[unable to retrieve full-text content]U.S. officials are also closely monitoring the upcoming presidential contest. The post Eurocrats Watch Poland With Bated Breath appeared first on The American Conservative.…

[unable to retrieve full-text content]Contrary to the gloom emanating from European capitals, the Russia–Ukraine meeting was a promising step toward an end to the war. The post The Istanbul Talks Were…

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Foreign Affairs Don’t Blame Trump If He Gives Up on Russia-Ukraine The president brought the warring nations together but can’t force them to make peace.   Is it possible to broker a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine? There have been doubters and skeptics on this question from the moment the first round of diplomacy occurred a few weeks after Moscow’s February 2022 invasion. The general consensus in Washington’s think tank circuit and Europe’s halls of power is that Russian President Vladimir Putin is simply too thick-headed, greedy, and intransigent to talk to. The only figure of major consequence who thought a settlement could be achieved was Donald Trump—and even his optimism, on the campaign trail and then in office, was predicated less on the ability of the combatants to strike an honorable peace and more on his supposed magical powers of persuasion.  But even President Trump is getting discouraged these days. Objectively speaking, the Trump administration’s first three months of shuttle diplomacy has been a wash. This hasn’t been for a lack of trying. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, peace envoy Steve Witkoff, and Ukraine envoy Keith Kellogg have done an extensive amount of traveling during this time—Witkoff has reportedly met with Putin four times. Meanwhile, Trump has browbeaten Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky into participating in the U.S.-mediated process (something Trump’s predecessor, Joe Biden, refused to do) and the administration has even put a draft peace deal on the table for discussion. Trump has taken a lot of heat for his diplomacy-first approach, particularly from those perfectly comfortable with having Zelensky dictate U.S. policy on the war.  But for those of us who supported diplomacy from the start, we must admit that the trend line isn’t good. Sure, this week Ukrainian and Russian officials met in Turkey for the first time in more than three years at Trump’s urging. Yes, this in and of itself is an accomplishment of sorts. But getting to this meeting was riddled with so much gamesmanship by the two sides, with Zelensky daring Putin to fly to Turkey and Putin responding by sending two lower-level Russian negotiators instead, that one wonders if either leader is capable of going beyond histrionics. As Rubio said before the May 16 session took place, the odds of success were slim: “I don’t think anything productive is actually going to happen from this point forward, until [Trump and Putin] engage in a very frank and direct conversation, which I know President Trump is willing to do.”  The meeting, which lasted about one hour and 40 minutes, didn’t produce any bombshells. But it would be a mistake to assume bombshells were in the offing anyway. While a prisoner exchange was agreed to, there wasn’t progress on the real matter at hand: getting to a deal. The Russians reportedly submitted hardline demands to the Ukrainians, including a full withdrawal from the parts of Ukraine Putin annexed in 2022. The topic of a ceasefire was broached, yet not settled. At this point one wonders if Trump should spend any more of his valuable time on striking a deal to end the war. Withdrawing from Russia-Ukraine diplomacy wouldn’t be a sign of defeatism but rather a reflection of reality. Mediators can do plenty during peace negotiations, like bringing the warring parties into the same room, shuttling proposals back-and-forth, and leaning on one side or the other (or both) to bring an agreement to fruition. This is what Jimmy Carter did during the 1977-1978 Israel-Egypt peace negotiations, what Richard Holbrooke did at Dayton in 1995 to end the war in Bosnia, and what President Bill Clinton tried to do with Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian Liberation Organization chairman Yasser Arafat during the closing months of his presidency.   But ultimately the talent of the mediator isn’t the most important variable in conflict diplomacy. Rather, the willingness of the parties themselves to break from maximalism and permit the other side a graceful off-ramp is usually the difference between success or failure. Clinton couldn’t get an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal across the finish line because Barak and Arafat were too divided on the big questions, such as what the borders of a future Palestinian state would be, how Jerusalem would be divided up, and how the Israeli settlements would be dealt with. Compromise, the one ingredient required to close, was too high a bar. The Ukraine-Russia talks aren’t dead in the water like the Israeli-Palestinian peace process was (and still is). But evidence for an imminent breakthrough just isn’t there. When the Trump administration finally got Ukraine to support a 30-day ceasefire arrangement in March, the Russians shrugged the proposal off. When the Trump administration convinced Kiev to sign onto a 30-day ceasefire in the Black Sea weeks later, Moscow linked its participation to U.S. and European sanctions relief. And when Putin declared unilateral, short-term ceasefires to mark important dates on the Russian calendar, Zelensky viewed it all as a public relations gambit by the Kremlin to persuade Trump that it was Moscow, not Kiev, who most wanted peace.  Zelensky and Putin both claim they endorse an end to the three-year-long war. The problem, as always, is that the two leaders aren’t working on the same paradigm—indeed, they are operating in separate universes. Originally, Zelensky demanded an immediate 30-day truce before authorizing direct talks with Putin, only to change his approach after Trump, to the surprise of Kiev’s European allies, called for direct talks right away. That solved one problem but created another: what to actually talk about? The Russians want to get to work on a comprehensive solution; the Ukrainians want to talk about nothing at this point other than getting a ceasefire.  None of this even accounts for the chasm between what Ukraine wants in a hypothetical settlement and what Russia considers acceptable. Putin, despite suffering hundreds of thousands of casualties over the last 16 months for an area smaller than the size of Delaware, is still harping on his original terms: formalizing his annexation of five Ukrainian regions, curtailing the size and capability of the Ukrainian armed forces, and dictating Kiev’s foreign policy. The Ukrainians remain dead set against any of this, and the loss in men and materiel over the last three years don’t seem to be having an appreciable effect on what they are—and aren’t—willing to live with. All of which is to say that Trump’s declining optimism is indicative of where the war is at this stage. If progress continues to elude, the White House could hardly be blamed if it threw up its hands, quit the peace process, and consoled itself that no stone was left unturned. The post Don’t Blame Trump If He Gives Up on Russia-Ukraine appeared first on The American Conservative.

