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1 y

Kamala Considers Racist Hatemonger Keith Ellison for Attorney General
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Kamala Considers Racist Hatemonger Keith Ellison for Attorney General

Ellison ran for office on a platform of having Nation of Islam thugs patrol neighborhoods The post Kamala Considers Racist Hatemonger Keith Ellison for Attorney General appeared first on Frontpage Mag.
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WATCH The Teaser: Melania Trump To EXPOSE Hidden Truths In Upcoming Memoir
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WATCH The Teaser: Melania Trump To EXPOSE Hidden Truths In Upcoming Memoir

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Watch: MSNBC Having A Meltdown Calling Musk Extreme
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Watch: MSNBC Having A Meltdown Calling Musk Extreme

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Living In Faith
Living In Faith
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Doubt? Or Unbelief? - Greg Laurie Devotion - September 7/8, 2024
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Doubt? Or Unbelief? - Greg Laurie Devotion - September 7/8, 2024

Doubt? Or Unbelief? - Greg Laurie Devotion - September 7/8, 2024
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Let’s Not Party Like It’s 1999
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Let’s Not Party Like It’s 1999

“We are not going back!” is something like the signature line of the Harris-Walz campaign, and for all of its vacuous dullness, the sentiment certainly encapsulates the progressive left’s prevailing…
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‘Kibbutz Blinken’ and the Limits of Protest
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‘Kibbutz Blinken’ and the Limits of Protest

Like a lot of commuters who cross the Potomac, I drive by Antony Blinken’s house frequently. The secretary of state lives on Chain Bridge Road, a long downhill slope which runs from the CIA to Chain…
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Did Communism Really Fall?
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Did Communism Really Fall?

Whenever the foreign news is especially depressing, I like to reminisce about the halcyon days of 1989, when the fall of the Berlin wall so memorably illustrated the collapse of Communist tyranny in eastern…
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Conservative Voices
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1 y

Let’s Not Party Like It’s 1999
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Let’s Not Party Like It’s 1999

