Figuring out how old your parakeet is can be handy. Just like people‚ birds change as they grow. A young bird might have stripes on its head and a leg band that says when it was born. When a budgie gets older‚ its eyes look different‚ and the color of its cere — the soft...

When “Put a Little Love in Your Heart” was first released in 1969 it was not intended to be a Christmas song‚ but it became one for me once it was included in the 1988 CONTINUE READING... The post ‘Put a Little Love in Your Heart’ from 1988’s Scrooged appeared first on The Retro Network.

Taking a record of the heart and minds of the people, American Journal puts the power of the conversation into the callers' hands. Join us Monday through Friday, 8-11AM CST and call in to talk to Harrison Smith about all current topics and stories in the news and on your mind.

Often overlooked in the history of firearms out West was the H&;R line of revolvers‚ innovative spur-trigger models with origins back East. In 1871 Massachusetts-based gunmakers Gilbert H. Harrington and Frank Wesson (brother of Daniel B. Wesson of Smith &; Wesson fame) formed a short-lived partnership under the name Wesson &; Harrington. Four years later Wesson branched out on his own and sold his shares to Harrington. By 1876 Harrington and former Wesson employee William A. Richardson had forged the namesake partnership destined to become one of the longest surviving firearms manufacturers in the region‚ though not until 1888 did Harrington &; Richardson Arms Co. formally incorporate in Worcester‚ Mass.   Starting up production in 1877‚ H&;R produced untold millions of revolvers‚ from early single-action models using rimfire cartridges to later double-action models using .32 and .38 Smith &; Wesson centerfire cartridges. The H&;R line expanded and improved over time‚ making both solid-frame and top-break revolvers.    Small-frame pocket “wheel guns” were popular in the Old West‚ most often as an extra measure of life insurance. By the late 1870s the double-action revolver came into vogue. As a shooter no longer needed to cock the hammer before each shot‚ such revolvers were considered the “semiautomatics” of their day. H&;R entered the scene with its five- or six-shot Model 1880 solid-frame double-action revolver in .32 and .38 S&;W calibers. By decade’s end the company’s top-break models had become the mainstays of its line.   Side-by-side advertisements illustrate the progression of H&;R’s small-frame pocket revolvers from the 1870s new model at left‚ pitched in the pages of Harper’s Weekly‚ to the later hammerless model praised at right in a 1908 brochure. Dubbed the “lemon squeezer‚” the latter proved a popular‚ lightweight pocket gun. Among H&;R’s leading competitors‚ Smith &; Wesson had pioneered the top-break action in the United States with its larger .44 S&;W Russian and American and .45 S&;W Schofield models‚ which ejected empty cases out of the cylinder on opening to reload—a welcome time (and‚ potentially‚ life) saver. Another of S&;W’s revolutionary double-action revolvers was its small-frame safety hammerless revolver. Introduced in 1887‚ the design caught on.   Already at work on a similar design‚ H&;R soon patented its own hammerless revolver with enough internal differences to avoid any infringement on S&;W’s model. The latter’s version was nicknamed the “lemon squeezer‚” a moniker eventually applied to all hammerless double-action models.   H&;R’s small-frame double-action revolvers proved especially popular with ranch hands and lawmen weary of lugging heavier hardware. Among those pocketing the hammerless five-shooters was famed Texas Ranger Frank Hamer‚ photographed here during the 1934 hunt for Depression-era outlaws Bonnie Parker and Clyde Barrow‚ which ended with the duo’s deaths that May 23rd. As the Old West gave way to the turn of the century‚ such small-frame double-action revolvers appealed to many a ranch hand who‚ given weight considerations and tamer times‚ had grown weary of lugging around heavier hardware. In photographs of settlers bound for the Cherokee Strip land run in 1893 one can spot‚ in addition to the standard Sharps or Spencer rifle‚ small-frame double-action revolvers in many a holster. Messengers and detectives with Wells Fargo &; Co. and other favorite targets of highwaymen were also fond of carrying a top-break small-frame double-action revolver or two. A period of especially brisk sales for H&;R accompanied the 1896–99 Klondike Gold Rush to the District of Alaska and Yukon Territory. Presumably for protection against such ne’er-do-wells as notorious con man Soapy Smith and cohorts‚ scores of gold seekers carried the low-cost H&;R hammerless double-action revolver. By then the company had plenty of competition in the small-frame revolver niche from such respected makers as Hopkins &; Allen‚ Forehand &; Wadsworth‚ Iver Johnson and Thames Arms. Among other noted users‚ Frank Hamer—the famed Texas Ranger who finally stopped Depression-era outlaw duo Bonnie Parker and Clyde Barrow‚ killing them from ambush near Gibsland‚ La.