If you're tired of censorship and dystopian threats against civil liberties‚ subscribe to Reclaim The Net. In a ruling keenly watched by proponents of free speech‚ an academic who was derisively compared to a “racist uncle” by her co-workers due to her gender-related opinions online‚ tasted victory in a claim against her employer. Jo Phoenix‚ a highly esteemed professor of criminology‚ had sought administrative intervention following an unrelenting barrage of slander and life-threatening messages. This plea‚ however‚ fell on deaf ears‚ with the Open University (OU) opting to abandon support due to a dread of backlash if seen as endorsing the professor’s views. The established criminologist had spent half a decade at OU when‚ in 2018‚ her signature appeared on an online open letter voicing concerns regarding self-identification for trans individuals seeking gender reassignment. The bold move‚ joined by 53 other academia members‚ kindled a fiery reaction from certain colleagues. According to the presiding tribunal in Watford‚ Professor Phoenix was rebuked by Professor Westmarland saying‚ “Having you in the department was like having a racist uncle at the Christmas dinner table.” The remarks were perceived as deriding Phoenix for expressing her stance on gender matters. Outside her responsibilities at the OU‚ Phoenix also founded the Gender Critical Research Network‚ assembling academics subscribing to the belief in biological sex’s veracity. The move‚ however‚ led to more criticism. Fellow staff members petitioned the Vice-Chancellor to cut ties with her network. The situation took a nosedive when abusive tweets and retweets flagging her as transphobic came to light. By mid-2021‚ the academic environment had grown so hostile that Phoenix was forced to resign. Despite the bleak circumstances‚ the tribunal sided with Phoenix‚ validating nearly twenty of her counter-claims. The judgment cast a spotlight on OU’s failure to shield its academic staff‚ highlighting its reluctance to be seen backing faculty with gender-critical views. As reported by The Daily Mail‚ an emotional Professor Phoenix responded‚ “It was an exceptionally painful part of my career but I am glad for the win.” The post Open University Academic Wins Tribunal Case Over Views on Transgender Ideology After Online Cancel Campaign appeared first on Reclaim The Net.

When it comes to George A. Custer and the June 25‚ 1876 Battle of the Little Bighorn‚ everyone seems to be an “expert”. Even those who may never have read a single book on the battle seem convinced they know exactly why Custer lost the western frontier’s most infamous battle and‚ in the process‚ got his regiment needlessly wiped out. Their narrative usually goes something like this: Foolishly declining a last-minute offer to take rapid-firing Gatling guns with him‚ Custer’s outsized ego‚ reckless bravery and overly ambitious quest for glory led to his egregiously bad tactical decisions—including dividing his regiment into four smaller “battalions” in the face of the enemy’s known superior numbers—and prompted him to disobey his commander’s written orders by prematurely launching his regiment a day earlier than planned in a doomed attack. They believe overwhelming numbers of enemy warriors annihilated his regiment to the last man in a brilliantly planned‚ expertly fought and shrewdly executed trap. Capt. Myles Keogh’s wounded horse‚ Comanche‚ they always point out‚ was the only living thing to survive the massacre.  In short‚ “everybody knows” that Custer lost because he was a blustering egomaniac with presidential ambitions who was “out-generaled” by the superior tactical skill and battlefield command of Lakota leaders Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse. Those who think they know for certain that’s exactly what happened to Custer at the Little Bighorn battle should heed this sage advice from an eminent historian: “It’s not what we don’t know about history that leads us astray; it’s what we think we know—but isn’t true—that causes the mischief.” The truth of what really caused Custer’s defeat in the most famous battle between Indians and the U.S. frontier army during the western Indian wars is best revealed by examining Custer’s critical tactical decisions that long‚ hot‚ dusty day in June 1876. His decisions must be evaluated within the context of what Custer actually knew at the time he made them—and‚ importantly‚ what he did not know.  First‚ it’s important to quickly dismiss some of the Little Bighorn “red herrings” (on the surface seemingly plausible but misleading distractions). The battle’s most important ones include:  Sitting Bull The Myth of “Indian Commanders” The oft-read claim that “the Lakota and Cheyenne fought under Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse‚” implying there was an Indian chain-of-command controlling the warriors’ tactics and maneuvers‚ exposes egregious ignorance of how Native Americans fought. Indians fought as individuals‚ fighting if they felt their “medicine” was good‚ opting out if they judged otherwise. No Indian commanders issued orders and exercised command authority (although some warriors voluntarily followed war-proven successful leaders‚ like Crazy Horse and Gall‚ who led purely by example). The best description of how the Lakota and Cheyenne fought Custer at the Little Bighorn is to imagine a hornet’s nest suddenly disturbed—within moments‚ clouds of angry hornets pour out‚ swarming and stinging whatever disturbs them‚ their numbers increasing with each passing minute. Furious that Custer’s attack threatened their families‚ Lakota and Cheyenne warriors simply swarmed their village’s attackers as they confronted‚ defeated or annihilated each threat in turn. Gatling Guns Fantasy Those who claim rapid-firing Gatling guns could have saved Custer know less about those weapons and their limited capability than they do about Native American warfighting. Three main deficiencies would have prevented these early “machine guns” from having any positive impact on the battle: transportation‚ targets and crew vulnerability. The guns were mounted on heavy‚ awkward‚ large-wheeled artillery piece carriages and pulled by 4-horse teams of “condemned” cavalry mounts (horses deemed unfit for troopers’ mounts but capable of dragging heavy loads). On vehicles susceptible to frequent break-downs‚ the weapons could not possibly have kept pace with Custer’s regiment’s 30-plus-miles-per-day rapid reconnaissance to fulfill his primary mission: find the Indians’ main camp as quickly as possible and prevent the highly-mobile tribes from scattering into the vast landscape. Trying to drag the clumsy guns over rough terrain and still move fast enough to find the elusive tribes would have been impossible. The guns would have moved slower than Custer’s large pack train of cantankerous‚ stubborn mules which were so slow that they failed to arrive on the battlefield until after Custer was already dead. Even if the Gatlings had miraculously been present on Last Stand Hill‚ they needed targets to shoot at—moving around the battlefield on fast‚ agile Indian ponies‚ the Indians fought mainly on foot once in range of trooper’s weapons‚ concealing themselves in every fold‚ depression and gully the broken terrain offered while firing rifles‚ muskets and bows and arrows at Custer’s trapped troopers. Unlike the famed 1896 Anheuser-Busch lithograph‚ Custer’s Last Fight‚ which graced thousands of saloons across the US‚ the Indians did not foolishly attack in close-packed masses. Thus the Gatlings would have had no targets to “mow down” with rapid fire. Indeed‚ the “lack of targets” is supported by the low number of Indian casualties in the battle which may be as few as 31 killed plus a few dozen wounded of an estimated 1‚500-2‚000 Indians who fought! Finally‚ Gatling crews had to stand upright to fire the weapon‚ the crews presenting themselves as vulnerable targets to be quickly shot down by hidden Indian marksmen as the tribesmen closed in on the pinned-down troopers. Terry’s “Coordinated” Tactical Attack Plan Those who try to force a modern-warfare template onto the 1876 Great Sioux War campaign typically claim that Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Terry’s three-column advance (Terry-Custer column moving west from Ft. Lincoln in Bismarck‚ ND; Colonel John Gibbon’s column moving east from Ft. Ellis‚ MT; and Brig. Gen. George Crook’s column—the campaign’s strongest force—moving northwest from Ft. Fetterman‚ WY) through central Montana where the main village of “hostile” Lakota and Cheyenne was presumed to be‚ was intended to be a tactical attack plan for a coordinated military assault on the Indians by all three forces. Yet it’s clear from Terry’s orders to Custer (see “Terry’s Orders to Custer” sidebar) that they are instructions regarding how to find Indians‚ not a tactical plan on how to fight them once found. It verifies that Terry’s wide 3-column approach was solely intended as a sweep through the vast area to locate the main body of Lakota and Cheyenne and prevent their escape‚ not a plan of tactical maneuver for a simultaneous‚ triple-pronged attack. In fact‚ Terry hoped there would be no fighting and that the Indians—once found‚ surrounded and prevented from escape—could be peacefully escorted to Dakota reservations. Terry’s hope that Gibbon’s column would arrive north of the Little Bighorn valley on June 26 as Custer arrived from the southeast that day was meant for Gibbon to be a stand-off “blocking force”—not a tactical participant in a coordinated two-pronged assault with Custer’s regiment to attack and destroy the Indians—hemming in the Indians so they could be corralled and escorted to reservations. In the event‚ the Gibbon column (by then accompanied by Terry) did not even arrive until June 27‚ further making the “coordinated attack” claim irrelevant. Also Crook’s third column had already turned back‚ fought to a standstill in the June 17 Battle of the Rosebud by most of the same Indian warriors who—heavily reinforced by hundreds of new arrivals who’d “jumped” their Dakota reservations—defeated Custer on June 25. Reenactors representing troopers of companies C‚ F and I‚ 7th Cavalry Regiment prepare to portray ‘Custer’s Last Stand’ to visitors at Harding‚ Mont.