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[View Article at Source]Medina v. Planned Parenthood gives states the discretion not to pay Planned Parenthood through Medicaid. The post SCOTUS Finds No ‘Right’ to Medical Care From Planned Parenthood…

[View Article at Source]Prime Minister Netanyahu shows few signs of wanting the war to end. The post Don’t Bet on a Gaza Ceasefire appeared first on The American Conservative.

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Politics SCOTUS Finds No ‘Right’ to Medical Care From Planned Parenthood Medina v. Planned Parenthood gives states the discretion not to pay Planned Parenthood through Medicaid. (Jamilya Khalilulina/Shutterstock) The Supreme Court released its decision in Medina v. Planned Parenthood last week, a 6–3 ruling against Planned Parenthood. Cue the predictable hysteria: Axios immediately opined that “Supreme Court ruling on patients rights’ could devastate Planned Parenthood,” Vox explained to its readers the Supreme Court’s “disastrous new abortion decision,” and so on.  Make no mistake: Medina v. Planned Parenthood is indeed a win for the pro-life movement. But the actual legal arguments addressed by the opinion matter greatly. Perusing the news headlines in reaction to Medina don’t actually give a very helpful explanation of what the decision means. So what actually happened? The case is not directly about abortion at all; it is about who decides which medical providers are qualified to receive Medicaid funds and whether there is an enforceable individual “right” to receive non-abortion medical services from Planned Parenthood with those funds.  The Medicaid laws already prohibit Medicaid dollars from funding abortions, but do not explicitly prohibit abortion providers like Planned Parenthood from receiving Medicaid funds for non-abortion services. Medicaid recipients are allowed to receive approved medical care from “any institution, agency, community pharmacy, or person, qualified to perform the service or services required” (emphasis added). The Medicaid statutes do not define what counts as a qualified service provider. So states make that decision—which makes sense, since medical standards, certifications, and the like are generally decided at the state level anyway. In 2018, South Carolina’s Governor Henry McMaster signed an executive order stating that, in South Carolina, Planned Parenthood was not a qualified service provider for any medical services. Planned Parenthood, along with a Medicaid recipient who wanted medical services from Planned Parenthood, filed a lawsuit alleging a violation of rights. There are two relevant legal questions here. First, does a state have the right to decide that Planned Parenthood is not a qualified provider for purposes of Medicaid funding? Second, and more importantly, does an individual have a “right” to Medicaid funding for services at Planned Parenthood that allows the individual to sue under 42 U.S. Code § 1983 for a deprivation of rights? The second issue is the fundamental one.  Section 1983 is a federal statute that allows individuals to sue if any state action causes them to suffer an injury by being deprived of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” As Associate Justice Clarence Thomas pointed out in his excellent concurring opinion, while the contours of Section 1983 rights were never clearly defined, the statute was meant to protect civil rights, particularly those enacted in law after the Civil War. The goal was to protect “racial equality respecting a citizen’s ability to sue and be a party in state court, to testify, to make contracts, and to buy, sell, and inherit property.” Thomas is correct that, in recent decades, Section 1983 has been expanded exponentially beyond its original meaning and intent. The majority opinion in Medina, written by Associate Justice Neil Gorsuch, agreed that Section 1983 is being pushed too far. Supreme Court precedent is clear that any right created by Congress can be nothing “short of an unambiguously conferred right.” If Congress intends to create a new right by statute, that is no light decision; the statutory language needs to be crystal clear. The Court explained that Congress knows this, because it has created statutory rights before. For example, there are “Federal Nursing Home Reform Act provisions requiring facilities to ‘protect and promote’ residents’ ‘right to be free from’ restraints and provisions titled ‘[t]ransfer and discharge rights’ in a subsection called ‘[r]equirements relating to residents’ rights.’” When Congress wants to create a right, it uses the term “right.”  