[View Article at Source]The world recently lost a wonderful, and subtly melancholic, A-list actress. The post More Than Just Daffy Diane appeared first on The American Conservative.

Major roads in Finland saw their traffic halted Saturday morning following a major pile-up in Lahti that featured around 50 vehicles and caused multiple injuries. A total of two pile-ups took place, with…

[View Article at Source]The real narco kingpins are waiting in the wings. The post Maduro is Not the Worst Case for Venezuela appeared first on The American Conservative.

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Culture More Than Just Daffy Diane The world recently lost a wonderful, and subtly melancholic, A-list actress. While making his 2011 documentary on Woody Allen, filmmaker Robert Weide invited the acclaimed writer-director to name three “movie star crushes” he had harbored as a youngster or in adulthood. “Rita Hayworth. Vivien Leigh. Ava Gardner,” Allen said, pausing between each name but reeling them off quickly enough to indicate that he did not need to give the matter much thought. Of course, any longtime watcher of Allen’s films will have their own answer to that question: “Diane Keaton. Diane Keaton. Diane Keaton.” Her appeal is indisputable. Keaton—who died on October 11 at the age of 79—was, for a time, the personal companion and, for a substantially lengthier period of time, the artistic muse of Allen. He seemed to delight in coming up with ways to show off her slightly loopy, playfully bantering, and surprisingly grounded personality. She played a wearisome feminist circa 2173 in the sci-fi sendup Sleeper (1973), a plausible stand-in for numerous heroines of Russian literature in the farce Love and Death (1975), and, of course, a scattered modern young woman in the classic comedy of romantic failure and flailing, Annie Hall (1975)—each a film from Allen’s classic period in which Keaton contributed her abundant intelligence, charm, and off-centered-ness.  Yet Allen’s subsequent castings of Keaton suggest that he perceived a sadness and even an emptiness in his favorite actress that was obscured by her outward daffiness in the crowd-pleasing Annie Hall and other films. In the deliberately humorless drama Interiors (1978), Allen cast Keaton as Renata, a poetess who vacillates between existential glumness over the state of the world and run-of-the-mill despondency over the state of her unhappy marriage. Renata only seems well-adjusted when viewed in comparison to her sister Joey (Mary Beth Hurt), an aimless sad sack, and her mother Eve (Geraldine Page), who is written as virtually a charity case: Eve is left by her husband for reasons of sheer selfishness, and, in the absence of the martial relationship that gave meaning to her life, becomes suicidal. It is a great film, but it always struck me as revealing that Allen, just a year after Annie Hall, declined to cast Keaton as another Annie Hall. In some ways, Keaton is portrayed in even starker terms in 1979’s Manhattan, the matchless romantic comedy that co-starred Allen, Mariel Hemingway, Michael Murphy, and Meryl Streep. Here, Keaton plays Mary Wilkie, a single woman who had none of Annie Hall’s loopiness but ample reserves of astringency, sarcasm, and meanness. Sophisticated cinephiles may remember the character for her scoffing at the assertions of others in her circle of New York wits: At one point, she savages a photography exhibition for being derivative of Diane Arbus, and at another, she gladly contributes names for her “Academy of the Overrated,” whose honorees including Isak Dinesen, Norman Mailer, and Vincent van Gogh—whose surname she mispronounces with confidence. She is also a working writer; she reviews a book of Tolstoy’s letters, and types away at a well-paying novelization. Of course, Mary Wilkie is deeply unhappy: She participates in an adulterous relationship with a married man (Murphy), and when that affair crumbles, she double-downs on a romance she has been carrying on with Allen’s character, a recently canned TV writer named Isaac Davis. Decades ago, when I first saw Manhattan, I felt Mary Wilkie embodied a certain chic cosmopolitanism—what could be more fun, I reckoned, than flitting around a big city while rattling off opinions about art, movies, and literature—but today I find the character lonely and adrift. She even alludes to an earlier, more contented version of herself when she says, apropos of nothing, “I’m just from Philadelphia, you know? I mean, we believe in God.” In a prescient touch, Mary Wilkie seems more attached to her annoying dog than any human being—a cardinal sin for Allen, who has expressed a welcome antipathy towards pets.  Yes, at the end of Annie Hall, Annie is said to be cohabitating with some fellow, and in the final scenes in Manhattan, Mary expresses abiding affection for her former lover (the Murphy character). But if romantic comedies often conspire to definitively bring their characters together (like Cary Grant and Irene Dunne in The Awful Truth), Keaton’s characters are failures in this regard: There is no reason to assume that the latest relationships of Annie or Mary will prove more enduring than the ones they have already run through; Isaac, for his part, predicts that Mary’s resumed affair will last four weeks, which sounds charitable.  