‚ just north of the Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument. 7th Cavalry “Wiped Out” Although certainly most legitimate Indian Wars historians know better‚ too many historically ignorant “Custer experts” keep repeating the mistaken claim that Custer’s 7th Cavalry Regiment was “wiped out to a man” in the battle. They mistake the fact that the five companies under Custer’s immediate command (companies C‚ E‚ F‚ I and L)‚ the “battalion” he personally led after reorganizing his regiment into four battalions (see “Custer’s Reorganization for Combat” sidebar) were wiped out (13 officers‚ 193 troopers and 4 civilians—210 total killed) for his entire 600-strong regiment (31 officers and 566 troopers) being annihilated. Actually‚ the 7th Cavalry Regiment that day suffered 52-percent casualties: 16 officers and 242 troopers KIA or died of wounds; 1 officer and 51 troopers wounded—horrendous losses‚ but far from the regiment being “wiped out to a man” in the battle. Other egregious “red herrings” include the idiotic idea that somehow Custer’s “foolish attack” was because he craved a dramatic victory since he wanted to run for U.S. president—as if any serving officer removed from command because he’d so enraged the Grant administration by his (valid) claims to Congress of the administration’s corruption could ever hope in his wildest dreams to be a valid presidential candidate. Custer not only had to beg for reinstatement to regimental service on the eve of the 1876 Sioux Campaign‚ but also had to convince his mentor‚ Maj. Gen. Phil Sheridan‚ to intercede for him with Grant—a request only granted shortly before the campaign began. Other improbable “red herring” reasons for the defeat include those Custer-contemporary bigots looking for a convenient scapegoat to excuse the disastrous defeat of the cream of the frontier army by so-called “primitive savages” by egregiously inflating the impact of the cavalry’s M1873 carbine’s weak expended-shell casing extractor that caused weapons to jam. The problem was real‚ but well-known and documented as affecting only as few as about 1-in-300 carbines. That it was not a major problem during the battle is supported by archaeological evidence from Dr. Doug Scott’s extensive 1991 Little Bighorn battlefield excavations which found very few carbine shell casings that evidenced any tell-tale scratches indicating manual extractions.  When the easily dismissed “red herrings” are wisely ignored‚ “human error” comes to the fore as the culprit in the 7th’s defeat—the series of command decisions made by Custer himself that determined the 7th Cavalry’s fate. Although he’s pilloried for his decisions based on the battle’s disastrous outcome‚ an examination of those decisions—assessed within the context of what he actually knew and didn’t know at the time he made them—reveals that most were consistent with what any combat-experienced frontier army officer would have made‚ and none were irredeemably disastrous…except for the final and ultimately fatal‚ decision he made at about 3:30 p.m. on June 25‚ 1876.  Sunday‚ June 25‚ 1876‚ was a long‚ hot‚ dusty day full of crucial decisions Custer faced at critical points during his—and half of the troopers in his 7th Cavalry Regiment’s—final day of life. The day began early. Custer had the regiment begin a night march following a wide‚ recent Indian trail at midnight—but by 5 p.m. that afternoon‚ Custer‚ his brothers Capt. Tom and Boston‚ his nephew Autie Reed‚ his brother-in-law Lt. James Calhoun (L Company) and half the troopers in the 7th’s 12 cavalry companies were dead on a bleak Montana hillside or soon to die about four miles southeast behind hastily dug entrenchments on Reno Hill. Hindsight is 20-20‚ but if the critics knew only what Custer knew—and didn’t know—that day‚ would their judgments be as harsh?  Here’s what Custer actually knew. His primary mission was to find the main Indian village and prevent Indians from escaping and “vanishing” into the vast landscape. Plains Indian warfare experience taught that the most difficult problem for frontier army commanders was finding Indians‚ not fighting them. At the start of the campaign‚ each of the three Army columns sent against the Indians in 1876 (Custer’s cavalry regiment‚ Col. John Gibbon’s column of infantry and cavalry‚ and Gen. George Crook’s cavalry and mule-mounted infantry) on their own was considered sufficient to defeat any Indian force expected to be encountered. The three widely-separated Army columns were intended to locate the Indians‚ not combine and fight them in a coordinated battle. Only after the full scope of the disaster was realized did Custer’s commander‚ Gen. Terry‚ later create the fiction that Custer and Gibbon were to attack simultaneously on June 26. Moreover‚ when Terry tumbled to the fact that the army would demand a scapegoat for the worst disaster in the western Indian Wars did he then create the self-serving narrative that “glory-hunting Custer rashly attacked prematurely‚ disobeying his orders.”  Famed Western artist‚ Charles M. Russell (1864-1926) painted his exceptionally accurate‚ Indians’ perspective The Custer Fight (1903) as mounted warriors swarmed over Last Stand Hill. Custer was told he would face‚ at most‚ 500 to 800 Indian warriors. The present for duty strength of the 7th that day was about 600 soldiers—31 officers and 566 troopers—plus Indian Scouts‚ quartermaster employees e.g.‚ mule skinners‚ and several civilians‚ including newspaper reporter‚ Mark Kellogg. Custer had written discretion to move against the Indians as he saw fit. His orders from Terry gave him full latitude in making tactical decisions (see “Terry’s Orders to Custer” sidebar). Finally‚ perhaps Custer’s most fatal “knowledge” was that he had successfully attacked a Cheyenne village under Chief Black Kettle on the Washita River (November 1868)—a small part of a much larger combined Indian encampment that may have rivaled in size the June 1876 Little Bighorn village—and he had prevailed against heavy odds by dividing the 7th into several battalions‚ striking the surprised village from multiple directions and preventing probably overwhelming Indian retaliation during his withdrawal by using captured Cheyenne women and children as hostages. However‚ the bloody result of Custer’s command decisions on June 25 was clearly affected by information he did not‚ or could not‚ know. Crook’s column‚ which at over 1‚200 Soldiers and hundreds of Crow Indian allies was the most powerful of Terry’s three converging columns‚ was fought to a standstill by possibly 1‚000 warriors at the day-long Battle of the Rosebud‚ about 30 miles from the Little Bighorn River‚ the week before on June 17‚ 1876. Crook retreated without informing the other columns that the Indians were in strength and fighting‚ not fleeing.  The number of Indian warriors opposing Custer at Little Bighorn was likely between 1‚500 to 2‚000 (two to three times more than what he had been told). Their ranks were swollen by new arrivals streaming in from Dakota reservations. Indian reservation agents purposely concealed the number of their “missing” Indians since that knowledge reduced their reservation “head count‚” prompting drastic cuts in rations and supplies. The Little Bighorn village—probably‚ at its peak‚ about 1‚000 lodges—was likely the largest-ever concentration of Plains Indians—a unique congregation lasting only a few days since game‚ grass for the huge pony herd and local resources would force the village to move after those had been exhausted. This historical accident—a congregation of‚ perhaps 7‚000-8‚000 Indians (up to 2‚000 warriors) in 1‚000 lodges (tipis) is the overriding factor leading to Custer’s defeat. Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Terry‚ Lt. Col. George A. Custer Terry’s Orders to Custer  On the morning of June 22‚ 1876‚ during their final meeting before sending Custer and his 7th Cavalry Regiment off on a “reconnaissance in force” mission to locate the main village of Lakota and Cheyenne‚ Brig. Gen. Alfred Terry‚ overall campaign commander whose mission was to find the Indians and force them to reservations in Dakota territory‚ issued written orders to Custer:  The Brigadier General commanding directs that‚ as soon as your regiment can be made ready for the march‚ you will proceed up the Rosebud [i.e.