Medina is dealing with the Medicaid statutes, which are spending laws. Congress used its legislative authority to authorize payments to the states to provide healthcare funds for the needy, with certain conditions attached. The “any-qualified-provider provision” in the Medicaid statute simply does not confer an individual right. The provision does not use the language of conferring rights; it isn’t even addressing the rights of individuals. The statute is simply stating that Medicaid funds are to be distributed to any qualified provider of the medical services. There is no reason to think that Congress was secretly conferring a right for individuals to deem Planned Parenthood a qualified service provider despite the judgment of the states to the contrary. As the Court notes in response to Planned Parenthood’s arguments, “while the Medicare provision ‘guarantee[s]’ patient ‘free choice,’ the Medicaid provision never uses ‘guarantee’ or ‘free choice’—Congress omitted the very language claimed to create rights.” Since there is no right being conferred in the Medicaid laws, Planned Parenthood and the Medicaid recipient have no ability to sue over a non-existent right. While Medina v. Planned Parenthood is ultimately a dispute about what counts as a right for purposes of Section 1983, it remains an important victory for the pro-life movement and for red state political action. Just as the ruling in Skrmetti opens the door for states to ban transgender medical interventions for minors, Medina opens the door for states to exclude Planned Parenthood and other abortion providers from receiving Medicaid dollars. This is not a broad, 50-state solution to the abortion problem. But it does put another obstacle in the way of radical leftists bent on imposing their agenda on the entire country by judicial fiat. Planned Parenthood—the organization responsible for around 40 percent of babies killed by abortion each year—is not entitled by right to receive taxpayer-funded Medicaid dollars throughout the nation. The Supreme Court has made this much clear and has paved the way for red states to cut off a huge source of government funding for the abortion industry. The post SCOTUS Finds No ‘Right’ to Medical Care From Planned Parenthood appeared first on The American Conservative.

Foreign Affairs Don’t Bet on a Gaza Ceasefire Prime Minister Netanyahu shows few signs of wanting the war to end. Credit: Menahem Kahana/Getty Images Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is riding high. His decision to short-circuit U.S. diplomacy with Tehran by bombing Iran’s nuclear sites, coupled with his successful attempt to enlist President Donald Trump in the effort, has paid off considerably for him over the short term. A final battle damage assessment notwithstanding, there’s no question that Iran’s main nuclear facilities at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan were seriously damaged. Iran’s nuclear industrial base took a hit as well, with at least 10 of its nuclear scientists killed during the 12-day air campaign. The entire effort has given Netanyahu—who has been fighting for his political life since the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack severely degraded his “Mr. Security” persona—a new lease on life. Netanyahu’s short rise in the polls has generated a bevy of speculation that the prime minister now possesses the political flexibility to finally end the nearly 21-month-long war in Gaza, which can charitably be described as a long slog with an unclear end-point. President Trump added more speculation to the pile Tuesday, when he alleged that Israel “agreed to the necessary conditions” for a 60-day truce. Senior Israeli officials have claimed that denting Iran’s military power has opened up new possibilities for Israeli foreign policy in the Middle East. Netanyahu himself has teased the “many opportunities” that have been created now that Tehran has been dealt with. The Israeli premier’s meeting with the U.S. at the White House next week, and Trump’s call on Truth Social to end the war in Gaza with a ceasefire deal that releases hostages, is only adding to the anticipation.  So, is a groundbreaking deal on Gaza really in sight? For those of us who have long worried that Israel’s goals in Gaza, especially “eradicating Hamas,” were unattainable, terminating the war through negotiation—or at least undergoing a serious diplomatic effort to achieve a cessation of violence—is a very appealing prospect. There’s some logic to the notion that Netanyahu’s successful gamble in Iran provides him enough goodwill, both with the Israeli public and within his governing coalition, to finally close the door on a conflict that has sullied Israel’s international reputation and taxed its military.  But this presumes that Netanyahu now deems Israel’s war aims in Gaza to be unattainable or unworthy of the cost, or that he has somehow turned into a peacenik after a good night’s sleep. Evidence for such presumptions is lacking. Alternatively, it presumes that Trump, who often speaks about the need to get all of the hostages back and even approved direct U.S. negotiations with Hamas, a designated foreign terrorist organization, to free the last American citizen still in Gaza, will actually put the screws on Netanyahu to end the war. This, too, isn’t a given, and if past actions are a predictor of future events, then we shouldn’t be surprised if Trump just moves on to bigger things and continues to delegate American policy on Gaza to Netanyahu. Before we buy into the budding narrative, we need to splash some ice-cold water on our faces and let reality sink