Foreign Affairs Eurocrats Watch Poland With Bated Breath U.S. officials are also closely monitoring the upcoming presidential contest. Credit: Vitalii Nosach/Getty Images The message to Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk is clear: America is watching. As Poland’s presidential election approaches—the first round will occur Sunday, the same day as nearby Romania’s second round—the significance is not lost on American public figures, including President Donald Trump. Barring a shock result, the candidates emerging to the second round will be Warsaw’s Mayor Rafał Trzaskowski, who is aligned with the liberal, EU-backed government of Tusk; and Karol Nawrocki, a prominent historian aligned with the opposition Law and Justice (PiS) party, which led conservative governments from 2015 to 2023.  For conservatives, the short-term prize is the status quo: outgoing term-limited President Andrzej Duda is informally allied with PiS. His presidential veto has been a critical, albeit imperfect, check on a government that has arrested political opponents, disregarded judicial rulings, scrubbed the media ecosystem, and handicapped its opponents’ participation in elections. This is the “Smiling Poland” promoted by the EU bureaucracy, regional talking heads like Anne Applebaum and Timothy Snyder, and the partially departed Biden foreign-policy apparatus.  To their chagrin, the Nawrocki campaign is ascendant. Polls suggested a comfortable Trzaskowski advantage for months, but Nawrocki has surged and enters the final weeks as the arguable favorite. “Tusk’s candidate [Trzaskowski] is far from the image of a nice, calm, confidence-inspiring guy,” journalist Marek Pyza wrote recently in the conservative weekly Sieci. “In recent weeks, he gives the impression of an exhausted, offended narcissist, frustrated that he has any opponents in this race, that anyone dares to ask him any uncomfortable questions.” Nawrocki’s momentum coincides with a string of visible endorsements. In late April, President Duda backed Nawrocki as his successor. Earlier this month, Nawrocki unexpectedly visited the White House for the National Day of Prayer. He posed for photos with President Trump and met with several key administration officials. The transatlantic visit “can be viewed as a kind of endorsement,” explained Jarosław Szczepański, a political scientist at the University of Warsaw. “This can be interpreted as support because the U.S. administration, seeing that Nawrocki could be a continuation of Andrzej Duda’s presidency, is supporting him as much as diplomatic protocol allows.” Republican members of the House Judiciary Committee followed up the visit with a letter to Michael McGrath, EU Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, and Rule of Law, in which they requested “a briefing about how the actions of Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s government might infringe upon Americans’ right to free speech online and what the EU is doing to respond to the Tusk government’s anti-democratic actions.”  Neither an unofficial Trump endorsement nor a statement from House Republicans is likely to move the needle with Polish swing voters. These moves are about putting Polish and European officials on notice that the United States will not tolerate anti-democratic liberal overreach in a country as strategically important as Poland. The coincidence with Romania’s presidential election is symbolic. (In a TAC interview this week, Romanian candidate George Simion asserted, “I’m proud to call Karol Nawrocki—a close ally and the likely successor to President Andrzej Duda—a friend.”)  Since Vice President J.D. Vance’s February speech at the Munich Security Conference, the world has witnessed France ban Marine Le Pen and Germany classify Alternative for Germany as an extremist group, both acts reminiscent of the banana-republic justice served in Romania last year.  The election outcome is not assured, even in the absence of liberal machinations. Even polls favorable to Nawrocki suggest a close race. Trzaskowski has the full backing of Polish and European institutions and next-door neighbors in Germany, not to mention the Polish urban managerial class, for whom the opposition conservatives are anathema. Then, irrespective of polling, there are simply too many variables of voter behavior in the second round. In a rapidly gentrifying Poland, the margins are getting tighter for conservative electoral coalitions. As usual, supporters of the agrarian Polish People’s Party (PSL) are enjoying considerable attention. Due to animosity toward PiS, it is part of the ruling government, but its socially conservative views often cause it to bicker with coalition partners. Nawrocki cannot afford to shed voters in the agrarian strongholds where PSL is influential.  Supporters of the centrist Szymon Hołownia, an influential figure in the current government who has run a disappointing presidential race, might decide in sufficient numbers that they are exhausted of the Tusk-Trzaskowski camp. Some supporters of the smattering of left-wing candidates could decide Trzaskowski is a bigger threat than the conservative; likewise, voters of two right-populist candidates might elect not to side with their more mainstream conservative rival. Of course, a critical mass of voters might simply stay home. Perhaps analysis of these traditional electoral factors is quaint in this European political environment. Arguably the most important question is whether Prime Minister Tusk and his allies in Brussels would allow Nawrocki to win—and then take office. “You will win,” President Trump reportedly told Nawrocki during their DC meeting. More revealing was Tusk’s alleged response to the question of what he’ll do if Trzaskowski loses: “I’ll manage.” Maybe these are the musings of experienced politicians with access to high-quality information. Nonetheless, predictable wheels are turning. On Wednesday, Polish data-network operator NASK announced suspicious Facebook ads potentially funded from abroad. Warsaw and Brussels must soon determine how many more lines they are willing to cross. The post Eurocrats Watch Poland With Bated Breath appeared first on The American Conservative.