‚ travel south in this region where rivers and creeks run north] in pursuit of the Indians whose trail was discovered by Major Reno [Custer’s second-in-command] a few days since. It is‚ of course‚ impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement‚ and were it not impossible to do so the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal‚ energy‚ and ability to wish to impose on you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy.[emphasis added] He will‚ however‚ indicate to you his own views of what your action should be‚ and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reasons for departing from them. He thinks that you should proceed up [south] the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads. Should it be found (as it appears almost certain that it will be found) to then turn toward the Little Horn‚ he thinks that you should still proceed southward‚ perhaps as far as the headwater of the Tongue‚ and then turn toward the Little Horn‚ feeling constantly‚ however‚ for your left‚ so as to preclude the possibility of the escape of the Indians to the south or southeast by passing your left flank. The column of Colonel Gibbon is now in motion for the mouth of the Big Horn. As soon as it reaches that point it will cross the Yellowstone and move up at least as far as the forks of the Big and Little Horns. Of course‚ its future movements must be controlled by circumstances as they arise‚ but it is hoped that the Indians‚ if upon the Little Horn‚ may be so nearly inclosed by the two columns that their escape will be impossible. The Department Commander desires that on your way up the Rosebud you should thoroughly examine the upper part of the Tullock’s creek‚ and that you should endeavor to send a scout through to Colonel Gibbon’s column‚ with information of the results of your examination. The lower part of this creek will be examined by a detachment from Colonel Gibbon’s command. The supply steamer [Far West under captain Grant Marsh] will be pushed up the Big Horn as far as the forks of the river if found to be navigable for that distance‚ and the Department Commander‚ who will accompany the column of Colonel Gibbon‚ desires you to report to him there not later than the expiration of the time for which your troops are rationed‚ unless in the meantime you receive further orders. Custer’s Reorganization for Combat After he was informed that the 7th had been seen by several small Indian parties and therefore assuming the main Indian camp would be warned‚ Custer abandoned his plan to hide the regiment all that day for a June 26 attack and instead move immediately against the Indian village before it could flee. Therefore‚ about noon on June 25‚ at the base of the “Crow’s Nest” peak in the Wolf Mountains from which the 7th’s Indian scouts had seen the main Lakota-Cheyenne village on the Little Bighorn 15 miles away‚ Custer reorganized the regiment for combat by dividing it into four battalions plus 35 Indian Scouts.                     Custer’s demise was a popular subject of paintings beginning in the 19th century’s last quarter. Most‚ like this one titled ‘Battle of the Big Horn’ are littered with fantasy‚ errors and countless historical inaccuracies. Custer’s Decisionsre: John Gray’s Centennial Campaign calculated timeline  9:00 p.m.‚ June 24‚ final bivouac (near today’s Busby‚ Mont.) Scouts report finding a fresh Indian trail‚ making it all but certain the main village is in the Little Bighorn valley. Custer decision Launch the 7th along that trail just past midnight‚ June 25. Assessment The decision is totally consistent with Custer’s primary mission to find the hostile Indians’ village as quickly as possible.  9:00 a.m.‚ June 25‚ Crow’s Nest vantage point (15 miles from Little Bighorn village) Accepting his scouts’ word that they can see the village’s huge pony herd (although neither he nor his chief of scouts‚ Lt. Charles Varnum‚ could make it out)‚ Custer now knows the camp’s location. Custer decision Hide the regiment all day in the Wolf Mountains‚ concealed by the rough terrain‚ then move at night to strike at dawn‚ June 26 (the day he was told by Terry that Gibbon’s column should reach a blocking position north of the Indian village).  Assessment Hiding the regiment for a dawn surprise attack on the unsuspecting village the next morning was prudent‚ consistent with Terry’s orders and confirming Custer’s plan conceived the night before. (Gibbon’s blocking force was intended to intercept fleeing Indians after Custer’s attack‚ not to participate in the 7th’s assault as an element in a coordinated attack as often erroneously assumed and as Terry falsely claimed afterwards—revealingly‚ when Terry wrote his orders‚ he of course had no idea Custer would decide to attack the village on June 25. Terry wanted the Indians found and kept from escaping.) 10:30 a.m.‚ base of the Crow’s Nest Custer learns that three separate small Indian groups had recently spotted elements of the regiment.     Custer decision Do not risk waiting‚ make an immediate attack on the village before it can be alerted and escape the approaching army columns.  Assessment Since experience taught that Indians invariably scattered and disappeared into the landscape if warned of an enemy’s approach‚ any experienced frontier army officer likely would have made this same decision. Custer could not have known that the Indians that spotted him were on their way to other distant locations and therefore none had alerted the village. 12:00 p.m.‚ one mile north of Crow’s Nest The approach to the village prompts reorganizing the 7th regiment’s companies for combat.                   Custer decision Divide the regiment into 4 battalions (see “Custer’s Reorganization for Combat” sidebar).  Assessment Sub-dividing a cavalry regiment into battalion-sized maneuver elements was a common Plains warfare army tactic. Custer successfully fought this way at the Washita (1868) and Crook used similar tactics at the Rosebud (June 17). Notably‚ Col. Ranald MacKenzie‚ who usually fought his regiment as a single unit‚ used such “battalion” tactics in his most famous victory—Palo Duro Canyon‚ Texas vs. Comanches and Kiowas (1874)‚ where MacKenzie’s stunning victory ended Comanche power forever and forced the tribes onto reservations. 2:30 p.m.‚ 4 miles east of Little Bighorn River  While Capt. Frederick Benteen’s battalion continues to scout for any Indians who might be south of the Little Bighorn valley‚ Custer’s and Maj. Marcus Reno’s battalions surprise a few Indians who immediately flee in panic toward the still-unseen main village. Scout/interpreter Fred Gerard shouts to Custer‚ “Here are your Indians! Running like devils!”   Custer decision Assuming these Indians certainly will alert the village‚ Custer immediately launches Reno’s 3-company battalion to directly attack it from the south while flanking the village by leading his own 5-company battalion to the high bluffs towering over the east bank of the river. Via messenger‚ Custer orders Benteen’s 3-company battalion to quickly rejoin the command.  Assessment Taking immediate action now that the village is certain to be warned likely would have been any frontier army commander’s decision. Still unaware of the village’s unprecedented size‚ attacking it unexpectedly from two directions (while summoning reinforcements—Benteen’s battalion) seemed tactically-feasible given what Custer—who had not yet seen the huge size of the village—then knew regarding Indian numbers.  3:30 p.m.‚ atop bluffs east of the river  Seeing Reno’s attack begin to bog down and becoming hotly engaged by warriors in the valley and with Benteen’s battalion still missing‚ Custer faces his most crucial decision—ride directly to Reno’s aid—which likely would have ended with Custer‚ Reno and eventually Benteen and the Pack Train‚ in effect the entire regiment‚ besieged on Reno Hill—wait for Benteen‚ or continue his attack from another direction. Custer decision Maneuver against the village from another‚ unexpected direction by leading his battalion farther north where the Indian women and children were fleeing‚ with the possibility of—like at the Washita battle—capturing them as hostages to dissuade Indian attacks.  Assessment None of Custer’s command decisions—up to this point—had put the 7th on an irreversible course to disaster. Options that would have led to his gathering the entire regiment on defensible high ground still remained possible. However‚ his decision at about 3:30 p.m. to continue north finally sealed his and his regiment’s fate. Recent scholarship suggests Custer had still not seen the huge size of the entire village when he made this decision (he had likely viewed the valley from further east—probably Sharpshooter Ridge—and not from the better (higher) vantage point known as Weir Point). Lacking this vital intelligence‚ still thinking the opposing Indian force was only one-half to one-third its actual size and denied critical knowledge about the Indians not fleeing but standing and fighting from Crook’s Rosebud battle‚ Custer made his last—fatal—decision. Pawnee Bill’s Wild West Show‚ Buffalo Bill’s competitor‚ staged this fanciful 1905 ‘Death of Custer’ performance showing ‘Sitting Bull’—who stayed in his tipi—stabbing saber-wielding‚ long-haired Custer—he had neither in the fight. this article first appeared in military history quarterly See more stories subscribe now!  

