FIRST ON THE DAILY SIGNAL—A mother in California lost her daughter to the foster care system in 2016 after she wouldn’t support the then-14-year-old girl identifying as a boy.  “I lost my husband,…

On Oct. 7, the world experienced the worst attack perpetrated against the Jewish people since the Holocaust. Hamas, a terrorist organization democratically elected to lead the Gazan people, invaded Israel,…

Ken Jennings of ‘Jeopardy!’Like the Jeopardy! game show, green energy subsidies have been Congress’ answer to every energy policy question. The first OPEC oil embargo of 1973-74 catalyzed decades…

The post Spotlight on the Israel-Palestinian Conflict (August 20-27 , 2024) appeared first on The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center.

Overview[1] On August 25, 2024, Hezbollah claimed responsibility for a combined rocket-UAV attack on military targets in Israel in retaliation for the killing of Fuad Shukr, the organization’s military commander, in an Israeli targeted attack in Beirut on July 30, 2024. Hezbollah claimed the attack had achieved its goals. Earlier, a hundred Israeli Air Force fighter jets carried out a pre-emptive strike against thousands of Hezbollah rocket and missile launchers in south Lebanon which were aimed at northern and central Israel. Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah secretary general, claimed 340 rockets had been fired at IDF bases in northern Israel, after which a large number of UAVs were launched deep into Israeli territory, hitting an aerial defense base and an intelligence base. He added that if the results were not “satisfactory” Hezbollah “reserved the right” to carry out further attacks. Contrary to Nasrallah’s claim, the aerial defense and intelligence bases were not attacked. Israel’s aerial defense forces, the Israeli Air Force and the Israeli Navy intercepted most of the rocket and UAV launches. One IDF soldier was killed and two were injured by an interceptor explosion near a Navy ship. A woman was injured by shrapnel in Acre and extensive property damage was caused. Hezbollah-affiliated commentators claimed that the objective of the retaliatory attack was to preserve the “equation” between Israel and Hezbollah and prevent an all-out war, and reiterated Hezbollah’s position that a cease-fire in the Gaza Strip would lead to the cessation of fighting in south Lebanon. Iran and the “resistance axis” organizations,[2] including Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, praised Hezbollah for the attack on Israel. Social media users in Lebanon and the Arab world mocked Hezbollah’s attack, noting that the most effective hit was a chicken coop in northern Israel. Hezbollah propaganda outlets made an effort to establish the false narrative that the IDF’s preemptive attack was unsuccessful, did not cause significant damage to the organization, and claimed success in hitting important targets in Israel. That was because Hezbollah wanted to justify its activities to the citizens of Lebanon, hide the extent of the damage caused to the organization by the preemptive attack, and possibly because the extent of the damage had not yet been fully calculated. In ITIC assessment , after Hezbollah finishes retaliating for the death of Fuad Shukr, its attacks on the northern border will continue according to the organization’s initial use of force and “equations,” which includes proactive fire near the border and reactive fire further away with varying extent, depending on the strength and nature of the IDF’s proactive activity.[3] Israel’s Preemptive Strike and Hezbollah’s Attack IDF Announcement Before dawn on August 25, 2024, about a hundred Israeli Air Force planes attacked more than 270 Hezbollah targets in south Lebanon, including thousands of rocket launchers. According to reports, most of the launchers were aimed at northern Israel; some of them were armed with long-range rockets and aimed at strategic targets in the center of the country. The IDF spokesperson stated that the objective of the attack was to prevent a broad Hezbollah attack (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 25, 2024).     Right: The sites which were attacked in Lebanon. Left: Picture of one of the attacks (IDF spokesperson, August 25, 2024) Hezbollah’s attack and reactions After the Israeli attack, Hezbollah fired rockets and launched UAVs at extensive areas of northern Israel. Hezbollah announced that to mark the arba’in,[4] the 40th day since the death of Fuad Shukr and the deaths of Lebanese civilians in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut on July 30, 2024,[5] it had launched an “initial response.” According to reports, a large number of UAVs were launched at “the Zionist depth and an important IDF target” which would be announced later, and that “a number of posts, camps and Iron Dome positions” in northern Israel were also attacked with “a large number of rockets.” The message stated that the “Islamic resistance” in Lebanon was on high alert, would stand firm in the face of any “Zionist aggression” and would severely punish any harm incurred, especially by civilians (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 25, 2024). Shortly thereafter, Hezbollah issued an announcement claiming that “the first phase ended with complete success and included attacking Israeli camps and posts with 320 rockets, allowing the UAVs to fly towards their desired targets in the depths of the Zionist entity [sic].” According to Hezbollah, it attacked 11 IDF bases (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 25, 2024). Hezbollah later issued another statement, claiming that “all the UAVs which were launched at the preplanned times crossed the border towards the intended targets and from different routes, therefore our military operation for the day has been completed and achieved.” The statement added that the “enemy’s” statements about its preventive action, the goals it achieved and its interference with the “resistance” attack were empty claims and belied by the facts on the ground (Telegram channel of Hezbollah’s combat information arm, August 25, 2024). Hezbollah claimed that the response to the killing of Fuad Shukr was carried out “with great precision” and successfully achieved its goals, despite Israeli censorship and its “false claims” regarding the disruption of the attack. Hezbollah further [falsely] claimed that the essence of the “resistance” response was the UAVs, which hit a vital military target, and the 320 rockets which were launched to engage Israel’s Iron Dome aerial defense system and interception capabilities. Hezbollah denied that Israel had destroyed more than a thousand rockets or precision missiles. It further claimed [again falsely] that despite Israel’s ongoing high alert and its use of American intelligence and operational support, the attack succeeded in hitting a vital target deep in Israel (al-Mayadeen, August 25, 2024). “Informed sources” said that Hezbollah had ended its retaliation and the “exchange of blows” with Israel would once again be within the “rules of the conflict,” pending a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip (Lebanon 24, August 26, 2024). Muhammad Fneish, a senior Hezbollah figure, said that the objective of the “resistance” was to “punish the enemy and return it to the rules of confrontation.” He claimed Hezbollah had the capability to prepare for any future development, “but does not aspire to an all-out war,” and that if Israel “exceeds its borders or attacks civilians, the resistance is prepared and will respond accordingly.” He claimed they no longer feared Israel, adding that “the resistance has changed the balance of power in Lebanon, ‘Palestine’ and the entire region” and Israel would not be able to attack “without an appropriate response” (MTV Lebanon, August 26, 2024). The IDF response Israeli Air Force aircraft, aerial defense systems and Israeli Navy vessels intercepted most of rockets. One IDF soldier was killed and two were injured by an interceptor explosion near a Navy ship. A woman was injured by shrapnel in Acre, and the attacks caused considerable damage to property, including the total destruction of a chicken coop near the border (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 25, 2024). The damage to the chicken coop (Israeli Fire and Rescue spokesman’s unit, August 25, 2024) According to the IDF, 230 Hezbollah rocket launches and 20 drone launches crossed into Israeli territory, 90% from the heart of the civilian population and near civilian facilities such as schools, mosques and UN sites (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 26, 2024).     Hezbollah launch sites near civilian sites in south Lebanon (IDF spokesperson, August 26, 2024) Nasrallah’s speech On the evening of August 25, 2024, Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah secretary general, delivered a speech summarizing the attack, which he called the “Operation Arba’in” (al-Manar, August 25, 2024): The reason for the delay in Hezbollah’s response: He claimed Hezbollah’s response was delayed because Israeli and United States forces were on high alert, and by the fear of failure. He added the members of the “resistance axis”[6] had to consult as to whether the response would be joint or if each would act individually. He claimed Hezbollah also wanted to provide an opportunity for a ceasefire to be negotiated in the Gaza Strip. Decision to hit a military target: He claimed that Hezbollah had decided to limit its response and not attack civilians, adding that the organization wanted to attack a military target related to the killing of Fuad Shukr, one that would be deep inside Israeli territory close to Tel Aviv. He also claimed they did not currently intend to use strategic missiles, but might in the near future. Description of the attack: According to Nasrallah, at 05:15 a.m. Hezbollah operatives were supposed to fire 300 rockets at Israel, a number he claimed could disable the Iron Dome aerial defense system and the interception batteries for several minutes, allowing the UAVs to penetrate Israeli airspace. He claimed they first fired 340 rockets to paralyze Israel’s aerial defense systems, and then launched UAVs of various types, including from the Lebanon Valley for the first time. He also claimed that all the UAV launch positions were operative, had not been damaged before the operation and that all the UAVs “crossed the border safely towards their destinations.” The results of the attack: He claimed that the two main targets were Ein Shemer base, an aerial defense base 72 km from the border and Gelilot base, an intelligence base 110 km from the border, near Tel Aviv. Nasrallah claimed that a “significant number” of UAVs reached their targets and accused Israel of being “silent” and that “day and night they will search for the truth about what happened.” Contrary to Nasrallah’s fabrications, the bases were not attacked. The effect of the attack on Israel: He praised the operation, noting that it was the first major operation carried out by the “resistance” in the absence of Fuad Shakar, and that it had been carried out “flawlessly.” He sneered, “If Israel shut down Tel Aviv and the airports and opened shelters just because we used rockets and UAVs, what would happen if we used more than that?” Nasrallah gives a speech about the attack on Israel (al-Manar, August 25, 2024) Israel’s preemptive attack: He accused Israel of “aggression,” not “preemptive action,” and denied Israeli reports that thousands of missiles and launchers had been destroyed. He said Israel began its attacks half an hour before the response operation was carried out after perceiving movement of the organization’s operatives, not based on intelligence information. He claimed that the Israeli attack had no effect on Hezbollah’s operation or operatives, and that no strategic or precision missiles had been hit, with the exception of two positions which were hit after Hezbollah’s operation. Threat of further attacks: He said Hezbollah would monitor “the results of the enemy’s silence” regarding events at the two bases targeted in the operation. He stated that “if the response appears satisfactory, we will consider whether it is sufficient” as retaliation for the killing of Fuad Shukr in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia, adding “if the response does not appear satisfactory, until further notice, we reserve the right [sic] to respond.” Support for the Gaza Strip and the “resistance axis:” He said Hezbollah would not abandon the Gaza Strip and its residents, regardless of the circumstances, challenges or victims. According to him, Hezbollah activity could benefit the Palestinian side or the Arab side in the negotiations. He added that the message to Israel and the United States was that the “support fronts,” especially Lebanon, could not be silenced, despite the victims. He said that Israel had be wary of Lebanon, as it was no longer weak. Immediately after the speech, Hezbollah issued a video showing satellite images of the two bases the organization claimed had been its two main targets. In addition, a video was issued of a simulation of some of the buildings at one of the bases (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 25-26, 2024). Reactions from Hezbollah-affiliated commentators Ibrahim al-Amin, editor-in-chief of the Hezbollah- and Nasrallah-affiliated Lebanese daily al-Akhbar, stated that Hezbollah’s action “had been completely coordinated with the strategy used by the organization since day one.” He claimed Hezbollah was not interested in an all-out war and therefore would never take any action that would lead it to one whose timing, arena or methods the organization had not chosen. If Hezbollah were interested in a war, he claimed, it would fire sporadic shots at the suburbs of Haifa, or Nahariya or Safed. However, the organization did not want to give the enemy a minute of the calm it needed to concentrate its efforts on Gaza and the West Bank, but wanted to drag it into using a third of its military, security and political efforts against Lebanon.” Al-Amin stated the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel would return to its framework, which had greatly changed over the past three months, and could be changed daily, but that would not actually change anything. He also noted that the attack provided another example of Hezbollah’s position since the front in south Lebanon opened on October 8, 2023, which was that the only way to stop attacks in the north was to stop the attacks in the south [i.e. the Gaza Strip]” (al-Akhbar, August 26, 2024). Al-Akhbar published an article entitled, “Hezbollah establishes the Tel Aviv-Dahiyeh equation.” According to Ali Haydar, a reporter for the newspaper, Hezbollah