The company has confirmed that hospital operations will remain unaffected, and there will be no immediate impact on patients or staff.Healthscope, Australia’s second-largest private hospital operator,…

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Politics Joe Biden, Rex Nemorensis For how much longer will the former president be king of the wood?  Credit: Justin Sullivan/Getty Images Not long before the presidential election, I wrote a column in these pages characterizing Joe Biden as a “temporary king” in the tradition of J.G. Frazer’s Golden Bough. The idea was that just as in ancient Babylonian society where, to avoid catastrophe, the real king temporarily abdicated the throne to a foolish imposter who was sacrificed at the end of his short reign, the Democratic party had given over the presidency to Biden until it could find a more permanent leader. Evidently, the Kamala Harris mumbo jumbo in November didn’t work—Biden is still at the center of the party—and I find my mind returning once again to Frazer.     These days though I see Biden less as a temporary king and more as the Rex Nemorensis, the priest of the sacred grove of Diana at Nemi. Anyone who has dipped into The Golden Bough is probably already familiar with the most famous figure in Frazer’s study of magic and religion, so I will be brief. This king, whose job it was to guard a sacred tree near Lake Nemi, held one of the most precarious offices in the ancient world. “He was a priest and a murderer,” Frazer writes. And he was perpetually in fear for his life: “A candidate for the priesthood could only succeed to office by slaying the priest, and having slain him, he retained office till he was himself slain by a stronger or a craftier.” Frazer has it that this barbarous office was a relic of a time when the rites of magic preceded the practice of religion. But, he adds, that collapsed world of belief is not so different from our own; indeed, ours was built on its ruins. In 12 mad, fascinating, and frankly sometimes unreadable volumes, he holds forth on the subject, attempting to demonstrate that the motives behind an institution such as the Rex Nemorensis “have operated widely, perhaps universally, in human society, producing in varied circumstances a variety of institutions specifically different but generically alike.”  Now, that is casting a very wide net, but there’s something undeniably attractive about this whole Key to All Mythologies exercise, even if Frazer’s facts are sometimes goofy. And I think it is fair to say that he is not only on to something about the past, but also the present. The office of Rex Nemorensis still exists, more or less, to this day. Its current occupant is Joe Biden. For how much longer, who can say. Biden became king of the wood in a strange manner. The former king, Barack Obama, abandoned the sacred tree after plucking its bough in 2008 and slaying Hillary Clinton (who, as the events of 2016 made clear, did not understand what had occurred). Obama’s departure left the grove open to a band of robbers and ruffians who aspired to the sacred priesthood. None was stronger or more brutish than Biden, who, right up until early 2020, hacked away at his competitors for the royal title. Of course, once he became king, no crowned head ever lay uneasier. All throughout his presidency, Biden fought off challengers for the title. Some hoped that senility would be his downfall, but even the insane can hold a sacred office. When Biden was forced to drop out of the race last summer—and it appeared as if Harris had finally dealt him the death stroke—fate intervened, and the defeat was not to be. Biden is still the king, and his party (along with its camp followers) are still trying to cut him down—to replace with a new king. But Biden is a tough old man, and the fight will likely continue beyond the grave. (Ronald Reagan, for example, was still the Republican Rex Nemorensis well into Donald Trump’s first term.) Even in Biden’s enfeebled state, someone stronger or craftier than he has yet to show his face in the wood. “It is a sombre picture, set to melancholy music,” Frazer writes of the aged priest’s struggle to maintain his kingship, “the background of forest showing black and jagged against a lowering and stormy sky, the sighing of the wind in the branches, the rustle of the withered leaves under foot, the lapping of the cold water on the shore, and in the foreground, pacing to and fro, now in twilight and now in gloom, a dark figure with a glitter of steel at the shoulder whenever the pale moon, riding clear of the cloud-rack, peers down at him through the matted boughs.” I can almost see it now: Joe Biden, stalking through the old-growth forest just outside Wilmington, trembling and carrying a drawn sword, peering warily about him as if at every instant he expects to be set upon by an enemy. Such is the reward of the priesthood. The post Joe Biden, Rex Nemorensis appeared first on The American Conservative.

