Foreign Affairs How Xi Jinping Views the Capture of Maduro Beijing can’t be pleased about losing a partner, but it may see silver linings. (Photo by Maxim Shemetov-Pool/Getty Images) As global attention turns to the fallout from the brazen U.S. military action in Venezuela last Saturday, China looms large. Xi Jinping’s long-stated pledge to reunify Taiwan with the “motherland” makes Washington’s boldness in seizing Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro impossible for Beijing to ignore. First and foremost, Beijing will likely look inward. Xi, as leader of the foremost challenger to U.S. hegemony, cannot afford to assume that he and his family would be off-limits in an era of audacious “special operations.” Expect tighter personal security and an intensified purge of suspected potential traitors within his inner circle. In 2025, Xi went on a purging spree of his top military generals. Such efforts are likely to persist as Xi works to ensure that no Maduro-esque operation could unfold within the halls of power in Beijing. As for whether this signals a green light for Xi to pursue a similar operation against Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te, there is little evidence that Beijing is moving in that direction. Instead, China so far has used the moment to portray itself as the more responsible actor in the international community. Xi said on Monday that “unilateral bullying seriously impacts the international order.” After decades of cultivating an image in the developing world as a non-interventionist power committed to “win-win cooperation,” China is unlikely to view this moment as an opening to target Taiwan’s leadership. More importantly, Chinese leaders regard Taiwan as a purely domestic matter. From Beijing’s perspective, analogies to Venezuela are misplaced, as Taiwan is seen as a “renegade” province and the unfinished business of the Chinese Civil War. Where Trump has shown a willingness to work with the remnants of the Chavista regime, the Chinese Communist Party harbors no illusions about cultivating political lackeys within Taiwan’s government. A now-deleted 2024 article from a Chinese research institute recommended that Beijing immediately begin preparations to build a “shadow government” for a post-unification Taiwan.  Several hours prior to the U.S. seizure of Maduro (and his wife), a Chinese delegation had met with the Venezuelan leader in Caracas. The Chinese officials were still in Venezuela at the time of the U.S. military operation. This likely upset the CCP leadership in Beijing, who react sharply to any potential violation of their diplomats’ safety. The accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 still engenders much resentment among the CCP old guard.  For all its rhetoric about anti-imperialism and solidarity in a “multipolar world,” China did very little to aid Maduro, its principal Latin American partner, in his moment of greatest need. By contrast, far smaller Cuba expended significantly more blood and treasure on behalf of its longtime socialist ally. Beijing’s refusal to intervene militarily on behalf of Maduro will carry lasting implications for how other client states assess the reliability of Chinese support. Since Maduro’s capture, Chinese state media have loudly invoked international law and sovereignty, but such rhetorical appeals ring hollow in the Third World when U.S. special forces can kick down the door and seize a country’s leader with relative ease. Beijing likely took note of the operation’s sheer audacity. As Russia remains bogged down in Ukraine, Washington captured a long-standing regional troublemaker within hours. The speed and success of the mission, without U.S. casualties, is a stark reminder to Chinese generals that the U.S. military remains the most capable force in the world. With its ongoing issues of graft and corruption, the leadership of the People’s Liberation Army may seriously doubt if they could replicate a Maduro-style raid in Taiwan. While the U.S. operation went smoothly, a failed attempt to seize Taiwan’s leader could quickly push Beijing into a forever war of its own. Beyond geopolitics, Beijing’s immediate concern is economic. China has invested heavily in propping up Venezuela’s oil sector despite the country’s modest role in its energy supply, and it remains unclear whether a post-Maduro leadership will repay the billions owed to Chinese lenders. Losses of this scale are unlikely to be overlooked in Beijing and could prompt a reassessment of how and where China deploys capital abroad. In the future, resource-rich states that avoid anti-U.S. posturing, such as Azerbaijan, may appear safer bets for Chinese investment. Overall, China’s leadership is almost certainly displeased with the unfolding events in Venezuela. They lost a longtime friend in Maduro. But they may also see silver linings. As pragmatic and calculating actors, the CCP will study the Venezuela episode closely, extracting lessons for future contingencies. Much as they did during America’s Global War on Terror, Beijing is likely to bide its time and watch the U.S. empire waste precious attention and resources on an unnecessary foreign crisis.   The post How Xi Jinping Views the Capture of Maduro appeared first on The American Conservative.