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by Paul Joseph Watson, Summit News: “I just thought that was kind of weird.” An eyewitness to the attempted assassination of Donald Trump told NBC News that security, particularly on rooftops, was noticeably lax compared to a previous Trump rally he had attended nearby four years earlier. Robert D. Philpot said he attended a Trump […]

by Matt Margolis, PJ Media: Stick a fork in Joe Biden. He’s done. After the recent turmoil his party went through after the debate, which significantly damaged his candidacy and prompted calls for him to drop out, Democratic strategists who spoke with NBC News on Sunday say that now the failed assassination attempt on Donald Trump most […]

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  It is perhaps no surprise that having earned his first commission in the military as an artillery officer in 1785, Napoleon Bonaparte depended a great deal on the effectiveness of his guns on the battlefield. Greatly influenced by several innovative French military thinkers and practitioners, Napoleon transformed his artillery into a more mobile and decisive force on the battlefield. In many of his battles, it would be artillery, rather than musketry, that would decide the outcome of the engagement.   The de Vallière System Print of a French cannon, c. 17th-18th century. Source: Wikimedia Commons   In order to contextualize the Napoleonic approach to artillery, it is important to understand the doctrines and systems that preceded Napoleon’s rise to the top of the military and political hierarchy, starting with the de Vallière system. Jean Florent de Vallière became the French Director-General of the Battalions and Schools of the Artillery in 1726, and his system prevailed for much of the century. His son, Joseph Florent de Vallière, was appointed to the same post in 1747 and continued to apply his father’s system.   De Vallière implemented important measures to improve and standardize the production of French artillery pieces. Crucially, he standardized the sizes of French artillery, which now included twenty-four-pounder, twelve-pounder, eight-pounder, and four-pounder cannons, as well as mortars in twelve-pounder and eight-pounder configurations.   The de Vallière system was a step up in terms of technological progress. The newer guns were more precise and could be produced with greater ease due to standardization efforts. The cannons were made to be longer and thicker, which facilitated greater range and the use of more powerful charges.   However, as René Chartrand points out in Napoleon’s Guns 1792-1815, the tactical deficiencies of this system became apparent during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748) and the Seven Years’ War (1757-1763). French artillery performed well during sieges, which de Vallière prioritized as their primary function, but they lacked the mobility to be effective in field battles.   “Reds” vs. “Blues:” Artillery Doctrine & Resistance to Change French Guard Foot Artillery and Gribeauval system twelve-pounder cannon, 1808. Source: New York Public Library   Despite the existential imperative to innovate and evolve in war, militaries can be notoriously resistant to change, and the French were no different in this regard during the 18th century. Although the de Vallière system had proven robust in the first half of the century, French defeats during the Seven Years’ War demonstrated the urgent need for reform.   The Austrians and later Prussians—who modeled their artillery on the Austrian system—were finding greater success on the battlefield with lighter guns and a doctrine that placed greater emphasis on maneuverability. The introduction of interchangeable parts also helped to make production and logistics more efficient.   Meanwhile, the French remained wedded to the de Vallière system, which emphasized power, range, siegecraft, and counter-battery fire. Despite the evidence that this approach was outdated and tactically inflexible, the younger de Vallière ensured that his father’s system endured, and change was sluggish until his death in 1776.   Nevertheless, debate between French artillery officers did exist in this period. There were two factions: the “Reds,” who supported the de Vallière system, and the “Blues,” who “sought a lighter, standardized, and more mobile ordnance system used to target the enemy’s troops.”   Gribeauval‘s Reforms A twelve-pounder Gribeauval cannon, 1793-1794. Source: Wikimedia Commons   One such “Blue” was Jean-Baptiste Vaquette de Gribeauval, and his reforms would largely set the foundations for the more effective use of artillery by Napoleonic armies. Gribeauval was greatly influenced by his service with Austrian and Prussian forces during the Seven Years War. During this time, he served under Joseph Wenzel I, Prince of Liechtenstein, who had been reforming the Austrian artillery since 1744 based on lessons learned from the Austrian War of Succession. Liechtenstein’s reforms emphasized maneuverability, and he introduced lighter standardized guns for use in the Austrian army.   Gribeauval returned to France with these reforms in mind. Upon becoming the Inspector of the French artillery, he began to implement his own system in the mid-1760s. Like Liechtenstein, Gribeauval further standardized the French guns and opted for lighter models that could be maneuvered more easily. In 1764, he introduced a new range of four-pounder, eight-pounder, and twelve-pounder cannons, as well as a six-inch howitzer.   Crucially, Gribeauval was able to lessen the weight and length of his guns while maintaining their precision. For example, the weight of a four-pounder cannon was reduced from 1,300 pounds to just 600 pounds. The cartridges were also made smaller. The result was that fewer horses and men were needed to move a single artillery piece, which granted commanders greater tactical flexibility to deploy them on the battlefield. As Bruce McConachy explains in his article “The Roots of Artillery Doctrine: Napoleonic Artillery Tactics Reconsidered” (2001), “Guns could now be transported across obstacles as easily as a small cavalry troop, or moved as quickly as infantry.”   