carried out its threat to respond to Fuad Shukr’s death and it “contains multiple messages and dimensions concerning the courage and wisdom of the decision, and the willingness to deal with all the consequences that could arise.” Haidar also claimed that “the ‘ceiling’ of attacks that the enemy wanted to set failed, because Hezbollah countered with a suburb of Tel Aviv for a suburb of Beirut.” He added that “not to be ignored is that the failure of American intimidation and the Israeli threat to launch a destructive war on Lebanon following the response are another variable to strengthening the resistance’s position in the deterrent equation, even when the other side is Washington and Tel Aviv” (al-Akhbar, August 26 2024). Reactions in Lebanon Najib Mikati, prime minister of the Lebanese interim government, convened a meeting of ministers to discuss developments and the preparedness of the country’s emergency services. The meeting was attended by the ministers of foreign affairs, justice, health, environment, economy, transport and energy, the president of the South Lebanon Council and the secretary general of the Supreme Security Council. Mikati said he was in contact with Lebanon’s partners to stop the escalation, stating that Israeli “aggression” had to be stopped and UN Security Council Resolution 1701 had to be implemented. He also stated that Lebanon supported the international efforts to achieve a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip (Lebanese prime minister’s X account, August 25, 2024). The Lebanese government meeting (Lebanese prime minister’s X account, August 25, 2024) Najib Mikati spoke on the phone with David Lammy, the British foreign minister, to discuss the latest developments and the situation in south Lebanon. According to reports, they said the top priority was to prevent the situation from escalating into an all-out war. Mikati said that “the way to a solution is the implementation of international resolutions,” adding that Israel had to be forced to stop its “continuous violations and attacks” (al-Nashra, August 25, 2024). Samy al-Gemayel, chairman of the Phalanges Party, said that “after a reaction and a reaction to the reaction and a reaction to the reaction to the reaction,” it was clear that none of the parties wanted to expand the war. Therefore, he called on Hezbollah and Israel to immediately stop the military operations on the border, promote a cease-fire agreement (hudna) and implement all international resolutions concerning Lebanon, especially UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which states that weapons will be only in the hands of the state and that Lebanese government would be sovereign throughout the entire country. He also criticized Nasrallah’s speech and said that “not even a Lebanese would believe the lies of the speeches and the claims of imaginary victories” (Samy al-Gemayel’s X account, August 25, 2024). Reactions of Iran and the “Resistance Axis” Iran Nasser Kanaani, spokesman for Iran’s foreign ministry, claimed that Israel had lost its deterrence. He claimed that despite the support of its allies, Israel could not predict even the time and location of the “resistance’s” limited, organized attack. He claimed that “the occupying regime now must defend itself from within the occupied territories” (Nasser Kanaani’s X account, August 26, 2024). According to the Nour news agency, affiliated with Iran’s National Security Council, Hezbollah’s “success” was made possible because it surprised the “Zionists,” a formula that will most likely be used again in the future (Nournews X account of Nour News, August 25, 2024). “Resistance axis” organizations Hamas said that they welcomed the “great, excellent response” of the Hezbollah fighters in attacking a number of vital, strategic targets in the depths of the “Zionist entity” in retaliation for the crime of the “Zionist” killing of “Fuad Shukr, the great jihadi commander,” and for the “Zionist” crimes and ongoing aggression in the Gaza Strip and in Lebanon (Hamas Telegram channel, August 25, 2024). Hamas called the retaliation a “slap in the face” of the Israeli government and a message that its “crimes” against the Palestinians and the Lebanese would not achieve their goals and would not go unanswered. Hamas blamed the United States for the consequences of being Israel’s partner in its aggression in “Palestine,” Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Iraq (Hamas website, August 25, 2024). Abu Obeida, spokesman for Hamas’ military wing, congratulated Hezbollah on its “response” to Israel. He claimed Hezbollah had again confirmed the change in the “entity’s strategic situation” since Operation al-Aqsa Flood, to one in which the “enemy” could be hit from anywhere and from any front. He stated that all the fronts would continue to “burn” as long as the “aggression” against the Palestinian people continued (Abu Obeida’s Telegram channel, August 25, 2024). Ahmed Abd al-Hady, a senior Hamas figure in Lebanon, claimed Hezbollah’s response “proved that Lebanon is not tricked by American deceptions regarding the calming of the fronts and negotiations.” He claimed the response “proves that the support fronts continue [operating] and all options will be open as long as the aggression against the Gaza Strip continues” (al-Mayadeen, August 25, 2024). Mahmoud Mardawi, a senior Hamas figure, wondered if it made sense from a military point of view to attack and destroy 6,000 rockets “without the response going beyond the southern Lebanese region and not being aimed at Hezbollah’s capitals and targets, which were parallel to targets that Israel believes Hezbollah wanted to hit?” He added that “during 11 months, the enemy failed to eliminate Hezbollah’s medium and long range rocket power, and now manages to do it in an hour?” Mardawi also wrote that “the enemy’s statement related to the restoration of deterrence. What deterrence does not break the rules of the conflict and leaves the enemy subject to them in the ongoing conflict?! However, at every stage the enemy exaggerates its messages and achievements” (Mahmoud Mardawi’s X account, August 25, 2024) . The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) congratulated the “brothers” in Hezbollah for the attack in the depth of the “thieving entity” and its success in delivering “brave blows [and a display of] courage,” noting that it firmly maintained its positions and had kept its promise [to retaliate]. The PIJ added that “the blows emphasize that the Zionist enemy only understands power and is deterred only by the strikes of the resistance and jihad fighters” (PIJ Telegram channel, August 25, 2024). Ahsan Ataya, PIJ’s representative in Lebanon, head of the organization’s department for Arab and international affairs and a member of the political bureau, that the Hezbollah attack “confirms the policy of the resistance in its response to the elimination of its leaders by the enemy.” He called the “initial response” to killing Fuad Shukr a “strategic achievement for the resistance” (al-Mayadeen, August 25, 2024). The Hezbollah Brigades in Iraq congratulated the Hezbollah fighters and Hassan Nasrallah for “Operation Arba’in, in which UAVs crossed all the defense lines of the global arrogance front and reached intelligence bases and military bases in the depths of the entity.” According to reports, the “Islamic resistance” once again proved that it could attack the “enemy” despite its extensive armament and technology, and that it was capable of attacking any area. It also claimed that “despite the protection and support of all the countries that what themselves on the Zionist entity, Hezbollah fighters destroyed its bases with hundreds of missiles and UAVs” (Hezbollah Brigades Telegram channel, August 25, 2024). Qais al-Khazali, the secretary general of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, congratulated Hassan Nasrallah for “the great heroic operation, which coincided with Arba’in Day, and hit important vital targets in the depths of the thieving entity.” He added that “despite all the enemy’s preparations, the support of the Arab countries whose cooperating governments normalized relations [with Israel] and the foreign countries which have been taken over by the Zionist lobby, the resistance had the last word, and the people of Allah held to their firm position that the answer would inevitably come, and no crime committed by the thieving entity will not be properly punished” (Qais al-Khazali’s Telegram channel, August 25, 2024). The political bureau of the Houthis in Yemen welcomed Hezbollah’s attack, “which proves that the resistance has powerful capabilities and keeps both its promises and threats.” According to reports, the Houthis support the “heroes of the resistance” and “all options and actions as part of the response to the Zionist enemy.” The Houthis claimed that their response to the Israeli attack on the port of al-Hudaydah on July 19, 2024 “would definitely come” (al-Masirah, August 25, 2024). International Reactions Jake Sullivan, American national security adviser, said the United States was “concerned” that the crisis in the Middle East would escalate into a wider war. He noted that the Biden administration was in constant communication with Israel regarding the current situation with Hezbollah (Reuters, August 25, 2024). American Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin spoke with Israeli Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant, to discuss “Israeli actions protecting against Hezbollah attacks.” According to reports, Austin reiterated America’s firm support for Israel’s right to defend itself and the American commitment to help Israel’s defense against threats from Iran and its regional partners and proxies (United States Department of Defense website, August 25, 2024). Antonio Guterres, UN secretary general, said he was “deeply concerned about the increase in the exchange of fire” along the Israel-Lebanon border. He added that “such actions put the populations in Lebanon and Israel at risk, and threaten regional security and stability.” He called on the parties to “avoid escalation and immediately cease hostile actions” (Antonio Guterres’ X account, August 25, 2024). The Egyptian foreign ministry stated that Egypt was following the latest escalation on the Israel-Lebanon front with concern. Egypt called on the international community to act together to reduce tension and instability. It also warned against the dangers of opening a new front and emphasized the importance of maintaining Lebanese stability and sovereignty. Egypt reiterated the need for a comprehensive ceasefire and an end to the war in the Gaza Strip in order to save the region from threats to international peace (Egyptian foreign ministry Facebook page, August 25, 2024). The Jordanian foreign ministry noted the importance of maintaining Lebanon’s stability and security, as well as the need to implement Resolution 1701 to prevent further escalation. The ministry stated that the continuation of “Israeli aggression” in the Gaza Strip and the failure to reach an agreement that would lead to a ceasefire put the region in danger of an expansion of the conflict (Jordanian foreign ministry X account, August 25, 2024). Social Media Reactions Hezbollah’s response to the killing of Fuad Shukr and the false claims of damage to strategic facilities deep in Israel provoked ridicule among surfers in Lebanon and the Arab world, when most of the reactions on social media focused on the damage to a chicken coop in northern Israel: Raymond Hakim, an activist in Lebanon for the implementation of resolution 1701 (with about 100.7 thousand followers), uploaded a photo of a rooster to his X account and wrote, “The commander of the enemy’s air force who was killed in a targeted attack this morning” (Raymond Hakim’s X account, August 25, 2024). In another tweet, he wrote that “At the end of the day, something caught my attention: our Photoshop will remain stronger, truer and smarter than theirs” (Raymond Hakim’s X account, August 26, 2024). “Commander of the Israeli Air Force” (Raymond Hakim’s X account, August 25, 2024) Omar Madaniah, an exiled Syrian journalist who opposes the Shi’ites and Hezbollah (with about 273 thousand followers), posted a picture on his X account of the organization’s logo with a rooster instead of the word “Hezbollah,” and asked “What do you think of the new symbol of the Lebanese Hezbollah militia?” (Omar_Madaniah’s X account, August 25, 2024). A new logo for Hezbollah (Omar_Madaniah’s X account, August 25, 2024) Hatem al-Shammary, a Saudi Arabian network celebrity who stated that he was interested in Iranian affairs (with about 239 thousand followers), wrote on his X account that “the result of Hezbollah’s response was the killing of 34 Zionist chickens and the destruction of 65 egg trays. Beware the chickens’ revenge” (Hatem al-Shamari’s X account, August 25, 2024).        Right: A chicken coop damaged in a Hezbollah attack. Left: “The Avenging Rooster” (Hatem al-Shammary’s X account, August 25, 2024) The Syrian journalist Nour Golan (with about 10.4 thousand followers) posted an illustration of a rooster to her X account, wearing a Hezbollah uniform in the style of Hezbollah’s mourning notices for its terrorist operatives killed fighting against Israel. The rooster’s name is The Rotten Egg, aka Jihad, and he was “the commander of the Little Rooster group.” While the Hezbollah mourning notices read “Martyrs on the way to Jerusalem,” this time it read “Martyrs on the way to the egg carton” (Nour Golan’s X account, August 25, 2024). Mourning notice for a Hezbollah rooster (Nour Golan’s X account, August 25, 2024) Muhammad al-Rouqy, a Saudi Arabian who opposes Iran and the Houthis (with about 8,240 followers), posted an AI [apparently] picture of Hassan Nasrallah to his X account, wearing Western clothing and riding a rooster, with the KFC logo changed to HFC (Hezbollah Fried Chicken) (Muhammad Rouqy’s X account, August 25, 2024). Nasrallah riding a rooster (Muhammad Rouqy’s X account, August 25, 2024) The Saudi network activist Noura (with about 16.9 thousand followers) posted a picture on her X account of Hassan Nasrallah. To the left is a damaged chicken coop and to the right, a cartoon chicken and the “Chicken Hunter.” She wrote, “Hezbollah: The response to the Israeli army, which attacked south Lebanon, ended our retaliation against. And if you repeat [it], we’ll repeat [it].” Hezbollah retaliated against a chicken coop (Noura’s X account, August 25, 2024). Nasrallah, chicken hunter (Noura’s X account, August 25, 2024) The post Reactions to Hezbollah’s Attack in Retaliation for the Killing of Fuad Shukr appeared first on The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center.