Although its initials brand it as a sniper rifle‚ the Snayperskaya Vintovka sistemy Dragunova that Evgeni F. Dragunov developed in 1963 falls short of the chilling precision and range of a current state-of-the-art‚ bolt-action weapon for the specialized sniper in the appraisal of weapons expert Chris McNab in his latest Osprey offering. Most rifle aficionados class it as a designated marksman rifle (DMR)‚ offering talented soldiers within standard infantry units good intermediary range‚ durable simplicity‚ and the ability to get off multiple shots because of its rare semiautomatic capability.   Since its introduction into the Soviet armed forces‚ the SVD has found its way into fighting forces around the world and killed untold thousands. That apparently began with a slow trickle into the People’s Army of Vietnam around 1972‚ and U.S. intelligence agencies allegedly placed a $25‚000 reward for any captured intact. One Soviet-made SVD-63 captured from the PAVN is shown in the book‚ but the weapon’s expense seems to have limited its introduction at a time when North Vietnam was going to prevail with or without semiautomatic sniper rifles. There were to be a lot more sniper duels in 1979‚ however‚ when China launched its invasion of Vietnam with its infantry units equipped with reverse-engineered 7.62mm Dragunovs‚ designated Type 79s‚ joined in later border incidents by improved Type 85s.   Ironic though it may have seemed back then‚ Vietnam was by no means the only occasion in which marksmen wielding SVDs traded shots with one another. The author’s comprehensive rundown of the many conflicts in which the SVD played vital roles lists many fighters‚ including Afghans‚ Chechens‚ and Ukrainians‚ whose targets were—and are—Russian. The SVD Dragunov Rifle offers an in-depth look at the technology and history of a weapon which retains its importance on the battlefield after 60 years. The SVD Dragunov Rifle By Chris McNab. Osprey Publishing‚ 2023‚ $23 get it on amazon If you buy something through our site‚ we might earn a commission. This review appeared in the 2024 Winter issue of Vietnam magazine. historynet magazines Our 9 best-selling history titles feature in-depth storytelling and iconic imagery to engage and inform on the people‚ the wars‚ and the events that shaped America and the world. subscribe today

History has long since established FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover abused his position‚ gathering defamatory information on elected officials‚ using his agents to intimidate and harass and beat suspects‚ and condoning flagrant abuses of civil rights. Hoover never forgot nor forgave anyone who made the FBI and himself look bad. He made inordinate efforts to destroy reputations and careers of men and women on his famous blacklist. But there was another facet to Hoover’s personal and professional character. As with the fictional John Riley Kane of “Citizen Kane‚” Hoover had his own “Rosebud.”   Her name was Kate “Ma” Barker.   During the crime wave that swept the Midwest in the early 1930s‚ the names of John Dillinger‚ Charles “Pretty Boy” Floyd‚ Bonnie and Clyde‚ and George “Machine Gun” Kelly became as famous as Charles Lindbergh. The early years of the Great Depression spawned gangs of bank robbers‚ murderers‚ kidnappers and auto thieves the likes of which have not been seen since. Among the list of criminals of the era were a murderous gang of Missouri hillbillies that carried out several bank robberies and two audacious kidnappings before they were tracked down. They were the Barker-Karpis Gang.   Leader of the Pack? Hoover claimed Kate “Ma” Barker‚ pictured here with her boyfriend Arthur Dunlop‚ was the mastermind of a criminal gang that included her four sons and family friend Alvin Karpis. Karpis called the claim “ridiculous” and said she only served as the gang’s cover. According to Hoover‚ the head of the gang was an evil‚ scheming and notorious criminal genius named Kate Barker. In his 1938 book Persons in Hiding‚ Hoover wrote that Kate Barker was the “most vicious‚ dangerous‚ and resourceful criminal brain of the last decade.” This was in a decade that included John Dillinger‚ easily the most clever criminal of the age‚ and Lester J. Gillis‚ better known as “Baby Face” Nelson‚ who topped the list of true psychopathic killers. Yet Ma Barker had earned Hoover’s particular wrath. “In her sixty or so years‚” Hoover continued‚ “this woman reared a spawn of Hell. Her sons looked to her for guidance‚ and obeyed her implicitly.”   In truth there is no evidence that Ma Barker ever robbed so much as a filling station or participated in any crime. But Hoover‚ ever vengeful‚ labeled Ma Barker as the mastermind of the Barker-Karpis Gang. Not only was she never arrested or charged with any crime‚ she was completely unknown until after her death. She was plump and short‚ with black hair she liked to twist into rings and curls. She was a simple‚ nearly illiterate country woman who would have looked at home in a church knitting bee or pulling carrots from her backyard garden. Nothing more than a frumpy hillbilly woman‚ her only interests‚ other than her family‚ were to listen to the radio and assemble jigsaw puzzles. Hardly the image of a matriarchal head of an outlaw gang.   Publicity Shot. J. Edgar Hoover‚ pictured with a Thompson submachine gun‚ took public aim at Ma Barker‚ giving her a “notorious” reputation‚ but it was mostly to protect his own. She was born Arizona “Ari” Donnie Clark in 1874 in rural Missouri. Her father John either died or left shortly after her birth. Her mother Emaline married Ruben Reynolds‚ and by 1885 the small family moved to Lawrence County. In 1892‚ when she was 18‚ Ari married George Barker‚ and they moved to Aurora. There they had three sons. Herman‚ born that same year‚ followed by Lloyd five years later‚ and Arthur‚ known as Doc‚ was born in 1899.   There is no census record of where they were living when Fred‚ the last son‚ was born in 1901‚ but by 1910 they were at Webb City in Jasper County. George supported his family with menial jobs. There is nothing to indicate he ever broke the law. The same could not be said of his four sons‚ all of whom became criminals. Physically‚ they were short and wiry‚ with black hair and sallow skin. As a sign of the times‚ neither Ari nor George made an effort to put their sons through school. All four were more or less illiterate. Fred‚ the youngest‚ was his mother’s favorite. She ruled the family with what was described as strong discipline. The eldest son‚ Herman‚ was remembered by local residents as being fascinated by Jesse James and the Youngers‚ both Missouri outlaws of the previous century.   this article first appeared in American history magazine See more stories SubscriBE NOW!   Early on Sunday morning‚ March 7‚ 1915‚ Herman and another boy held up five men playing cards in the back of a grocery store in Webb City. Arrested the following day‚ Herman was released for lack of evidence. Ari packed up the family and moved to Tulsa‚ Okla.‚ where she hoped her oldest son would have a fresh start. It did not happen. All four boys‚ even the 14-year old Fred joined a gang of boys and young men who committed small-time burglary and car theft in Missouri‚ Minnesota‚ and Oklahoma.   Hoover later called this gang a “school of crime‚ with Ma Barker being their teacher.” This is an example of how Hoover later inserted fictional vignettes of Ma Barker’s early rise in the criminal underworld.   Fred Barker. Herman was in an out of jail several times over the next 12 years‚ and died  in 1927 during a shootout with police in Wichita. Lloyd Barker‚ the next eldest‚ was arrested for robbing the U. S. Mail and sent to Leavenworth Federal Penitentiary in January 1922. Coincidentally‚ this was when Robert Stroud was raising his canaries there and was already known as the Birdman.   One month later‚ Arthur “Doc” Barker was sentenced to life for murdering a night watchman during a botched robbery at a Tulsa hospital. Doc had always shown a lack of sense and tended to be rash and violent despite his mother’s discipline. He was sentenced to life at the Oklahoma State Prison.   The family was left with young Fred‚ who was sent to live with a family friend‚ Herbert “Deafy” Farmer near Joplin. Farmer‚ whose own life as a criminal would span the next ten years‚ was a mentor to Fred until the young man was sent to a reformatory.   It was there that Fred met a young hood named Alvin “Ray” Karpis‚ the Canadian-born son of Lithuanian immigrants. Born in 1907‚ and a dead ringer for the horror film star Boris Karloff with glasses‚ Karpis was one of the Depression era’s most successful criminals‚ as well as the last one still alive in the 1970s. He would be the longest-serving inmate of Alcatraz.   Sometime in late 1928‚ George Barker either left in disgust with his criminal sons‚ or was thrown out by Ari‚ who had by now taken to calling herself Kate.   