Guibert’s Artillery Theory  French Napoleonic artillery battery. Photo taken during the 200th anniversary reenactment of the battle of Austerlitz by Jean-Claude Brunner, 2005. Source: Wikimedia Commons   Another military theorist who influenced Napoleon was Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte, comte de Guibert. He served in the French army alongside his father in 1756 and published several military treatises in the 1770s, including the famous Essai général de Tactique.   In The Background of Napoleonic Warfare: The Theory of Military Tactics in Eighteenth-Century France, Professor Robert Quimby writes that Guibert’s position on the use of artillery struck a balance between the argument raging between the Reds and Blues. In Guibert’s view, the artillery was an accessory to the infantry and cavalry because it could not operate independently; however, Guibert also argued in favor of more mobile artillery and felt that armies over-encumbered by static gunnery would benefit from a more maneuverable approach.   Crucially, Guibert also argued in favor of massing the artillery and using it to pound enemy infantry and cavalry rather than as a dispersed counter-battery tool used to target the other side’s artillery. As McConachy writes,   “Guibert saw that to facilitate victory, the artillery’s role should be to support and sustain friendly troops, to bombard important positions in preparation for an assault, and to strengthen weak portions of the battle line. Because of the inaccuracy of individual guns, Guibert believed that to have a decisive effect, many guns would be needed to bring concentrated fire onto a large area occupied by masses of troops.”   Mobile Gunnery  The Capture of a French Battery by the 52nd Regiment at Waterloo by Ernest Crofts, 1896. Source: Royal Green Jackets (Rifles) Museum   The Blues’ approach to artillery started to gain ground in the late 18th century, and the Gribeauval system was first battle-tested in the 1790s during the French Revolution. It proved successful, especially due to the increased mobility afforded to the artillery by lighter guns and the introduction of horse artillery. The horse artillery attached their cannons to two-wheeled carriages called limbers, which were drawn by horses. The artillerymen were also mounted and could quickly reposition their guns to different points on the battlefield.   Horse artillery was particularly impactful when used in conjunction with cavalry. The presence of cavalry would typically force enemy infantry to form a square formation in case they were charged. This densely packed formation was excellent at repelling mounted soldiers, but the proximity of the men to one another made them vulnerable to artillery. Once the enemy infantry had formed a square, the French artillerymen would quickly unlimber their cannons just outside of musket range and fire canister shot at the bunched-up infantry, causing high casualties.   The Gribeauval system demonstrated its effectiveness at the Battle of Valmy in September 1792, the Battle of Wattignies in October 1792, the Battle of Altenkirchen in June 1796, the Battle of Rastadt in July 1796, and the Battle of Biberach in October 1796.   The du Teil Brothers and Napoleon Portrait du Général Jean-Pierre du Teil by Alfred de Jaubert, c. 19th century. Source: Château de Versailles   The du Teil brothers, Jean-Pierre and Jean, like Gribeauval, were proponents for change and would likewise have a lasting impact on Napoleon’s approach to the use of artillery.   Jean-Pierre met Napoleon at the artillery school in Auxonne, where the former had been appointed commander in 1777. Jean-Pierre tutored the young Napoleon, who was a lieutenant at the time, on the implementation of the Gribeauval system. He evidently judged Napoleon competent and tasked him with overseeing experiments exploring the feasibility of firing mortar shells from cannons. Napoleon produced two memoirs for Jean-Pierre on the topic.   After his time in Auxonne, Jean-Pierre secured two more high-profile appointments, notably as chief of the artillery of the Armée du Rhin in 1792 and inspector general of the artillery of the Armée des Alpes in 1793. However, he became a victim of the French Revolution and was executed as a traitor in 1794.   Jean du Teil was also a highly respected officer and was successively made commander of the artillery in three French armies. Like his brother, Jean was a proponent of the Gribeauval system and rubbed shoulders with Napoleon. Commenting on his influence over the latter, Major Justin G. McBride writes, “Napoleon, like Jean du Teil came to believe the artillery should concentrate its fire at a single point to create gaps in the enemy’s line. Once the enemy’s line was broken, the equilibrium of the battle was broken, and the remainder of the fight was easy.”   Napoleon’s Artillery Napoleon and Guard artillerymen at the battle of Montmirail, c. mid-19th century. Source Wikimedia Commons   Other military practitioners and theorists had laid the groundwork for more mobile gunnery, but it would be Napoleon who would form the artillery into a decisive arm of battle. Previously, artillery had been used in a supporting role, with the infantry and cavalry landing the decisive blows in battle. Napoleon, however, drawing inspiration from other innovators, began using artillery more decisively.   According to Major McBride, “Through his foundational artillery education and the influence of teachers, writers, and mentors, Napoleon developed a theory of artillery application that intended to inflict casualties and create gaps in the enemy’s ranks through massed fires, which would then be exploited by shock forces.”   Whereas commanders had previously dispersed their artillery amidst the ranks and focused on counter-battery fire (targeting enemy artillery), Napoleon massed his artillery at advantageous points on the battlefield to increase the effect of their firepower and focused their fire against enemy infantry and cavalry.   Implementation & Reorganization  Combat d’Eylau le 7 février 1807: attaque du cimetière by Jean-Antoine-Siméon Fort, n.d. Source: Château du Versailles   Implementing this new approach to artillery, based on the innovations of Guibert, Gribeauval, and the du Teil brothers, would take time. Formal command structures and established procedures would have to be imposed on the artillery corps. In 1799, not long after Napoleon had become First Consul, he formed a large army artillery staff under his direct supervision. The artillery staff was responsible for overseeing the organization of artillery schools, managing the production of munitions and weapons, and the provision of fortress defenses.   