Foreign Affairs How China’s Propaganda Machine Reinforces Its Power Washington can’t afford to ignore Beijing’s information advantage. (Xinhua/Xie Huanchi via Getty Images) In the arena of great power rivalry, where arsenals are inventoried and economic output meticulously weighed, one domain remains undervalued yet quietly decisive: information.  Different states manage the flow of information differently. The United States, with its devotion to pluralism, prizes a cacophony of voices—free, unfiltered, and often discordant. China, by contrast, composes a coherent national message with the precision of a single baton, wielding a centralized propaganda apparatus not merely as a mouthpiece, but as a pillar of statecraft.  This is not merely a cultural divergence; it is a strategic asymmetry. While it may be tempting to cast this contrast in moral terms, policymakers must resist the comforts of ideological certainty. The ability to manage perception at scale shapes power itself. Realpolitik demands we recognize that before the clash of armies or the contest of markets, there is a quieter battlefield—one that conditions and partially determines the fate of the former contests. In moments of geopolitical tension—be it tariff escalation or regional brinkmanship—Beijing’s informational cohesion acts as a force multiplier, enabling it to act with velocity and unanimity. Washington, meanwhile, must navigate a democratic din, where competing narratives dilute momentum and fracture resolve. The United States must begin to factor this asymmetry into its calculus. Decisions cannot be measured by economic or military rationale alone—they must be filtered through the structural realities of informational coherence and the political will it enables. The truth is, even when strategies make perfect sense on paper—militarily calibrated or economically sound—they often falter if divorced from considerations of public reception. Take the tariff war, for example. Zoom in on the raw numbers, and the case seems airtight: The U.S. could inflict disproportionate pain on China by restricting access to its market. After all, it’s far easier to reroute supply chains than to repurpose an entire industrial ecosystem built around outbound trade (we should know this!). As interdependent as the relationship might be, if we forget about information, the U.S. seems able to punch hard. But strategy, like architecture, must rest on solid terrain—in this case, the ground of public opinion. And here, the unstable foundation is one that policy technocrats tend to overlook. America does have the tools to strike, but do we have the scaffolding to sustain such contests? Less so.  When push comes to shove, the Chinese government doesn’t flinch—it steers. How long did it take for the U.S. to unravel? Before the tariff truce, when China’s commerce ministry spokesperson told the world that “China will fight to the end if the U.S. side is bent on going down the wrong path,” a classmate of mine scoffed, reading the statement as a sign of hyper-ideological posturing. What he, and many dismiss, is that such a posture was incredibly logical. Even if China was set to economically suffer more, they knew that the U.S. was more likely to budge.  For the China-watchers who are obsessed over maritime maneuvers, this may not be quite perceptible. But for those who know about Xi Jinping’s ambitious securitization efforts, as well as the use of the propaganda machinery to temper reform under Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, this all makes sense. Especially after the Tiananmen trauma, weiwen—“stability maintenance”—has been not just a slogan but a governing obsession. “Without a stable environment, we can accomplish nothing and may even lose what we have gained,” Deng told President George H.W. Bush in 1989.  As much as we may resist the thought, the uncomfortable reality is this: Even when facing less material pain, the United States is more likely to blink — because it lacks the narrative cohesion to endure. Acknowledging this isn’t defeatism; it’s realism. The real kind. For all the virtues of our political system—and they are many—invoking democratic ideals does little when the terrain shifts beneath us.  