Qian Xuesen, a Chinese rocket scientist and California Institute of Technology professor, worked on U.S. missile programs during World War II. In the 1950s, he was accused of communist affiliations and potential espionage. The U.S. put him under surveillance and partial house arrest for several years, but never formally prosecuted him for espionage. In 1955, the U.S. let him go back to China as part of a prisoner exchange. He later became a key figure in China’s missile and space programs. Subscribe to The American Spectator to receive our fall 2025 print magazine. Bo Jiang, a Chinese national and former NASA contractor, was suspected of attempting to steal sensitive space technology data. In March 2013, he was arrested while boarding a flight to China with laptops containing potentially classified information. Earlier, Jiang also took a NASA laptop containing sensitive information to China. Instead of prosecuting him, he was released two months later after pleading to misuse of federal office equipment. When I first learned about these episodes, I thought of the United States as a great aristocratic household — wealthy, full of treasures, admired by all. Yet the doors of this house are wide open, and its guests, some of them “friends,” wander in and help themselves to valuables. The host, Uncle Sam, waves his finger and says politely, “Don’t do that, or I’ll have to prosecute you.” But instead of arresting the intruders, he often just escorts them out the door. Piece by piece, America’s treasures — nuclear know-how, advanced materials, defense technologies, state secrets — slip away. Now this open house faces an unprecedented challenge: China’s determined campaign to undermine it. Already in a Cold War Beijing’s propaganda insists there is “no new Cold War.” Instead, the party claims the U.S. suffers from a “Cold War mentality.” This is psychological warfare, a deliberate attempt to brainwash American policymakers into believing that confrontation is avoidable if only the U.S. stops being “paranoid.” Subscribe to The American Spectator to receive our latest print magazine. But this is a lie. The reality is that the CCP has always regarded the United States as its foremost adversary, and we are already locked in a Cold War with China. The conflict is being waged in cyberspace, boardrooms, universities, and the halls of Congress. It is not an abstraction; it is daily confrontation. To deny this is to blindfold ourselves. The only real question is whether we will fight it effectively — and whether we will win. While the U.S. is still waking up to this reality, China is well prepared for it, as aptly summarized in the title of a Wall Street Journal article, “Xi Has Spent Decades Preparing for a Cold War With the U.S.” And China’s main attack is through intelligence warfare. The Philosophy of the People’s War The guiding principle of the Chinese Communist Party’s intelligence strategy is the doctrine of the people’s war. Mao Zedong developed this concept during the revolution. It holds that every citizen is a soldier; every village and workplace can be mobilized; and that the party survives by making the entire population serve its cause. Today, the people’s war underpins China’s global intelligence campaign. Article 7 of China’s National Intelligence Law obligates every citizen and organization to “support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence efforts.” In practice, it blurs the line between professional spies and ordinary people. A graduate student, a visiting scholar, a business executive — all can be tasked to collect intelligence. China turns 1.4 billion citizens into a latent army of collectors. Against America’s 340 million, the imbalance is overwhelming. The Russian Doll Strategy One of the CCP’s most effective tactics in this “people’s war” is the Russian doll strategy. Like a set of nesting dolls, the party layers its appeals. At the core is the CCP itself (dang). Surrounding it is the state (guo). Beyond that — and this is the largest shell — lies China as a civilization (zhonghua).  The strategy is subtle but powerful. If overseas Chinese recoil from the party, the United Front tells them: “You don’t have to support the CCP — just support China.” If that fails, the appeal shifts outward: “At least honor your Chinese heritage.” Once someone accepts the outer shell, the party works to draw them inward, step by step, toward the core. For foreigners who are not Chinese at all, the same pattern applies: It starts with admiration for Chinese culture, then moves toward respect for China’s “achievements,” and finally seeks tolerance of the CCP.  