In 1806, Napoleon reorganized the artillery’s integration with the rest of the army. Each infantry division was assigned one foot and one horse artillery company. Meanwhile, light cavalry divisions were assigned one company of horse artillery, and heavy cavalry received two. To every corps was also attached a reserve of artillery, including two-foot companies and a horse company. At least one of the foot companies always came equipped with twelve-pounder cannons.   According to Antoine-Henri Jomini, a military theorist frequently compared to Clausewitz, Napoleon was even more determined to bolster the capabilities of his artillery after the Battle of Eylau in February 1807, fought between the French and Russians. The Russians had far more guns than the French and deployed them in masses to concentrate fire. During the battle, the Russian artillery hammered the French lines, softening them up for a cavalry charge. In just 30 minutes, an entire French corps was decimated. Henceforth, Napoleon aimed to maintain a cannon-to-troop ratio of 5:1,000, although he was only able to achieve a ratio of 3.3:1,000.   In Battle  Bataille de Wagram. 6 Juillet 1809 by Horace Vernet, 1836. Source: Château de Versailles   Later, in 1807, the French artillery inflicted devastating losses upon the Russians at the Battle of Friedland on June 14. During the battle, one of Napoleon’s officers, Alexandre-Antoine Hureau de Sénarmont, Chief of Artillery for the First Corps, positioned thirty cannons within just 120 yards of the Russian infantry. The cannons unleashed canister shot upon the enemy for 25 minutes, greatly reducing their numbers and morale. This tactic was repeated successively in subsequent battles.   The artillery could fire canister shot accurately at ranges between 400 and 600 yards, whereas a shot fired from a musket could not travel further than 200 yards. This allowed the artillery to devastate enemy lines from a relatively safe distance before the infantry or cavalry moved in to finish them off.   The Battle of Friedland, June 14, 1807 by Horace Vernet, 1835. Source: Wikimedia Commons   Napoleon’s artillery again distinguished themselves at the Battle of Wagram on July 8-9, 1809. On the second day of the battle, Napoleon assembled a grand battery of over 100 guns over a two-kilometer stretch. The wet terrain meant that the cannonballs ricocheted, increasing their lethality. Entire Austrian infantry and cavalry files, sometimes up to 20 men, were eliminated with a single shot. The French also used canister shots at short range and advanced steadily, maintaining a relentless barrage until the Austrian counter-barrage forced them to slow down. After the battle, Napoleon told his artillery commander, Jean Ambroise Baston de Lariboisière, “at Eylau, you provided me with powerful support, but today you have won the battle.”   Napoleon’s artillery served with distinction until his eventual downfall at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815. He transformed the artillery into a decisive force on the battlefield so that commanders came to measure the strength of forces by the number of guns rather than the number of muskets.

  If asked to recall the Nazi Party’s most powerful figures, certain names are likely to spring to mind. Hitler, Himmler, Goebbels, Goering, and Hess are typically among the men many will immediately think of, each having achieved their own personal infamy. One man, however, is often overlooked.   Quiet and reserved, he was closer to Hitler than anyone, yet through a calculated campaign of lies and deceit, he would craft a narrative that would see him emerge from the war a blameless victim of his own regime.   That man was Albert Speer.   Youth & Upbringing Speer’s city of birth, Mannheim, 1887. Source: Wikimedia Commons   Speer was born March 19, 1905, in Mannheim, Southwest Germany to a wealthy upper-middle-class family. His father, Albert Friedrich Speer, ran his own architectural firm, making the Speers one of the leading families in the city.   Butlers, cooks, chauffeurs—he was afforded every luxury during his childhood, but due to ill health and physical weakness, it was not a time he would look back on with fondness. His classmates and two brothers would bully him relentlessly for this frailty.   In 1918, Speer and his family moved to Heidelberg, and his health soon improved. He took a keen interest in sports soon after, particularly rowing and skiing. It was here, too, on his way to school at the age of 17, that he would meet his future wife, Margarete Weber.   His marks at school improved as well, and he quickly settled on becoming an architect like his father (rather than a mathematician, as he had originally intended). After two years studying at the University of Karlsruhe and the Technical University of Munich, he transferred to the Technical University of Berlin in 1925. Half a year after passing his final exams, he became assistant to his professor, Heinrich Tessenow, a man he described as his first “catalyst” and “inspiration.” So deep was his respect for him that, years later, in 1933, when Tessenow was barred from teaching due to his advocacy of anti-Nazi ideals, Speer would use his then-privileged position to have him reinstated.   Architect & Nazi: A Career in the Making Hitler speaks at a rally, 1933. Source: National Digital Archives, Poland   In late 1930, Speer first heard Hitler speak. The future Führer was addressing a group of students at Berlin University, and Speer quickly found himself under his spell. Using his powerful oratory, Hitler promised solutions to the economic turmoil caused by the Great Depression. He also offered up some convenient scapegoats: communists and Jews.   A few weeks later, Speer attended a rally led by Joseph Goebbels. Convinced by his rhetoric and the violence that followed the demonstration, he joined the Nazi Party the following day, member number 474,481.   Speer left his position as Tessenow’s assistant and returned to Mannheim in early 1932. He hoped to make a living as an architect in his own right, but Germany’s economic situation made it all but impossible. Amid his struggle, however, an opportunity would soon present itself.   