Of course, we know that, in real life, Diane Keaton never recited the marital vows. Let us hope that she found satisfaction in the raising of her two adopted children. But the melancholy take on the single life in Annie Hall and Manhattan ought not to be discounted; these are not cinematic versions of The Mary Tyler Moore Show in which a single woman “makes it after all.” In the sublimely rueful last shot of Annie Hall, are we to believe that Annie is better off for shaking hands with Allen’s character—the one guy who truly loved her—and walking away forevermore?  I have always been struck by the final two roles Allen wrote for Keaton. In 1987’s Radio Days, Keaton was given an uncommonly sublime cameo as a nightclub singer who performs Cole Porter’s “You’d Be So Nice to Come Home To”—a song that functions as a wish for a companion with whom to share a life. “You’d be so nice, you’d be paradise,” she sings, “to come home to and love.” But Keaton declined the satisfactions of marriage. Is it too much to imagine that Allen was trying to prod his old friend to settle down by casting her, in 1993, as his on-screen spouse in Manhattan Murder Mystery? They were really good together! Other movies, too, saw her possibilities as a wife, a helpmate, a soul destined to be with another: Reds, even Father of the Bride.  I mourn Diane Keaton, but I am also sad for her. The post More Than Just Daffy Diane appeared first on The American Conservative.

Foreign Affairs The Russia–Ukraine War as Seen From Budapest The American Conservative sits down with Balázs Orbán, political director to the Hungarian Prime Minister, to discuss why the logic of war should be replaced in the forthcoming Budapest summit by the idea of political settlement.  (Photo by ARIS MESSINIS/AFP via Getty Images) President Donald Trump recently demonstrated willingness for a summit with Russia, in Budapest, to seek an end to the conflict in Ukraine. Balázs Orbán, political director to the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán (no relation), sat down with The American Conservative to discuss what are the possibilities of peace in Ukraine, and who in the EU might try to hinder that.  Hungary has been pushing for peace in Ukraine for a while. This seems to be a great opportunity to demonstrate that the Hungarian position was correct all along. The goal of Hungarian foreign policy has never been to prove that our position is right, but to clearly represent our national strategic interests. Ukraine is our direct neighbour, which means the Ukraine–Russia war is not a distant conflict but a direct security risk for Hungary. This is why we have consistently advocated a political settlement, and why Prime Minister Viktor Orbán launched a peace mission last summer—during Hungary’s EU presidency—becoming the only European leader to visit both Moscow and Kiev to understand the positions of the parties first-hand.  In this context, President Trump’s return to office marked a turning point. From the outset, he made it clear that he stands with those seeking peace, and he is the only leader with the political weight to give new momentum to diplomacy. Following the successful conclusion of the Middle East peace process, the Sharm el-Sheikh summit once again confirmed that the American president is indeed a “President of Peace”: conflicts once thought insoluble can be transformed through strategic vision and determined diplomacy. We believe that, in the same spirit, the upcoming Budapest summit—through direct dialogue between the American and Russian presidents—can bring the world closer to restoring peace in Europe. What seem to be the challenges to peace in Ukraine? The most important lesson of Prime Minister Orbán’s peace mission last year was that both warring parties remain convinced that time is on their side and that a military victory is still within reach. Under such circumstances, the path toward peace depends not only on the will of the direct actors but also on whether the international community is able to step in as a mediator and steer the process toward a political settlement. The challenge, however, is that many key players—first and foremost the European Union—continue to operate within a wartime logic: in recent years, its decision-making has increasingly narrowed to following Ukraine’s military strategy, and Brussels has often acted as a political agent of one side rather than as a mediator. Hungary, by contrast—despite deep disagreements with the EU leadership—has consistently kept the door open to dialogue with all relevant actors, creating a unique diplomatic environment within the Union, one in which the preconditions for a potential Trump–Putin meeting can realistically be established. Hungarian relations with Poland suffered on the question of Ukraine. Is the question of Russia going to cause a permanent rift with Poland, the Baltic states, or the