Highlights On the night of August 27-28, 2024, Israeli security forces launched counterterrorism operations in Jenin and its environs, in the Nur Shams refugee camp in Tulkarm, and the al-Far’a refugee camp in the Tubas area. The operation in Jenin continues (as of September 2, 2024), while the other two operations have been completed. An IDF soldier was killed and at least ten other members of the Israeli security forces were wounded. During the operation, the forces killed more than 25 terrorist operatives in airstrikes and exchanges of fire, including commanders of terrorist networks in Jenin and Tulkarm, detained wanted persons, located explosives laboratories and large quantities of weapons, and destroyed IEDs planted on traffic routes. Concurrently with the IDF operations, two terrorist attacks were carried out. Two car bombs driven by terrorists exploded in the Gush Etzion area, wounding three security personnel. Three policemen were shot dead in a shooting attack in the South Hebron Hills. A car bomb was found near the community of Ateret. During 2024, some processes and trends can be identified that contributed to the increase in terrorist activity in Judea and Samaria, especially in northern Samaria, which in the ITIC’s assessment are expected to continue even after the activity of the Israeli security forces: efforts by Hamas and Iran to encourage terrorist activity through incitement, directing terrorist attacks, and smuggling weapons and money; cooperation between armed terrorist networks belonging to various Palestinian organizations; increasing use of powerful IEDs for terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria and inside Israel; increase attempts to carry out shooting attacks targeting Israeli communities in the Seam Zone. IDF activity in northern Samaria Since the outbreak of the Iron Swords War on October 7, 2023, the Israeli security forces have carried out counterterrorism activities throughout Judea and Samaria to prevent the outbreak of a terrorist front in Judea, Samaria, and east Jerusalem, while fighting in the Gaza Strip and on the northern border with Hezbollah. The activity includes daily detention of wanted persons, along with targeted, extensive raids to seize weapons, destroy IEDs and explosive laboratories, and locate incitement materials and funds for financing terrorism. As part of the security activity, aircraft are also being increasingly used to target wanted operatives and terrorist squads preparing to carry out attacks.[1] On the night of August 27-28, 2024, Israeli security forces launched three large-scale counterterrorism operations in northern Samaria: Operation “Summer Camps” in Jenin and its environs (still ongoing, as of September 2, 2024); Operation “Ir Shemesh” in the Nur Shams refugee camp in Tulkarm (ended August 30, 2024); and Operation “Olim Kita” in the al-Far’a refugee camp in the Tubas area (ended August 29, 2024). The forces killed more than 25 terrorist operatives in exchanges of fire and airstrikes, detained wanted persons, seized large quantities of weapons, located explosive laboratories, and destroyed IEDs hidden on traffic routes. In addition, the Israeli forces surrounded the hospitals in the areas of activity to prevent wanted persons from fleeing. An IDF soldier was killed in an exchange of fire in Jenin and at least ten members of the security forces were wounded in operations in Jenin and Tulkarm (IDF Spokesperson and Israeli media, August 28 – September 1, 2024). The operations were reportedly launched due to the improvement in IED capabilities after the terrorist attack in Tel Aviv on August 18, 2024, in which an Israeli civilian was wounded in the explosion of a powerful IED carried by a Palestinian terrorist operative from Nablus, and due to the detonation of IEDs against IDF forces and civilians in Judea and Samaria (Israeli media, August 28, 2024). IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevy noted that the activity was intended to prevent an escalation of terrorism in Judea and Samaria. He said the objective was to enter the Palestinian refugee camps, destroy their sabotage capabilities, and thwart terrorist attacks (IDF spokesperson, August 31, 2024). Operation “Summer Camps” On August 28, 2024, the Israeli security forces began a counterterrorism operation in Jenin and its environs. The activity began in the eastern neighborhood of Jenin and the Kasbah and later expanded to the Jenin refugee camp. The forces also operated in the Qabatiya and al-Sila al-Harithiya areas (IDF Spokesperson and Israeli media, August 28-September 1, 2024). During the operation, the forces killed at least 18 terrorist operatives. On August 30, 2024, Israeli security forces killed the head of a Hamas network in Jenin, Wissam Hazem, in an airstrike on a vehicle in the Jenin area. Two other Hamas operatives, Maysara Masharqa and Arafat Amer, who were involved in shooting attacks targeting Israeli communities in the Seam Zone, were also killed in the attack. Rifles, a handgun, magazines, IEDs, and gas grenades were found in the car, as well as tens of thousands of shekels intended to finance terrorism (IDF Spokesperson, August 30, 2024). Hamas’ military wing confirmed that “commander” Wissam Ayman Hazem from the Jenin refugee camp was killed, along with Maysara al-Masharqa and Arafat al-Amer, in a clash with the Israeli security forces in the town of al-Zababdeh, east of Jenin (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, August 30, 2024).       