While on a visit to Berlin, Speer was offered the chance to renovate the party’s district headquarters for the region’s Gauleiter (district leader), Goebbels. After the election that brought Hitler to power in March 1933, Goebbels also asked Speer to rebuild and redecorate his new Ministry of Propaganda.   Goebbels’ Ministry of Propaganda, Berlin, 1936. Source: National Digital Archives, Poland   His big break would come immediately after. Summoned to Nuremberg in July, Speer was asked to submit plans for the first party rally of the new government. His proposal of a giant eagle to crown the Zeppelin Field was put before Rudolph Hess, who sent Speer and his plans to Hitler himself. The Führer approved.   Following this success, Hitler had Speer work with his Munich architect, Paul Troost, to rebuild and renovate the Reich Chancellery. Hitler himself took a great interest in the construction, undertaking tours of the work almost every day. Speer would accompany him on these tours, and the Führer quickly took a liking to him. Soon after, Hitler presented him with the first of many great personal honors: an invitation to dine with him.   Such invitations would become frequent, as would more work. After remodeling the palace of Hermann Goering and the death of Troost in early 1934, Speer, now Hitler’s chief architect, was asked to oversee the funeral ceremonies of Paul von Hindenburg, who had died in August that same year. His first major commission quickly followed, with Hitler ordering him to build a more permanent installation at the Nuremberg Zeppelin Field. Speer’s design took the form of a colossal stone staircase enclosed by a long colonnade, 1,300 feet long and 80 feet high. Hitler again approved.   Speer also had grand ideas for the rallies to be held there. He envisioned marches in near-total darkness, the columns of flag-waving men lit by 130 searchlights beaming up into the night sky. This created the striking effect of a “cathedral of light,” now an enduring image of the Nazis’ architectural megalomania.   Speer’s Zeppelin Field monument and the accompanying “cathedral of light,” 1937. Source: Nuremberg Museums   Hitler’s obsession with scale and Speer’s willingness to indulge it would result in plans that went even further in their ambition.   In 1937, Speer designed a new stadium for his Führer to be built at the party’s rally grounds in Nuremberg. With a capacity of 400,000 spectators, it was to be the biggest stadium ever built and one of the largest structures in human history. According to Speer’s calculations, it was to be 1,815 feet long and 1,518 feet wide, with towering stands over 300 feet high. The Great Pyramid of Giza, in contrast, measures 756 feet at its base. The stadium, unsurprisingly, was never completed.   In January of that same year, Speer was also commissioned to carry out Hitler’s “greatest architectural task,” the rebuilding of Berlin. He was named Inspector General of Buildings for the Renovation of the Federal Capital and given a free hand to work without informing the city government, including Berlin’s Gauleiter, Goebbels.   Hitler and Speer’s vision for the city was for its heart to be rebuilt along a massive north-south avenue, almost 400 feet wide and three miles long. Like Paris’ Champs-Élysées, it was to terminate in the south at a triumphal arch 400 feet tall, well over twice the height of the Arc de Triomphe. In the north, near the Reichstag, an even more grandiose structure was proposed: the Volkshalle. At close to 1,000 feet tall, this giant domed meeting hall was to be the city’s crowning glory.   A VFX artist’s rendering of the Volkshalle if it were ever constructed, as seen in season 2 of Amazon Studios’ alternate history drama, The Man in the High Castle, 2016. Source: Ben McDougal and Amazon Studios   Neither the arch nor the Volkshalle were ever built, but Berlin did get a New Reich Chancellery. Speer oversaw its design and construction in 1938, ensuring its scale and grandeur were more than to the Führer’s liking. To meet Hitler’s deadline of having it built within a year, concentration camp inmates were used to quarry the stone needed for the building’s construction. Speer had no qualms about using them as an easy source of slave labor, nor did he pay any mind to their abhorrent living conditions.   His attitude towards Berlin’s Jewish population was equally callous. In late 1938, after having just suffered one of history’s most infamous antisemitic pogroms, Kristallnacht, the community was further devastated by mass evictions of Jewish tenants instigated by Speer and his department. As part of his Berlin rebuilding project, almost half the city’s Jewish population were evicted and forcibly rehoused. Most would later be deported to ghettos in Eastern Europe, then, beginning in 1942, directly to extermination camps in Poland.   Models, Movies, & War Nazis and civilians watch on as Jewish businesses in Fürth are destroyed during Kristallnacht, November 1938. Source: AP, via The Times of Israel   Speer’s relationship with Hitler, meanwhile, was going from strength to strength. By 1939, the two had developed an unlikely friendship, with Speer now very much a part of Hitler’s inner circle. Along with a select few others, he would join the Führer for weekly dinners and evening socials, the latter typically involving supper followed by a screening of the latest movies.   Compared to those others, however, Speer was special. He and Hitler’s relationship was built on a shared interest, a commonality he shared with no one else: architecture. It was a subject Hitler was oddly passionate about and had been for much of his life. He enjoyed nothing more than poring over sketches, models, and plans, many of which he himself personally drew up. In Speer’s own words, “in no other situation did I see him so lively, so spontaneous, so relaxed.”   The two bonded over the subject to such a degree that their relationship at this point can almost be described as, for want of a better word, a bromance. For instance, following supper at the chancellery and the obligatory late-night movie, Hitler would often go with Speer to study plans and models in his studio next door, his favorite being their model city of the new Berlin. Hitler even had doors and a path installed between the two buildings to make these twilight jaunts easier.   