In 1959, the Luna 2 probe from the Soviet Union became the very first human-made object to reach our closest celestial neighbor. In the decades since, we have been leaving footprints - both literally and figuratively - all over the Moon. Today, there are over 100 metric tons of human-made material resting on the Moon’s surface - everything from advanced cameras and sensors to literal human waste. But that’s nothing compared to what’s to come. NASA predicts the next decade will see over 100 new lunar missions, equaling or exceeding all the missions previously flown. Which brings up a pressing question about all the stuff that’s already there - how do we protect that history? A new paper by Teasel Muir-Harmony, the Curator of the Space History Department of the Smithsonian and Todd Mosher, a Scholar in Residence at University of Colorado, Boulder, reports on a Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum and the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Summit on Outer Space Heritage that dives into the legal, scientific, and engineering hurdles of preserving these historic sites.

The Relist Watch column examines cert petitions that the Supreme Court has “relisted” for its upcoming conference. A short explanation of relists is available here. There are 261 petitions and applications teed up for this Friday’s conference. Seventeen are familiar faces making return appearances on the relist stage, joined by four newcomers trying to break into the rotation. The lineup this week includes a RICO class-action that asks how many uninjured plaintiffs are too many, a capital case about whether harmless-error review can rely on evidence the jury never saw, and a qualified-immunity dispute featuring the wrong tear-gas round at the wrong time. Uninjured class members and statistical proof In Takeda Pharmaceutical Co. v. Painters and Allied Trades District Council 82 Health Care Fund, Takeda and Eli Lilly seek review of a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit allowing a nationwide RICO class action to proceed against them based on alleged concealment of the bladder-cancer risks associated with the diabetes drug Actos. The suit is brought not by patients but by third-party payors – insurers and benefit funds – that reimbursed prescriptions. They allege that for more than a decade the companies concealed evidence linking Actos to bladder cancer in order to boost prescriptions, causing TPPs to pay for drugs they otherwise would not have reimbursed. The district court certified a nationwide class of TPPs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) that reimbursed at least five prescriptions, relying heavily on an econometric model estimating that roughly 57% of prescriptions were “fraudulently induced” – and thus that most class members likely paid for at least one “excess” prescription. A divided panel of the 9th Circuit affirmed certification, reasoning that common proof – including regression analysis and company documents – could establish classwide injury and causation, and that the possibility some class members were uninjured did not defeat predominance (one of the requirements for class certification). Judge Eric Miller dissented, warning that reliance and causation turned on individualized prescribing decisions, making classwide adjudication inappropriate. The petition argues the 9th Circuit’s permissive approach to Rule 23(b)(3) certification deepens two circuit splits. First, whether Rule 23(b)(3) permits certification of damages classes that include uninjured members without a reliable mechanism to identify and exclude them – an issue the court has twice tried and failed to resolve in Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Davis and Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo – both Relist Watch graduates. Second, whether plaintiffs can use statistical modeling to prove individualized reliance in fraud class actions. Respondents counter that the case is interlocutory (a premature appeal before a final judgment on the merits) and fact-bound and there’s no real split on the causation issue. From a Relist Watch perspective, this is catnip: a big-ticket class action, a dissent below, and one of the court’s favorite unresolved questions – how much statistical averaging Rule 23 will tolerate. If the justices are still looking for a clean vehicle after LabCorp’s untimely demise (the court dismissed the petition as improvidently granted), this one may be hard to resist. Of course, “hard to resist” has described several recent cert petitions that ultimately proved very resistible. Determining prejudice on habeas review: harmless in hindsight? Whitton v. Dixon asks whether courts evaluating prejudice from constitutional trial error may rely on evidence the jury never saw. Gary Whitton was sentenced to death for a 1990 stabbing in Florida. The prosecution’s case leaned heavily on two jailhouse informants who claimed Whitton confessed. One of them falsely testified that he had never been arrested – a misstatement the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit later agreed violated Giglio v. United States because the government failed to correct it. But the 11th Circuit still denied habeas relief, concluding that the Florida Supreme Court reasonably found the evidence of Whitton’s guilt “overwhelming.” In reaching that conclusion, the court pointed to DNA testing conducted years after trial that allegedly linked blood on Whitton’s boots to the victim – testing never presented to the jury. Whitton argues that this turns harmless-error review into a hindsight exercise: prejudice must be assessed based on the trial record, not post hoc developments. According to the petition, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 2nd, 6th, and 10th Circuits, as well as the North Carolina Supreme Court, have rejected the use of post-verdict evidence when evaluating harmless error. The state counters that the 11th Circuit was merely holding – under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act‘s famously forgiving standard limiting federal courts’ power to grant habeas relief – that the state court’s determination was not unreasonable. If the justices see a genuine split about harmless-error methodology rather than a fact-bound dispute about AEDPA deference, Whitton may get a closer look; otherwise, the case may depart as quickly as it arrived. All the president’s men Stephen K. Bannon, former advisor to President Donald Trump, was convicted of contempt of Congress under 2 U.S.C. § 192 for “willfully” refusing to comply with a subpoena from the January 6, 2021, House Select Committee on the grounds that Trump had invoked executive privilege. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed his conviction, noting in part that circuit precedent required a willful refusal only be “deliberate” and “intentional,” and does not require bad faith or unlawful purpose. It also rejected as forfeited Bannon’s argument that the committee was improperly constituted under its authorizing House resolution, because he had not raised it before the committee. Judges Neomi Rao, Karen Henderson, and Justin Walker dissented from en banc denial on the mens rea issue, with Rao and Henderson also wanting to reach the composition question. Judge Gregory Katsas issued a decision respecting denial of rehearing en banc. And Judges Bradley Garcia, Cornelia Pillard, Patricia Millett, and Florence Pan concurred in the denial of rehearing en banc. All acknowledged varying degrees of tension between circuit precedent and more recent Supreme Court precedent indicating that “willfulness” requires a showing that the defendant knew his conduct was unlawful. In his petition, Bannon renews the two questions that spilled so much judicial ink: whether “willfully” in Section 192 requires the government to prove the defendant knew his conduct was unlawful, or merely that his noncompliance was intentional and deliberate; and whether the Select Committee’s apparent failure to comply with its own authorizing resolution (it never had the required 13 members or a ranking minority member) deprived it of the “authority” necessary to issue a valid subpoena under Section 192. Although the court may be interested in those issues, it is unlikely to reach the merits. In a terse filing signed only by the Trump administration’s Solicitor General, D. John Sauer, the government informed the court that it “has determined in its prosecutorial discretion that dismissal of this criminal case is in the interests of justice,” and requested a GVR (grant, vacate, and remand) so the district court can grant the government’s pending Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) motion to dismiss the case with prejudice. Bannon’s team, not surprisingly, agreed, while taking a parting shot at the D.C. Circuit’s “errant interpretation” of Section 192 and noting that the legal questions remain live and threatening to individual liberty. Given the ever-present risk of contempt-of-Congress prosecutions in D.C., the justices are likely giving this one a careful look.  Qualified immunity and excessive force The petition in Reinink v. Hart arises from the chaotic protests in Grand Rapids following George Floyd’s death. During a confrontation with protester Sean Hart, Officer Phillip Reinink fired a 40-mm canister launcher saying that he believed it contained a “Muzzle Blast” powdered tear-gas round designed for close-range dispersal. Instead, the launcher discharged a similar-looking Spede-Heat tear-gas projectile, a munition intended to be lobbed into the air rather than fired directly at a person. The projectile struck Hart in the shoulder, injuring him. Hart brought an “excessive force” claim against Reinink. The district court granted summary judgment for Reinink, holding that his mistaken deployment of the wrong munition was objectively reasonable under the traditional Graham v. Connor totality-of-the-circumstances framework and that qualified immunity applied. A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit reversed, reasoning that because testimony indicated that firing Spede-Heat directly at