in. In particular, we need to consider the war aims and political incentives of Netanyahu, whose choices will determine the fate of the proposed ceasefire. First and foremost, there is no evidence thus far that Netanyahu’s position on Gaza has moved an inch since the war with Iran concluded in a Trump-imposed ceasefire. Although the Israelis may talk vaguely about newfound opportunities to settle the conflict, the terms they’re offering are just as rigid now as they were in March, when the last ceasefire collapsed. Hamas’s terms haven’t changed much either, which means both sides continue to be locked in an irreconcilable, concrete maze that is impossible to escape. Hamas is willing to free the remaining 50 or so hostages (only 20 of whom are believed to be alive) if Israel ends the war permanently and withdraws its troops from Gaza; Netanyahu is only willing to end the war if Hamas releases all the hostages, disarms itself, and flies its leaders into exile.  The U.S., Qatar, and Egypt have all served as mediators, periodically poking and prodding both sides into compromise, but their pleadings have largely fallen on deaf ears. Trump’s Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff tried to create some common ground by proposing a formula back in May that would trade a 60-day ceasefire and accelerated aid shipments into Gaza for the release of half of the hostages, yet Hamas is highly opposed to signing on to any arrangement that leaves Israel with the option of resuming the war again. Netanyahu, in turn, is highly reluctant to sign on to anything that ties his hands and takes that option away from him. This is the same problem that ruined the Trump administration’s previous truce in the spring, when Israel chose to return to war rather than extend the ceasefire by a few more weeks. That event was a major wake-up call to Hamas, and the lesson was clear: don’t agree to anything with Israel until the Americans guarantee that Israel will accept a permanent truce.  Israeli military operations inside Gaza aren’t losing steam—in fact, they’re getting even more intense. As the world was fixated on the missile attacks and airstrikes between Israel and Iran, hundreds of people were killed in Gaza as Israeli jets and artillery blasted away at highly-populated areas in what the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) insist were Hamas positions. More than 70 people were killed on Tuesday alone, with more than 20 losing their lives just trying to get humanitarian assistance. The IDF has yet again ordered mandatory evacuations of large swaths of northern Gaza, and Israeli tanks are making forays into Gaza City in a bid to root out Hamas in the area. While one could claim these actions are designed to squeeze Hamas even further in the lead-up to renewed ceasefire negotiations, one can just as easily claim that Netanyahu is doubling down on his pledge to defeat Hamas militarily—in which case there isn’t much diplomacy to engage in. And let’s not forget about the domestic politics Netanyahu needs to manage. Yes, his approval ratings have increased a bit, courtesy of the war in Iran, which could theoretically reduce the stranglehold that ultra-nationalist, anti-Arab extremists like Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich hold over him. Yet we shouldn’t pretend that these two cabinet ministers and the parties they lead don’t remain a crucial voting bloc for the PM, who, after all, remains an unpopular political figure and is mired in several corruption cases. Needless to say, both of these men would rather jump off the Allenby Bridge than be associated with ending the war in Gaza, a territory the two hope to congest with Israeli settlements and annex as part of Israel. Is Netanyahu willing to bet his political future (and perhaps his freedom) on a new election when the results could turn out poorly for him? Anything is possible—and we shouldn’t discount Netanyahu’s ability to enact new political alliances to keep himself afloat—but it would be a risky bet for a man who prefers stability and predictability.  Ultimately, whether or not the war in Gaza is cut short will likely depend on Donald Trump. Next week’s meeting with Netanyahu at the White House will focus at least in part on the Gaza file, and one can imagine Trump browbeating the Israeli premier to end the conflict and get to work on other projects in the Middle East that the president cares about—Israeli-Saudi normalization, a peace deal between Israel and the new Syrian government, and perhaps a similar arrangement between Israel and Lebanon. But, as mentioned, it’s hardly assured that Trump will pressure the Israelis beyond tough rhetoric; previous Trump entreaties towards this end have largely gone in one ear and out the other, with Netanyahu stonewalling the request and Trump deferring to whatever the Israelis want to do.  Have any of these dynamics changed? We’ll soon find out. The answer will determine whether Trump’s wider Middle East agenda has a shot or whether it’s stuck in purgatory. The post Don’t Bet on a Gaza Ceasefire appeared first on The American Conservative.