Hitler and Speer (second right) examining the plans for new party buildings in Nuremberg, 1937. Source: AP, via The Times of Israel   Speer no doubt reveled in his Führer’s attention. To him and many others, Hitler was nothing short of a phenomenon, a “hero from ancient myth” destined to be “one of the great figures in German history.”   The breakout of war in September 1939 would only strengthen his opinion of the man. Following the annexation of Poland and the successful invasions of Denmark and Norway in April 1940, Germany swept aside its old enemy, France, a month later in a campaign that lasted just over six weeks. Speer’s “hero” even had the French sign the terms of their surrender in the same railway car the Allies used for the armistice of 1918—a symbolic reversal of what many in Germany saw as the nation’s greatest humiliation.   From Architect to Armaments German soldiers celebrating news of France’s surrender, June 1940. Source: Imperial War Museums UK   Despite the initial victories, the war did ultimately force a pause on Berlin’s massive building projects. Speer and his department were instead reduced to the building of air raid shelters, the cleanup of debris, and demolitions. A critical shortage of manpower made such tasks extremely difficult to achieve with just German workers, most of whom had been drafted, so Speer again turned to slave labor, just as he had done with the New Reich Chancellery.   Speer’s duties expanded in 1941 and 1942 to include operations in Eastern Europe, for which he was given 30,000 workers and his own construction staff: the Baustab Speer-Ostbau. In cooperation with Heinrich Himmler, the Wehrmacht, and Organisation Todt (the Reich’s largest engineering organization), the Baustab Speer-Ostbau became what was essentially a moving concentration camp. Its inmates, mostly Jews and Soviet POWs, were used to build the Durchgangsstrasse IV, an Autobahn spanning much of western Ukraine. Tens of thousands would be worked to death during its construction.   When the head (and founder) of Organisation Todt, Fritz Todt, died in February 1942, Speer saw his power and responsibilities grow even larger. Todt had been the first Reich Minister for Armaments, and Hitler needed a replacement. Speer was not an obvious choice; he was not an engineer like Todt and knew almost nothing about armament production. What he was was Hitler’s favorite. In the Führer’s eyes, his successes up to that point (the repair of railways and roads, the design and construction of industry buildings and work camps) more than qualified him for the job, as did his youth and loyalty.   Speer’s predecessor as Reich Minister of Armaments and Munitions, Fritz Todt (second right), at a meeting of workers, December 1939. Source: National Digital Archives, Poland   Speer inherited not only Todt’s position as Reich Minister of Armaments, but all his other positions too. With the stroke of a pen, Hitler gave him power over roads, railways, water, energy, technology, and engineering.   With such a large (and vague) remit, Speer quickly found himself in conflict with the other big hitters in Hitler’s inner circle. Spats with Hermann Göring and others over who and where his authority lay threatened to make his job frustratingly difficult, but Speer was clever, and his political instincts sharp. Using his relationship with Hitler to his advantage, it did not take long for him to consolidate his power, and by mid-1943, he had control over almost every aspect of war production.   The “Miracle” A Daimler-Benz plant producing automobiles and tanks, date unknown. Source: Mercedes-Benz Group   Speer, armed with a concept he referred to as “industrial self-responsibility,” immediately set about improving the Reich’s production statistics, which did not make for good reading. Within six months of his appointment as minister, those numbers already looked to be improving: a 27% increase in guns, a 25% increase in tanks, and a near doubling of ammunition production.   He was soon hailed by Hitler, among others, for bringing about an “armaments miracle” in the face of growing difficulties. Hitler’s praise for Speer, like their relationship, would also reach new levels as a result. At the end of their monthly phone calls, for instance, when Speer signed off with the obligatory, “Heil, mein Führer!” Hitler would show his confidence in him with the jokey, appreciative reply, “Heil, Speer!”   The true reality of the Reich’s production and industry, however, was not how Speer claimed it to be. While war production did grow, it was far from the miraculous increase he readily took credit for. Using misleading statistics, inflated well beyond those above, Speer made it appear as though he had essentially doubled Germany’s entire armament output when, in reality, any improvements in production were well within what would have been expected.   The actual increase in armaments cannot be entirely credited to Speer, either. Most of the measures that led to this increase had already been instituted by his predecessor, Fritz Todt, and any production outside of Germany (notably those in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, now Czechia) was simply not in his purview. Moreover, the production increases within Germany were only made possible by the procurement and use of slave labor on a massive scale, with well over one million Soviet citizens brutally seized and sent to work in its factories. Speer was more than willing to ruthlessly exploit every single one of them.   The Beginning of the End A Ukrainian family deported to work in Lower Saxony, 1943. Source: The Jewish Museum Berlin   Despite Speer’s “miracle,” any increases in war production were made redundant in mid-1943 thanks to the increase in strategic bombing by the Allies. After one particularly devastating attack on Hamburg in July—an attack that crippled the city’s industry and left over 60% of its population homeless—Speer and most others could see the writing on the wall: if the bombings continued, Germany’s armament production could not be sustained.   