a person could constitute deadly force, a jury could find the use of such force unreasonable under the circuit’s test for evaluating its use. Judge Joan Larsen dissented, emphasizing the absence of clearly established law addressing this kind of mistaken deployment. Reinink’s petition asks the Supreme Court to resolve two questions. First, he urges the justices to clarify how courts should distinguish ordinary force from deadly force in Fourth Amendment cases, proposing a test that considers the weapon’s typical lethality, the officer’s intent, and the actual harm inflicted. Second, he asks the court to address when a reasonable factual mistake about the type of force used entitles an officer to qualified immunity. Respondent Hart counters that the case presents no doctrinal gap: the court recently reaffirmed Graham’s totality-of-the-circumstances objective reasonableness approach in Barnes v. Felix, under which an officer’s intent is irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry. He maintains that the 6th Circuit correctly focused on the nature of the force actually deployed. In reply, Reinink says his case provides a “perfect vessel” to answer important questions about how to handle factual mistakes in use-of-force cases. The court takes petitions from police officers invoking qualified immunity very seriously, and this case is no exception. Whether this one presents a genuine doctrinal gap or just a fact-specific disagreement remains to be seen – but it has enough moving parts to warrant at least one more look. We should know soon whether this petition is going to get traction. New Relists Reinink v. Hart, 25-179 Issues: (1) Whether, in the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness-of-a-seizure context, a law enforcement officer’s intended level of force is relevant to determining whether an officer’s use of force should be analyzed under a deadly-use-of-force standard or a general use-of-force standard; and (2) whether, in analyzing an excessive force claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an officer’s mistaken use of force being higher than what he or she intended entitles the officer to qualified immunity, so long as the mistake is reasonable under the circumstances. (Relisted after the Mar. 6 conference.) Bannon v. United States, 25-453 Issues: (1) Whether “willfully” in 2 U.S.C. § 192 – which states that anyone who is “summoned … by the authority of either House of Congress” and “willfully makes default” on the subpoena has committed a crime – requires the government to prove the defendant knew his conduct was unlawful; and (2) whether the proper composition of a congressional committee bears on its “authority” to issue a subpoena for purposes of 2 U.S.C. § 192. (Relisted after the Mar. 6 conference.) Takeda Pharmaceutical Co. v. Painters and Allied Trades District Council 82 Health Care Fund, 25-625 Issues: (1) Whether a federal court may certify a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) when some members of the proposed class lack any compensable injury in fact; and (2) whether a federal court may certify a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) when a class relies on representative evidence to try to prove an individualized reliance issue that is a necessary element of each plaintiff’s claim. (Relisted after the Mar. 6 conference.) Whitton v. Dixon, 25-580 Issues: (1) Whether in determining if a constitutional error had a prejudicial effect on the outcome of a trial a court must consider only that evidence that was presented to the jury at the trial; and (2) whether the prejudice from the Giglio v. United States violation in this case met the standards for relief under Giglio and Brecht v. Abrahamson. (Relisted after the Mar. 6 conference.) Returning Relists Smith v. Scott, 24-1099 Issues: (1) Whether, viewing the facts from the officers’ perspective at the time, the officers acted reasonably under the Fourth Amendment by using bodyweight pressure to restrain a potentially armed and actively resisting individual only until handcuffing could be accomplished; and (2) whether the panel erred in denying qualified immunity where no case clearly established that pre-handcuffing bodyweight pressure violates the Fourth Amendment. (Relisted after the Sept. 29, Oct. 10, Oct. 17, Nov. 7, Nov. 14, Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12, Jan. 9, Jan. 16, Jan. 23, Feb. 20, Feb. 27, and Mar. 6 conferences.) Bannon v. United States, 25-453 Issue: (1) Whether “willfully” in 2 U.S.C. § 192 – which states that anyone who is “summoned … by the authority of either House of Congress” and “willfully makes default” on the subpoena has committed a crime – requires the government to prove the defendant knew his conduct was unlawful; and (2) whether the proper composition of a congressional committee bears on its “authority” to issue a subpoena for purposes of 2 U.S.C. § 192. (Relisted after the Mar. 6 conference.) Foote v. Ludlow School Committee, 25-77 Issue: Whether a public school violates parents’ constitutional rights when, without