Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine in order to restore Russia’s imperial greatness. Instead, he may go down in history as the man who transformed Russia into China’s junior partner, thereby demoting it to a middle power or, worse, transforming it into a Third World country with the bomb. Putin wants the West to believe he remains strong. Yet Russian forces are grinding against Ukraine’s “drone wall,” while Kyiv’s mid-range drones impose a “logistics lockdown” on Russian supply routes to occupied Crimea. Meanwhile, the Kremlin still portrays Russia and China as equal powers united against the West. But the reality is far less flattering. Moscow’s battlefield frustration is showing in scare tactics, with Russian officials warning Washington to evacuate Americans from Kyiv and crudely implying that European diplomats who remain there could be targeted “to trim the headcount.” Even if Russia captures more Ukrainian territory, the long-term cost may prove catastrophic. The longer the war in Ukraine continues, the more dependent Russia becomes on China economically, technologically, and strategically. With the Kremlin struggling to sustain the war, China has gradually increased support for Russia’s economy and war machine, helping keep the West bogged down in Ukraine. In order to sustain his brutal war effort, Putin is sacrificing Russia’s economic future while steadily increasing Beijing’s leverage over Moscow. Russia’s fiscal strain is also becoming harder to hide, with some officials warning that the country faces its worst budget pressures in decades. Russia today relies heavily on China for everything from electronics and industrial machinery to automobiles and dual-use technologies that help sustain the Russian war machine. As Western sanctions cut Russia off from many global markets, China has emerged as Moscow’s primary economic lifeline. Yet this relationship is becoming increasingly asymmetrical. Even Russia’s artificial intelligence ambitions rely on Chinese technology, with Moscow now seeking Chinese microchips to power its flagship AI systems. During Putin’s latest trip to China, senior Russian officials publicly complained that Chinese car manufacturers were overwhelming domestic producers such as AvtoVAZ and KamAZ. Before the invasion of Ukraine, major Russian industrial firms preferred cooperation with European and American partners. Western sanctions and the war severed those ties, leaving Chinese companies to dominate sectors once viewed as strategically Russian. The imbalance is perhaps most visible in energy negotiations. China again refused to finalize the long-delayed Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline agreement, a project critical for Moscow after Russia largely lost the European gas market following the invasion of Ukraine. Beijing reportedly continues to demand steep discounts, using Russia’s growing dependence as leverage. That marks a dramatic reversal for the Kremlin. Russia once supplied Europe from a position of strength. Now Moscow finds itself negotiating from weakness with the only major buyer capable of replacing lost European demand. Despite the Kremlin’s rhetoric about a “no limits” partnership, Beijing has approached the relationship pragmatically. China wants discounted energy, secure access to Russian resources, and greater geopolitical leverage over an isolated Moscow. For Beijing, a weakened but stable Russia serves Chinese interests: dependent enough to supply discounted resources and diplomatic support, but not so weakened that it seeks renewed integration with the West. Even some of Russia’s most ardent nationalist supporters have begun voicing frustration over Moscow’s growing dependence on Beijing. Following Putin’s May visit to China, pro-war “Z” bloggers complained that Russia was becoming a “raw materials colony” of China as Beijing extracted ever greater economic concessions from a Kremlin with few alternatives. Meanwhile, this growing dependence is becoming especially visible in Russia’s Far East. The region has lost nearly 300,000 residents since 2010, while investment remains far below levels in Moscow and St. Petersburg. That demographic and economic weakness makes the region vulnerable to Chinese influence, even without any formal challenge to Russian sovereignty. According to The Saratoga Foundation, in parts of Siberia and the Russian Far East, local officials and residents increasingly look to Beijing for solutions that Moscow can no longer provide. In Irkutsk, frustrated residents even appealed to Putin to seek Chinese help building schools because, as they put it, “the Russian Federation is not in a position to do so.” In Sakha, China’s share of foreign economic cooperation reportedly rose from 27.5 percent in 2021 to more than 45 percent in 2024, while Mandarin instruction expanded in local schools after 2022. Increasingly, Moscow is restructuring parts of the Russian Far East around Chinese economic needs. Infrastructure, logistics corridors, and investment rules are being adapted to attract Chinese capital as Russia grows more isolated from Western markets. Apart from growing relations with Central Asia, Beijing has also deepened ties with Belarus, expanding its influence across the former Soviet space, giving China greater leverage over a Kremlin that increasingly lacks alternative partners. China does not need to annex Russian territory to dominate it. Economic dependency, financial leverage and regional integration can achieve what military conquest once sought. Putin launched the invasion of Ukraine claiming he was defending Russian sovereignty and reversing Russia’s historic decline. Yet the war has accelerated the very process he supposedly sought to stop. Russia has suffered staggering military and economic losses while becoming increasingly dependent on a far more powerful China whose economy dwarfs its own. Even if Russia captures more Ukrainian territory, the long-term cost may prove catastrophic. The country’s best future markets, technologies, and investment opportunities historically came from Europe, not China. By severing those ties in pursuit of imperial fantasies, Putin is binding Russia ever tighter to a relationship in which Beijing holds the upper hand. Putin hopes to secure his place in Russian history as the leader who rebuilt the empire. Instead, he may ultimately be remembered as the man who exhausted Russia in the fields of Donbas while surrendering much of the country’s strategic independence to China. READ MORE from David Kirichenko and Alexander J. Motyl: While Washington Looks Elsewhere, Ukraine Finds Leverage Technology Sharing Powers the Axis of Evil READ MORE: Deminers: The Dangerous Work of Giving Ukraine Back Its Land   David Kirichenko is an associate research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society. His work on warfare has been featured in publications such as the Atlantic Council, the Center for European Policy Analysis, and the Modern Warfare Institute. Follow him on X: @DVKirichenko. Alexander J. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, as well as Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires and Why Empires Reemerge: Imperial Collapse and Imperial Revival in Comparative Perspective.