Arthur Barker. Lloyd Barker. Alvin Karpis. Karpis‚ after being released from the reformatory‚ went to find Fred and it was then he first met Kate Barker. She was living in a shack near some railroad tracks. “As I approached‚” he said later‚ “she was wearing a pair of bib overalls over a man’s sweater.” He introduced himself and she invited him in. The shack had no electricity nor running water. A ramshackle outhouse was in the back yard. “There were flies everywhere.” But Ma Barker liked Karpis‚ and virtually adopted the young hoodlum‚ who eventually became as close as Fred.   Alvin Karpis‚ who later came to hate Hoover with a vehemence because of the FBI director’s self-proclaimed genius as the nation’s best investigator‚ said that Kate Barker was “gullible‚ easily led‚ simple‚ and generally law-abiding. The idea that she was the mastermind‚” to use Hoover’s own words‚ was the most “ridiculous story in the annals of crime.”   Her only role was as a cover for the gang so they would look less conspicuous when they traveled. Convicted bank robber Harvey Bailey‚ who was well-acquainted with Kate Barker and her sons‚ said years later “Ma Barker couldn’t plan breakfast‚ let alone a major crime.” Rather than a criminal overlord‚ she was nothing more than an overindulgent mother who traveled with her sons and benefited from their ill-gotten gains.   So far the Barkers had not come to the attention of the Bureau of Investigation in Washington. It would not acquire the word “Federal” until 1935. The agents in Oklahoma and Missouri had never heard of the outlaw family‚ and certainly knew nothing of Ma Barker. Only the local city‚ county‚ and state police knew of them‚ even though Doc was in prison for a Federal offense.   Fred arrived from Joplin‚ and together he and Karpis began nighttime burglaries around Tulsa. They were both arrested. While Karpis was released‚ Fred later escaped. They took Ma and her current boyfriend‚ a drunk named Albert Dunlop‚ to southern Missouri. There they pulled their first bank robbery. Fred used the money to buy his mother a small farm. The boys did not remain. When a West Plains‚ Missouri police officer came to question them about a burglary‚ Karpis panicked and shot the lawman. Running just ahead of a posse‚ they took Ma and Albert to Herb Farmer’s place outside Joplin.   Herbert “Deafy” Farmer. Harvey Bailey. Fred Goetz. Farmer suggested to the boys they go to St. Paul‚ Minn.‚ where the police were easily bribed. St. Paul‚ already considered the crime capital of the Midwest‚ was the home of a man who‚ while never indicted nor prosecuted‚ was one of the most notorious partners of crime in the state. Chief of Police Tom Brown took bribes and protected criminals while lining his pockets.   The Green Lantern Tavern‚ a favorite hangout for outlaws‚ was run by a portly man named Harry Sawyer. In December of 1931‚ Fred Barker and Alvin Karpis entered the big leagues of the Midwest’s criminal underworld. The Green Lantern often hosted Chicago gunmen and bank robbers‚ including Harvey Bailey and the soon to be infamous Machine Gun Kelly.   Where was Ma during all this? She was in a small home rented for her and Dunlop‚ where she kept house‚ listened to Amos ‘n’ Andy‚ and assembled puzzles. She was happy as long as she had her son‚ a roof over her head and something to do.   The Safe House. In late 1931‚ Fred Barker and Alvin Karpis began frequenting the Green Lantern Tavern in St. Paul‚ Minn.‚ a favorite hangout for outlaws that also acted as a safe haven for the two‚ who were on the run and wanted in Missouri for the December 19‚ 1931‚ murder of Sheriff C.R. Kelly. Sawyer took to the new arrivals and introduced them to more of his patrons. After one successful bank robbery‚ Karpis and Fred were sought for the crime. Tom Brown sidetracked the investigation while warning the boys. They suspected Dunlop as alerting the cops. They took the drunk out to the woods and shot him. This act alone disputes that Ma was a leader of the gang. She was lonely‚ and would not have allowed Dunlop to be killed. Fred‚ who was intimidated by his mother‚ rarely went against her wishes. But Dunlop was a threat.   In June 1932 ‚ with Harvey Bailey‚ they robbed another bank in Fort Scott‚ Kan.. By autumn‚ they had enough money for the next step‚ getting Doc Barker out of prison. This was accomplished with the help of Tom Brown. A $200 dollar bribe to corrupt state Senator Preston Lester put Doc back on the street. Another bribe also released Volney Davis‚ another outlaw. There is some discrepancy on this matter‚ as many sources state Doc was paroled. But historians‚ going through FBI files‚ determined that Doc was released early due to bribery.   Now calling themselves the Barker-Karpis Gang‚ the four men joined up with George Ziegler‚ whose real name was Fred Goetz‚ and Brian Bolton‚ both from Chicago.   Goetz and Bolton‚ along with another man‚ Fred “Killer” Burke‚ were the then-unknown gunmen of the infamous St. Valentine’s Day Massacre in a Chicago garage in 1929.   The “Tommy Gun” was a favored weapon of bank robbers and other criminals of the era‚ including the Barkers. Amazingly‚ Fred and Doc Barker‚ whose standing in the fugitive hierarchy was hardly worth mentioning‚ had been joined by the men who murdered seven of Chicago gang leader Bugs Moran’s men on the orders of Al Capone. Rarely in the underworld did the world of organized crime and the Depression-era hoodlums come together. Neither Goetz nor Bolton ever met Ma Barker‚ being content in her small and quiet apartment.   Sawyer‚ knowing Karpis wanted to find a less dangerous and more lucrative crime than armed robbery‚ told him about William Hamm‚ the scion of the old Hamm’s Brewery in St. Paul. He would be an easy target for kidnapping and ransom. Curiously‚ even though the June 1933 Hamm kidnapping yielded far more money than even John Dillinger had ever robbed‚ the Barkers were still unknown to the FBI. This was the crime that brought them into the hunt‚ since the passage of the Lindbergh Law in 1932 made interstate kidnapping a Federal crime.   Ma was still in St. Paul working on her jigsaw puzzles. She was aware of her sons’ crimes‚ but probably not the scale. As long as they came home with nice clothes and took her out for fun in the evenings‚ she was content. To be sure‚ Kate Barker was not a model of American motherhood.   The Hamm kidnapping yielded $100‚000 in cash‚ which the gang laundered through their connections in St. Paul‚ Cleveland‚ and Chicago. Ma was shuffled from city to city as the gang kept ahead of the law. In August of 1933 Karpis was associated with Baby Face Nelson‚ and introduced him to other bank robbers. Karpis‚ always cautious‚ found Nelson to be too unstable and violent. Nelson‚ who often bragged about his connections in the criminal underworld‚ which included Dillinger‚ never mentioned even meeting the supposed matriarchal mastermind behind the Barker Gang. Furthermore‚ Nelson was very much a chauvinist‚ and would never have let a woman tell him what to do.   Edward Bremer. By 1931‚ the Barker gang had begun working with more infamous felons. It wasn’t until their 1934 kidnapping of Edward Bremer‚ shown here‚ though‚ that Hoover began to take notice of them. Wanted poster for Alvin Karpis and Fred Barker for the murder of C. R. Kelly‚ sheriff of Howell County‚ Missouri. When the ransom money was distributed‚ the corrupt Tom Brown received $25‚000 with the gang splitting the rest. But even in the 1930s‚ the money‚ with their profligate spending‚ did not last long. Fred sent Herb Farmer $2‚500 to help pay his legal expenses when he was on trial for conspiracy.   Another kidnapping‚ that of businessman Edward Bremer on January 17‚ 1934‚ infuriated Hoover‚ who knew Bremer had connections to President Roosevelt. Hoover‚ who micromanaged the field agents to the point of verbally criticizing any typographical errors in their written reports‚ still knew nothing of Ma Barker. He rode the field officers mercilessly‚ to find out who had kidnapped Bremer. At last one of Doc Barker’s fingerprints was found on a cache of four gas cans left on a rural road where the gang had refueled their vehicles. Hoover’s men scoured the Midwest looking for Karpis‚ Fred‚ and Doc Barker‚ but no mention of Ma Barker turned up in their files or list of suspects.   It took months to launder the $200‚000 in Bremer ransom money. The Departments of Justice and Treasury had posted the serial numbers to every bank in the country. Some of it was sent to Cuba‚ where it would spread to Mexico and South America. It was time to lay low. In September‚ Karpis‚ needing some time out of the country‚ visited Cuba with his girlfriend Dolores Delany. While there‚ he sent a letter to Ma in Chicago and invited her to come down. They spent a week fishing‚ boating‚ and relaxing in the beach house he had rented. But Cuba was under virtual martial law from the violence between the government and the revolt under Fulgencio Batista. Karpis returned to the states and began looking for another bank to rob.   The Point of No Return. Alvin Karpis had his fingerprints removed by underworld physician Joseph Moran‚ as documented in this FBI file photo. He was arrested on May 1‚ 1936‚ in New Orleans by Hoover and his FBI agents. FBI agents meticulouosly documented their plan to capture Karpis‚ shown here on this blackboard. Then Doc‚ never the brightest of men‚ was arrested by Special Agent Earl Connally in early January. Among his personal effects was a map of central Florida‚ with a red ring circled around Lake Wier near Ocklawaha. That was where Fred and Ma were staying.   