Just consider what this might mean militarily. We couldn’t sustain Vietnam once public opinion turned. And yet, many of today’s leaders speak with unwarranted confidence about weathering a protracted conflict over Taiwan. What’s needed now isn’t bravado, but calm reflection. What we can do to reduce the cohesion/information gap should command as much attention, if not more, than fighter jets. When I asked about the challenge China’s propaganda system poses to U.S. policy formulation, Missouri Sen. Eric Schmitt—arguably the most vocal proponent of an America First foreign policy—brushed off the concern. “I think they are very vulnerable, actually,” he told me after stepping off stage at POLITICO’s Security Summit. “Forty percent of the world’s consumers live in the United States. Their entire economy is based on selling to us. We’ve got a lot of leverage.” Schmitt continued, “They’re worried. You’ve seen protests in the streets, youth unemployment is high—I actually think President Trump is doing the right thing.”  Texas Rep. Michael McCaul, the hawkish Chairman Emeritus of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, struck a similar tone. In response to the same question, he said, “The tariffs are going to open more markets in China. If they’re a stick for better behavior, to deescalate tensions, that’d be a good thing. I’m not totally optimistic that’ll happen, given Xi’s ambitions.” He added,  “I do think he looks at Ukraine—and that it hasn’t gone so well for Putin—and that factors in. But they have a long-term plan, and it’s very clear to me what that is. We need to provide deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, especially through the AUKUS program…” We’ve heard some of that before. Although I completely understand why these answers would be given to a journo, we should hope this isn’t all our leaders are thinking about—maybe the tone changes in the SCIF room?  As America Firsters rightly search for measures to better compete with China, we should take a high dose of prudence. As it stands, China’s elites know us better than we know them. Alexis de Tocqueville and Edmund Burke, for instance, are widely read by senior CCP cadres. Our leaders, on the other hand, may (or may not) be able to recite a Sun Tzu quote or two. Whenever someone dares to say there’s something to learn from China—or, heaven forbid, expresses a glimmer of intellectual respect—some will cry “China sympathizer.” Ignore them. That happened to Henry Kissinger too, and he was no fool. The U.S. shouldn’t abandon its commitments to free speech and open debate. But if America wants to stay strong, we must shed the arrogance that has long dulled our strategic edge.  Knowing our adversary isn’t appeasement. Caution isn’t cowardice. We are stumbling blind into a contest we claim to be ready for. And China may be more ready than many assume. The post How China’s Propaganda Machine Reinforces Its Power appeared first on The American Conservative.

Foreign Affairs The End of Neoconservatism Trump is cutting a new trail for American foreign policy. (Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images) In what can be called a victory speech over failed neoconservative foreign policy, President Donald Trump proclaimed the end of 30-some years of existing foreign policy in the Mideast. The ideology dragged the U.S. through pointless wars from Libya to Yemen is now dead. At an investment conference in Riyadh, in a speech little-commented on by the mainstream media, Trump said, “In the end, the so-called nation builders wrecked far more nations than they built. And the interventionalists [sic] were intervening in complex societies that they did not even understand.” For the first time since the First Gulf War in the 1990s, America is not fighting in the Middle East. Trump arranged a fragile ceasefire with Yemen, where multiple U.S. presidents have waged a proxy war against Iran. Trump is withdrawing American troops from Syria, became the first American president in 25 years to meet with a Syrian leader, and announced alongside his speech the end of sanctions against that country. He is finally negotiating with Iran toward some sort of nuclear deal to replace the one he unilaterally canceled in his first term. Progress has not always been in a straight line, but there has been progress. One need only to look back on the past decades to see the difference. The United States once overtly supported Saddam Hussein in his war against Iran, leading to thousands of deaths on both sides. Pivoting, the U.S. invaded Iraq in 1991 after Saddam moved into Kuwait. Saudi Arabia was threatened, saved from war by U.S. intervention because of its oil reserves, which the U.S. was then fully dependent on. In the neocon spasms following 9/11, America invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, launching a nation-building plan in both countries to displace national governments with American puppet states and local Islamic traditions with Western ideas on women and society. Those nation-building actions gave support to warnings issued by Al