EU leadership in Brussels? Hungary is convinced that long-term regional cooperation is not based on agreement in every detail but on mutual understanding of each other’s perspectives. There is full consensus that Russia’s aggression is a grave violation of international law and that Ukraine needs support—a position Hungary fully shares. Since the outbreak of the war, we have carried out the largest humanitarian operation in our history, providing continuous assistance to those fleeing the conflict and playing a key role in ensuring Ukraine’s energy supply: Over one-third of its electricity imports and more than half of its gas imports come from Hungary. All this is done while making it clear that we will not send weapons and will not participate in the war. The debate is therefore not about the goals but about the means—and while Brussels often follows a logic of escalation, we see dialogue and political settlement as the key to Europe’s security. There is no strategic rift with Poland either: relations remain close and friendly, as shown by our excellent cooperation with President Karol Nawrocki. The difference is one of approach: While Donald Tusk asks who will win the war, Prime Minister Orbán’s question is how to end it as soon as possible, save tens of thousands of lives, and guarantee the safety of the Hungarian people. What are the Hungarian expectations about peace and the settlement of the war from the upcoming meeting in Budapest, given the hangover from the previous Budapest Memorandum? Donald Trump has already proven in the Middle East peace process that he is capable of achieving what few previously thought possible. His success shows that peace negotiations are not a sprint but a marathon. A setback at the negotiating table is not a reason to give up—on the contrary, it is a reason to continue. According to the Hungarian Prime Minister, this perseverance is precisely what is missing from European politics today. When things do not go as expected, many simply take offense and walk away. That is not how it works. It works the way President Trump does it: You must try again and again—and eventually, you will succeed. In this spirit, the Budapest summit could offer an important opportunity for the logic of war to be gradually replaced by the will for a political settlement, and for dialogue between the parties to take tangible steps toward a lasting and just peace. Hungary sees its role as doing everything within its power to help create the conditions necessary for a diplomatic settlement. The outcome of the conflict will ultimately be shaped by the political will and agreement of the major powers; our task is to ensure that the Budapest meeting provides a climate of trust, as well as the technical and security framework, that allows dialogue to continue and offers the parties a realistic setting for political resolution. In short, we are not seeking to act as mediators, but to create the practical conditions in which the path to peace can take shape. It might seem to be a huge boost to Prime Minister Orbán’s position as a peace premier ahead of the elections. Will he focus his run especially on the questions of a realist foreign policy, trade and investment? I would start by saying that we must not put the cart before the horse: Next spring’s election will not be won by international accolades or diplomatic posturing, but by the Hungarian people themselves, who have the power to secure victory for the patriotic governing parties, Fidesz–KDNP. At the same time, the fact that Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin have chosen Budapest as the next venue for peace talks on resolving the war is a clear and significant validation of the sovereignty-based policy that the Hungarian government has consistently pursued over the past years. Experience shows that, in the long run, it is the nations that stay true to their own path, stand firm under external pressure, and refuse to compromise on their core principles—even when doing so entails conflicts—that ultimately prevail. The same was true in the field of migration: we faced immense pressure then as well, yet we did not yield—and, as a result, we avoided the consequences that others are struggling with today. Moreover, many of the Western companies that once criticized us are now cornered by the outcomes of their own sanctions policies, while Hungarian businesses continue to produce, provide jobs, raise wages, and help maintain energy price stability. These positive outcomes strengthen the civic, patriotic community. The Budapest peace summit, our upcoming national holiday on October 23 commemorating the heroes of 1956, Prime Minister Orbán’s forthcoming visit to Washington, and Hungary’s consistent resistance to Brussels’ war agenda will together provide a powerful momentum for the patriotic camp—one that will endure through the election and ultimately deliver a decisive victory for our political community. In this sense, our opponents have every reason to be concerned. The post The Russia–Ukraine War as Seen From Budapest appeared first on The American Conservative.