Culture Let’s Not Party Like It’s 1999 A convenient anniversary hardly makes for a cultural golden age. Credit: image via Shutterstock “We are not going back!” is something like the signature line of the Harris-Walz campaign, and for all of its vacuous dullness, the sentiment certainly encapsulates the progressive left’s prevailing philosophy.As the left sees it, a society is not a constellation of permanent things but is itself malleable. History, tradition, and passed-down values are merely things to be corrected or canceled. Long-held and fairly self-evident ideas—such as, for example, that there are only two genders, or that price controls have proven calamitous—can be forsaken for the woke ideology du jour.  Yet, in at least one department, our cultural commissars are hopeless sentimentalists: When it comes to the movies, the recent past is apparently an inexhaustible treasure chest. In recent weeks, the New York Times has been running articles trumpeting the movies released in 1999. Sample: “The Year Tom Cruise Gave Not One but Two Dangerously Vulnerable Performances.” Or: “10 Unforgettable Songs From 1999 Movies.” We are informed that the cinematic offerings of 25 years ago were unusually good and hold up especially well. Citing the mixture of pre-millennium optimism and dread, the Times movie critic Alissa Wilkinson wrote, “That collective mood—one of hope and fear mashed together—made 1999 an incredible year at the movies.”  Although this sort of talk has picked up during the quarter-century anniversary of that alleged golden year, multiplex wistfulness for the last year of the last century is nothing new: As far back as 2019, an entire book advancing this thesis was published by Simon & Schuster: Brian Raftery’s Best. Movie. Year. Ever.: How 1999 Blew Up the Big Screen. Such screeds tend to persuade because of Americans’ addiction to nostalgia: Anything, including the record of once-disliked presidents, can look appealing when regarded in the rearview mirror.  Dear reader, I was an avid moviegoer in 1999, and while I do not necessarily endorse all or even most of my opinions as a 16-year-old, I am confident in my assessment of the movie scene just before the turn of the millennium: I would have said then, and I say now, that 1999 was no great shakes. Let us start with the claims of those arguing in favor of the year’s alleged cinematic greatness. “Just look at the list: Fight Club. The Matrix. Toy Story 2. Eyes Wide Shut. Office Space. Shakespeare in Love. Magnolia. The Green Mile. The Blair Witch Project. Being John Malkovich. The Virgin Suicides,” Wilkinson wrote, throwing titles at us as though their greatness is self-evident.  Some of these are fine movies, but none can plausibly be said to equal the greatest works of the art form. Is the deadening coolness of Fight Club the equal of the invigorating humanism of The Rules of the Game? Do the cheapo thrills of Blair Witch compare to the spiritually rigorous soul-searching of Vertigo? Does the dime-store sentiment of The Green Mile measure up to the operatic expressiveness of Douglas Sirk melodramas? For heaven’s sake, does the dreary technical proficiency of the Toy Story sequel come within a country mile of the old Looney Tunes cartoons? Let’s keep some perspective here, people. In fact, several of the best-remembered movies from 1999 suggest that our present troubles had emerged earlier than we might have imagined. For example, Paul Thomas Anderson’s extravagant epic Magnolia, another film mentioned by Wilkinson, could easily pass for a movie of today: From Tom Cruise blubbering over his ornery dying father to the principal cast members engaging in mass karaoke to an Aimee Mann song to the climactic scene of frogs pelting down, the movie is a harbinger of 21st-century-style spiritual-but-not-religious touchy-feeliness. Even the retro-casting of old-timey supporting players like Philip Baker Hall or Melinda Dillon (the mom in Close Encounters!) anticipates the very nostalgia craze that elevates the movie today. Similarly, the postmodern mumbo-jumbo of Being John Malkovich and the techno soullessness of The Matrix—to which sequels are still being produced—feel all too familiar. The 1999 release that eventually won the Oscar for Best Picture, American Beauty, indulges in an early, and easy, attack on the American normal entirely in keeping with contemporary sentiments: Middle-class suburbia was portrayed as a sham to be uncovered and a hellscape from which to escape. Apart from the presence of its now-canceled star Kevin Spacey, the movie would still appeal to our cultural gatekeepers.  Wilkinson goes on to call the entirely disposable Runaway Bride “a great rom-com” and the utterly profane American Pie “a teen classic,” at which point she loses even the pretense of critical seriousness. If these were the highlights of 1999, what were the lowlights? I liked plenty of movies in 1999, but then, as now, they were not the ones that broke box-office records, accumulated glowing notices, or would later occasion fond reappraisals in the New York Times. I especially admired David Mamet’s British legal drama The Winslow Boy, Neil Jordan’s lovely adaptation of Graham Greene’s The End of the Affair, and Robert Altman’s digressive Southern reverie Cookie’s Fortune. I liked the latest films by Clint Eastwood (True Crime), Woody Allen (Sweet and Lowdown), and Steven Soderbergh (The Limey), too. Yet I would not use this personal pantheon to argue that 1999 was an exceptionally consequential year in moviemaking. To do so is to suggest that the mere passage of time alone confers greatness; by that reckoning, the filmic junk of 2024—say, Furiosa: A Mad Max Saga or Drive-Away Dolls—might look good in 2049. I beg to differ. To “want to go back” to an earlier, more wholesome era in American civic life is entirely salutary, but to romanticize the slop Hollywood produces one year over another? Thanks, but no thanks. The post Let’s Not Party Like It’s 1999 appeared first on The American Conservative.
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Did Communism Really Fall?
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Did Communism Really Fall?