Highlights[1] The new Iranian foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, spoke with a senior Hamas figure and stressed that Iran would support any agreement to end the war in the Gaza Strip that would be acceptable to the Palestinians and the “resistance.” Senior Iranian officials once again threatened to retaliate for the killing of Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’ political bureau, in Tehran. However, they stressed that Iran would respond in a time and manner that would not disrupt the talks to achieve a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. The Iranian chief of staff noted that Iran would decide how to respond on its own, and that the “axis of resistance” would operate separately and independently. Foreign Minister Araghchi also discussed the possible response with his counterparts in the region and in Europe. Qatar’s prime minister and foreign minister visited Tehran and met with President Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Araghchi. During his visit, the sides discussed regional developments and efforts to reach a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Iran praised Hezbollah’s retaliation for the killing of Fuad Shukr in Beirut. The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman described Hezbollah’s action as a clear indication of a shift in the strategic balance, now working against Israel. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for two drone attacks against “vital targets” in Haifa. The claims have not been verified. The pro-Iranian militias are preparing to escalate their attacks against Israel as well as against American bases in the region. The Houthis claimed responsibility for attacking two vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. A Greek oil tanker caught fire following the attack and began leaking oil. All crew members were evacuated safely. Houthi sources reported that the preparation of the target bank for the expected attack against Israel due to the attack against the port of al-Hudaydah had been completed and that the Houthis were also expected to participate in the responses of the “axis of resistance” to the killing of Haniyeh and Shukr. Iranian involvement in the Palestinian arena On August 27, 2024, the new Iranian foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, spoke with senior Hamas official Khalil al-Haya to discuss the situation in the Gaza Strip and negotiations for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Araghchi praised the steadfastness of the residents of the Gaza Strip and the “resistance fighters,” stressing that Iran would support any agreement that would end the war in the Gaza Strip, acceptable to the Palestinian people and the “resistance groups” (Tasnim, August 28, 2024). Amir Saeed Iravani, Iran’s ambassador to the UN, said that the response to the killing of Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’ political bureau, would be carried out at the most surprising time for Israel. According to Iravani, it is possible that when the eyes of the “Zionist regime” are on the sky and radar screens, they will be surprised from the ground or from a combination of the two. According to him, the Iranian response should achieve two goals: punish Israel for violating Iran’s sovereignty and strengthen its deterrent power to prevent similar aggression in the future. He stressed that Iran had to respond in a way that would not adversely affect the possibility of achieving a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip (ISNA, August 21, 2024). Abolfazl Zahravand, a member of the Majles National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said Iran’s retaliation for the killing of Haniyeh was certain and was on its agenda in accordance with the Supreme Leader’s instructions. He noted, however, that there might be tactical adjustments to the timing of the response to maximize the effectiveness of the retaliation. Zahravand also highlighted the psychological, social, and economic damage inflicted on Israel while it was waiting for Iran’s response (SNN, August 22, 2024). Mohammad Bagheri, chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces, said at the inauguration ceremony of the new defense minister, Aziz Nasirzadeh, that revenge by the “axis of resistance” and Iran for the killing of Haniyeh was certain. He said Iran would decide on revenge itself and the “axis of resistance” would operate separately and independently, just as Hezbollah had retaliated against Israel[2] (Tasnim, August 26, 2024). Iranian Chief of Staff Bagheri (Tasnim, August 26, 2024) Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon Mojtaba Amani noted that Iran’s retaliation for the killing of Haniyeh in Tehran was certain and that its date was to be decided by the Iranian armed forces (al-Alam, August 27, 2024). In a commentary article, the Iranian news website Khabar Online, which is affiliated with the pragmatic wing of the conservative camp, discussed the delay in Iran’s retaliation for Ismail Haniyeh’s assassination in Tehran, outlining six main reasons for the postponement: the need to assess the intelligence breach that enabled the assassination; ongoing negotiations for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip; the Arbaeen ceremonies[3]; the necessity for precise planning of an attack on Israeli military and security targets that would enhance Iranian deterrence, as opposed to the attack on Israel on April 13, 2024, without causing civilian casualties; the American military presence in the region; and the need to choose a target that would fulfill Iran’s dual objectives of punishing Israel and strengthening Iranian deterrence (Khabar Online, August 24, 2024). The Iranian Diplomacy website, which is affiliated with the pragmatic wing of the conservative camp, referred to “Iran’s tactical withdrawal” in the context of its retaliation to Israel following Haniyeh’s killing. In a commentary article, the website provided three main reasons for the delay in the Iranian retaliation: the change of government in Tehran and the establishment of a new government; the need to maintain the safety of pilgrims during the Arbaeen ceremonies and ensure their ability to fly to Iraq to perform the ceremonies; and Iran’s diplomatic superiority, which is reflected in the intensive international diplomatic activity to prevent Iran from retaliating against Israel that can be used by Iran to change the conditions in its favor (Iranian Diplomacy website, August 24, 2024). Muhammad Reza Falahzadeh, deputy commander of the Qods Force, said Operation al-Aqsa Flood had caused heavy damage to the “Zionist regime” and that the “resistance” had not allowed it to occupy the Gaza Strip, eliminate the “resistance,” and change the Middle East. He said the “enemy” could not guarantee its victory through assassinations, and that the “resistance” was growing stronger day by day and Islam would take over the world’s key strongholds (snn.ir, August 22, 2024) The deputy commander of the Qods Force (snn.ir, August 22, 2024) The new Iranian foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, spoke with EU Foreign Minister Josep Borrell and German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock to discuss regional developments, including the war in the Gaza Strip (Iranian Foreign Ministry website, August 22, 2024). Araghchi also spoke with the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom and France. Araghchi said in his conversation with French Foreign Minister Stéphane Séjourné that Iran had the right to respond to the killing of Haniyeh in Tehran, which was a violation of its security and sovereignty. In a conversation with British Foreign Secretary David Lammy, the Iranian foreign minister said that Iran was not interested in expanding the war and increasing regional tensions (Tasnim, August 23, 2024). Speaking to journalists, Araghchi said that in his talks with his counterparts in France, Britain, and Germany, he had stressed that the “Zionist terrorist attack” that led to Haniyeh’s killing would not go unanswered and that Iran would respond at the right time and in the right way, in a “precise, calculated and managed” manner while taking into account all the various aspects (Mehr, August 24, 2024). On August 24, 2024, Araghchi spoke with his Egyptian counterpart, Badr Abdelatty, about regional developments and efforts for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. The Iranian foreign minister stressed Iran’s right to respond to Haniyeh’s killing in Tehran (Mehr, August 24, 2024). He also discussed regional and Palestinian developments in his conversation with Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan (ISNA, August 25, 2024). In an interview given to Iranian TV, Foreign Minister Araghchi discussed the foreign policy of the new government in Tehran, stressing that the “resistance front” would receive Iran’s support under all circumstances and that this was Iran’s fundamental policy. According to Araghchi, Iran’s support for all the “resistance” groups is a fixed principle that does not change (Tasnim, August 23, 2024). Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (Tasnim, August 23, 2024) Araghchi told reporters that just as Iran succeeded in punishing the “Zionist regime” and avoiding expanding the war in the region with an attack against Israel in April 2024, so too will it be following the killing of Haniyeh in Tehran. He said diplomacy and the battlefield complemented each other, and that Iran would act in a way that would realize its national interests, security, and national honor (ISNA, August 24, 2024). On August 26, 2024, Qatar’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammad bin Abdulrahman Al Thani arrived in Tehran and met with Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Araghchi. The foreign ministers of the two countries discussed the latest developments in the region and the Gaza Strip and efforts to reach a ceasefire. Araghchi said Iran would support any agreement accepted by the Palestinian “resistance” and Hamas (Iranian Foreign Ministry website, August 26, 2024). President Pezeshkian said in his meeting with the Qatari senior official that Islamic countries and other countries committed to international law had to take joint action to force supporters of the “Zionist regime” to stop its crimes and the “genocide” in the Gaza Strip (Iranian president’s website, August 26, 2024). The Iranian president meets with the prime minister of Qatar (Fars, August 26, 2024) Iranian involvement in Lebanon and Syria The Iranian Nour News Agency, affiliated with the Supreme National Security Council, referred to Hezbollah’s response against Israel following the killing of the organization’s military commander, Fuad Shukr. According to the statement, the al-Aqsa Flood proved that a security surprise is the main weakness of the Israeli regime and that the success of Hezbollah’s operation was made possible thanks to the renewed surprise of the “Zionists,” and this pattern of operation is expected to continue (Nour News X account, August 25, 2024). Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Nasser Kanani praised Hezbollah’s response. He said that it demonstrated a fundamental shift in the strategic balance, now to Israel’s detriment, that the myth of the invincible Israeli army had become a hollow slogan, and that the “Israeli terrorist army” had lost its effective offensive power. Kanani added that the “resistance” attacks had been extended deep into the “occupied territories,” Israel was required to defend itself from within, and despite the support of its allies, including the United States, it had lost its ability to predict the time and location, even of a limited and planned “resistance” operation (Nasser Kanani’s X account, August 26, 2024). Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi spoke with his Syrian counterpart, Faisal Mekdad, who congratulated him on taking office and stressed the importance of strengthening the strategic ties between the two countries. Araghchi thanked Mekdad and stressed Iran’s support for Syria and countries supporting the “resistance against the Zionist regime.” According to a statement issued by the Iranian Foreign Ministry, the two stressed the need for continued consultations and coordination between the countries to strengthen bilateral relations in various fields, confront the “crimes of the Zionist regime,” and support “Palestine.” The foreign ministers invited each other for reciprocal visits to Tehran and Damascus. Araghchi also spoke with Lebanese Foreign Minister Abdallah Bou Habib and discussed relations between the two countries and recent regional developments. Araghchi stressed the new Iranian government’s support for the government and “resistance” in Lebanon (Iranian Foreign Ministry website, August 23, 2024). The IRGC reportedly temporarily appointed Haj Seyyed Hosseini in charge of security and military affairs in the Albukamal region following the departure of the permanent commander, Haj Askar, and Haj Fajr al-Din on vacation in Iran to supervise the recruitment camps of IRGC members. It was also reported that the IRGC had recently issued updated instructions regarding the movement of IRGC commanders and operatives between Syria and Iran. According to these instructions, travel from Syria to Iran will be carried out through the international airport in Baghdad instead of through the airports in Damascus and Aleppo. The crossing between Syria and Iraq will be carried out through the Albukamal-al-Qaim land crossing, and from there by buses to Iraq. Travel to the other provinces in Syria will be carried out by buses intended for pilgrims to Shiite holy sites. These instructions are intended to increase the level of security of IRGC personnel during their movement to and from Syria (Ayn al-Furat, August 22-23, 2024). Activities of the Shiite militias Iraq Claims of responsibility of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for two drone attacks against Israel: August 27, 2024: Against a “vital target” in Haifa (Islamic Resistance in Iraq Telegram channel, August 27, 2024). The claim has not been verified. August 25, 2024: Against a “vital target” in Haifa. A video of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq documenting the launch, which took place on August 24, 2024, showed for the first time a map that allegedly showed the drone’s route from the al-Anbar Governorate in western Iraq towards the target in Haifa, marked on Mount Carmel (Islamic Resistance in Iraq Telegram channel, August 25, 2024). The claim has not been verified.     Right: The alleged launch zone in the al-Anbar Governorate in western Iraq. Left: The drone before the launch (Islamic Resistance in Iraq Telegram channel, August 25, 2024) The militias prepare for escalation “A source in the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee” said the Committee had convened to coordinate positions on “recent events in the region.” According to the source, most of the participants agreed to end the truce with the United States and renew the attacks against American bases in the region. It was also reported that the “resistance” would engage in precise military planning to carry out “powerful attacks” against the Americans (al-Akhbar, August 27, 2024). According to a “source close to the Iraqi militias,” the militias in Iraq are an important part of the “axis of resistance,” but they depend on coordination at the highest level regarding the decision to carry out direct attacks, whether against American or “Zionist” targets, in accordance with a fixed principle in dealing with the “aggression” that harms Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and other Palestinian cities. The source added that the militias also reserved the right to respond to US strikes and that there was no ceasefire with “treacherous force,” but that the time and place of the response would be subject to specific conditions that would determine when it would take place. The source also noted that “five Iraqi forces,” whose identities were not disclosed, asked the militias to hold a temporary ceasefire due to the complex circumstances in the region, but the militias attacked “targets deep inside the occupying country” (Baghdad Today, August 25, 2024). On August 25, 2024, the Ashab al-Kahf militia announced that with the end of Arbaeen Day, it had been decided to resume military operations against the “terrorist Zionist enemy” as part of the “support front” for the Gaza Strip (Ashab al-Kahf Telegram channel, August 25, 2024). According to a “knowledgeable source,” the American forces at the Ain al-Assad airbase in western Iraq and the Harir airbase in northern Iraq raised the alert level to the maximum following Hezbollah’s retaliation attack on Israel, in the expectation that the Iraqi militias might also operate (Baghdad Today, August 25, 2024). According to another report, a “source” said that the US had reinforced its military base in the al-Omar oil field in Syria. According to the source, the US transported 15 ammunition trucks and five military vehicles to the base, and an American cargo plane with thirty American soldiers landed at Kharab al-Jir Airport in the Damascus region (Sputnik in Arabic, August 27, 2024). “Iraqi sources” reported that Iran had ordered militias loyal to it in Iraq not to attack American bases in the country and to concentrate on attacks against Israel, to prevent American counterattacks that could lead Iraq to deterioration into a regional war. In addition, the “sources” claimed that Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia’ al-Sudani had worked to persuade the Americans not to respond to the attack on the Ain al-Assad base and also worked with the Iranians to convince the militias to stop the attacks against the American bases (1news-iq.com, August 22, 2024). Kadhim al-Fartousi, spokesman for the Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada militia, warned that if diplomatic efforts to end the American presence in Iraq failed, the militias would resume their activities to “liberate Iraqi lands.” In addition, Haidar al-Lami, a member of the Nujaba Movement’s political bureau, said “all options are open to attack all American bases within Iraq” (Asharq al-Awsat, August 21, 2024). Kata’ib Hezbollah spokesman Abu Ali al-Askari accused the United States and the United Kingdom of their “involvement in their unlimited military and political support in the war of genocide waged by the Zionist entity against the Palestinian people.” Regarding Iraq, he added that “if the Iraqi government does not punish the US ambassador of evil in Baghdad, we will punish her in other ways,” stressing that “we have no obligation to halt operations against American occupation forces in Iraq” (Abu Ali al-Askari’s Telegram channel, August 21, 2024). Yemen Houthi military activity On August 22, 2024, Houthi armed forces spokesman Yahya Saria reported two attacks against vessels using UAVs, unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles (Yahya Saria’s X account, August 22, 2024): Against the oil tanker Sounion while it was sailing in the Red Sea. According to Saria, the hit was precise, leaving the tanker at risk of sinking. In addition, a video was released allegedly documenting the attack on the tanker (Yahya Saria’s X account, August 23, 2024). Against the ship North Wind 1 while it was sailing in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. According to Saria, the hit was precise (Yahya Saria’s X account, August 23, 2024). The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) agency reported that the ship had been attacked by Houthi forces in the Gulf of Aden. According to its statement, the crew reported several explosions near the ship, followed by a USV attack that caused minor damage. The crew reported that the vessel was continuing on its way to its destination (UKMTO X account, August 21-23, 2024). The alleged documentation of the Houthi attack on the Sounion tanker (the Houthi armed forces’ media arm X account, August 23, 2024) On August 22, 2024, the European Union Red Sea Task Force (EUNAVFOR Aspides) reported that it had sent a ship to assist the Greek-flagged tanker MV Sounion after it was attacked on August 21, 2024, and its engine stopped working while in international waters in the southern Red Sea. The aid ship destroyed a threatening Houthi USV and evacuated the entire crew to Djibouti (Operation EUNAVFOR Aspides X account, August 22, 2024). The task force also said that on August 23, 2024, a fire broke out in a tanker carrying 150,000 tons of crude oil and that the tanker posed “a significant environmental threat that could lead to an ecological disaster with potentially devastating effects on biodiversity in the region” (Operation EUNAVFOR Aspides X account, August 24, 2024). On August 27, 2024, the US Department of Defense reported that the tanker was still stuck in the Red Sea, where it was on fire and there was an oil spill (US Department of Defense website, August 27, 2024).     Right: Rescue of the tanker’s crew (Operation EUNAVFOR Aspides X account, August 22, 2024). Left: Documentation of the fires on board the tanker (Operation EUNAVFOR Aspides X account, August 26, 2024) The US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that during the past week, its forces had intercepted two drones over the Red Sea. In addition, CENTCOM forces destroyed a UAV, a surface-to-air missile, a missile system, and a radar station in airstrikes carried out in Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen (CENTCOM X account, August 21-28, 2024). Houthi preparations for an attack against Israel Houthi sources in Sana’a confirmed that the process of marking strategic targets deep in Israel had been completed in preparation for the response to the Israeli attack on the port of al-Hudaydah on July 20, 2024.[4] The “sources” noted that the response to the Israeli attack would be from Yemen, but that the Houthis also continued to coordinate with the other members of the “axis of resistance” the “joint response” to the killing of Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’ political bureau, in Tehran and the killing of Hezbollah’s military commander Fuad Shukr in Beirut. According to the “sources,” the Houthi drone attack in Tel Aviv on July 19, 2024, was the only one so far in the “fifth phase” of the escalation, and “the capabilities of the Houthi forces in the fifth phase are completely different from the previous stages, especially with regard to drones, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles with new ranges.” The report also quoted “informed military sources” as saying that the Houthis discussed with the “axis of resistance” the damage to Israeli natural gas rigs in the Mediterranean, the supply of oil and fuel tanks at the ports of Ashdod, Haifa, and other areas, and that there was a possibility of joint action between the Houthis and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (al-Akhbar, August 28, 2024). On August 25, 2024, senior Houthi military officials convened a meeting in Sana’a, during which Yemeni Defense Minister Mohammad al-Atifi declared that the Yemeni armed forces were on the highest level of alert to inflict “painful blows” deep inside the “Zionist entity.” He added that the “Zionist entity” would pay a heavy price for the continued violation of Yemen’s sovereignty and the attack on al-Hudaydah. According to al-Atifi, the target bank includes “the most important points in enemy territory” and was defined “with maximum precision and underwent deep intelligence analysis.” According to him, the Houthis’ missile systems, drones, and navy possess capabilities that enable them to carry out “precise” operations (Houthi armed forces’ media arm X account, August 25, 2024). On August 23, 2024, the leader of the Houthi movement in Yemen, Abd al-Malik al-Houthi, delivered his weekly speech, in which he stressed the psychological effects of the delay in implementing the Houthi response to the Israeli attack on the port of al-Hudaydah and the retaliatory attacks carried out by Hezbollah and Iran in response to the assassinations attributed to Israel. According to al-Houthi, one of the reasons for the delay in these attacks is the planning process, but he noted that the delay also creates “anxiety” among the Israeli population, which expects “the inevitable response” (al-Masirah, August 23, 2024). The post Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (August 21-28, 2024) appeared first on The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center.