The bombings did continue and only became more frequent. By 1944, Germany was also losing large swathes of territory to the Russians, much of which held vital natural resources (such as oil and alloy metals) that could not be replaced. With the Reich’s stockpiles dwindling, the situation was becoming desperate. As Minister of Armaments, Speer had the unenviable task of providing Hitler with increasingly bleak figures, putting a great strain on their relationship. Eventually, Hitler simply stopped receiving reports from Speer, preferring instead to receive them from his associate, Karl Saur.   Fearing for his position and overcome by stress, Speer fell seriously ill and was taken to hospital in January 1944. His condition quickly worsened, and he became intensely paranoid that those in the inner circle, namely Himmler, were behind his deterioration. Whether or not this was true, Speer did eventually recover and was back home by April. Having been away from the center of power for so long, however, his position and standing among Hitler’s intimates was greatly diminished.   Scorched Earth Speer in conversation with General Adolf Galland, September 1943. Source: National Digital Archives, Poland   As early as 1942, Speer had championed the development of programs that pushed the technological envelope, the rocketry program in particular. This would face considerable disruption from allied bombing, and it was eventually agreed that the program would be moved underground to a facility (Mittelwerk) in the Harz Mountains. Labor for the program came from the Mittelbau-Dora concentration camp, which Speer and his staff would visit in December 1943. He was pleased with what he saw and made no protest at the appalling conditions there—conditions that would ultimately kill over one-third of its 60,000 inmates.   While the rocketry program did find some later success, it could not halt the inevitable. The D-Day landings on June 6, 1944, coupled with the endless retreats in the East, signaled the beginning of the end for Nazi Germany. By September, the Allies had reached Germany’s western border, and Hitler’s response, as it appeared in the Nazi Party’s newspaper at the time, was clear:   “Not a German stalk of wheat is to feed the enemy, not a German mouth to give him information, not a German hand to offer him help. He is to find every footbridge destroyed, every road blocked – nothing but death, annihilation, and hatred will meet him.”   One of the underground facilities built into the mountains by workers at Mittelbau-Dora concentration camp, 1943/44. Source: Mittelbau-Dora Memorial   For Speer, a policy of scorched earth on German soil was a step too far. He pushed back against Hitler’s orders, trying to spare as much of the nation’s industry as he could (while still advocating for a continuation of the war, it should be noted). It was now, in February 1945, that Speer claimed he plotted to assassinate Hitler. Having seen the failed attempt on his life in July of the previous year, he planned to use the nerve agent tabun rather than a bomb. He hoped to administer the gas through the air vents of the Reich Chancellery bunker but was ultimately forced to abandon his plan, he claims, because of the chimneys Hitler had had installed atop the vents. Whether this is true or a complete fabrication on Speer’s part, it is difficult to say definitively.   With Hitler in his bunker and the Reich collapsing around them, Speer visited his Führer one final time on April 22, 1945. He had no plans to stay, and the two parted with an icy goodbye. Eight days later, Hitler was dead. In his final act, he dictated his wishes for a successor government, detailing its members. Speer was not among them.   Regardless, Speer did take up a ministerial post in the new government before its dissolution on May 23. Speer and the other members of the government were then arrested and later tried at the International Military Tribunal, better known as the Nuremberg trials.   Crimes Against Humanity Speer during his trial at Nuremberg, 1946. Source: AP, via The Times of Israel   Speer and his fellow Nazi officials were indicted on charges of conspiracy to wage a war of aggression (count one), crimes against peace (count two), war crimes (count three), and crimes against humanity (count four). If found guilty, they would more than likely face the death penalty.   No doubt aware of this, Speer used the trial to distance himself from his co-defendants. He confessed to a collective responsibility and accepted his guilt in a way that the others did not. Critically, he denied all knowledge of the Holocaust—a brazen lie that would come to light only after his death.   Of the 24 major Nazi officials tried at Nuremberg, 12 were sentenced to death. Speer was not among them. He was acquitted on counts one and two of the indictment but found guilty on counts three and four. For this, he was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment in Spandau Prison.   The “Good Nazi” Speer speaking to the press upon his release from Spandau Prison, 1966. Source: Realworks Ltd, via The Times of Israel   Speer spent most of his time in prison writing his memoirs. The detail and candor with which he writes have provided historians with vital insight, but these works are to be read with caution. His recollections are rife with omissions and, at times, blatant lies fabricated to reinforce the false image of a neutral technocrat and unwitting victim. For instance, his visits to concentration camps are conveniently left out, as is his brutal disregard for the conditions in which his workers were forced to live and work. His knowledge of the Holocaust is also again denied, and any mention of his eviction of Jewish tenants beginning in 1938 is omitted.   Speer was released from prison in 1966 and spent the remainder of his life attempting to rehabilitate his image. He died of a stroke in September 1981.   The façade of the “Good Nazi” did not last for long, however, and by the late 20th century, assessments of Speer had changed. As new evidence came to light, historians were able to expose his lies and prove his personal culpability beyond little doubt. The smoking gun came in 2007, in a letter written by Speer in 1971. In it, he admitted to being present for Himmler’s second speech in Posen, 1943, in which the systematic extermination of the Jews was outlined.   Despite his brazen attempts to conceal and obfuscate, Speer’s role in the atrocities of the Third Reich will not be forgotten. He was not a “Good Nazi,” he was not a blameless technocrat, and he was not a victim. He was a ruthless, cold, and calculating war criminal.