Politics Did Communism Really Fall? The essence of Communism is both subtler and more familiar than economic programs. Credit: image via Shutterstock Whenever the foreign news is especially depressing, I like to reminisce about the halcyon days of 1989, when the fall of the Berlin wall so memorably illustrated the collapse of Communist tyranny in eastern Europe, or 1991, when a still relatively sober Boris Yeltsin stared down an “anti-democratic” coup mounted by stodgy Soviet bureaucrats and then grandly outlawed the Russian Communist Party, perpetrator of so many crimes in the USSR, Europe, and Asia. If domestic affairs get me down, I recall fondly the atmosphere of 1994 and 1995 when, as a wide-eyed Stanford undergraduate in the heart of Silicon Valley, I witnessed the exciting launch of the World Wide Web, with its heady promise of new liberties dawning in cyberspace. The reverie does not last long. Even in 1989, I have to remind myself, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), demonstrating ruthlessness that the last Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev fortunately lacked, had placed a giant asterisk on the “fall of Communism” narrative by slaughtering hundreds of demonstrators in Tiananmen Square. Since the West followed China down the Covid path of forcible quarantine, Orwellian “contact tracing” and online surveillance and censorship in 2020—enabled, to my shame, by Stanford University’s now-disbanded “Internet Observatory”—the failure of Communist-style statist tyranny to die off is hard to ignore. We should not forget that President Yeltsin lost in court when the Communist Party sued to be reinstated in 1992; it is still the second-largest political party in Russia. In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the aggressive western sanctions (and Russian counter-measures) that followed it, relations between Moscow and the West are now colder, by many measures, than at the height of the Cold War. As for the vaunted World Wide Web, compare a typical headline from its muse, Wired magazine, in 1995 (“Save Free Speech in Cyberspace!”) to today (August 19, 2024): “The Pentagon is Planning a ‘Drone Hellscape’ to Defend Taiwan.”  Something has clearly gone badly awry in the post–Cold War world. In that ARPANET, the precursor to today’s heavily-controlled internet, was originally designed by the U.S. military as a failsafe against Soviet nuclear attack, it is perhaps not entirely surprising that the internet search and social media behemoths of Silicon Valley became heavily intertwined with U.S. intelligence agencies, or that Wired now does PR for the Pentagon. But were not the U.S. defense and spy agencies supposed to be tasked with defending American and western freedoms against the Communist threat, rather than imposing Communist-style controls on the population? Did the U.S. and its Allies, despite appearances in 1989 and 1991, actually lose the Cold War? From the earliest days of the Cold War, certain ironies were manifest. The Manhattan Project which bought the U.S. a short-lived nuclear monopoly from 1945–1949 was a top-down government planning project par excellence, “more Soviet than the Soviets”—it was even honeycombed with Soviet agents (seven, as we now know, or roughly six more than were implied in the recent blockbuster film Oppenheimer). The CIA was largely modeled on, and designed to defeat, the Soviet KGB (and its predecessors), which it came uncannily to resemble. In the nuclear arms race, the space race, in higher education policy, and in international sports, the U.S. government often closely mirrored the Soviet statist approach, sometimes winning by outspending Moscow (as with the Manhattan Project and the Apollo program and moon landings), and sometimes losing by not cheating as egregiously (as with Soviet Olympic success enabled by flouting rules on “amateurism” and aggressive state doping).  The collapse of the USSR in 1991 should have prompted a rethink, with an American “peace dividend” allowing the metastasizing U.S. security state to scale back down to human size. Washington, DC, a city then suffering through a crack-era crime wave that caused much of the real estate around Congress to plunge in value, might have reverted to its roots as a swampy backwater as older American patterns re-asserted themselves, with New York dominating finance, fashion, and advertising, Chicago mercantile trade, Los Angeles entertainment, while Silicon Valley surged ahead in IT while severing its slightly embarrassing ties to the Pentagon and the CIA. The migration of millions of people from crowded eastern cities such as Washington and nearby Baltimore to the “Sun Belt,” a process well underway by the 1980s, could and should have brought about a long-overdue rebalancing between the imperial capital and the American periphery. The statist excesses of the Cold War, perhaps justifiable as temporary expedients to see off a determined global threat, could have served as a warning.  