Right: The weapons and money discovered in the vehicle (IDF Spokesperson, August 30, 2024). Left: Hamas notice of the deaths of Hazem, al-Masharqa, and al-Amer (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, August 30, 2024) The al-Nasser Salah al-Din Brigades, the military wing of the Popular Resistance Committees, announced the death of the commander of the battalions in Jenin, Ahmed Hussein Turkman, in a clash with the Israeli security forces in the Jenin district. He was allegedly responsible for several “heroic missions,” including setting fires near the Etzion camp on June 28, 2024 (al-Aqsa TV Telegram channel, August 29, 2024). The Palestinian armed networks, led by the Jenin Battalion of the al-Quds Brigades of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), claimed responsibility for carrying out ambushes, shooting at the Israeli security forces, and detonating IEDs (Quds News Agency, August 28-September 1, 2024). On August 31, 2024, an IDF soldier was killed and another was wounded in an exchange of fire in Jenin. The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades announced that their fighters had set a precise ambush on an Israeli infantry force in the al-Damaj neighborhood of Jenin (al-Arabi, August 31, 2024). It was also reported that for the first time, an RPG rocket was used in fighting against the Israeli security forces in Jenin (Nablus Battalions Telegram channel, August 31, 2024). The Palestinian media reported that at least 17 Palestinians had been killed in the Jenin area since the beginning of the Israeli operation (Wafa, September 1, 2024). Jenin Mayor Nidal Obeidi claimed that the damage after four days of activity had reached NIS 50 million (Fajr News, August 31, 2024). The Jenin municipality claimed that more than 70 percent of the city’s streets had been destroyed and that water had been cut off to 80 percent of the city and the refugee camp (Wafa, August 31, 2024). Operation “Ir Shemesh” Between August 28 and August 30, 2024, Israeli security forces operated in the Nur Shams refugee camp in Tulkarm. The forces killed five terrorist operatives and detained six wanted persons, located and destroyed dozens of IEDs planted on traffic routes. A suspicious vehicle was identified near the government hospital in Tulkarm, containing an M-16 rifle and a large quantity of weapons (IDF Spokesperson, August 31, 2024). On August 29, 2024, Israeli security forces killed five terrorist operatives hiding in a mosque. Among those killed was Muhammad Jaber, aka Abu Shuja, PIJ Tulkarm Battalion commander in Nur Shams, who was responsible for many attacks, including the shooting attack in which an Israeli civilian was killed in Qalqilya on June 22, 2024. A SWAT soldier sustained minor injuries. Jaber managed to evade Israeli targeted killing attempts and detention attempts by the Palestinian security services several times (IDF Spokesperson and Israeli media, August 29, 2024). The PIJ announced that Jaber, commander of the Tulkarm Battalion and one of its early founders, had been killed along with “some of his brothers after a heroic confrontation with the occupation soldiers” (Quds News Agency Telegram channel, August 29, 2024). Hamas’ military wing announced that one of its operatives, Muhammad Tawfiq Ofi, from the Tulkarm refugee camp, had been killed along with Jaber (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, August 30, 2024). PIJ announcement of Jaber’s death (PIJ Tulkarm Battalion Telegram channel, August 29, 2024) The Palestinian media reported five fatalities in the activity of the Israeli security forces in Tulkarm (Wafa, September 1, 2024). After Israeli forces entered the Nur Shams refugee camp, electricity was reportedly cut off, and internet and water networks were damaged. It is also claimed that 30 percent of the residents had left for nearby villages (Radio Alam, August 28, 2024). The head of the Popular Committee in the Nur Shams camp claimed that 35 buildings had been completely destroyed and that 120 structures had been partially damaged (al-Aqsa Radio Telegram channel, August 30, 2024). Operation “Olim Kita” On August 29, 2024, Israeli security forces completed a 30-hour operation in the al-Far’a refugee camp in the northern Jordan Valley. During the operation, the forces surrounded the camp and located an IED laboratory and an operations room operating from a mosque, where ready-to-use IEDs and large quantities of weapons were discovered. In addition, four terrorist operatives were killed (IDF Spokesperson and Israeli media, August 29, 2024). The Palestinians reported four fatalities in the Tubas area (Wafa, September 1, 2024). Hamas expressed sorrow over the deaths of Ibrahim Abd al-Qader al-Ghanimi, Murad Masoud al-Ja’aita, Ahmad Saleh al-Nabzizi, and a 14-year-old boy named Muhammad Masoud al-Ja’aita (Hamas Telegram channel, August 28, 2024). Tubas Governor Ahmed As’ad claimed that Israeli forces “deliberately destroyed the infrastructure” during the operation (Sabak24 News Agency Telegram channel, August 30, 2024). Israeli forces allegedly surrounded houses and demanded that those inside surrender. It was also alleged that the forces raided the Red Crescent medical point in the camp, attacked the staff, and seized their phones (Radio Alam, August 29, 2024).     