  Risorgimento is the term used to explain how Italy emerged as a unified country in the mid-19th century. The word Risorgimento refers to a resurrection or revival. Indeed, Italian nationalists called for a rediscovery of Italy’s rich past—from the Roman Empire to the Renaissance. But no single state existed in the Italian peninsula since the fall of the Roman Empire in the West in the 5th century. That would change with the French Revolutionary Wars’ outbreak in the 1790s. The northern Italian kingdom of Piedmont would also emerge as a driving force for unification.   Origins  Napoleon Crossing the Alps by Jacques-Louis David, c. 1801. Source: Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna   Two major questions dominated the struggle for Italian unification. For starters, how would the patchwork of states across the Italian peninsula unite into a single country? What type of government would be created? Some called for a loose confederation of the existing states. But by the early 19th century, leading nationalists debated the merits of a republican government or a monarchy. Finally, what role, if any, would the papacy have in this new Italy? At the time, the pope was the spiritual head of the Roman Catholic Church and ruler over the Papal States, which stretched across much of central and southern Italy.   Moreover, how would this unified Italy unite people on a cultural, social, and economic level? For Italian nationalists, this became a more difficult challenge than politically unifying the country. As one nationalist leader, Massimo d ’Azeglio, put it, “We have to give thought to forming Italians if we wish to have an Italy.”   The story of Italian unification begins with the French Revolution. But it would take many twists and unexpected turns before a unified Italian state appeared on the map of Europe in the 1860s.   From Revolution to Restoration Portrait of General Napoleon Bonaparte, by Louis Albert Bacler d’Albe, 1797 . Source: Wikipedia Commons   At the start of the French Revolution, the Italian peninsula comprised ten states. They were a collection of kingdoms, duchies, republics, a grand duchy, and the Papal states. Napoleon would change the map of Italy beginning in 1796.   At the head of the French Revolutionary Army of Italy, a young Napoleon Bonaparte defeated the Austrians and their Piedmontese allies in northern Italy. By 1799, the French had set up republics in Italy from Milan to Naples. However, with political turmoil brewing in France and Napoleon-occupied Egypt, these Italian republics fell before an Austrian, Russian, and Neapolitan invasion.   However, Napoleon quickly restored French dominance in Italy with his victory over the Austrians at Marengo in June 1800.   The French then established a northern Italian Republic in 1802. This became the Kingdom of Italy in 1805. French control extended to Naples, where the Bourbon royals were driven out of their kingdom. Napoleon’s older brother Joseph became the Neapolitan king until he was sent to take the Spanish throne in 1808. Naples fell to Napoleon’s brother-in-law, Marshal Joachim Murat.   Napoleon’s defeat and the 1814-1815 Congress of Vienna paved the way for the return of the Italian rulers deposed by the French. No restored monarch did more to try and reverse the Napoleonic reforms than Piedmont’s King Victor Emanuel I.   Early Uprisings  Joachim Murat, King of Naples. Source: Wikipedia Commons   Piedmont became a hotbed of revolutionary activity as the restored monarch met heavy opposition to his plan to eliminate all French reforms. Revolution was also in the air in southern Italy. King Murat in Naples desperately sought to save his throne from France’s enemies. Murat had distanced himself from Napoleon to convince Austria and Britain that he could be part of post-Napoleonic Europe’s future.   But Napoleon’s enemies, like Austria, preferred a Bourbon return to Naples. Murat tried to start an Italian war of independence against Austria to save his throne. Unfortunately for Murat, his appeal to Italians did not prevent his version of Waterloo at the Battle of Tolentino in May 1815. He was later executed for attempting to reclaim his lost throne.   Austria was thus the dominant power in post-Napoleonic Italy. Led by its foreign minister and later chancellor, Prince Metternich, Austria and other powers like Britain and Russia sought to prevent further revolutionary troubles in Europe. Conditions across Europe in the 1820s and 1830s showed that this was a challenge for those like Metternich, who had opposed the French Revolution and Napoleonic reforms.   Various Italian revolutionary groups and societies were inspired by uprisings in Spain, Greece, and France during the 1820s and 1830s. However, few conspiracies ever materialized, and many were killed, imprisoned, or forced into exile. But these failures did launch the careers of Italian nationalist leaders Giuseppe Mazzini and Giuseppe Garibaldi.   The Revolutions of 1848 Combattimento a Porta Tosa by Carlo Canella, around 1848, Museo del Risorgimento, Milan. Source: Comune Milano   The conservative and reactionary Europe orchestrated by Metternich in the aftermath of Napoleon’s defeat crumbled in 1848-49. Bowing to popular pressure, rulers across Europe issued constitutions and promised reforms. There were uprisings across Italy. Rulers in northern and central Italy, like Leopold II of Tuscany and Piedmont’s King Charles Albert, granted constitutions in February and March 1848. Charles Albert sensed an opportunity to create a Kingdom of Northern Italy by annexing cities from Milan to Venice that were currently in rebellion against the Austrians.   Even Pope Pius IX promised a part-lay government in the Papal States. But in these revolutionary times across Europe, actions trumped promises. In Rome, papal rule was replaced by a republic. Both Mazzini and Garibaldi played prominent roles in the Roman Republic.   At first, things seemed to be going well for Italian nationalists. Milan successfully resisted five days of fierce Austrian attacks led by Marshal Joseph Radetsky. Other Italian rulers felt pressure to join the war on Austria. The rulers of Tuscany and Naples (now called the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies) briefly supported Venice. Italian unification seemed close to realization.   