‚ on May 23‚ 1934—carried a small-frame‚ five-shot‚ .38-caliber double-action pocket revolver in addition to full-size sidearms.   Though the patent for H&;R’s hammerless safety revolver dates from 1895‚ it is difficult to date individual guns‚ as the company used run-on serial numbers and didn’t keep meticulous records. In addition to its popular revolvers‚ H&;R also produced single- and double-barrel shotguns‚ including the first American-made hammerless double-barreled shotgun based on the British Anson &; Deeley action‚ as well as the single-shot “Handy-Gun‚” a short-barreled shotgun with a pistol grip that was dropped from production in 1934 following passage of the National Firearms Act‚ which outlawed such “gangsterish” configurations. H&;R was among the few American firearms manufacturers with unprecedented longevity. It continued to produce well-made‚ no-frills guns for the money until shuttering its doors in 1986 after more than a century in business. this article first appeared in wild west magazine See more stories SubscriBE NOW!  

No general‚ the old saying goes‚ ever wakes up in the morning and decides he is going to lose a battle. Yet for every general who loses a battle‚ there is an opposite number who wins the fight. This has been a constant of warfare for as long as man has kept historical records. World War I‚ however‚ has been recorded somewhat differently by history‚ or at least by popular history. Given the four years of carnage in the trenches‚ the likes of which the world had never seen‚ the myth of “lions led by donkeys” still holds great sway a century later. Yet‚ despite the appeal and apparent clarity of such a view‚ the truth on the ground was nowhere near as simplistic. World War I was a war unlike any other ever fought. It was a war of future shock. Newly emerging technologies in weaponry‚ communications and‚ later‚ mobility rendered all the old tactics and mechanics of warfighting obsolete. Nor did the new dynamics of warfighting remain static between 1914 and ’18. They evolved rapidly‚ constantly changing the harsh realities of the battlefield. Thus‚ the senior military leaders on all sides spent most of the first three years of the war trying to keep up with and come to terms with the new technologies. Unfortunately‚ when you are in the middle of fighting a war‚ trial and error is the only viable mechanism for such a process. Thus‚ World War I was a 20th century war fought by 19th century soldiers. From the most senior field marshal to the most junior platoon leader to the privates on the front lines‚ all faced a steep learning curve‚ and they had to climb it rapidly. The starting point for any analysis of senior-level military leadership must be a working definition of generalship itself. The art of generalship—and it is very much an art‚ rather than a science—involves far more than the command of large formations of troops. It also comprises the formation‚ organization‚ equipment and training of an army; the transportation of forces to a theater of operations; the logistical sustainment of troops throughout their deployment; the collection‚ processing and analysis of intelligence on the enemy; the planning of operations and committal of forces to battle; and the direction and coordination of their actions once committed. Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz grouped these diverse activities of generalship into two primary categories—preparation for war and the conduct of war proper—and argued that precious few commanders are equally skilled in both categories. History bears him out. Circa 1915 propaganda depicts German Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg (seated at right) and an Austrian ally besting buffoonish Allied rivals‚ though by that point the war was in stalemate. Do generals single-handedly win battles? Of course not. But they can single-handedly lose them. During World War I Britain’s then First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill referred to Admiral Sir John Jellicoe‚ the