parental knowledge or consent, the school encourages a student to transition to a new “gender” or participates in that process. (Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12, Jan. 9, Jan. 16, Jan. 23, Feb. 20, Feb. 27, and Mar. 6 conferences.) Fields v. Plappert, 23-6912 Issue: Whether the requirement that a verdict be based only on the evidence presented in the courtroom at trial satisfies 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)‘s “clearly established” requirement, and if so, whether a jury’s consideration of and reliance on extrinsic evidence as part of a jury experiment violates this rule. (Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12, Jan. 9, and Jan. 16 conferences; now being held for consideration of response to Fields’ rehearing petition.) Reed v. Goertz, 24-1268 Issue: Whether Article 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, as authoritatively construed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, violates due process by arbitrarily denying prisoners access to postconviction DNA testing, rendering illusory prisoners’ state-created right to prove their innocence through newly discovered evidence. (Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12, Jan. 9, Jan. 16, Jan. 23, Feb. 20, Feb. 27, and Mar. 6 conferences.) Gator’s Custom Guns, Inc. v. Washington, 25-153 Issue: Whether ammunition feeding devices with the capacity to hold more than ten rounds are “Arms” presumptively entitled to constitutional protection under the plain text of the Second Amendment. (Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12, Jan. 9, Jan. 16, Jan. 23, Feb. 20, Feb. 27, and Mar. 6 conferences.) Duncan v. Bonta, 25-198 Issue: (1) Whether a ban on the possession of exceedingly common ammunition feeding devices violates the Second Amendment; and (2) whether a law dispossessing citizens, without compensation, of property that they lawfully acquired and long possessed without incident violates the takings clause. (Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12, Jan. 9, Jan. 16, Jan. 23, Feb. 20, Feb. 27, and Mar. 6 conferences.) Viramontes v. Cook County, 25-238 Issue: Whether the Second and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to possess AR-15 platform and similar semiautomatic rifles. (Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12, Jan. 9, Jan. 16, Jan. 23, Feb. 20, Feb. 27, and Mar. 6 conferences.) Zorn v. Linton, 25-297 Issue: Whether the 2nd Circuit’s qualified immunity analysis conflicts with this court’s repeated instruction that courts must define rights with specificity and look for close factual analogues in determining whether a Fourth Amendment right is clearly established. (Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12, Jan. 9, Jan. 16, Jan. 23, Feb. 20, Feb. 27, and Mar. 6 conferences.) Villarreal v. Alaniz, 25-29 Issue: (1) Whether it obviously violates the First Amendment to arrest someone for asking government officials questions and publishing the information they volunteer; and (2) whether qualified immunity is unavailable to public officials who use a state statute in a way that obviously violates the First Amendment, or whether qualified immunity shields those officials. (Relisted after the Dec. 12, Jan. 9, Jan. 16, Jan. 23, and Feb. 20 conferences.) Sittenfeld v. United States, 25-49 Issue: Whether, when the government alleges bribery based solely on lawful campaign contributions, the defendant may be convicted based on evidence that is ambiguous as to whether the public official conditioned any official act on the campaign contributions. (Relisted after the Dec. 12, Jan. 9, Jan. 16, Jan. 23, Feb. 20, Feb. 27, and Mar. 6 conferences.) Poore v. United States, 25-227 Issue: Whether the limits on agency deference announced in Kisor v. Wilkie and Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo constrain the deference courts may accord the Sentencing Commission’s interpretation of its own rules via commentary. (Relisted after the Jan. 9, Jan. 16, Jan. 23, Feb. 20, Feb. 27, and Mar. 6 conferences.) District of Columbia v. R.W., 25-248 Issues: (1) Whether a court assessing the existence of reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment may exclude a fact known to the officer, or instead must assess all the evidence when weighing the totality of the circumstances; and (2) whether, under the totality-of-the-circumstances test, the officer in this case had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop. (Relisted after the Jan. 9, Jan. 16, Jan. 23, Feb. 20, Feb. 27, and Mar. 6 conferences.) Stroble v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 25-382 Issue: Whether Oklahoma may tax the income of a Muscogee (Creek) Nation citizen who lives and works within the Muscogee (Creek) Reservation that McGirt v. Oklahoma held remains Indian country. (Relisted after the Jan. 9, Jan. 16, Jan. 23, Feb. 20, Feb. 27, and Mar. 6 conferences.) Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Fazaga, 25-430 Issue: Whether dismissal of a claim after assertion of the state-secrets privilege requires a district court to adjudicate the merits of the claim using the privileged information where the privileged information is relevant to a defense. (Relisted after the Jan. 9, Jan. 16, Jan. 23, Feb. 20, Feb. 27, and Mar. 6 conferences.) National Association for Gun Rights v. Lamont, 25-421 Issue: Whether a ban on the possession of AR-15-style rifles and firearm magazines with a capacity in excess of 10 rounds violates the Second Amendment. (Relisted after the Feb. 20, Feb. 27, and Mar. 6 conferences.) Grant v. Higgins, 25-566 Issue: Whether the Second and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to possess semiautomatic rifles that are in common use for lawful purposes, including the AR-15. (Relisted after the Feb. 20, Feb. 27, and Mar. 6 conferences.) Beaird v. United States, 25-5343 Issues: (1) Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) comports with the Second Amendment; (2) whether Stinson v. United States still accurately state the level of deference due to the Commentary of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines; (3) whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) permits conviction for the possession of any firearm that has ever crossed state lines at any time in the indefinite past, and, if so, whether it is facially unconstitutional. (Relisted after the Feb. 27 and Mar. 6 conferences.) The post Uninjured class members, hindsight harmlessness, presidential cronies, and the mistaken use of deadly force appeared first on SCOTUSblog.

The Supreme Court will hear oral arguments next week in a challenge to the government’s policy of systematically turning back asylum seekers before they can reach the U.S. border with Mexico. The policy at the center of Noem v. Al Otro Lado is no longer in place, but the Trump administration calls it a “critical tool for addressing” surges in immigrants at the border. The immigrant rights group and asylum seekers who are challenging the policy counter that it is contrary to federal immigration law and, when it was in effect, “created a humanitarian crisis in Mexico.” Asylum is a form of legal protection for people who flee their own countries because they fear persecution or harm there. Under U.S. law, noncitizens can apply for asylum when they are “physically present in the United States” or when they “arrive[] in the United States.” Noncitizens who arrive at a port of entry, an officially designated site to enter the country, such as an airport or a land crossing – and indicate that they want to seek asylum – are inspected and processed. That is, they are screened by border officials and then channeled into the asylum system, which may include either an interview with an asylum officer or proceedings in immigration court. Nearly a decade ago, in response to a surge in the number of Haitian immigrants seeking asylum in San Ysidro, a port of entry outside San Diego, the Department of Homeland Security initiated a policy known as “metering.” Officials from the Customs and Border Patrol agency would stand along the U.S.-Mexico border and turn back noncitizens without valid travel documents, including asylum seekers, before they could enter the United States. In 2017, the government extended that policy to all ports of entry across the U.S. border with Mexico, and it was formalized in a memorandum in 2018. Al Otro Lado, an immigrant rights group, and 13 asylum seekers went to federal court in southern California to challenge the policy. In 2024, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit ruled that, for purposes of being able to apply for asylum under federal immigration law, noncitizens who were turned away from ports of entry before they could enter the United States had “arrived in” the country. “The phrase ‘physically present in the United States,’” Judge Michelle Friedland wrote, “encompasses noncitizens within our borders, and the phrase ‘arrives in the United States’ encompasses those who encounter officials at the border, whichever side of the border they are standing on.” The full court of appeals turned down the federal government’s request to reconsider the case. In a dissent joined by 11 other judges, Judge Daniel Bress wrote that the panel’s holding “violates clear statutory text, precedent, the presumption against” applying U.S. law outside the United States, “and long-held understandings limiting application of the asylum and inspection laws to aliens ‘in’ the United States—which aliens in Mexico are not.” The federal government then appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed last fall to weigh in. In its brief on the merits, the government pointed first to the text of the federal immigration law at the center of the dispute. “In ordinary English,” U.S. Solicitor General D. John Sauer argued, “a person ‘arrives in’ a country only when he comes within its borders. A person does not ‘arrive in the United States’ if he is stopped in Mexico.” In reaching a contrary conclusion, Sauer wrote, the 9th Circuit “effectively replaced the statutory text (‘arrives in the