Ruthless to the Enemy, Cold to Its Own The CCP’s treatment of spies shows both ruthlessness and cold pragmatism. Larry Wu-Tai Chin, a CIA translator who spied for Beijing for more than three decades, discovered this bitter truth. When he was arrested in 1985, Chin believed his value to the CCP would protect him. Perhaps Beijing would arrange a swap, or at least pressure Washington. But Beijing did none of these. Instead, a Chinese consul informed him that the Chinese state would provide for the needs of his family if he died without revealing his secrets. Shortly after the visit, Chin committed suicide in prison before sentencing. The American Spectator The party shows even less mercy to foreign spies. From 2010 through 2012, China killed or imprisoned an estimated eighteen to twenty CIA sources. One of the informants was shot in the courtyard of a government building. The message was unmistakable: Espionage against China would be met with terror, fear, and death. Here lies the stark contrast: In Beijing, spies are executed to instill fear; in Washington, they are often escorted to the airport. The Asymmetry of Deterrence The difference between the two systems is philosophical as well as practical. In the CCP way, it is better to kill a thousand innocents than to let one guilty person escape. This principle, rooted in Leninist paranoia, underpins its purges and counterintelligence crackdowns. The American way is the opposite. Out of respect for civil liberties, out of concern for exposing classified information, and out of fear of “discrimination against Chinese,” the U.S. would rather release a thousand spies than risk arresting one innocent person. Trials collapse, prosecutions are avoided, and expulsions substitute for justice. Evolution of Chinese Espionage The known cases of Chinese espionage in America show worrisome trends. Larry Chin passed hundreds of top-secret reports to Beijing. Hanson Huang stole nuclear secrets. Katrina Leung, an FBI informant, doubled as a Chinese agent, her case collapsing in 2003 due to mishandling. Chi Mak smuggled defense technology to China, while Dongfan “Greg” Chung stole aerospace designs from Boeing. In the 2010s, Beijing targeted disillusioned ex-officers: Kevin Mallory, Jerry Chun Shing Lee, and Ron Hansen — not ideologues but middle-aged Americans lured by cash. Now the net has widened. In 2023, two U.S. Navy sailors, Jinchao “Patrick” Wei and Wenheng Zhao, were caught transmitting ship schedules and operational details. They were not senior officials. They were ordinary sailors — proof that China will recruit anyone, at any level, if the access is useful. And now Beijing is thinking even further ahead. Young Americans studying international relations or Chinese language are approached on LinkedIn and offered research funding or overseas trips. The aim is long-term cultivation: By the time they enter the State Department or intelligence community, they are already compromised. Espionage for Business, Not Just Politics The CCP’s intelligence machine is not confined to political and military secrets. Commercial espionage is central. Jet engine designs, biotech formulas, semiconductor technology — all have been targeted. The party’s intelligence services work directly for Chinese firms. Here the asymmetry with the United States is most obvious. If the CIA were to steal a telecommunications invention abroad, who would it give it to? AT&T? Verizon? T-Mobile? The lawsuits would be immediate. U.S. law forbids intelligence agencies from enriching private firms. In China, by contrast, national champions are fed directly by state espionage. Unrestricted Warfare The CCP does not follow rules. To Beijing, warfare is unrestricted. Any means can be used: political warfare, economic coercion, cognitive manipulation, cyber intrusion. In 1999, two Chinese colonels published a book literally called Unrestricted Warfare that laid out a strategy for China to achieve superpower status by using every available tool. Today, that doctrine is reality. The most recent example is the “Salt Typhoon” cyberespionage campaign, which struck more than eighty countries, compromised some six hundred companies, and swept up millions of call records — even President Donald Trump’s personal phone calls. It targeted telecom carriers worldwide, penetrated law enforcement surveillance systems, and allowed Chinese intelligence to track the movements of Americans. It was global, indiscriminate, and beyond the norms of conventional espionage. Patterns, Old and New Across decades, certain constants define China’s espionage, but changes appear too. First, there are often appeals to Chinese cultural or heritage affinity, as well as efforts to cultivate the Chinese communities in the U.S. Second, access comes before tradecraft. Beijing recruits insiders already near the secrets. Third, the motivation of Chinese spies is overwhelmingly financial. The ideological infiltrators of the Cold War have been replaced by mercenaries. New trends include the diffusion of recruitment channels and a focus on non-Chinese targets. Channels may include front companies, cultural associations, United Front networks, talent programs, and professional platforms like LinkedIn. A Strategic Imbalance Over time, China’s strategy has shifted but not fundamentally changed. Cold War moles gave way to industrial spies; cyber operations now accompany human recruitment; and lower-level personnel and students are now added to the mix. The guiding thread is constant: the people’s war, in service of the party. Meanwhile, the United States remains cautious, legalistic, and restrained. Its institutions are designed to protect individual rights, not to wage unrestricted war. One side fights with no rules; the other clings to legality. That imbalance defines the contest. Unless America confronts the reality of the new Cold War, abandons the illusion that it is not happening, and takes steps to fight and win, the open house will remain open — and the guests will keep walking out with the silver. Subscribe to The American Spectator to receive our fall 2025 print magazine.