Foreign policy Maduro is Not the Worst Case for Venezuela The real narco kingpins are waiting in the wings. (Photo by FEDERICO PARRA/AFP via Getty Images) The U.S. seems poised to launch its largest intervention in Latin America in at least 35 years, as military assets continue to accumulate in the theater surrounding Nicolás Maduro’s Venezuela. The Trump administration has made it clear that removing Maduro from power is one of its major objectives, branding the dictator an illegitimate narcoterrorist responsible for a vast operation of crime and death on American soil. While there is no doubt that Maduro is a tyrant that has oppressed and impoverished Venezuelans during his long years at the head of the Bolivarian Republic, his rule over the country is not the worst case scenario for Venezuela. That may seem absurd, given the depths the country has plumbed under his rule: the complete collapse of the economy, the terror of the secret police, a population at times on the verge of starvation, a massive wave of refugees streaming across the hemisphere in search of more hospitable situations. But the sad lesson of human history is that the wells of misery are rarely exhausted—things can almost always get worse. For Venezuela, that threat comes in the form of the cartels. Currently, Venezuela exists principally as a point of transit in the cartel drug trafficking network. Thousands of pounds of Colombian cocaine pass through Venezuela every day on their way north to the lucrative American market, often being run by air to unmarked runways in Central America. This transport is winked at and even at times facilitated by Maduro and the Venezuelan government in return for a cut of the profits. But the cartels do not have a significant territorial foothold; they do not control significant portions of the countryside, grow coca plants, or process the plants into cocaine in Venezuela. If they get too assertive, Maduro is happy to exert the full force of the state against them; he has no interest in permitting organized criminals to form alternative power centers. But that situation could easily change. There is nothing inherent to Venezuela that prevents cartels from entrenching themselves as quasi-state actors capable of contesting the control of territory and waging protracted war against the central government, as has been the case in neighboring Colombia or the more lawless portions of Mexico for decades. The struggle against the narco-revolutionaries in Colombia nearly destroyed the nation during the latter half of the 20th century, and only a brutal and painstaking fight has allowed the nation to regain the semblance of order and sovereignty. If the Venezuelan government crumbles, either by means of covert operations or a military intervention from the U.S., the only power that is keeping the cartels at arm’s length (albeit by means of generous concessions and a great deal of corruption) will disappear. Any new government, even with the help of an American occupying force, would be largely incapable of managing and projecting force into the far-flung reaches of the country, especially the portion of the Amazon that characterizes the southernmost region of Venezuela. This would open a golden opportunity for cartels like the National Liberation Army (ELN), which controls significant territory just across the border and already frequently travels through Venezuelan territory between clashes with the Colombian government. The cartels are likely to be significant beneficiaries of any conflict in Venezuela that topples the government, because they are well positioned with nearby strongholds and pre-existing connections to Maduro supporters in the government and military. The remaining supporters of the Bolivarian revolution would be left with little recourse but guerrilla warfare—and the ELN and its competitors provide the perfect platform for such operations. They would undoubtedly be delighted to accommodate the fragments of the old regime—and to expand their powerbase across the Colombia–Venezuela border. Maduro may be oppressive, but his regime is paradisiacal in comparison to the brutal reality of cartel warfare. The result of American intervention may well be a chavista Long March to the Amazon, plunging Venezuela into a terrible, drug-fueled civil war that could last for decades. It would also almost certainly involve American soldiers in some of the most horrific guerrilla fighting on the planet—some of whom would come home in a casket. For this reason, a peaceful and orderly transition of power away from Maduro is the preferable result of American pressure on Venezuela. Such a transition lacks, of course, the catharsis of overthrowing the regime by force, and unfortunately permits the principal perpetrators to escape their earthly just deserts. But it avoids the creation of a power vacuum during the process of redemocratization, and sharply reduces the probability of introducing permanent guerrilla conflict into the country—a situation clearly at odds with American interests in Venezuela. Thankfully, that option appears to be on the table. The Venezuelan government reportedly offered the Trump administration a plan for Maduro to gradually step down and hand power off at the end of his current presidential term, a remarkable step that demonstrates both the immensity of the pressure the U.S. is exerting on the Maduro regime and that Maduro is considering whether it might be rational to get out while the getting is good (or at least not yet catastrophically bad). The offer was rejected—likely at least in part because the timescale proposed would have meant no change until the very end of Trump’s second term—but the very proposition may mean that, with further pressure, a more suitable settlement could be reached. Such a settlement would be a signal achievement for the Trump administration’s foreign policy in Latin America, and it would avoid very real risks both for the people of Venezuela and for any potential American forces involved in the intervention. The post Maduro is Not the Worst Case for Venezuela appeared first on The American Conservative.

A bunch of fanboys. The post “Fanboy stuff”: When Metallica personally apologised to David Bowie first appeared on Far Out Magazine.