Reactionary Resurgence  Giuseppe Mazzini. Source: Wikipedia Commons   But then the tide changed. First, fighting between Neapolitan troops and republicans in Naples sapped King Ferdinand Charles’ enthusiasm for reform and anti-Austrian activity. Meanwhile, Radetsky’s Austrian forces regrouped and routed Piedmontese troops under King Charles Albert at Custoza in July 1848. Charles Albert agreed to an armistice that also meant the Austrian recapture of Milan.   However, Charles Albert broke his truce with Austria and fought Radetsky again in March 1849. Once again, Radetsky crushed the Piedmontese, and Charles Albert abdicated in favor of his son, Victor Emmanuel II. The new monarch staved off pressure by keeping the liberal constitution granted by his father and declaring his public support for Italian unification.   Radetsky mopped up republican resistance across Italy in 1849. After crushing revolts in Tuscany in April 1849, only Rome and Venice held out. That would change by the late summer of 1849. Despite Garibaldi’s heroic efforts, French troops helped restore Pius IX in Rome. Garibaldi and Mazzini both managed to escape into exile. Many others were not as fortunate and were executed by papal or Austrian authorities.   Piedmont Takes the Lead The Battle of Solferino, by Adolphe Yvon, 1859. Via Wikimedia Commons.   While the revolutions of 1848-49 were crushed, the same could not be said of Italian patriotism and the cause of unification. Piedmont recovered throughout the 1850s from the embarrassment of defeat and Charles Albert’s abdication. This was largely thanks to Prime Minister Count Camillo Benso di Cavour.   Cavour modernized Piedmont’s economy and fostered close ties to France’s new emperor, Napoleon III.   Napoleon III admired Italy and envisioned an expanded Piedmont as a solid ally. However, he did not want a unified Italian state to come into existence for fear it would rival France. Nor did Cavour wish to see a unified Italy if it was dominated by radical revolutionaries.   In 1858, Napoleon III and Cavour secretly set plans to provoke a war with Austria to gain territory for Piedmont. In return, Napoleon III demanded Piedmont cede territory in the form of Nice and Savoy.   French troops aided by Piedmontese forces beat the Austrians in the battles of Magenta and Solferino in June 1859. The bloody fighting at Magenta gave a name to the color.   Historian Richard J. Evans points out that the Battle of Solferino was the last in world history where reigning monarchs commanded opposing armies. Napoleon III proved a better general than Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph. Moreover, the plight of wounded soldiers that day moved a Swiss observer, Henri Dunant, to return to Geneva and create the International Red Cross.   Garibaldi’s Expedition & The Kingdom of Italy  Giuseppe Garibaldi. Source: Wikipedia Commons   But then Napoleon III shocked Cavour by reaching a separate agreement with Austria. Moreover, France’s acquisition of Nice and Savoy sparked a backlash against Napoleon III and Cavour. For example, Garibaldi was enraged that Piedmont would cede his native city of Nice to the French.   Piedmont had been enlarged as northern Italian cities voted to join the kingdom. However, the sudden pause in the conflict also created the danger of escalation as many volunteers flocked to Garibaldi to continue the fight.   Garibaldi seized the initiative. He sailed in May 1860 with his now legendary 1,000 volunteers from outside Genoa to Marsala, Sicily. The island was in the midst of social upheaval against the Bourbon government. Garibaldi and his followers saw the opportunity to unite the Italian peninsula without waiting for Cavour’s diplomacy.   In a stunning campaign that caught the world’s attention, Garibaldi crushed Bourbon resistance and paved the way for southern Italy’s union with the growing Piedmontese kingdom. Most of central and southern Italy had voted to join Piedmont by November 1860.   In early 1861, elections were held to form the first Italian parliament. Victor Emanuel II became King of Italy in March 1861. Despite the situation moving beyond his control, Cavour had successfully channeled the power of Italian nationalism into maintaining the established social and political order. But Cavour died suddenly in June 1861. The institutions he helped build in Piedmont now governed most of the peninsula.   An Unfinished Revolution? King Victor Emmanuel II. Source: Wikipedia Commons   Victor Emmanuel’s kingdom did not yet encompass the entire Italian peninsula. In 1866, Italy received Venice and the Veneto region as a diplomatic payoff for backing Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s war against Austria.   Moreover, Rome remained under papal control. Garibaldi led multiple unsuccessful efforts to seize Rome in the 1860s. However, the revolutionary leader faced opposition from the Italian government.   Italy’s leaders feared Piedmont’s former ally, French emperor Napoleon III, who supported papal control of Rome. Historian Chris Duggan explains that while Napoleon III was happy to see an enlarged Piedmont, he feared a unified Italy as a potential rival to France. However, French defeats in the Franco-Prussian War paved the way for Italy’s conquest of Rome.   Italian troops breached Rome’s formidable walls and seized the city on September 20, 1870. Papal rule had ended, but Pope Pius IX refused to recognize the Italian state. By mid-1871, Italy’s government transferred to Rome, making the city the country’s capital.   However, many Italian nationalists did not believe the Risorgimento’s full promise had been achieved. Many were disillusioned with the type of government the previous decade had created. Other nationalists also advocated for further territorial annexations. But the fledgling Italian state’s most significant challenge involved uniting the people of northern and southern Italy. All these factors would play a role in Italy’s history.