United States’) with alternative text of its own (‘presents herself to an official at the border’).” Second, the government emphasized, the Supreme Court held more than 30 years ago, in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., that immigration laws do not protect refugees who are trying to reach the United States but are intercepted at sea before they do so. That case was a challenge to an executive order directing the U.S. Coast Guard to stop boats illegally transporting Haitians to the United States and return the passengers to Haiti without determining whether they qualified as refugees. According to Sauer, “Sale’s logic confirms that the immigration laws at issue here likewise do not protect aliens who are stopped on land before reaching U.S. soil.” Sauer also told the justices that there is bipartisan opposition to the 9th Circuit’s ruling – which, he said, “deprives the Executive Branch of a critical tool for addressing border surges and preventing overcrowding at ports of entry.” And although the Department of Homeland Security rescinded the memoranda authorizing “metering” more than four years ago, he said, “it seeks to retain the option of reviving the practice” if needed. Finally, Sauer argued that the 9th Circuit’s ruling violates the presumption against extraterritoriality – that is, the principle that federal law applies only in the United States unless Congress clearly states otherwise. “The phrase ‘arrives in the United States’ does not even plausibly, much less clearly, cover aliens in Mexico,” Sauer wrote. In their brief on the merits, the challengers contended that the text of the federal immigration law actually supports their reading. First, they said, Congress’ use of the present tense – the phrase “arrives in the United States” – shows that it intended federal laws instructing immigration officials to inspect noncitizens seeking admission in the United States and asylum “to apply not only to those who have arrived, but also to those who are attempting to step over the border.” “If Congress wanted the law to cover only noncitizens who had arrived, it would have said so,” the challengers stressed. Moreover, they added, by limiting the phrase “arrives in the United States” to people who are already in the country, the government’s interpretation would also render the other phrase in the law – “physically present in the United States” – superfluous.  The policy also conflicts with regulations that were issued in 1997, shortly after the law was enacted, the challengers continued, which provide that noncitizens “‘attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry’ are ‘arriving.’” The understanding embodied in those regulations, the challengers added, “is consistent with longstanding practice: Since 1917, immigration law has been understood as requiring federal officials to inspect all noncitizens who present themselves at ports of entry, whether or not they yet have a foot on U.S. soil.” The challengers pushed back against the government’s argument that the 9th Circuit’s reading would violate the presumption against extraterritoriality. That principle does not apply here, they wrote, because the federal laws at the center of this case simply apply to “immigration officers’ conduct on U.S. soil.” By contrast, they contended, the government’s reading would conflict with the United States’ obligations under international law to refrain from sending refugees back to countries where they face persecution – a principle known as non-refoulement. The government’s policy, the challengers cautioned, would “create a perverse incentive to cross the border between ports of entry by affording people who do so greater rights—the exact result Congress sought to avoid when it adopted” this law. And in any event, the challengers said, the ruling by the court of appeals only means that noncitizens who arrive at the border must be allowed to apply for asylum; “it does not foreclose reasonable delays” in procedures for dealing with asylum seekers. If the federal government wants to change this rule, they concluded, it should go to Congress, rather than the court, to do so. The post Justices to consider the rights of asylum seekers at the U.S.-Mexico border appeared first on SCOTUSblog.

Your 20’s are supposed to be the most exciting years of your life, and that incredibly optimistic expectation is why we’re so shocked when they aren’t. I’ve hated most of my 20s. And as I edge ever closer to the next decade of my life, I’m starting to realize that it may actually be pretty […] The post 7 Things I’d Tell My 20-year-old Self appeared first on No Sidebar.

Jenny Marrs frequently uses her social media platform to share words that uplift and encourage others, a skill which she is considering...

Davis was struck and killed while crossing the street on Dec. 8.

"be aligned and in touch" The post Emails Show Qatar Coordinated Messaging About October 7th Attacks With American Universities in Doha first appeared on Le·gal In·sur·rec·tion.

Cloaked's latest round is a mix of equity and growth funding.