Instead, Washington has doubled and tripled down on statism, in everything from NATO expansion to foreign “forever war” military interventions to an almost parabolic expansion of the federal bureaucracy. Rather than a peace dividend, the U.S. government now runs nine-figure deficits annually as a matter of course, and meddles in citizens’ lives in everything from vaccine mandates and (corporate lobbying–distorted) nutrition guidelines, to who is allowed to use boys’ and girls’ bathrooms in public institutions, to the water pressure of showers and toilets at home, to Title IX policing of speech and behavior in workplaces and on college campuses—and then spends still more taxpayer money promoting similarly questionable policies around the world. The U.S. capital is more imperial than ever before, its obscenely expensive suburbs occupied by unaccountable employees of the 429 federal agencies of the permanent administrative state, who vote lockstep in numbers approaching 100 percent for the “party of government”—America’s undeclared version of a ruling Communist party – while blithely ignoring the social pathologies and miseries affecting the provincial peons whose taxes pay their generous six-figure salaries. Perhaps most shocking of all has been the embrace of Communist-style censorship policies by the U.S. and other Western governments once pledged to uphold freedom of speech and the press. To sample news headlines from August 2024 alone, a ranking member of the European Commission threatened the owner of Twitter (now “X”), Elon Musk, over Musk’s decision to interview a U.S. presidential candidate on his own platform; an “Online Harms Bill” was introduced in Canada’s parliament proposing to amend the country’s criminal code to “increase the maximum sentences for hate propaganda offenses”; France arrested the owner of the messaging platform Telegram not for anything he said or did, but for not suppressing alleged criminal activities by users of the platform; Robert Reich, a former U.S. Secretary of Labor, demanded in the Guardian that “regulators around the world should threaten Musk with arrest”; taking Reich’s advice, Brazil banned Musk’s X outright, with draconian fines for citizens who simply access it; Britain’s new government proudly announced it was expanding space in its prisons for protestors and citizens who make offensive social media posts (presumably, although this was not stated directly, by letting actual criminals go) and duly arrested hundreds of protestors and speech “offenders”; and Mark Zuckerberg, founder of social media giant Facebook, confessed in a public letter to Congress that “in 2021, senior officials from the Biden Administration, including the White House, repeatedly pressured our teams for months to censor certain COVID-19 content, including humor and satire.” In many ways, the self-reinforcing panopticon of surveillance and social media controls which has spread across the western world in the past decade would have been the envy of Soviet dictators, who had to blanket the USSR with hundreds of thousands of paid KGB censors and spies, buttressed in the Brezhnev era (c. 1964–1982) by expensive pin-sized listening devices, to achieve similar reach into people’s private thoughts. Today’s Western “cancel culture” controls more closely resemble the bright red “denunciation boxes” introduced by Mao in China in the early 1950s, which outsourced spying to volunteer snitches rather than to paid spies, or the notorious inoffizielle Mitarbeiter (unofficial collaborators) of the East German Stasi, who by the Stasi’s peak in 1975 numbered 180,000 in a country of less than 17 million. Why hire spies and heavies to pry information out of dissidents, after all, when their friends and neighbors—or in today’s online world, random strangers—will turn them in for free?  