In early December, the Trump administration issued its National Security Strategy, a 33-page document required by law that has been published by various administrations since the late 1980s. The accompanying letter from President Trump cites successful border security, strengthening the armed forces and getting rid of woke, enhancing alliances and getting NATO to commit to 5 percent of GDP on defense, increased tariffs and energy production, stepped up focus on narco-trafficking, destruction of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, and intermediation in various regional conflicts.  We should applaud its refreshing clarity and directness of purpose. The essence of the strategy is focusing on core national interests of the United States, without the distraction of asking countries to share our democratic values, and of trying to do too much with limited human, capital, and military resources.  The document also seeks to avoid bloat caused by the need to mention every corner of the world to create a “feel good” environment.  One may infer a desired transactional approach to foreign relations, in which American interests are governed in balanced economic and security partnerships, without the loss of sovereignty attendant to multilateral relations and organizations. Indeed, the Trump administration expects other countries to take more responsibility for their security, becoming regional Leviathans mentored by the United States. The document is anti-elitist, anti-DEI for its discriminatory practices and inhibition of competence, and unapologetic about the success and capabilities of the United States. It accepts the shortcomings of unnamed countries needed as partners, implying that we must overlook some repugnant practices to “get it done.” The objectives of the United States are well defined, e.g. protection of the country from threats to our interests, border security and control, secure infrastructure and supply chains, superior military prowess as a deterrent, economic innovation and industrial restoration, deregulation, balanced trade flows, a leading energy sector, scientific and technological might, “soft power” influence, and traditional families. The document lays out an extensive array of strategic strengths and assets, such as an agile political system, innovative economy, leadership in financial markets with the world’s main reserve currency, the most capable military in the world, alliances in principal regions, and abundant natural resources.  With so many strategic advantages however, one may ask why it looks like the U.S. is on the decline in this century — for example, a declining portion of world trade and the dollar as reserve currency, the rise of BRICS nations, and menacing actions of foreign autocracies. This would indeed be a separate topic, although allowing China into the World Trade Organization in 2001 was naïve, thinking that through commerce the country would “be like us.” Another factor was spending the so-called peace dividend after the collapse of the Soviet Union — beating swords not into plowshares, but into tall lattes, iPhones, and earbuds.  The vision of the Trump administration is well set forth: dominance in the Western Hemisphere, a region long taken for granted, where China is trying to gain influence; strategic alliances in Asia to protect the first island chain, containing China and affirming no alteration of the status quo over Taiwan; Europe as economically and culturally important, although unwilling to defend its borders, protect its civilization, invest enough in its defense, and eliminate regulation that stifles its economies; diminishing importance of the Middle East with the United States a net energy exporter; and Africa, morphing from a foreign aid recipient to beneficial economic partnerships.  The national security strategy has received much criticism, as expected, particularly from left-leaning sources and institutions.  It has caused outrage in Europe, which has been scolded and downgraded. Doubtless the Europeans are smarting from this sentence: “Our goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory” (p.26). The New York Times has characterized the strategy as “misguided and dangerous.” The Stimson Center advises that in spite of non-interventionist rhetoric, the strategy affirms American dominance but without the liberal values of yesteryear. The Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)  laments that the strategy principally focuses on economic benefits, not on democracy. The document also does not call for extrication from Gaza, delegating the future and disarming of Hamas to Israel and moderate Arab governments.  It is easier to write a strategy than to execute one, and the document represents substantial execution risk and potential for resistance. While the strategy aims to focus on core interests of the United States, there is a vertiginous array of objectives and initiatives. One must wonder who exactly is responsible for implementation, and how will we know if results are being achieved in an orderly way. The document also seems longer on the “what” of strategy and shorter on the “how.” The Congress, American people, and U.S. government are polarized — bureaucracies are notorious for slow rolling and stonewalling ideas that are new or threatening. Not only that, some initiatives, such as the construction of naval assets, replacement of sophisticated weapons, and development and processing of rare earths can take many years, requiring more skilled workers and increased manufacturing capacity. There is no guarantee that Republicans will continue to hold the House and Senate next November, or prevail in 2028 — the next strategy and vision could revert to multilateralism and more emphasis on exporting democracy.  The National Security Strategy is a product of strategic management and communications skills — like McKinsey 101 for the general public. We should applaud its refreshing clarity and directness of purpose, although it would benefit from an executive summary and a conclusion, enumerating the top five national security priorities. Thankfully, it lacks the equivocation and multilateral pablum that emanate from some government agencies, never wishing to offend — although a waggish chap might point out that, as with many strategy documents, the word “robust” appears four times.  READ MORE from Frank Schell: A 50-Year Mortgage Is a Financial Narcotic The GENIUS Act: Is It Greed or Is It Good? Trump and Modi Need The Art of the Deal Frank Schell is a business strategy consultant and former senior vice president of the First National Bank of Chicago. He was a Lecturer at the Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago and is a contributor of opinion pieces to various journals.