Overview[1] On October 8, 2023, following the Hamas terrorist attack and massacre carried out the previous day, Hezbollah opened a front against Israel from Lebanon “in support of the Gaza Strip.” Since the beginning of the fighting, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Amal, al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyya, the Lebanese Resistance Brigades and the Syrian Social-Nationalist Party have joined Hezbollah in the fighting, to a greater or lesser degree. Unlike Hezbollah, which has so far claimed responsibility for more than 2,200 attacks, the auxiliary organizations have claimed responsibility for “only” a few dozens. Most were rocket fire targeting military and civilian sites in northern Israel, along with attempts to penetrate the border and exchanges of fire with IDF forces. Although there are ideological and religious differences between Hezbollah and most of the other organizations, they have been cooperating since the days of the Israeli presence in south Lebanon and the Second Lebanon War. In ITIC assessment, the auxiliary organizations’ operations are fully coordinated with Hezbollah, and sometimes the operate in concert. As long as the fighting between Israel and Lebanon is waged within the framework of the so-called “equations,” Hezbollah can be expected to limit the organizations’ activities. However, in the event of further escalation and an all-out war, Hezbollah will most likely loosen the reins and give them more freedom to attack Israeli territory, IDF forces and civilians. The Palestinian Organizations in Lebanon Hamas Order of combat and deployment The Hamas branch in Lebanon operates mainly in the -Burj al-Shemali and al-Buss Palestinian refugee camps near Tyre in south Lebanon, but it also has a presence in the Burj al-Barajneh refugee camp in Beirut and the Ein al-Hilweh refugee camp near Sidon.[2] According to estimates, Hamas in Lebanon has about 1,500 fighters who underwent training in Iran (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 15, 2023). According to reports, since October 7, 2023, Hamas has been recruiting more fighters in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon (al-Jazeera, December 18, 2023). Senior Hamas operatives and senior Lebanese figures stated that in recent months hundreds of new operatives from 12 Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon joined the ranks of the Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military wing. However, most of the recruits apparently remain in the camps to assist with local activities, and only occasionally go to the Israeli border region, usually to fire rockets. A New York Times correspondent who visited the Ein al-Hilweh refugee camp in Sidon reported seeing recruiting posters in the streets which offered training for the “new al-Aqsa generation” (New York Times, August 24, 2024). In December 2023, Hamas announced a new youth movement called “Pioneers of the al-Aqsa Flood” in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, especially in Ein al-Hilweh. According to Hamas, its objective was to establish a cadre to serve as “a resistance vanguard force which will participate in the liberation of Jerusalem and al-Aqsa Mosque.” In reality, the objective is to provide an organizational framework for ideological recruitment and to train young Palestinians in the refugee camps in Lebanon as terrorist operatives to fight Israel from the Lebanese border, following the model of youth movements of other terrorist organizations.[3] A boy who joined “Pioneers of the al-Aqsa Flood” (“The 2006 war is remembered and will not be repeated” X account December 12, 2023) Attacking Israel Since October 8, 2023, Hamas’ military wing in Lebanon has claimed responsibility for 13 attacks on Israel, the two first of which were firing 15 rockets at the Western Galilee on October 10, 2023 and an attempted cross-border infiltration by three nukhba operatives on October 14, 2023. Their main activity has been firing concentrated rocket barrages at civilian and military targets, mainly in the Western Galilee, but also at more distant targets, including a 15 rocket attack on Haifa Bay on November 12, 2023. Hamas operatives also made attempts to infiltrate Israeli territory and shoot at IDF forces in the border regions.       Launching rockets at IDF posts andcamps on the northern border (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, May 3, 2024). The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Order of combat and deployment The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) has an active presence in the refugee camps in Lebanon and Syria. The networks are closely connected, operate together and can be regarded as a single unit. Their facilities include headquarters, offices, weapons and training bases. The ITIC does not have exact data on the number of PIJ operatives in south Lebanon, but according to the PIJ mourning notices for 23 of its operatives killed in the fighting, 19 belonged to the Syrian branch of the Jerusalem Brigades, the PIJ’s military wing, and therefore it can be assumed that the organization relies mainly on moving manpower from Syria to south Lebanon. Attacks on Israel Since the start of hostilities, the Jerusalem Brigades have carried out at least seven attacks, most of them attempts to infiltrate into Israeli territory while firing small arms at IDF forces. The Jerusalem Brigades’ only claim of responsibility was issued on October 9, 2023, following an infiltration in the north of the country in which three IDF soldiers were killed. The PIJ confirmed that two of its operatives were killed (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, October 9, 2023; Quds Agency, October 10, 2023). Regarding 18 other operatives, according to reports they were killed while performing their “combat duty” or “jihad duty” on the border of “occupied Palestine,” without specifying the circumstances. Coordination between Hezbollah and the Palestinian organizations Cooperation between Hamas and Hezbollah has increased since 2017, when Yahya al-Sinwar was elected head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip and worked to restore the movement’s relations with Iran, Hezbollah and Syria, which had deteriorated after Hamas supported the uprising against the Assad regime in 2011. In addition, senior Hamas figures moved to Lebanon after being forced to leave Turkey, led by Saleh al-‘Arouri, deputy chairman of the Hamas political bureau, who became Hamas’ main liaison with Hezbollah. He held the position until he was eliminated in the Hezbollah stronghold of Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in southern Beirut on January 2, 2024. Six other Hamas terrorist operatives were killed in the attack, including Samir Fendi who was responsible for Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades activities in Lebanon (New Lines Magazine, November 3, 2023).[4] PIJ leader Ziyad al-Nakhalah has also been living in Lebanon since he left Syria in 2011, and he maintains regular and close contact with the Hezbollah leadership.[5] Na’im Qassem, Hezbollah deputy secretary general, confirmed the existence of intelligence coordination between Hezbollah and Hamas during Operation Guardian of the Walls in May 2021 (al-Mayadeen, July 8, 2021). On June 29, 2021, the late Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, met in Beirut with Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah secretary general, to sum up Operation Guardian of the Walls, and according to reports they noted that the depth of relations between Hezbollah and Hamas was essential for the “resistance axis”[6] (al-Manar, June 29, 2021). On April 6, 2023, Hamas fired 34 rockets at Israel from south Lebanon, simultaneously with rocket fire attacking Israel from the Gaza Strip and southern Syria. The excuse for the rocket fire was the clashes between Israeli police officers and Palestinians in front of al-Aqsa Mosque, however, according to reports, the rocket fire was coordinated between Hamas, Hezbollah and Esmail Qaani, commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps’ Qods Force.[7] “Palestinian sources” reported that after Operation al-Aqsa Flood began on October 7, 2023, Hamas and PIJ operatives in Lebanon moved to the south of the country under the auspices of Hezbollah (al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 15, 2023). Ihsan Ataya, who is head of the PIJ department for Arab and international affairs, a member of the political bureau and PIJ representative in Lebanon, said there was coordination between the “Palestinian resistance” and the “resistance axis” at the highest levels, especially Hezbollah, and that joint operations rooms had been established to monitor “the progress of the fighting from all angles” (al-‘Ahed, October 26, 2023). Ibrahim al-Amin, editor-in-chief of the Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese daily al-Akhbar, and who is considered close to Hassan Nasrallah, reported that a joint operations room of all “resistance axis” members had been established after October 7, 2023 for the daily coordination of the fighting on the ground as well as to coordinate strategic and political activity (al-Akhbar, October 20, 2023). On September 2, 2023, about a month before the Hamas terrorist attack and massacre of October 7, 2023, Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah secretary general, met with Saleh al-‘Arouri, deputy head of Hamas’ political bureau, and Ziyad al-Nakhalah, PIJ secretary general. According to reports they discussed the “firm, determined position of all the resistance axis forces in confronting the Zionist enemy” and the importance of “permanent daily coordination” of the entire “resistance” movement, especially in “Palestine” and Lebanon, during war as well (al-Manar, September 2, 2023). On October 25, 2023, Nasrallah, al-‘Arouri and al-Nakhalah met and reportedly agreed to continue coordinating and monitoring developments on a regular, daily basis (al-Nashra, October 25, 2023). On May 15, 2024, Nasrallah met with a delegation of senior Hamas figures, which included Khalil al-Haya and Muhammad Nasr, both members of the Hamas political bureau, and Osama Hamdan, the ranking Hamas member in Lebanon. They reportedly discussed the latest events and developments in the Gaza Strip and Israel, and emphasized the unity and cooperation of the various arenas (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, May 15, 2024).     Right: al-‘Arouri (right), Nasrallah and al-Nakhalah (left) (al-Manar, September 2, 2023). Left: Nasrallah (second from the right) and the Hamas delegation (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, May 15, 2024) At the beginning of the war, Israel’s security establishment identified Palestinian terrorist operatives, mostly from the PIJ, who operated as an organic force within Hezbollah’s Radwan Force and wore Hezbollah uniforms. According to reports, Hezbollah added hundreds of PIJ terrorist operatives to its ranks to fight on the northern border (Israeli Kan 11 TV, February 13, 2024). On August 28, 2024, Faras Qassem, a senior PIJ terrorist operative, was eliminated in an Israeli Air Force aircraft attack on the Syria-Lebanon border. According to reports, he was responsible for formulating the operational plans of the PIJ in Syria and Lebanon and participated in recruiting Palestinian terrorist operatives for Hezbollah. It was reported that several other PIJ operatives en route to Lebanon to join Hezbollah were also killed (IDF spokesperson, August 28, 2024). The PIJ’s military wing confirmed that Faras Hussein Qassem was killed with two other operatives from the Jerusalem Brigades’ Syrian branch “while carrying out their jihad duty” (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, August 28, 2024). Hezbollah also confirmed that one of its operatives was killed in the attack (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 28, 2024). Activity decreases as the fighting progresses The vast majority of Hamas and the PIJ attacks targeting Israel from south Lebanon were carried out in the first months of the fighting, and a sharp decrease began in February 2024. The last Hamas claim of responsibility was issued on May 15, 2024, and the last PIJ claim on May 8, 2024. Ihsan Ataya, the PIJ representative in Lebanon, said that military operations depended on the close monitoring of the Israeli army patrols, their vehicles, soldiers and officers, to ensure they were in firing range, but the IDF forces had increased their precautionary measures on the northern border. He said no decision prevented the Palestinian “organizations” from fighting the “enemy,” they were prepared to attack any “enemy military target” and were fully coordinated with the “resistance” forces in south Lebanon. However he added, the fighting also continued in other arenas. Naji Malaeb, a Lebanese military expert, pointed out that the Palestinians’ “limited weapons” had little effect on the fighting compared to Hezbollah’s weapons. He added that Israel’s intelligence and air superiority made it difficult for Palestinian “militants” to operate in south Lebanon. He also mentioned that the Palestinian organizations wanted to avoid giving Israel a reason to attack the refugee camps (al-Jazeera, February 17, 2024). The Amal Movement[8] Order of combat and deployment According to reports, Amal has more than 17,000 armed operatives, including 2,200 operatives in elite forces trained to carry out “takeover and sabotage” operations. The Amal forces are also reportedly responsible for protecting settlements and that each group is accompanied by a company of elite fighters (al-Mahatta YouTube channel, December 28, 2023). Since October 8, 2023, Amal has deployed its fighters along the entire length of the border, from al-Naqoura in the west to Mt. Hermon in the east (al-Nahar, November 2, 2023; al-Akhbar, February 6, 2024). Muhammad Khawaja, Amal faction representative in the Lebanese Parliament, claimed the movement had a presence “in all the villages on the southern border” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 5, 2024). Attacks on Israel Amal does not provide details about its combat activities. So far, 20 Amal operatives have been reported killed in the fighting, but the circumstances were not reported, only that they were killed “while fulfilling their jihadist and national duty in the defense of Lebanon and the south” (al-Akhbar, February 6, 2024). According to reports, Amal attacked Israel with artillery and Katyusha and Grad rockets (al-Mahatta YouTube channel, December 28, 2023). Hashem Jaber, a retired lieutenant general in the Lebanese army, claimed Amal’s combat activity was “limited and symbolic” compared to Hezbollah and carried out under Hezbollah aegis (al-Nahar, November 2, 2023). Amal and Hezbollah connections Like Hezbollah, Amal is a Shiite movement. However, while Hezbollah is a religious organization operating according to the concepts and perceptions of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Amal is more secular. Nevertheless, Amal and Hezbollah were closely allied politically, and were known in Lebanon as the “Shi’ite couple.” Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, Amal’s leader, said the movement stood with Hezbollah in the defense of all Lebanese territories, but admitted that it did not have Hezbollah’s military capabilities (Lebanese NBN network, February 4, 2024). Although Berri, as speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, is supposed to represent the interests of the entire Lebanese population, he is Hezbollah’s official representative in the diplomatic talks currently being held, mainly with the United States and France, to end the fighting in south Lebanon and later to demark the Lebanon-Israel border. Berri himself said he was not afraid of his diplomatic role because diplomatic resistance was an essential part of the resistance (Lebanese NBN network, February 4, 2024). Hassan Nasrallah and Nabih Berri (al-Nashra, October 25, 2016) Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Group)[9] Order of combat and deployment Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya operates a military wing called the al-Fajr Forces. It was established in 1982 with the outbreak of the First Lebanon War and operated against the IDF in Lebanon until 2000, when the IDF withdrew from the country. The force was concentrated in and around Sidon, and in current assessment the situation has not changed (al-Jazeera, May 11, 2024). Al-Fajr has about 500 operatives, but its potential for recruitment is high because of the economic hardships of the Sunni population in the north of the country (al-Hadath, June 22, 2024). A “source” in al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya confirmed that dozens of young men from Aqar and Tripoli in northern Lebanon have joined the al-Fajr Forces since the beginning of the fighting (Nidaa al-Watan, May 8, 2024). Muhammad Taqoush, movement’s secretary general, stated that “after the forces announced their military activity, we noticed that many young people, enthusiastic about what was happening in Palestine, wanted to be a part of defeating the occupier and resisting the enemy, so they visited our centers and met with a number of commanders to express their desire to join to our ranks” (al-Nashra, October 27, 2023). Al-Fajr operatives (Janoub360, April 30, 2024) Attacks on Israel When the fighting began on October 8, 2023, Bassam Hammoud, the al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya political bureau’s deputy head, called on its operatives to “seriously prepare to intervene in the war against Israel.” He reported al-Fajr operatives were on standby in the border areas to counter any Israeli “aggression” against Lebanon (al-Nashra, October 9, 2023). The movement claimed responsibility for firing five rocket barrages at the Kiryat Shmona region between October 18, 2023 and January 6, 2024 (al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya website, October 18, 2023: January 6, 2024). While there have been no claims of responsibility since January 6, 2024, Bassam Hammoud stated that al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya had not stopped attacking, claiming that al-Fajr operatives were in the field and continued operations as usual. He added that they would “continue to resist until the liberation of Lebanese lands and victory in the Gaza Strip” (al-Jadeed, June 25, 2024). Relations with Hamas Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya and Hamas are both branches of the Muslim Brotherhood and therefore share a close ideological kinship, but their cooperation increased significantly after the elections for the al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya Shura Council in September 2022, won by the faction led by Muhammad Taqoush and close to Hamas. According to reports, many senior al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya figures receive their salaries directly from Hamas (Asas Media, September 20, 2022). A “senior al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya figure” confirmed that the movement had been carrying out “joint combat operations” with Hamas in south Lebanon since October 8, 2023 (Arab News, March 28, 2024). Bassam Hammoud, deputy head of al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, said that “we and Hamas are two sides of the same coin in the confrontation with the Zionist enemy” (al-Jazeera, January 4, 2024). However, he also said that despite their ideological similarity, they had different opinions regarding internal issues in the Palestinian and Lebanese arenas (AWP, July 27, 2024). According to Muhannad al-Hajj Ali, a researcher at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya in fact operates as an affiliate of Hamas (al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 26, 2024). The similarity between al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya and Hamas is also reflected in the mourning notices for the ten al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya operatives killed in the fighting: The Israeli attack in Beirut on January 2, 2024, which eliminated Saleh al-‘Arouri, deputy head of Hamas’ political bureau, also killed Mahmoud Zaki Shahin and Mohammed Bashasha. Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya confirmed that the two were operatives in its rank, and that Shahin was a commander (al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya website, January 4, 2024). A senior al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya figure stated that the two had been al-‘Arouri’s bodyguards (Arab News, March 28, 2024). The mourning notice for Bashasha’s death was jointly issued by his family, al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya and Hamas, and showed the logos of both Hamas and al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya (saidaonline.com, January 4, 2024). The announcement of Bashasha’s death with the logos of Hamas (left) and al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya (saidaonline.com, January 4, 2024) On May 17, 2024, Sharhabil Ali al-Sayid was killed in an Israeli Air Force attack in the Lebanon Valley. The IDF spokesperson reported that al-Sayid had been a senior al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya operative in Lebanon and led many terrorist attacks on Israel in cooperation with Hamas in Lebanon (IDF spokesperson, May 17, 2024). He death was not mentioned on the al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya website in Lebanon, but the Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military wing, announced he had been a commander in the organization (Shehab, May 17, 2024). On July 18, 2024, Muhammad Hamed Jabara, aka Abu Mahmoud, was killed in an Israeli Air Force attack in the Lebanon Valley. The IDF spokesperson stated he was a Hamas operative and responsible for promoting attacks and rocket fire from Lebanon, some in cooperation with al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya in Lebanon (IDF spokesperson, July 18, 2024). Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya claimed him as a senior al-Fajr commander (al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya Telegram channel, July 18, 2024). Hamas’ military wing referred to him as a “commander” (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, July 18, 2024). His coffin was draped with the flags of Lebanon, the al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, the Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades and the Palestinian flag (Muhammad Abd al-Aziz-Gaza’s X account, July 19, 2024). His ID and Lebanese internal security forces’ cards (valid until April 5, 2028) were made public; he was a retired officer with the rank of deputy lieutenant. It has been claimed that Lebanon disguises terrorist operatives by providing them with identification from its internal security forces (Tanzim Thuwwar Lebanon X account , July 19, 2024). Right to left: Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya mourning notice for Jabara (al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya Telegram channel, July 18, 2024); Hamas mourning notice (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, July 18, 2024); Jabara’s flag-draped coffin (Muhammad Abd al-Aziz-Gaza’s X account, July 19, 2024); Jabara’s Lebanese internal security forces retired officer’s certificate and his identity card (Tanzim Thuwwar Lebanon X Account, July 19, 2024) Connections with Hezbollah Despite the profound ideological differences between Sunni al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya and Shi’ite Hezbollah, they have cooperated in the past. Ibrahim al-Masri, one of al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya’s founders, said that al-Fajr operatives participated in the fighting against Israel in south Lebanon in 1982 and “carried out resistance operations” in coordination with Hezbollah operatives, and since then had supported the organization (al-Arabiya, August 1, 2006). In recent years, al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya and Hezbollah have drifted apart. After the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri, the former Lebanese prime minister, in February 2005, al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya joined the March 8 Camp of Hezbollah opponents, like most of the Sunni population in Lebanon. After the outbreak of the civil war in Syria in 2011, al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya supported the rebels, while Hezbollah assisted the Syrian army in its repression (L’Orient Today, November 2, 2023). After the election of Muhammad Taqoush as head of al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya in September 2022, Hamas-encouraged rapprochement between the organizations began, and Taqoush met with Hassan Nasrallah (Carnegie Endowment, October 17, 2022). He said, “We agree with Hezbollah on many issues, including fighting the Israeli enemy, and we disagree on other issues. We and Hezbollah are similar in many matters” (al-Akhbar, December 9, 2022). When the current fighting in south Lebanon began, Taqoush hinted at cooperation, or at least coordination, with Hezbollah. He pointed out that “there is no harm or embarrassment in coordinating with the Shi’ite resistance faction,” and added that the operations of al-Fajr operatives on the Israel-Lebanon border were not coordinated with Hezbollah, but communication at the level of senior officials and operatives in the southern arena existed and was slowly increasing in order to identify targets and attack the “enemy” (al-Nashra, October 27, 2023). He added that “coordination with the Shi’ite Hezbollah is essential to fight Israel” (Arab News, March 26, 2024). Bassem Hammoud, deputy head of al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya’s political bureau, stated that fighting Israel “requires closing ranks, unifying positions and coordinating on the ground,” despite the fact that there were still differences regarding internal Lebanese politics (AWP, July 27, 2024). On June 28, 2024, Hassan Nasrallah met with Muhammad Taqoush, and they agreed that the “resistance” forces had to continue cooperating in order to support the Gazans (al-Akhbar, June 28, 2024). According to reports, the meeting provided a basis for new relations between the movements, after for years al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya had belonged to the camp opposed to Hezbollah in Lebanon. A “senior al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya source” said that the objective of the meeting was to establish cooperation and coordination for the purpose of managing the campaign in south Lebanon, but he had reservations regarding a future political alliance between the parties because of Hezbollah’s involvement in the war in Syria and negative behavior towards Sunnis in Lebanon (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 28, 2024). Nasrallah meets with Taqoush (al-Akhbar Telegram channel, June 28, 2024) According to a “source” in north Lebanon, Hezbollah and al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya need each other, since Hezbollah needs a Sunni faction to refute the claims that it decided on its own to take Lebanon on a “combat adventure” and that the other sectors of the Lebanese population were not part of the decision. Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyya exploited Hezbollah’s decision to attack Israel from south Lebanon to regain a popular base in areas where it previously operated at the parliamentary and public level (Nidaa al-Watan, May 8, 2024). The Lebanese Resistance Brigades[10] Order of combat and deployment According to “sources,” the Lebanese Resistance Brigades have more than 10,000 fighters, most of them Sunni. It was also reported that since the beginning of the fighting in south Lebanon, its operatives were in the rear posts on the border and worked in the field of logistical support (MTV, July 16, 2024). Attacks on Israel On July 15, 2024, the Lebanese Resistance Brigades stated that since the beginning of the fighting in south Lebanon on October 8, 2023, the organization’s operatives had been present in the field and carried out logistical support missions which had claimed dead and wounded. However, in view of the developments on the ground, they announced they were also engaged in “directly dealing with any threat,” and wanted to convey the message that the Lebanese people would not waive their right to defend their land and sovereignty, and that Lebanese youth would not remain neutral to threats. The organization also claimed to be highly prepared to deal with any threat or “foolish attempt by the enemy” (al-Mayadeen, July 15, 2024). A “senior source” in the Lebanese Resistance Brigades stated that they joined the fighting on October 10, 2023, along with the “resistance” in south Lebanon, and that they were effectively involved on the “frontline of the confrontation with the Zionist enemy on the ground to confront and protect Lebanon.” “The source” claimed the Brigades were a “parallel deterrent force” to Hezbollah, but rejected the claims that they might replace Hezbollah fighters if the latter had to retreat to the north of the Litani River after the war, with the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (al-Nabā’, Kuwait , July 17, 2024). So far, the organization has claimed responsibility for two attacks: July 12, 2024: A rocket attack on an IDF post. According to a Lebanese Resistance Brigades’ operations room statement to the Israeli “occupation,” the objective of the attack was to support the Palestinian people and protect Lebanon. It was also carried out to mark the 18th anniversary of the Second Lebanon War and the organization’s commitment “to continue the resistance until victory and liberation” (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, July 12, 2024). July 19, 2024: An anti-tank missile and artillery attack on an IDF post (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, July 19, 2024).     