www.theamericanconservative.com
On Iran, Trump’s No Change Agent
Foreign Affairs
On Iran, Trump’s No Change Agent
The president acted in line with the decades-old foreign policy consensus he claimed to oppose.
Credit: Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
Donald Trump ran for office promising to shake up U.S. grand strategy.
In Trump’s telling, America’s leaders over the last several decades were too beholden to allied concerns, to the detriment of U.S. interests. And they were too enamored of military force that expended American blood and treasure on peripheral issues. In contrast, Trump suggested a willingness to break with allies when U.S. and partner concerns differed (“they’re screwing us” economically, he famously said of NATO allies), and he conveyed an openness to forgoing military adventures (there would be no “forever wars” on his watch) and instead prioritize diplomacy and negotiation.
In ordering military strikes against the Iranian nuclear program, President Trump has shown that his claim to be a grand-strategic change agent may be overstated. More than widely appreciated, and though the decision-making process itself was more idiosyncratic and personalistic, Trump’s move largely aligns with the foreign policy mainstream he has long lambasted. The status quo endures.
For decades, the U.S. has focused on curbing nuclear proliferation and embraced a range of both sticks (e.g., sanctions) and carrots (e.g., security guarantees) to this end. In several cases, U.S. leaders have considered the use of force to stop others’ nuclear ambitions. At the height of the Cold War, policymakers in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations explored possible military action against China’s rapidly developing nuclear program. In 1994, the Clinton administration nearly went to war with North Korea over Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions before a last-minute diplomatic deal was secured. The George W. Bush administration famously argued that the Iraq invasion was needed to ensure Iraq remained non-nuclear, and even politicized intelligence to portray Iraq as further along in its nuclear ambitions than was truly the case. Most recently, both the W. Bush and Obama administrations at least flirted with the idea of attacking Iran’s nuclear program should diplomacy fail. For sure, Trump may be the first U.S. leader to actually authorize an attack to abet nonproliferation (something his supporters say demonstrates his “guts”). Still, the objective itself is straight out of central U.S. foreign policy casting.
Trump has similarly followed his predecessors in equating allied interests—in this case, Israeli interests—with American concerns. To be clear, Israel has real fears about the Iranian nuclear program. After all, not only has the Islamic Republic long threatened Israel with destruction, but Iran has been a major sponsor of terrorist and militia groups such as Hezbollah that have imperiled Israeli security. Coupled with the fact that Israel is the sole nuclear power in the Middle East—meaning Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon would restrict Israeli freedom of action and require Jerusalem to focus on nuclear deterrence—and it is unsurprising that Israel has sought to roll back Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. Indeed, the combination of these long-standing concerns with the sense that Israel had a window of opportunity to strike Iran seems to have played a major role in spurring Israel to start the current war with Iran.
Still, if not for Trump’s willingness to treat Israeli interests as America’s own, it is difficult to explain the American decision to join the fight. Few actual American interests were at stake. Though the administration has sought to portray Iran as both an “imminent threat” to the U.S. due to its nuclear program and as a legitimate target due to its support for terrorism, neither claim withstands serious scrutiny. No evidence has been offered to demonstrate that Iran was (a) preparing to attack the United States or (b) even moving to develop a nuclear weapon—in fact, U.S. intelligence agencies continue to assess that Iran remains undecided about acquiring nuclear weapons. Moreover, even if Iran had acquired a nuclear weapon, seventy-five years of nuclear politics demonstrates that Washington could have successfully deterred Tehran from contemplating a nuclear strike on the United States. As for terrorism, it is certainly true that Iran supports militant groups, but they are regionally-based and motivated by regional concerns.
One reason Trump chose to strike Iran anyway, despite a lack of threat to the American homeland, seems to be that he came to equate Israeli and U.S. interests. Following Israel’s initial attack, for instance, Trump began praising the “excellent” and “very successful” military operation and—as the New York Times reports—“hinting that he had much more to do with it than people realized.” As the Israeli campaign continued, Trump’s rhetoric continued to conflate the U.S. and Israel, with Trump even posting online that “We now have complete and total control of the skies over Iran.” After the U.S. finally intervened, Trump praised the strike as “a great victory for our country”—again, a difficult proposition to entertain given the limited American stakes involved.
What about prioritizing diplomacy and negotiation over the use of force and avoiding “forever wars”? At the time of this writing, an Israeli–Iranian ceasefire, after a rough start, seems to be mostly holding. As a result, the United States may have avoided a larger war immediately after the strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Still, we should not lose sight of the fact that, by striking Iran, Trump has effectively undercut a durable diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear ambitions while creating conditions that can pull the United States back into conflict with Iran.
Before the 12-day conflict between Israel and Iran, negotiations were underway between American and Iranian officials to create a successor to the Obama-era Iran nuclear deal. Public accounts suggest that Trump simply decided that the process was not generating the results he wanted in a timeframe he found acceptable—as one senior official described it, Trump came to “a feeling” that diplomacy would not yield the outcome he sought. In ordering strikes under these circumstances, however, the administration seems to have overlooked that negotiations are just that—the other side gets a vote, and no one party gets to set the pace of events or impose agreement to its demands.
Having now attacked Iran, the Trump team has reduced the prospects for a long-term, stable deal. Not only does Iran have vivid evidence that the U.S. may not be a faithful and reliable negotiating partner, but Trump’s allusions to regime change give Tehran even more reasons to acquire a nuclear option. Indeed, there are already credible reports that the strikes did less damage to Iran’s nuclear program than the administration claims and that Tehran may be preparing to develop nuclear weapons with its remaining assets if not restart its nuclear program. To keep Iran from going nuclear, the U.S. must therefore overcome starker Iranian mistrust and reasons to race for a nuclear deterrent—or be willing to strike again. In either scenario, the result limits the space for diplomacy and creates a continued inclination to rely on military force, potentially fostering a slow-burning forever confrontation. Not coincidentally, it also keeps the U.S. more engaged with Middle Eastern affairs than would otherwise be the case and constrains U.S. opportunities for shifting attention to other theaters.
Taken as a whole, the result poses problems for claims pushed by both Trump’s supporters and his critics that the present administration is altering the foundation of U.S. grand strategy. Change the names of those signing the military orders and appearing on the news shows, and recent events could just as readily have occurred under the Bush, Obama, or Biden administrations. Indeed, one thing that unites each of those presidents is that they, unlike Trump, refused to strike Iran despite pressure at home and abroad to do so.
Of course, the Trump administration is not even six months old—time will tell if future policy choices take the U.S. in new and improved strategic directions. For now, however, the Washington foreign policy establishment can rejoice: In attacking Iran, President Trump has acted fully in line with the foreign policy consensus.
The post On Iran, Trump’s No Change Agent appeared first on The American Conservative.
New Posts (Home)
ChatBox
Popular Posts 
Game Zone
Top PodCasts