With Dillinger‚ Floyd‚ Nelson‚ and the Barrow Gang dead by this time‚ the Karpis and Barkers drew the full attention of Hoover’s agents. Earl Connally flew down to Florida and‚ with the help of Miami agents and local police‚ set up a cordon around the two-story lake house where Fred and Ma were staying. Karpis had visited the house only a few days before and felt it was too exposed. He advised them to find a better place. But Ma liked how quiet it was.   On the morning of January 16‚ Connally and his men‚ armed with tear gas grenades‚ rifles‚ shotguns and Thompson submachine guns‚ yelled for Fred to come out. Gunfire erupted from an upper window‚ then shifted to another. It was obvious only one person was shooting‚ as the shots never came from more than one window at a time. After firing tear gas and riddling the house with bullets‚ the agents waited‚ then called again. After three hours of more tear gas and fusillades of gunfire‚ the shooting ceased.   Connally‚ not willing to risk his men’s lives‚ sent the house’s caretaker‚ Will Woodbury‚ in to see if the Barkers were dead. Told by Connally that he would be okay‚ the frightened Woodbury went inside the house‚ still reeking of tear gas. A few minutes later he called out that both Fred and Ma were dead.   When agents finally summoned up the courage to enter the house‚ they found Ma and Fred dead‚ the latter riddled with bullets. Ma was lying nearby with a single bullet hole in her head. Not far from her left hand was a Thompson submachine gun. Almost immediately the story circulated that Ma had been found with a “smoking machine gun in her hand‚” but the truth is more logical if not lurid. Kate Barker was right-handed. At ten pounds‚ the Thompson was a heavy weapon‚ almost impossible to handle when firing at full automatic. There was no way she could have used it;. The gun was Fred’s. Ma Barker was simply in the wrong place.   But Hoover‚ delighted to have the case closed‚ immediately told the press that she had been killed while fighting the agents. There is no doubt he wanted to spin the news away from the fact that his agents had murdered an old and unarmed woman. Thus the legend of the nefarious criminal mastermind Ma Barker was hatched and has persisted to this day.   In the Florida hideout‚ FBI agents found this large cache of weapons and ammunition. Gathering the Evidence. After an hours-long shootout at their Florida hideout‚ FBI agents entered the home and found the dead bodies of Fred and Ma Barker‚ pictured here at the morgue. Even though the Barkers were active longer than any of the more famous Depression-era criminals‚ they were hardly known to the general public. Ma Barker’s notorious role was posthumous. Not being alive to defend herself‚ Hoover had full control of the outrageous legend. He never tired of talking about her. In fact‚ even as he directed the FBI through the Second World War‚ the McCarthy Era‚ the Cold war and several presidential administrations‚ he never stopped maligning the criminal fiend‚ Ma Barker.   Mark Carlson’s articles have appeared in numerous national magazines. He is currently working on the definitive account of the Lincoln Assassination. This story appeared in the 2024 Winter issue of American History magazine. historynet magazines Our 9 best-selling history titles feature in-depth storytelling and iconic imagery to engage and inform on the people‚ the wars‚ and the events that shaped America and the world. subscribe today

Ludwig August Theodor Beck was the Third Reich’s most enigmatic and tragic senior general. As the first chief of the resurrected German Army General Staff in 1935‚ he played a leading role in building the post-World War I rump-Reichswehr into the Wehrmacht of World War II. He was a brilliant military thinker and the primary author of the 1933 operations manual Truppenführung (Unit Command)‚ which remained the foundation of Germany’s war-fighting doctrine until 1945—and beyond. Yet Beck became a staunch anti-Nazi who opposed the politicization of the army and many of Hitler’s plans for large-scale wars of conquest. After retiring in protest in 1938‚ Beck became one of the leaders of the Widerstand—the German resistance.  He was born in a suburb of Wiesbaden‚ Germany‚ on June 29‚ 1880‚ a descendent from an old Hessian officer family. In 1898 he joined a Prussian field artillery regiment based in Strasbourg as anofficer candidate and received his commission as a 2nd lieutenant the following year. From 1908 to 1911 he attended the highly selective Kriegsakademie (War College)‚ where General Carl von Clausewitz once served as the director. In 1913 he became a full-fledged member of the General Staff. During World War I he served as the General Staff Officer Ia (operations officer) of two different divisions. From 1916 to 1918 he was assigned to the General Staff of Army Group German Crown Prince on the Western Front. When the Armistice went into effect in November 1918‚ Beck was responsible for planning the orderly and controlled withdrawal of some 90 German divisions back across the Rhine. It was an overwhelming responsibility for a 38-year-old major. Beck was a cultured man with an intellectual bent. He spoke French and English; he played the violin; and he was an expert equestrian. But he did not have very much of a private life. He married in 1916; but he had to return to the front after the briefest of honeymoons. His daughter was born the following year; but then his wife died late in 1917. Much like Britain’s Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery‚ whose wife also died young‚ Beck withdrew into his profession. The introverted officer also remained increasingly aloof from the bonhomie social life of the traditional officers’ messes.  Beck (center) was a skilled equestrian. Following the war‚ Beck was one of the only 3‚718 officers out of 227‚081 selected for retention in the 100‚000-man Reichswehr that Germany was allowed under the draconian terms of the Versailles Treaty. The treaty restrictions also prohibited Germany from having a General Staff. The Germans circumvented that restriction by camouflaging the Reichswehr’s General Staff as an innocuous-sounding organization called the Truppenamt (Troop Office). The treaty also forbade Germany from even training General Staff officers‚ forcing the closing of the Kriegs-akademie. The Reichswehr circumvented that by conducting decentralized leadership training in the military districts. The successful graduates were designated a Führerstabsoffizier (Leader Staff Officer)‚ the cover term for a General Staff officer.  During the 1920s Beck rotated between troop commands as an artillery officer and assignments in the Truppenamt. From 1919 to 1922 he was assigned to special duties‚ working personally for Colonel General Hans von Seeckt‚ the first chief of the Truppenamt and later the Chief of the Army Command. Seeckt was the key architect of the small Reichswehr as an elite Führerheer (Leaders’ Army)‚ the foundation for the army’s rapid expansion at some point in the future. Of the many wide-ranging reforms carried out under Seeckt‚ one of the most important was a new manual for tactical doctrine published in 1922. H.Dv.487 Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen (Command and Combat of the Combined Arms)‚ was widely called “Das FuG.” Unlike the post-World War I operational manuals of almost every other Western army‚ Das FuG abandoned the concept of trench warfare. Instead‚ it emphasized mobile warfare while also adopting many of the offensive and defensive technical and tactical innovations that evolved during the First World War. Das FuG stressed the primacy of the offensive‚ with encirclement combined with a frontal or flank holding action as the preferred tactical maneuver in most cases. The defensive was purely a temporary economy of force measure in preparation for going on the offensive. In 1931 and 1932‚ Beck had been the lead author of a revision of Das FuG to bring the doctrine up to date with the rapidly emerging potentials of motorized warfare‚ aviation‚ and electronic communications. His editorial assistants were Generals Werner von Fritsch and Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel. Published in 1933‚ H.Dv.300 Truppenführung (Unit Command)‚ continued Das FuG’s focus on mobile and offensive operations‚ with entire paragraphs from Das FuG carried over verbatim into Truppenführung. One very significant addition to the new manual‚ however‚ was the introduction. In 15 elegantly phrased and highly philosophical paragraphs‚ Beck set the manual’s tone. Among his observations were that the conduct of war is subject to continual development‚ with new weapons dictating new forms of warfare; regulations alone aren’t enough to fight a war and such principles must conform to the situation at hand; military command requires leaders capable of judgment‚ with clear vision and foresight‚ and the ability to make