Lebanese Resistance Brigades terrorist operatives (Right: al-‘Ahed, February 14, 2020. Left: al-Mayadeen, July 13, 2024) The Syrian Social-Nationalist Party[11] Order of combat and deployment The Syrian Social Nationalist Party operates a military wing called Eagles of the Storm, which was established in 1974 and participated in the civil war in Lebanon and in fighting against the IDF forces and the South Lebanese army. In 1985 was also responsible for the first suicide bombing attack carried out by a woman. During the Syrian Civil War, its military wing helped the Assad regime and the forces loyal to it against the rebels, and then participated alongside them in the fight against ISIS (Clingendael, January 2019). The Eagles of the Storm are estimated to have between 6,000 and 8,000 operative, most of them Christians but some Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims. The party is active in various areas in Lebanon and in the rural areas of Homs and Hamat in Syria (Foreign Policy, March 28, 2016). In March 2023, Rabi’ Banat, the party president, announced a “return to the jihad arena.” Maher al-Dana, head of media relations, said they had decided “to confront Israel” and accused that the previous party leadership party of “preferring political and government jobs at the expense of the resistance activity in the south” (Nidaa al-Watan, April 7, 2023). On May 29, 2023, a high-ranking delegation of the party’s leadership visited an Eagles’ military site in south Lebanon near the Israeli border to examine the combat readiness of its operatives (Lebanese News Agency, May 29, 2023). Attacks on Israel On October 7, 2023, the party congratulated Hamas for its attack on Israel and claimed that Operation al-Aqsa Flood established an equation of “the unity of the arenas” and united the fronts of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, South Lebanon and the Golan Heights. They noted their “absolute readiness” to participate in the fighting and announced that they were on full alert (al-Jadid, October 7, 2023). On October 8, 2023, the Eagles of the Storm issued a video of anti-tank missiles being prepared for launch. The caption read, “When determination combines with the will to resist, you will find our eagles soaring over the south to free Palestine together, all of Palestine, from […] the occupier.” They also wrote, “We promise and pledge to you that the struggle will continue until victory and liberation” (Eagles of the Storm X account, October 8, 2023). An operative next to an anti-tank missile (Eagles of the Storm X account, October 8, 2023) Rabi’ Banat, the party president, claimed the “resistance” in Lebanon, including the Eagles of the Storm, was ready to “follow what the resistance started in Palestine.” Amer al-Tal, head of the party’s supreme council, said the party was ” fully prepared to prepare the Eagles for entering the jihad arena” (Party website, October 12, 2023). “Senior sources” in the party claimed the Eagles had been present in south Lebanon “since the 1990s,” and that the party had “centers whose sole purpose is to protect the honor of our nation” (Sada Wadi al-Tim, December 15, 2023). In July 2024, Rabi’ Banat reported that its operatives would remain “at the forefront of the fight against the enemy” and that “the jihad arena will not lose its Eagle friends” (Party website, July 23, 2024). The Syrian Social-Nationalist Party and its military wing have not claimed responsibility for direct attacks on Israel, but the reports of the only two Eagles of the Storm casualties indicate that they were on the front lines in south Lebanon. According to the mourning notice for Wissam Salim, the first terrorist operative to be killed, he died “at point-blank range while performing his national duty in south Lebanon” (Party website, December 15, 2023). According to the mourning notice for Ibrahim Akram al-Musawi, the second terrorist operative to be killed, he “performed his national duty in south Lebanon in resistance at point-blank range” (the party’s website, July 22, 2024). Connections with Hezbollah The Eagles of the Strom and Hezbollah have had long-standing cooperation since the period of fighting the IDF in south Lebanon, then in the Second Lebanon War in 2006 and in the armed conflicts between Hezbollah and the Sunni militias in Lebanon in 2008. The cooperation continued during the Syrian Civil War, when Hezbollah operatives provided Eagles’ operatives with military training (Foreign Policy, March 28, 2016). Maher al-Dana, head of media relations, stated that the Eagles of the Storm and Hezbollah had a “partnership in blood” (Nidaa al-Watan, April 7, 2023). Their coordination continues in the current fighting in south Lebanon. According to reports, Wissam Salim, the Eagles’ first casualty, was killed in December 2023 by an Israeli attack on “a group of resistance fighters operating against enemy positions on the southern border,” while Hezbollah also announced that one of its operatives had been killed in the same attack (al-Akhbar, December 16, 2023) . During Salim’s funeral, Rabi’ Banat, the Party president, thanked Hassan Nasrallah, calling him “the master of the resistance and the leader of the axis.”[12] He praised Nasrallah for his “tremendous effort in managing this war in all its political, military, strategic, social and cultural aspects” (Party website, December 16, 2023). Maher al-Dana, head of media relations, said they had established a joint operations room which coordinated the activities of all the “resistance” organizations operating in south Lebanon. He called coordination with Hezbollah “great, both in details and in the whole plan” (al-‘Ahed, December 19, 2023). Appendix A: Casualties Between beginning of the fighting on October 8, 2023 and August 29, 2024, Hezbollah reported 419 operatives killed. The six organizations supporting Hezbollah reported 69 operatives killed: Appendix B: Claims of Responsibility Hamas-Lebanon October 10, 2023: A “concentrated” launch of rockets targeting the Western Galilee (Hamas Telegram channel, October 10, 2023). October 15, 2023: Twenty rockets fired at Shlomi and Nahariya (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, December 25, 2023). October 19, 2023: A barrage of thirty rockets fired at Nahariya, Shlomi and the Western Galilee (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, October 19, 2023). November 2, 2023: Twelve rockets fired at Kiryat Shmona and its surroundings (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, November 2, 2023). November 6, 2023: Twelve rockets fired at Nahariya and northern Haifa (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, November 6, 2023). November 12, 2023: Rocket barrages fired at northern Haifa, Shlomi and Nahariya (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, November 12, 2023). December 25, 2023: Rocket barrage fired at the Western Galilee (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, December 25, 2023). January 17, 2024: Twenty rockets fired at the Upper Galilee (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, January 17, 2024). February 28, 2024: Barrage of 40 Grad rockets fired at the Western Galilee (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, February 28, 2024). April 21, 2024: Twenty Grad rockets fired at the Upper Galilee (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, April 21, 2024). April 29, 2024: “Concentrated” rocket barrages fired at the Upper Galilee (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, April 29, 2024). May 15, 2024: “Concentrated” rocket barrages fired at the Western Galilee (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, May 15, 2024). July 20, 2024: Barrage of rockets at the Upper Galilee (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, July 20, 2024). PIJ-Lebanon On October 9, 2023, the PIJ claimed responsibility for the infiltration of a squad of terrorist operatives from Lebanese territory into Israel and shooting at IDF forces. Three IDF soldiers were killed; two PIJ were killed (RT network in the Arabic language, October 9, 2023). Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya October 18, 2023: Rockets fired at “the positions of the Zionist enemy in the occupied territories” (al-Akhbar, October 18, 2023). January 5, 2024: Two rocket barrages fired at Kiryat Shmona (al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya website, January 6, 2024). The Lebanese Resistance Brigades July 12, 2024: Rockets fired at an IDF post to mark the 18th anniversary of the Second Lebanon War (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, July 12, 2024). July 19, 2024: Anti-tank missiles launched and artillery fired at an IDF post (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, July 19, 2024). The post The Organizations Assisting Hezbollah in Combat Against Israel appeared first on The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center.

*Updated from October 8, 2023 Overview[1] This past week Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 48 attacks on military and civilian targets in Israel. Two civilians and a member of a security squad were injured and there was considerable property damage. Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked Hezbollah targets and operatives in south Lebanon and the Lebanon Valley. Hezbollah announced the death of one of its operatives. An attempted targeted attack was carried out to eliminate a senior terrorist operative of Hamas in Lebanon; the attack failed. Hezbollah-affiliated media outlets falsely claimed that the attack on the IDF intelligence base carried out in retaliation for the killing of Fuad Shukr was successful. The claim has led to increasing assessment that Hezbollah is trying to avoid escalation and a comprehensive war. The UN Security Council extended UNIFIL’s mandate for another year. Syria: Three operatives of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s military wing and a Hezbollah operative were killed in an Israeli Air Force attack on a vehicle near the border with Lebanon. South Lebanon Hezbollah attacks During the past week (August 26 to September 2, 2024), Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 48 attacks on military and civilian targets in northern Israel, compared to 72 attacks the previous week. The attacks were carried out using anti-tank missiles, artillery, UAVs and various types of rockets. Increased use of explosive drones: This past week Hezbollah claimed responsibility for three explosive drone attacks on surveillance cameras located in IDF posts on the northern border (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 26-27, 2024). In ITIC assessment, Hezbollah will increase its use of explosive drones to attack surveillance cameras, communication and electrical cables, and technical equipment at IDF posts, because the drones are inexpensive, can focus on a target with great precision and are extremely difficult to intercept.     Explosive drone attacks on surveillance cameras located at IDF posts (Right: Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 28, 2024. Left: Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 29, 2024) The attacks according to Hezbollah (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, as of 1 p.m., August 26 – September 2, 2024): September 2, 2024: Three attacks. An anti-tank missile hit a house in a moshav near the border. There were no casualties, the house was damaged (Israeli media, September 2, 2024). September 1, 2024: Ten attacks. A civilian was seriously injured and a member of a security squad was also injured by an anti-tank missile. An anti-tank missile hit a building in Kiryat Shmona; there were no casualties. Ten rockets were fired into the Western Galilee, most of them falling in an open area; there were no casualties. An explosive drone hit near the border; there were no casualties. Twenty rockets were fired at the Mount Miron area. Rockets hit in an open area in a moshav, causing a fire; no casualties were reported (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, September 1, 2024). August 31, 2024: Six attacks. A UAV fell in an open area and a rocket hit near the border; there were no casualties (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 31, 2024). August 30, 2024: Six attacks. Rockets were fired into Israeli territory from south Lebanon from a launcher damaged in an Israeli Air Force attack. One of the rockets fell in an open area. Forty rockets were fired into the Western Galilee, hitting populated areas. An explosive drone exploded in Metula, causing minor damage to various facilities. There were no casualties (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 30, 2024). August 29, 2024: Ten attacks. A UAV launched from Syrian territory was intercepted before it crossed the border into Israel. UAVs fell in the northern Golan Heights, causing fires. Anti-tank missiles were fired at Mount Dov. There were no casualties (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 29, 2024). August 28, 2024: Six attacks. Rockets fell in the Kiryat Shmona area; there were no casualties (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 28, 2024). August 27, 2024: Four attacks. An IDF soldier was injured when a UAV fell near Safed (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 27, 2024). August 26, 2024 (as of 1 p.m.): Three attacks. UAVs fell in the Upper Galilee and one fell in the Western Galilee. There were no casualties (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 26, 2024). Hezbollah UAVs According to a lone report, Hezbollah and Iran have spent 20 years developing UAVs, but the sanctions imposed on them have so far prevented them from developing the UAVs to a technological level which would allow them to overcome Israel’s GPS jamming, which still maintains an advantage (MTV Lebanon, August 30, 2024). IDF response In response to Hezbollah’s attacks, Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked Hezbollah targets and operatives in south Lebanon and the Lebanon Valley, including armed squads of terrorist operatives, terrorist facilities, buildings used for military purposes, munitions warehouses, observation posts, launching positions and rocket launchers (IDF spokesperson, August 26-September 2, 2024). An attack on a truck, apparently belonging to Hezbollah, in the north of the Lebanon Valley, was attributed to Israel. After the attack a number of secondary explosions occurred (indicating the truck was carrying weapons. The explosions led to the evacuation of local residents (al-Nahar, August 28, 2024).     