Then there is Wikipedia, which increasingly resembles the old Great Soviet Encyclopedia in its enforcement of the party line on controversial subjects or the ostracization of dissidents via crowd-sourced character assassination—except that it costs Western governments nothing. Trying to figure out who owns, edits, or stealth-edits Wikipedia entries is a revealing exercise in plausible deniability. The “Wikimedia Foundation,” which is said to “own” Wikipedia, is registered as a “non-profit organization” in San Francisco, California, allowing it to evade taxes or transparency-enhancing buyouts of the kind Elon Musk performed with Twitter—even though it is financed by the heaviest hitters of Big Tech, including Google, Apple, and Microsoft.  If volunteer snitches and scolds prove unobliging, media or government surveillance teams can cheaply and quietly acquire personal data hoovered up by search engines and social media companies, with none of the fuss the KGB or Stasi had to make coercing or bribing informants and victims. Indeed, volunteer online doxxers and lazy “journalists” now do this for free, alerting employers, colleagues, or angry online mobs whom it would behoove them to slander, censor, fire, prosecute, or perhaps to picket, harass, threaten, and even assault if a particularly famous victim’s home address is discovered. Of course, American citizens (if not Canadians, Britons, or west Europeans) still enjoy some First-Amendment protections, and few if any of us have suffered horrors like those endured routinely by Soviet and Chinese class enemies and dissidents, from “expropriation” of their homes, belongings, and bank accounts to forced labor camps, executions, and mass starvation. Since the Deng Xiaoping reforms in China, even avowedly Communist governments (with the partial exception of North Korea’s) now accept some level of private ownership and economic activity, and it is unlikely that any government, Communist or not, will again attempt anything on the scale of Stalin’s murderous forced-collectivization drive or Mao’s genocidal Great Leap Forward.  The grotesque abuses and disappointing economic results of these infamous episodes in central economic planning helped discredit the “maximalist” (or we might say “literal-minded”) version of Communism, which now has almost no purchase in Russia or China, and appeals in the West only to those deeply ignorant of history. But to assume that Communism in practice has always required strict state ownership of the “means of production” is erroneous. The outsized role of U.S. corporations and Western capitalist investors in the Chinese Communist “economic miracle” of the past few decades is broadly familiar, but even in the heyday of Stalinist Five-Year Plans in the 1930s, the Soviet economy depended heavily on imported Western technology and the hiring of foreign firms, engineers, managers, and even agronomists (Thomas Campbell, the “Wheat King” of Montana, helped design the first Soviet collective farm, or kolkhoz).  A close study of the history of Communism suggests that economic policy was rarely consistent or doctrinaire, and anyhow explains little about the success or longevity of Communist governments. The USSR fell whereas Communist China endured not because of differences in macroeconomic policy—both governments were in the midst of parallel economic reform programs in 1989, and enduring similar bouts of runaway inflation—but because Chinese leaders were much more ruthless in suppressing opposition than a hesitant and ineffectual Gorbachev. Maybe it really was the Stasi-style spies, volunteer informants, show trials, banishments and crackdowns that made it all go, rather than bland policy apparatchiks with their Five-Year Plans.  The essence of Communism, Karl Marx’s longtime colleague and later critic Bakunin noticed, was not this or that economic policy but an authoritarian “statism” that “concentrates the reins of government in a strong hand [controlled by] a privileged scientific and political class,” “because the ignorant people require strong supervision.” It is the desire to control and dominate others which motivates revolutionaries and thought commissars, whether or not they understand the recondite subtleties of ever-changing doctrine. The USSR and its planned economy may be defunct, but the creed of the commissar lives on. We underestimate its appeal at our peril. The post Did Communism Really Fall? appeared first on The American Conservative.
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‘Kibbutz Blinken’ and the Limits of Protest
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‘Kibbutz Blinken’ and the Limits of Protest