independent decisions‚ and to carry them out unwaveringly and positively; and that every man‚ from the youngest soldier upward‚ must commit his whole mental‚ spiritual‚ and physical strength to his unit. General Werner von Fritsch‚ commander-in-chief of the army (left)‚ was a Beck ally. When the Nazis forced Fritsch out of the army‚ Beck was increasingly isolated. Truppenführung is the key to understanding the psychology‚ philosophy‚ and social values of the Wehrmacht at the start of World War II. Tragically‚ too many of those principles were perverted by the Nazism of the Third Reich as the war progressed. Nonetheless‚ Truppenführung remains essential to understanding German military operations until the end of the war. In many of its passages Truppenführung was a like a modern version of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War. According to historian Williamson Murray‚ Truppenführung “remains the most influential doctrinal manual ever written” as well as “one of the most thoughtful examinations of the conduct of operations and leadership.” Murray did not exaggerate. The primary operations manual of the German Bundeswehr today is still called Truppenführung‚ and it is heavily influenced by many of the concepts in the original 1933 edition. Likewise‚ when the U.S. Army introduced its AirLand Battle doctrine during the 1980s‚ the authors of the 1986 edition of Field Manual 100-5‚ Operations studied the original Truppenführung closely. Another important principle that emerged from the pages of Truppenführung is what is now called Auftragstaktik (Mission Command Tactics)‚ the idea that senior commanders should tell their subordinate commanders what needs to be done‚ why it needs to be done‚ and when it needs to be done—but then give the junior commanders the flexibility to figure out the best way possible to achieve the senior commander’s intent. Although traditional German deference to higher authority and close adherence to established procedures would seem to be the very antithesis of Auftragstaktik‚ the Wehrmacht made it work to a degree unsurpassed by any other army in history to that point. Oddly enough‚ the term itself never appears in print in Truppenführung; but the concept comes through clearly in the pages of the manual. German tactical thinking‚ however‚ continued to evolve after the publication of Truppenführung. As General Friedrich-Wilhelm von Mellenthin noted in his classic 1956 book Panzer Battles‚ the Army General Staff had a series of very intense internal debates between 1935 and 1937 over the use of tanks. Beck at that point tended to subscribe to the then-current French doctrine of committing tanks to close support of the infantry. Generals Werner von Fritsch and Heinz Guderian were among those who argued instead for independent Panzer operations. In his post-war memoirs‚ Guderian painted Beck—who by then was dead and unable to defend himself—as a narrow-minded defeatist with no operational understanding who even opposed the formation of the Panzer divisions. Various passages in Truppenführung do cover infantry and armor actions that are coordinated‚ but not combined. The true integration of infantry and armor tactics in the German Army did not take place until after the 1940 campaign in France‚ when Colonel Hermann Balck recommended the formation of combined infantry-armor teams. As early as 1934 Beck‚ in fact‚ wrote a lengthy cover memo to an extensive report on British Army armored maneuvers‚ stressing the need for continued evaluation and assessment of evolving armored warfare. And as historian Robert Citino pointed out‚ the first Panzer divisions started forming in 1935‚ less than two years after Beck became the chief of the Truppenamt. General Staff exercises that Beck planned that year included notional Panzer divisions and even corps‚ well before Germany had hardly any tanks at all. Thus‚ Guderian’s claim to have waged a “long‚ drawn-out fight” with Beck over the creation of the Panzer divisions can only be overstatement at best. General Heinz Guderian disparaged Beck’s contributions to Panzer tactics. Hitler’s National Socialist movement gained traction during the late 1920s and early 1930s‚ but Beck never became a member of the Nazi Party‚ although he continued his rise in the military. He assumed command of the 1st Cavalry Division in Frankfurt an der Oder in 1932 with a promotion to lieutenant general (two stars) and became chief of the Truppenamt on October 1‚ 1933. Like Hitler‚ he supported the repudiation of the Versailles Treaty because he believed that Germany had both the need and the right to rearm. In early 1933 Beck naively wrote of Nazism; “I have wished for years for the political revolution‚ and now my wishes have come true. It is the first ray of hope since 1918.” His optimism‚ however‚ did not last long. After President Paul von Hindenburg died in office on August 2‚ 1934‚ Hitler grabbed total power in Germany by combining the offices of president and chancellor‚ styling himself as the new Führer. Eighteen days later‚ all German officers were required to swear an oath of fealty to Hitler personally. Beck had serious misgivings‚ but he failed to raise objections because he believed that Hitler could provide the strong government that Germany needed‚ while the army’s traditional elements could keep him under reasonable control. It was a Hobson’s Choice‚ preferable to the paramilitary thugs of the Sturmabteilungen (SA) and Schutzstaffel (SS) becoming the dominant power force in the country. Tragically‚ that is exactly what happened. Once Hitler had all the reins of power in hand‚ he progressively threw off the Versailles Treaty restrictions‚ first clandestinely‚ and then openly. On March 16‚ 1935‚ he had the Reichswehr renamed the Wehrmacht. Simultaneously‚ the Truppenamt was re-designated the General Staff of the Army (Generalstab des Heeres)‚ with Beck as its first chief. The so-called “Leader Staff Officers” were redesignated General Staff Officers and authorized to append the traditional “i.G.” (im Generalstab) after their rank titles. That May‚ Beck was promoted to General of Artillery (three stars). He set to work managing the expansion of the resurrected General Staff. One of his first acts was to re-open the Kriegsakademie as the central point for General Staff Officer training. Beck adhered to a traditional German militarist worldview. He believed that German military power had to be restored to its pre-1919 levels‚ and he advocated increasingly greater levels of military spending. His war plans for Germany were initially based on a defensive strategy. He clearly understood that any future large-scale war could all too easily become another multi-front conflict that Germany could not win. Once Germany was sufficiently rearmed‚ Beck thought that the Reich should conduct a progressive series of limited wars that would establish Germany as Europe’s foremost power and place all of Central and Eastern Europe within the German sphere of influence. Nonetheless‚ in 1936 he fully supported Hitler during the remilitarization of the German Rhineland—as opposed to many of the other generals who feared the possible French reaction. Colonel I.G. Claus von Stauffenberg planted a bomb that almost killed Hitler on July 20‚ 1944. Beck was part of the plot. Hitler shows Benito Mussolini the bomb’s destruction. Retaliation against the plotters was swift. Beck’s close ally was General Werner von Fritsch‚ the commander-in-chief of the German Army. The two saw their primary task as one of rebuilding the army on the old apolitical traditional model‚ rather than as an appendage of the Nazi Party. This ultimately put them on a collision course with War Minister General Werner von Blomberg‚ who intended to remake the army as a mirror of National Socialist ideology. Fritsch and Beck continued to resist the politicization of the army‚ but Hitler and his key henchmen progressively tightened the political cordon. In January 1938 Blomberg was forced out of office when it was revealed that his new second wife had a lengthy criminal record. Hitler then personally assumed the War Ministry portfolio‚ making him the commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht. The following month Fritsch was forced to resign after he was falsely accused of being a homosexual. Fritsch was replaced as army commander-in-chief by the more pliable Colonel General Walther von Brauchitsch. Beck was now politically isolated.  