Right: The attack on the truck in the Lebanon Valley (al-Nahar, August 28, 2024). Left: Attack on a building in al-Adeisa (IDF spokesperson, August 27, 2024) This past week Hezbollah reported the death of one operative in south Lebanon, Hussein Ahmed al-Musawi, known as Maytham al-Sid, born in 1996, from al-Nabi Chit in the Lebanon Valley (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, September 1, 2024). Hussein Ahmed al-Musawi (Telegram channel of Hezbollah’s combat propaganda arm, September 1, 2024) Attempted elimination of senior Hamas terrorist operative According to reports, on August 26, 2024, an Israeli drone launched two missiles at a car parked [at the side of the road] between the towns of ‘Abra and the Saida neighborhood near the al-Shama’ highway close to Sidon. The attack reportedly targeted Nidal Halihal, aka Abu Omar, a senior Hamas terrorist who was hit while leaving his home towards his car, and the lower part of his body was seriously injured (al-Nahar; al-‘Ahed, August 26, 2024). A “Lebanesesecurity source” claimed Halihal had been “slightly injured” (al-Jazeera, August 26, 2024).     Halihali’s vehicle after the attack near Sidon (Right: al-‘Ahed, August 26, 2024. Left: al-Nahar, August 26,2024) Possible Hezbollah Attempts to Prevent Escalation Following the Hezbollah rocket and UAV attack on Israel on August 25, 2024, in retaliation for the elimination of Fuad Shukr, the organization’s military commander,[2] it is of increasing considered opinion that Hezbollah does not want to escalate the fighting and the chances of a comprehensive war’s breaking out on the northern border have decreased: The al-Mayadeen network, which is affiliated with Hezbollah and the “resistance axis,”[3] cited “knowledgeable sources” who claimed Israel had “confirmed” Hezbollah had hit an Israeli intelligence base as part of the attack called Operation Arba’in.[4] The “sources” claimed that six drones hit the base and IDF forces closed the area for several hours to prevent soldiers and civilians from approaching or entering the base. They also claimed that the operation “was successful beyond the shadow of a doubt” as far as Hezbollah was concerned (al-Mayadeen, August 29, 2024). The Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese daily al-Akhbar also claimed that six drones launched at the base all hit their target (al-Akhbar, August 29, 2024). Contrary to Hezbollah’s claims, neither the intelligence base nor the air force base was actually attacked and no damage was caused. Simia, the electronic unit of Hezbollah’s Executive Committee, issued a notice called Operation Arba’in, which claimed the organization had reacted in a “strong, considered” manner and had not dragged the region into war. It listed as its achievements equating Tel Aviv with the Dahiyeh, exposing the extent of its infiltration of Israeli intelligence, attacking 110 km inside Israeli territory, hitting targets and evading the Iron Dome and Arrow aerial defense systems and defending all its UAV positions against enemy attack. It listed the “enemy’s failures” as “a new failure for Israeli intelligence.” Israel’s proactive [allegedly] action failed to prevent the Hezbollah’s retaliation, the Israeli government [allegedly] had to “invent” a new false narrative which did not even convince the Israeli public, Israel’s defense systems failed to intercept the rockets and UAVs, and Israel had carried out 40 attacks which hit only a number of launch sites (Simia, August 26, 2024). Hezbollah’s Operation Arba’in notice (Simia, August 26, 2024) “Sources” claimed Hezbollah was satisfied with several aspects of the retaliation attack, including its ability to “respond,” and had proven itself in terms of the distances and the level of weapons used (al-Jadeed, August 26, 2024). Muhammad Fneish, a senior Hezbollah figure, claimed the objective of the “resistance retaliation” was to punish the “enemy” and return it to abiding by the rules of confrontation [decided on by Hezbollah]. He claimed Hezbollah could prepare for any future development but did not aspire to a comprehensive war, but if the “enemy” exceeded its borders or attacked civilians, the “resistance” was prepared and would respond accordingly. He claimed “the enemy” would no longer be able to attack without an “appropriate response” (MTV network, August 26, 2024). Ali Shoeib, a correspondent for Hezbollah’s al-Manar TV, said that after the “Islamic resistance” in Lebanon had met its commitment and retaliated for the Israeli attack on the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut, and after it had prevented the “enemy” from attacking the villages in south Lebanon by firing hundreds of rockets at “enemy” bases, it returned to its role of supporting the Gaza Strip (Ali Shoeib’s X account, August 26, 2024). “Diplomatic sources privy to the talks conducted by Washington, Tel Aviv and Beirut,” said Hezbollah had informed the Americans via the Lebanese government that “it was necessary” to adhere to Hezbollah’s “rules of engagement,” as they did not want to expand the war and aspired to avoid damage to infrastructure and civilians. Hezbollah claimed it had no intention of expanding the fighting, otherwise it would have launched its precision missiles in response to the killing of Fuad Shukr. The “sources” added that it was likely the conflict would remain as “support for Hamas” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 26, 2024). Ali al-Amin, editor of the Lebanese news site Janoubia, said that Hezbollah’s retaliation for the killing of Fuad Shukr relieved the pressure being exerted by its supporters to react strongly against Israel and restored some of its damaged dignity (Janoubia, August 29, 2024). Charles Brown, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that after the exchange between Israel and Hezbollah, the risks the war would expand in the near future had lessened (Reuters, August 27, 2024). The Lebanese Government In a speech given on the occasion of the 46th anniversary of the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr,[5] Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, accused the “Israeli war machine” of turning the border villages near Israel into scorched earth using “illegal” weapons and called Israel “absolute evil.” He said the Lebanese government was committed to UN Security Council Resolution 1701, claiming Israel was a serial violator of UN resolutions. He called the war in the Gaza Strip “genocide and a political crime” and called for support for the Palestinian people, adding that “the situation in the Gaza Strip cannot be resolved except by escalating resistance in all available forms, political, public and cultural, and with weapons” (al-Nashra, August 31, 2024). Criticism of Hezbollah Gebran Bassil, chairman of the Free National Movement in Lebanon considered an ally of Hezbollah, criticized the organization’s continued fighting against Israel in the name of supporting the Gaza Strip. Bassil said Hezbollah members had asked him, “What is your [Movement’s] position regarding Hezbollah? One day you say, ‘We are with you in the war,’ and the next day you say, ‘We are against you in the war’.” He answered, “We are with you when you defend Lebanon, we are with you when Israel attacks us, but we are not with you when you start a war against Israel.” Bassil noted they were in favor of a defensive strategy, but not of an attack strategy. He also asked, “What is the purpose of this war in which we participate?” and rejected the justification that it was in aid of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. He said destroying part of Lebanon and having its people killed was not helping the Gaza Strip by (Mary Saadeh’s X account, August 30, 2024). Gebran Bassil (Mary Saadeh’s X account, August 30, 2024) The Lebanese Army An “opposition source” in Lebanon claimed that Hezbollah was taking every possible step to prevent the Lebanese army from equipping itself with the necessary means for deployment on the border, using false excuses ranging from funding to inter-sectarian balances and party disputes. That belies the claim of a “high-level source” from the “Shi’ite couple” [Hezbollah and Amal] alleging that both movements fully support Resolution 1701, including in the sections concerning the deployment of the Lebanese army south of the Litani River (Lebanon al-Kabir, August 29, 2024). According to reports, Joseph Aoun, the commander of the Lebanese army, cancelled all annual vacations abroad for Lebanese army soldiers, including officers, because of the recent escalation in south Lebanon and the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hezbollah (al-Nashra, August 27, 2024). According to reports, 4,700 Lebanese army officers and soldiers are prepared to cross the Litani River, a number which does not include approximately 300 management personnel. It was also reported that no response had yet been received from the contributing countries to the request for a grant to recruit 6,000 additional soldiers and deploy them in south Lebanon (Lebanon al-Khabir, August 27, 2024). Josep Borrell, EU foreign minister, said the European Union supported the Lebanese army and was expected to provide it with additional aid next year (al-Nashra, August 30, 2024). UNIFIL UNIFIL mandate extended for another year On August 28, 2024, the UN Security Council unanimously approved the extension of the UNIFIL mandate in Lebanon for another year (Reuters, August 28, 2024): Najib Mikati, prime minister of the Lebanese interim government, thanked the UN Security Council, France and the United States for understanding Lebanon’s need to preserve the activities of UNIFIL. He also noted Lebanon’s commitment to cooperate in facing the challenges and threats to stability in south Lebanon, and Lebanon’s commitment to implementing international resolutions, first of all Resolution 1701 (Lebanese prime minister’s X account, August 28, 2024). The Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese daily al-Akhbar, claimed that the United States had failed in its attempt to change the wording of UNIFIL’s mandate and the status quo had been maintained. It also claimed that the “resistance” had always been suspicious of the activities of the UN forces, since not only did they conduct patrols, they operated radars which the “enemy” could use, either through access to the radar’s data or by penetrating its network “Authorized UNIFIL personnel” stated that the force did not operate against the “resistance” or “in the service” of any of the parties. According to the sources, the radar protects the forces and monitors “Israeli air violations.” They added that the objective of the radar was to warn the force of artillery shells falling on their bases (al-Akhbar, August 29, 2024). Candace Ardell, UNIFIL spokeswoman, said that one of the rockets fired by Hezbollah on August 25, 2024, in retaliation for the killing Fuad Shakr, was fired near a UNIFIL post. She added that on the same day an explosion occurred near another UNIFIL post in the area of ​​Meiss al-Jabal, but no injuries or damage were reported. She said that using areas close to UNIFIL posts to carry out cross-border attacks was unacceptable and constituted a violation of Resolution 1701 (Reuters, August 27, 2024). United States Wages Psychological Warfare on Tinder in Lebanon  The United States Army’s Central Command (CENTCOM) posted several warning messages in Arabic on the Lebanese Tinder app reading, “US [Army] Central Command is on high alert and ready with F-16 Fighting Falcons and A-10 Thunder Bolt sound barrier-breaking fighter jets,” “Don’t take up arms against the United States or its partners,” “The United States will protect its partners in dealing with the threats of the Iranian regime and its proxies.” In expert assessment it was a psychological warfare campaign aimed at Hezbollah operatives in an attempt to deter them from continuing to attack Israel. Tinder later announced the messages had been deleted (Task & Purpose, August 28, 2024). CENTCOM warnings posted on Tinder in Lebanon (Séamus Malekafzali’s X account, August 22, 2024) Syria Senior PIJ terrorist operative eliminated On August 28, 2024, an Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked along the Syria-Lebanon border, killing Faras Qassem, a key operative in the PIJ’s operations department in Syria. He had been in charge of constructing PIJ operational plans in Syria and Lebanon and played a central role in recruiting Palestinian operatives to Hezbollah for terrorist attacks on Israel from Lebanon. According to reports, several other PIJ operatives en route from Syria to Lebanon to carry out terrorist activities for Hezbollah were also killed in the attack (IDF spokesperson, August 28, 2024).[6] According to reports, the attack was carried out in the al-Zabadani region, about nine kilometers east of the Syria-Lebanon border (Ghattas’ X account, August 28, 2024). Two “security sources” said that three of those killed in the attack on the Syria-Lebanon border were PIJ operatives and the fourth was a Hezbollah operative. It was also reported that the vehicle did not transport weapons (Reuters, August 28, 2024).     The Jerusalem Brigades, the PIJ’s military wing, confirmed the death of three of its operatives: Faras Hussein Qassem, 37 years old; Osama Mufaq ‘Arisha, 39 years old, and Hussam Ziyad ‘Arisha, 39 years old, all of whom were Jerusalem Brigades operatives in Syria (Jerusalem Brigades’ Telegram channel, August 28, 2024). Hezbollah announced the death of Muhammad Hassan Taha, aka Karar, born in 1972, from Baalbek in the Lebanon Valley (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 28, 2024). According to the social networks, Taha was among the passengers of the vehicle that was attacked and was killed (Hayan Mo’s X account, August 28, 2024). From right to left: Faras Hussein Qassem, Osama Mufaq ‘Arisha, Hussam Ziyad Arisha (Telegram channel of Jerusalem companies, August 28, 2024). Extreme left: Muhammad Hassan Taha (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, August 28, 2024) The post Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria (August 26-September 2 , 2024) appeared first on The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center.