commander of Britain’s Grand Fleet‚ as “the only man on either side who could lose the war in an afternoon.” Any close analysis of the battles of 1914–18 clearly demonstrates that a great deal turned on the planning and execution decisions made by the senior-most commanders. There is much to learn from the study of those decisions‚ the men who made them and the conditions under which they carried out their duties as they saw them. Paul von Hindenburg. Erich Ludendorff. There is no such thing as a wartime general who does everything perfectly all the time. All are flesh-and-blood human beings. All at one point or another rate some degree of legitimate criticism for their actions and decisions. But by necessity such judgments always come after the fact. Most of us cannot possibly imagine what it is like to be responsible for the lives of thousands‚ even hundreds of thousands‚ of one’s own countrymen; having to make decisions under extreme pressure‚ in the environment of the fog and friction of war; and with partial‚ incorrect and even intentionally deceptive information on which to base those decisions. Even if the general does everything right‚ his troops still wind up suffering casualties while killing and wounding huge numbers of the enemy. It is just this mass expenditure of human life in war that results in the tendency to classify generals into neatly self-contained categories: heroes (cult icons such as World War II German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel)‚ villains (World War I’s butchers and bunglers) or fools (World War I’s donkeys). In modern-day estimation virtually no World War I general ranks in the hero class‚ yet to one degree or another every battlefield commander in history can be included simultaneously in all three categories. The following analysis will focus on the six senior-most Western Front battlefield commanders of 1918‚ namely:   Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg‚ chief of the General Staff of the German field army (Feldheer) General of the Infantry Erich Ludendorff‚ first quartermaster general of the German army Marshal of France Ferdinand Foch‚ general in chief of the Allied armies General of Division Philippe Pétain‚ commander in chief of French armies on the Western Front Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig‚ commander in chief of the British Expeditionary Force General John J. “Black Jack” Pershing‚ commander in chief of the American Expeditionary Forces   Chief of the German General Staff Hindenburg (left) and Quartermaster General Erich Ludendorff acted in concert during the war‚ the latter as chief tactician. Ferdinand Foch. Philippe Pétain this article first appeared in Military History magazine See more stories Subscribe now!   Sir Douglas Haig. John J. Pershing. Despite broad rejection today in most academic circles of the “great man theory” of history‚ these six generals had the major influence on the outcome of the campaigns of 1918 and‚ ultimately‚ the war. It was these senior-most commanders who made the decisions‚ and it is impossible to understand the Western Front in 1918 without studying them. The judgment of history still has not been settled on these six warlords. Judgment rests far more heavily on three of the six than the records of their wartime commands merit. Pétain is rightly remembered as the savior of France on two separate occasions—at Verdun in 1916 and again in the spring of 1917 after mutinies threatened his ranks. But he is better remembered as the man who as chief of state of Vichy France from 1940 to ’44 sold out his country to the Third Reich. Hindenburg was the “Wooden Titan” (der Nagelsäulen)‚ Germany’s only true national hero during the war. He was also the last president of the doomed Weimar Republic and the man who appointed Adolf Hitler chancellor of Germany in January 1933. The debate continues on Ludendorff. He was either the greatest military genius of the war‚ or he was the man whose strategic ineptitude and personal military and political overreach resulted in a complete loss of focus that cost Germany the war. He also was an early supporter of the Nazis‚ later tried along with Hitler for the infamous Beer Hall Putsch of November 1923. Of the six‚ Haig is the one most often branded today as a “château general‚” or one who led from the rear. Foch had a reputation as a fighter‚ while every frontline poilu knew that Pétain‚ more than anyone else‚ would be more careful with their lives. Pershing had comparatively little experience commanding in combat‚ certainly not enough to acquire any significant negative repute among doughboys. Unfortunately‚ space limitations restrict the following assessment. For more detail see my 2018 book The Generals’ War: Operational Level Command on the Western Front in 1918.   