Uncategorized ‘Kibbutz Blinken’ and the Futility of Protest A consideration of protests’ power to persuade. Like a lot of commuters who cross the Potomac, I drive by Antony Blinken’s house frequently. The secretary of state lives on Chain Bridge Road, a long downhill slope which runs from the CIA to Chain Bridge itself, and which connects residential Arlington to Northwest Washington, DC. It is one of the most-hated roads in the area: narrow, winding, and at rush hour impassably clogged with cars. It is also pocked with perilous blind spots, a fact I have only fully appreciated in the eleven months following the October 7 attacks on Israel, as pro-Palestine protesters and the Arlington County Police Department have engaged in a protracted struggle over the roadway directly in front of Blinken’s house. The trouble began just a few days after Israel began war on against Hamas. Blinken visited the country, met with Benjamin Netanyahu, and provisionally assured the prime minister of American support for Israeli action in the Gaza strip. His words were not so forceful as Israel’s more fervent supporters wished, yet they were far from the tone its most outspoken critics demanded. In the days, weeks, and months that followed, he maintained more or less the same attitude, which became the Biden administration’s official stance on the conflict. This was upsetting for everyone involved, but mostly for the pro-Palestine side. It did not take long before the DC protest circuit discovered Blinken’s address, showed up across from his driveway, and set up an encampment dubbed “Kibbutz Blinken.”    For passing motorists, Kibbutz Blinken was yet another hazard on Chain Bridge. Much of the property across the street from the secretary’s house is owned by the Saudi Arabian royal family, and perhaps for that reason little effort was made to contain the disgruntled activists to the road’s shoulder. In no time, they set up folding tables, posters, and tents all along the roadway and often occupied the street itself, causing a permanent traffic jam. The Arlington police were called in to control the situation, and for several months, the two sides antagonized each other—not to mention all of us passersby—until one morning in late July, the police tore down the encampment and erected “no loitering” signs in its place. The police claimed they acted in the interests of public safety; the protesters said their decision was politically motivated. Both sides were in the right. And they are still bickering to this day: Now it is the police who have a round-the-clock encampment and the protesters who demand they clear out. It’s hard to say what effect, if any, Kibbutz Blinken had on the secretary’s Middle East policy. But somehow I suspect the ruckus did not make him more sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. One day a few months into the Israel war I was driving behind his motorcade, a fleet of black Suburbans coming down from McLean, and together we encountered the protesters. As Blinken’s car pulled up to the gate in front of his house, people waving Palestinian flags and chanting “war criminal” surrounded it. They blew horns, beat drums, and poured fake blood on the ground. I began to film the clash, but a cop who was already struggling to keep the crowd away screamed at me to put the phone down. Fair enough. I complied. As I drove away, I considered the likely atmosphere in Blinken’s car during those few minutes. I have a little insight into what it is like to be the subject of protest: In my time as a Supreme Court reporter, I spoke on occasion with those who faced chanting mobs at their homes or their offices. And I have been on the other side of the fence myself. A few years ago, I attended the annual gala of an organization whose events regularly draw protests. As my party strolled into the National Building Museum, all dressed up in our evening wear, people hurled insults and yelled obscenities at us from the parking lot. It was not intimidating. Quite the opposite: Those walking with me puffed their chests out, held their heads a little higher. They were proud of themselves; protest only made them more confident in their beliefs. I imagine the same is true of the secretary of state. The hard fact about protest in the United States is that, on the whole, it is not a tool of persuasion. For the protester, speaking out in public is most often about raising awareness or achieving catharsis or simply feeling useful—all goals more beneficial to himself than to those who don’t share his beliefs. And for the protested, the advantage of the thing, which, though unsought, is almost always gladly received, is a feeling of importance or the knowledge of notoriety or that pure endorphin rush that comes from standing in front of a crowd. But, I’ve found, many on that side of the fence quickly tire of the charade and become disdainful of all those poor people yelling in their faces. The result is a version of that old joke about the tired king whose advisor informs him that the peasants are revolting, and, looking down at the rabble assembled beneath his balcony, the king agrees: “Yes, disgusting.”  Others, however, come to pity their protesters, a virtue that always risks veering into the vice of condescension. Most often they feel a mixture of the two. It is hard not to when faced with an action so earnest and so doomed. Only the most lifeless are left cold by a dedicated, long-running demonstration against their person; the rest ride that queasy pendulum swinging from pity to condescension, condescension to pity.  The post ‘Kibbutz Blinken’ and the Limits of Protest appeared first on The American Conservative.
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