northern border and framed Israel as the aggressor while breathing new life into the initiator of the conflict and excusing the feckless Lebanese state. As each day passes, it becomes increasingly perplexing why the Israelis signed on to a Biden-mediated ceasefire that was naïve and premature — naïve insofar that the Lebanese state might execute it in a timely fashion and that Hezbollah would cooperate; premature insofar as Hezbollah needed to be weakened more before confrontation by the Lebanese state. In 30 years, when the Biden presidential archives are declassified, we will have better insight into how and why the Biden administration was able to procure Israeli agreement with this deeply problematic “ceasefire.” Until then, all we can do is speculate and ask: “What were the Israelis thinking?” Eric Bordenkircher, Ph.D., is a research fellow at UCLA’s Center for Middle East Development. He tweets at @UCLA_Eagle. The views represented in this piece are his own and do not necessarily represent the position of UCLA or the Center for Middle East Development.