Paul von Hindenburg Hindenburg is the most enigmatic of the war’s senior commanders‚ certainly more than the mere figurehead he appears today. The German command system was significantly different than those of the Allies. The relationship between a German commander and his chief of staff (Ludendorff’s de facto role by war’s end) was a far closer partnership. Thus‚ it is impossible to consider one or the other alone. Although by the last year of the war Hindenburg appeared to be little more than Ludendorff’s political top cover‚ one can never forget that‚ unlike many other German senior commanders‚ he was a fully qualified General Staff officer‚ one who had graduated with honors from the Kriegsakademie. The field marshal’s principal British biographer‚ John W. Wheeler-Bennett‚ said Hindenburg’s greatest contribution was his “never-failing capacity and willingness to accept responsibility‚ a feature of his character which became less apparent in his later life.” Those cracks in his armor began to show as early as October 1918.   By war’s end Hindenburg looked on as Ludendorff coordinated German tactics. When the end came and Ludendorff broke down‚ Hindenburg defended him. Erich Ludendorff Although Ludendorff arguably was the most brilliant tactician of the war‚ he had a blind spot for the operational level and virtually no understanding of the strategic. The five German offensives of 1918 did not constitute a coordinated‚ integrated and sequentially phased operational campaign‚ but rather five huge‚ costly and largely unconnected tactical actions. After the failure of the first offensive in March 1918‚ each subsequent offensive was a reaction to the failure of the one before it. As British historian David Stevenson has argued‚ rail lines were the key to the 1918 campaigns. The Allies‚ especially Foch‚ continually targeted the German rail network. The Germans‚ though sensitive to the security of their own network‚ failed to focus sufficiently on the significant vulnerabilities of the shallow and fragile Allied rail system. Rather than attacking vital Allied vulnerabilities‚ like the BEF’s key rail nodes of Amiens and Hazebrouck‚ Ludendorff repeatedly tried to win with force-on-force attacks. While the Germans did have a fleeting force superiority early in 1918‚ it was not large enough for that kind of strategy. And in May‚ when the third German offensive pushed from the Chemin des Dames ridge south to the Marne River‚ the Germans were left holding a large and ultimately indefensible salient that had no major rail lines leading into it. The outcome was inevitable. By then many of the staff officers at Oberste Heeresleitung (supreme army command) and subordinate headquarters were complaining that Ludendorff combined total strategic indecision with endless interference over minor tactical details.   Opposing generals Ludendorff and Pétain each overhauled the tactics of his army‚ the former bogging down in that task to the detriment of strategic concerns. The two key French generals of 1918‚ Foch and Pétain‚ were very different men. Pétain was by far the better tactician‚ but he was overcautious and pessimistic at the operational level. Foch had serious shortcomings as a tactician‚ but at the operational level he was the best general of the war. Fortunately for the Allies‚ they were the two right generals in the right positions at the right time—Foch as the overall Allied commander‚ and Pétain as commander of the French army. A similar division of duties existed between Generals Dwight Eisenhower and George Patton in 1944–45. Neither could have done the other’s job half as well. Ferdinand Foch Foch remains largely underrated. As Australian historian Elizabeth Greenhalgh noted‚ “Most historians dismiss the First World War version of supreme command as of little value‚ and Foch’s role in the victory as minimal.” But‚ Greenhalgh argued‚ Foch’s role in the Allies’ final victory was anything but minimal‚ and the precedent of his appointment to the supreme command and the lessons derived therefrom proved the essential foundation for the successful British-American combined command of World War II. Foch’s operational strategy of concentric attacks across a broad front between August and November 1918 essentially broke the German army. Unlike the uncoordinated and piecemeal German offenses during the first half of 1918‚ the Allied attacks during the second half were focused‚ synchronized and systematically timed. From July 18 through war’s end Hindenburg and Ludendorff were forced to react to Foch‚ rather than the other way around. Perhaps his old friend and sometime critic General Sir Henry Wilson summed up the generalissimo best when after the war he observed‚ “[Foch] jumps over hills and valleys‚ but he always lands in the right place.”   