Qaeda and ISIS that the west sought to neuter Islam and turn the Middle East into a part of a new global empire. Rumors circulated that American troops in Iraq were issued maps of the Syrian border ahead of plans to turn the massive military to sweep west into Syria and Lebanon following the “conquest” of Iraq. As that war brought Iran into the fight, U.S. troops were deployed to Syria, the Turks threatened invasion, and Russian intervention complicated the struggle. ISIS rose to replace Al Qaeda. The U.S. began a war in Libya, overthrowing another ugly but stable government, leading to chaos which continues to this day. Massive streams of refugees flowed into Europe. Yemen dissolved into anarchy and civil war. The Afghan war threatened to spill into Pakistan. Though actual numbers can never be known, the Costs of War Project estimates over 940,000 people died directly as a result of violence due to American foreign policy in the post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. An additional 3.6–3.8 million died indirectly due to factors like malnutrition, disease, and the breakdown of healthcare systems related to these conflicts. The total death toll, including both direct and indirect casualties, is estimated to be between 4.5 and 4.7 million. The Costs of War Project also highlights the significant displacement caused by these conflicts, with an estimated 38 million people displaced since 2001. Some 7,000 U.S. military service members died. The Project estimates the wars cost the U.S. over $8 trillion. Afghanistan today is again ruled by the Taliban, Iraq by Iranian proxies. Nation-building was a complete failure. The broader neoconservative interventionist policy failed. Indeed, the best summation of America’s decades long policy in the Middle East is Trump’s. Words are easy, actions often much harder. So what is next? Trump stated his “fervent wish” that Saudi Arabia follow its neighbors, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, in recognizing Israel. He said a nuclear deal is within sight with Iran, adding he “never believed in having permanent enemies.” Both are hard asks. But in a sign of what may be the most significant change alongside the new foreign policy, Trump met the new leader of Syria, Ahmed al-Sharaa, a former Al Qaeda jihadist (one makes peace with one’s enemies, not one’s friends) who led a rebel alliance that ousted Bashar al-Assad. Trump posed for a photograph with al-Sharaa and the Saudi crown prince that “dropped jaws in the region and beyond.” “In recent years, far too many American presidents have been afflicted with the notion that it’s our job to look into the souls of foreign leaders and use U.S. policy to dispense justice for their sins,” Trump added in support of his growing realpolitik approach. Syria is now at a crossroads. The end of sanctions will give the country its first chance at economic breathing room in 14 years. Al-Sharaa has invited American energy companies to exploit Syria’s oil. But the ball is still in the Syrian court. Syria must decide whether to reject Iranian terrorist support and stop providing a safe haven for those fighters. Gulf leaders have rallied behind the new government in Damascus and want Trump to do the same, believing it is a bulwark against Iranian influence. Pressure will come from the United States for Syria to cut its ties with Russia and dismantle the Russian bases and enclaves there. Although al-Sharaa has confirmed his commitment to the 1974 disengagement agreement with Israel, Trump will no doubt seek his support for the Abraham Accords. He’ll also want Syria to assume responsibility for ISIS detention centers in Northeast Syria. There is a lot to talk about and many difficult steps ahead, but a start is a start. With Trump making clear that the goals of fostering human rights, nation-building, and democracy promotion have been replaced by a pragmatic emphasis on prosperity and regional stability, Syria has its opening. “I am willing to end past conflicts and forge new partnerships for a better and more stable world, even if our differences may be profound,” Trump said. The post The End of Neoconservatism appeared first on The American Conservative.

If any other country did things like this they'd be held to account, but because it's Israel & 'God's Chosen People' (fake and bullshit) no one dares say anything. God's chosen people blow the arms and legs off people then blows up the prosthetic limbs warehouse. Have a think about that...would God 'choose' such animals? If YOUR country supports Israel, they have by default committed a 'war crime' and have therefore absolved themselves from Government.