In May 1937‚ Beck initially resisted issuing the orders for the German invasion of Austria. He apparently had no deep-seated moral objection to the idea of a war of aggression‚ but he believed that such a move might trigger a world war before Germany had rearmed enough for a major conflict. He believed that the earliest date Germany could risk a war was 1940. Most of the generals also believed that starting a war in 1938 was highly risky; but none of them dared to confront Hitler directly on the issue. Beck issued the orders for the Wehrmacht to march into Austria in March 1938‚ an invasion that was unopposed. Beck continued to cling to the belief that the German officer corps could keep the National Socialists under control. But as Hitler pushed to invade Czechoslovakia in 1938‚ Beck began to oppose him openly‚ writing a series of memoranda describing the inherent dangers in a premature major military operation. Beck attempted to mobilize other generals to resist what he saw as Hitler’s strategic crapshoot; but he failed to gain the backing of army commander-in-chief Brauchitsch. Increasingly frustrated over Germany’s course‚ Beck established his own personal intelligence network of German military attachés‚ which he used both to collect and to leak information. He also reached out to key civilians for his network‚ with the most notable being Carl Goerdeler‚ an anti-Nazi and former mayor of Leipzig. In August 1938‚ Beck retired from the army in protest. He was promoted to colonel general (four stars) on the retired list. In retirement‚ Beck organized a covert opposition group of active and retired officers and other conservatives‚ including Admiral Wilhelm Canaris‚ the anti-Nazi head of German Military Intelligence (Abwehr). Beck’s name appears on a memorial to the bomb plotters on the building in Berlin that now houses the German Resistance Memorial Center. By the start of 1940‚ before the German invasion of France and the Low Countries‚ Beck had reached the conclusion that the only plausible way to overthrow the Nazi regime was to remove Hitler from power. Beck’s group even went so far as to reach out to the Vatican to request help in mediating with the Western Allies. At that point‚ however‚ the plotters naively believed that they could negotiate a peace settlement with Britain and France that would allow Germany to keep most of its recent conquests—including Austria‚ western Poland‚ and the occupied Czechoslovakian provinces of Bohemia and Moravia. A skeptical Britain remained noncommittal. Shortly before the 1940 invasion of Belgium and France‚ Beck’s group tried to warn the Belgians of the imminent attack. By 1943‚ Beck had become convinced that the only way to save Germany was to assassinate Hitler. His group tried several times‚ culminating in Colonel i.G. Claus von Stauffenberg’s attempt to kill Hitler with a bomb on July 20‚ 1944. Stauffenberg managed to place the explosive‚ hidden in a briefcase‚ beneath a table in a room where Hitler was leading a military conference. The bomb exploded‚ but another officer had unwittingly pushed the briefcase behind a heavy table leg‚ shielding Hitler from the full blast and saving his life. Had Stauffenberg succeeded‚ the conspirators planned to establish martial law‚ seize radio stations‚ and arrest key Nazi and SS leaders. (Beck did refuse to approve their summary execution.) Pending free elections‚ Beck would have become the acting head of state of the interim government‚ with Carl Goerdeler as chancellor. When the conspirators learned that Stauffenberg had failed‚ Beck insisted on continuing the putsch‚ called Operation Valkyrie. He believed that Germany deserved the attempt. But the effort failed. Arrested with other key conspirators and taken into custody at the army’s headquarters on Bendler Strasse in Berlin‚ Beck was offered the privilege of shooting himself to avoid death by torture by the Gestapo. On the night of July 20-21‚ Beck managed to wound himself. A sergeant then shot the unconscious Beck in the neck‚ killing him. Having started out in a somewhat loose league with the devil‚ Colonel General Ludwig Beck died on the right side of history—a German patriot‚ but one with a clouded legacy. this article first appeared in world war II magazine See more stories SubscriBE NOW!  

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Pharmaceutical companies raised the list prices of hundreds and hundreds of drugs in January 2024. While that figure is down from previous years‚ the recent price hikes have caught the attention of the US Senate Health Committee‚ which wants to hear testimonies from big pharma CEOs about why Americans pay the highest prices in the world for prescription drugs.To herald in the new year‚ drugmakers often jack up their prices on January 1 – and 2024 was no different. On January 1‚ 453 branded drugs increased in cost‚ according to data analysis by drug price transparency NGO 46brooklyn Research.That’s similar to January 1‚ 2023‚ which saw 452 brand-name drugs up in price – but it’s significantly down from 2022 and 2021‚ which saw 540 and 602 drug price increases respectively. More followed the New Year’s Day price hike. According to further analysis for the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) by 46brooklyn Research‚ 775 brand-name drugs underwent raised list prices during the first half of January 2024. The drug companies reportedly raised the prices by a median of 4.5 percent‚ which is higher than the rate of inflation.Some of the most prominent price rises involved the asthma medication Xolair and the Shingles vaccine Shingrix‚ which saw price increases of over 7.5 percent‚ as per the WSJ analysis. Cancer-treating medications – such as Verzenio‚ Ibrance‚ and Pomalyst – also saw surges in price over 5 percent. Ozempic‚ a diabetes treatment that has become an in-vogue weight-loss drug‚ has also risen in price by 3.5 percent. That means a month’s supply reportedly now costs $970.  Bear in mind that drug prices and pharmaceutical markets are deeply complex beasts‚ especially in the US due to private healthcare. Rises in drug list prices don’t necessarily mean people will be paying more at the pharmacy counter or through their health insurance plans. Likewise‚ a price hike doesn’t always mean that a drugmaker will be profiting more. As 46brooklyn Research explains: “Tracking drug prices is an exercise fraught with complication due to the fact that pricing is more of a range of experiences (see price discrimination) rather than something that is a consistent‚ transparent‚ shared experience among purchasers. And even with something as surface level as tracking list prices‚ there are many ways to view and contextualize what’s happening from an overall system impact perspective.”There were also some notable decreases in drug prices this January. At least 24 products became cheaper in January which 46brooklyn Research described as “nearly unprecedented.”The subject of drug prices has recently caught the attention of Senate health committee chair Bernie Sanders. On January 25‚ the Senate Health Committee intended to hold a hearing called: “Why Does the United States Pay‚ By Far‚ The Highest Prices In The World For Prescription Drugs?”. As reported by STAT News‚ Johnson &; Johnson CEO Joaquin Duato‚ Merck CEO Robert Davis‚ and Bristol Myers Squibb CEO Chris Boerner were asked to testify about why consumers in the US pay higher prices for drugs compared with other countries. However‚ it didn’t go ahead because the CEOs of Johnson &; Johnson and Merck declined the invite. The Bristol Myers Squibb CEO then ducked out of the hearing on the grounds he would only participate if at least one other pharma CEO was present. Bernie is now set to hold a committee vote on whether to issue the two subpoenas to the CEOs of Johnson &; Johnson and Merck‚ forcing them to testify‚ according to STAT. If that goes ahead‚ it will be the first time the health committee has issued a subpoena in more than 40 years. “The American people have a right to know why it is that they pay‚ by far‚ the highest prices in the world for prescription drugs while the pharmaceutical industry in the US makes hundreds of billions in profits and pays their CEOs tens of millions of dollars in compensation‚” Chairman Sanders said in a statement published November 2023. "A life-saving drug is not effective if the patient who needs that drug cannot afford it‚" he added.

A small rock called 2024 BJ will fly past Earth and the Moon in just a few days. It was discovered only last week‚ on January 17‚ and will approach our planet on Saturday‚ January 27. The object is estimated to be 25 meters (82 feet) across and is a near-earth object. It won’t get anywhere close to us this week – at least‚ relatively speaking.While the flyby is close in cosmic terms‚ 2024 BJ is flying 353‚000 kilometers (220‚000 miles) away. That’s 92 percent of the average distance between the Earth and the Moon. The object will first approach the Moon (although even further away than our planet) at around 2 pm UTC and then reach its close passage to Earth about three and a half hours later. A video livestream is being organized by our friends at The Virtual Telescope Project.2024 BJ is among the 158 new space rocks discovered since the beginning of the year‚ and one of the 119 Apollo types. These are objects that cross the orbit of the Earth at their closest point to the Sun but whose orbit goes much further out. In fact‚ 2024 BJ gets slightly closer to the Sun than our planet does‚ but then extends well beyond the orbit of Mars.Humans are getting better at discovering potentially hazardous asteroids in advance and before they get too close‚ although sometimes the warnings come just minutes before. Just this weekend‚ a meteor was predicted to hit the atmosphere over Germany‚ only the eighth time this type of prediction has happened.