As general in chief of the Allied armies‚ Foch managed to coordinate French‚ British and American efforts and achieve victory. Philippe Pétain As British historian Sir Alistair Horne wrote‚ “Pétain may not have had any original concepts on how the Great War should have been fought‚ but he understood better than either his colleagues or his opponents how it should not have been fought.” Actually‚ Horne’s assessment is somewhat parsimonious‚ for Pétain’s overhaul of French army tactics in 1917 was every bit the equal of Ludendorff’s initiatives.   Pétain depicted here reviewing French troops at Verdun. Sir Douglas Haig Much criticism‚ fair and unfair‚ has been heaped upon Haig over the last eight decades. For almost 20 years following the war the British public held him largely in high esteem. That changed radically in the mid-1930s‚ when wartime Prime Minister David Lloyd George started publishing his war memoirs. As American General William Westmoreland would experience in the wake of the Vietnam War‚ Haig became a lightning rod for almost everything that had gone wrong during World War I‚ including things over which he really had no control. Haig was hardly a stellar battlefield general‚ and he was a rather unimaginative tactician; but by the second half of 1918 he had become a reasonably competent and effective operational-level commander. Haig also had significant input on Foch’s concept for the Allied general offensive of the final two months of the war. There can be little doubt the key to the final Allied success was the difficult but ultimately effective partnership between Haig and Foch. The two met some 60 times between April and November 1918. It was Haig who convinced Foch the AEF’s main effort in late 1918 should be toward Mézières rather than Metz‚ as Pershing wanted‚ turning the Allied offensive into a gigantic‚ sequential pincer attack. While assessments of Haig have become more nuanced over the last 30 years‚ British historians remain divided. In 2008 Paul Harris wrote of Haig during the Hundred Days that despite his shortcomings‚ “He commanded the most combat effective of the Allied armies at this period in the war‚ and there were few‚ if any‚ others who had the authority and determination to use the instrument with such vigor.”   Haig put in a mixed performance as British commander. John J. Pershing Though “Black Jack” Pershing has long held a reputation as one of the United States’ greatest generals‚ his reputation abroad was somewhat lower and admittedly closer to the mark. Pershing was a brilliant organizer of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). He also was an efficient trainer—but not an effective one‚ as he trained his troops for the wrong things. Pershing came late to the war‚ infused with a belief in American exceptionalism and an unstinting faith in superior marksmanship and the power of the bayonet. Ignoring the experiences of the previous three years‚ he believed that the tired and dispirited enemy troops cowering in their trenches could never stand up to his robust and fresh doughboys. Accordingly‚ he discounted the effects of new weapons like machine guns‚ trench mortars‚ artillery and aircraft‚ pushing his troops forward in relentless frontal attacks. Pershing’s misreading of the World War I battlefield was a major contributor to the U.S. Army having suffered a staggering 117‚000 dead and 204‚000 wounded in little more than six months of major combat operations. Despite Pershing’s serious tactical shortcomings‚ the AEF most likely would never have made it to the European battlefields of 1918 without him. He was a tireless organizer and had a talent for overcoming seemingly insurmountable obstacles. Regardless‚ his prejudices against modern weapons and lack of understanding of their firepower meant his AEF units were trained and equipped inadequately for the war they had to fight.   