Foreign Affairs The Istanbul Talks Were a Success Contrary to the gloom emanating from European capitals, the Russia–Ukraine meeting was a promising step toward an end to the war. Credit: Vlasov Yevhenii Predictions to the contrary, Ukraine and Russia’s first direct talks in three years, held in Istanbul on May 16, went quite well. Most importantly, the two sides agreed to keep talking.  For the Trump administration, which has made ending the war in Ukraine a priority, this initial round of negotiations marks the exact sort of breakthrough it had hoped to create. Washington’s priority now should be to encourage continued talks between the combatants, even as fighting persists. This will require pushing back on Europe’s calls for more pressure on Putin and resisting the temptation to interfere before the two sides are ready to tackle issues that cannot be addressed without American involvement. After all, the most sustainable peace will be one agreed to by Ukraine and Russia together, not one coerced by the United States or Europe.  Despite naysayers on both sides of the Atlantic and the uncertainty up to the last minute, Russian and Ukrainian negotiators not only met, but achieved notable results. According to statements made by the heads of the Ukrainian and Russian delegations, the two teams agreed to at least three next steps: to conduct the largest single POW exchange to date (1,000 personnel on each side); to produce a written version of their vision for peace for discussion at a future session; and to hold initial discussions about a meeting between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky. The positive report from the Russian and Ukrainian delegations, as well as their Turkish hosts, contrasted sharply with the negative reactions of Zelensky himself and key European leaders, including France’s President Emmanuel Macron, Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk, and the UK’s Prime Minister Keir Starmer. This group, assembled for a meeting in Albania, called the Russian refusal to accept an unconditional ceasefire “unacceptable,” and urged Trump, once again, to join them in imposing greater costs on Russia. Tusk even argued the Russians had “de facto broken off negotiations” and now was the “time to increase the pressure.” The European assessment is as unsurprising as it is inconsistent with the facts on the ground. Since Trump’s election, European leaders have sought to convince him that Putin would never seek a stable settlement in Ukraine. As Trump and his team sought ways to resolve the brutal war, Europe has interfered with and even undermined U.S. efforts. Europe’s leaders have, for instance, encouraged Zelensky to set maximalist conditions for peace, adopted new sanctions packages aimed at Russia, floated plans for “reassurance forces” that would require an American backstop the Trump administration opposes, and offered unsubstantiated warnings of Russia’s plans to invade NATO territory. The European reaction to talks in Istanbul was simply more of the same—an attempt to extend the war, reconstitute Biden’s “coalition of democracies,” and pull the United States deeper into a conflict that does not advance its interests. If Trump is serious about peace, he won’t listen. Trump should rule out new ultimatums and coercive measures targeting Russia of the kind pushed by Europe. These sticks are unlikely to work against Putin. As Russian negotiators indicated in Istanbul, Moscow is ready to keep fighting for several more years if necessary and believes that it can withstand additional Western punishment whether in the form of sanctions or whatever additional military aid might be sent to Ukraine. Instead, Trump should encourage Ukraine and Russia to keep talking. The administration can support continued negotiations by framing today’s meeting in Istanbul as a constructive first step and signaling its support for further working level discussions. A Putin-Trump meeting—a prospect floated by President Trump himself—could help signal American support for the Ukraine–Russia negotiations and indicate that the United States sees Russia as an essential interlocutor in any effort to resolve the conflict. But a potential presidential meeting should not be billed as an all-or-nothing occasion to determine Putin’s willingness to end the war in Ukraine. There is no simple test, or single headline, that can settle this question. Continued conversation between the combatants—and away from the spotlight—will be far more revealing of each side’s motivations. Ending the war between Russia and Ukraine will take time and require many rounds of talks. At this point, process is more important than high profile summits or dramatic dealmaking. It may take longer than he originally hoped, but with a little more patience, Trump’s goal of peace in Ukraine looks increasingly achievable.  The post The Istanbul Talks Were a Success appeared first on The American Conservative.

Back during his first term I thought he was good. Now he's just a washed up zionist chooch.... :-(.