Pershing‚ commander in chief of the American Expeditionary Forces‚ arrives in France in June 1917. Though a brilliant organizer‚ he underestimated the devastating firepower of modern weaponry. A century after the outset of World War I there remains much to learn from a study of it‚ especially the last year of the war. Its conduct changed the way wars have been fought ever since. The basic outlines of the warfighting mechanics it introduced are still valid. A general of 1918 would recognize many of the basic challenges facing a general of 2018. As retired British Maj. Gen. Jonathan B.A. Bailey has observed‚ “The new thinking of 1917–18 formed the seedbed for the new techniques of fire and manoeuver practiced in the Second World War.” Indeed‚ and far beyond.  Retired U.S. Army Maj. Gen. David T. Zabecki is HistoryNet’s chief military historian. For further reading he suggests his own The Generals’ War: Operational Level Command on the Western Front in 1918‚ which shared the 2018 Tomlinson Book Prize from the World War I Historical Association. Zabecki also recommends Reputations: Ten Years After‚ by B.H. Liddell Hart. This story appeared in the Winter 2024 issue of Military History magazine. historynet magazines Our 9 best-selling history titles feature in-depth storytelling and iconic imagery to engage and inform on the people‚ the wars‚ and the events that shaped America and the world. subscribe today

A recent study conducted by researchers at the Azabu University in Kanagawa‚ Japan shows that female dog and cat owners tend to be a bit more involved in their families‚ resulting to a healthier life.

Government Weaponized Against Elon Musk Once Again

Chicago City Council Denies Voters a Voice on Continued Sanctuary City Status

NASA’s Perseverance has spent over 1‚000 sols – Martian days – inside Jezero Crater. The location of an ancient impact‚ the crater was for a time a lake with a river carrying water into it. A prominent delta has been sculpted in the rocks and it is there that the rover has been exploring. And now‚ it has enough information to paint a picture of what this location has gone through over eons.It all started 4 billion years ago. An asteroid slammed into Mars and created a large crater which we now call Jezero. The crater floor is made of igneous rock‚ evidence of either volcanic activity on the surface post-impact or magma formation that raised up. Hundreds of millions of years later‚ water came to Jezero.Perseverance found sandstone and mudstone‚ indicating that water flowed into the crater that long ago. Above those rocks though‚ there are others. More mudstones‚ but these are rich in salt. From the flowing water‚ a shallow lake formed. It is estimated that it grew to have a diameter of 35 kilometers (22 miles) but it was at most only 30 meters (100 feet) deep. The evaporation of the lake left behind the salt.But the watery history of the place doesn’t end there. The final chapter saw‚ at a later time‚ the flowing of fast water across the delta that Perseverance is exploring. Boulders were carried by this powerful river and they were spread over the surface of the delta."We picked Jezero Crater as a landing site because orbital imagery showed a delta – clear evidence that a large lake once filled the crater. A lake is a potentially habitable environment‚ and delta rocks are a great environment for entombing signs of ancient life as fossils in the geologic record‚" Perseverance's project scientist‚ Ken Farley of Caltech‚ said in a statement. "After thorough exploration‚ we've pieced together the crater's geologic history‚ charting its lake and river phase from beginning to end."While the region is a prime candidate for possible ancient life‚ the rover has not found any signs yet. The suite of instruments on board Perseverance can detect both ancient fossil-like structures and the chemical alterations brought forth by ancient life. It has been investigating the many collected samples thoroughly but nothing so far.The current region being explored has carbonate material indicating an ancient water environment where life might have evolved. Iron phosphates have also been found‚ and phosphorus is a key ingredient in life. It is also rich in silica‚ which is seen as an ideal substance to preserve ancient life."We have ideal conditions for finding signs of ancient life where we find carbonates and phosphates‚ which point to a watery‚ habitable environment‚ as well as silica‚ which is great at preservation‚" added Morgan Cable‚ the deputy principal investigator of Pereseverance’s Planetary Instrument for X-ray Lithochemistry.The rover is not standing still after crossing the 1‚000th sol mark. It is now going to explore the rim of Jezero crater.