Right: An operations room located in the mosque (IDF Spokesperson, August 28, 2024). Left: IDF forces in the al-Far’a camp (IDF Spokesperson, August 29, 2024) Terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria during IDF operations On the night of August 30-31, 2024, a car bomb exploded at a gas station at the Gush Etzion junction. The terrorist driving the car then tried to attack the Israeli security forces, who responded by shooting and killing him. Three officers sustained minor to moderate injuries. At the same time, a terrorist driving a car bomb infiltrated the community of Karmei Tzur. The community’s security guard crashed into the vehicle and killed the terrorist with gunfire. During the exchange of fire, the IED exploded in the car bomb. There were no casualties (IDF Spokesperson, August 31, 2024). The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claimed responsibility for the double attack, reporting that the perpetrators were Zuhdi Nidal Abu Afifa and Mohammad Ihsan Marqa (al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades Telegram channel, September 1, 2024). Hamas’ military wing also announced that the perpetrators of the double attack were its operatives, with Mohammad Ihsan Marqa detonating the car bomb at the gas station and Zuhdi Nidal Abu Afifa detonating the car in Karmei Tzur (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, September 2, 2024). On September 1, 2024, a drive-by shooting was carried out at a police car on Route 35, near the Tarqumiya checkpoint in the South Hebron Hills. Three Israeli policemen were killed. A few hours later, Israeli security forces located the perpetrator, Muhannad al-Aswad, inside a building in Hebron and killed him after an exchange of fire. An M-16 rifle was discovered next to him. Al-Aswad, a resident of the town of Idhna, was reportedly a Fatah operative and previously served in the presidential guard of the Palestinian Authority (IDF spokesperson, September 1, 2024). The Palestinian media confirmed that Muhannad al-Aswad, a resident of the town of Idhna, had carried out the shooting attack and that he had served in the presidential guard until 2015 before he began working as an electrical contractor (Palestinian Media Center Telegram channel, September 1, 2024). The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claimed responsibility, noting that the perpetrator of the attack was Muhannad Muhammad al-Aswad, from the town of Idhna. According to the announcement, the attack was “revenge for the blood of the shaheeds and within the framework of the responsibility of retaliating for the Zionist massacres in the Gaza Strip, for the crimes of the occupation in the occupied West Bank, and for the ongoing violations against al-Aqsa Mosque headed by the criminal Ben Gvir” (al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades Telegram channel, September 2, 2024). The scene of the shooting attack near the Tarqumiya checkpoint (Israel Police X account, September 1, 2024) In the early morning hours of September 2, 2024, a report was received of a suspicious vehicle near the community of Ateret in the Binyamin area, north of Ramallah. IDF forces and sappers searched the vehicle. Two gas canisters connected to an operating mechanism were discovered inside (IDF Spokesperson, Israel Police X account, and Israeli Media, September 2, 2024). Palestinian reactions to the IDF activity In their comments, Palestinian officials condemned the IDF activity in northern Samaria and accused Israel of trying to carry out “genocide” and “cleansing” in Judea and Samaria similar to the Gaza Strip. Residents were called upon to “resist” the Israeli forces. The following are notable comments: Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas cut short his visit to Saudi Arabia in view of the beginning of Israeli activity. Nabil Abu Rudeineh, spokesman for Mahmoud Abbas’s office, said that the Israeli actions “will lead to severe consequences that will be paid for by everyone” and that “they are the continuation of an all-out war on the Palestinian people” (Wafa, August 28, 2024). Hamas said the Israeli operations were “a practical attempt to implement the plans of the extremist government and expand the brutal war of extermination in the Gaza Strip to all cities, towns, and refugee camps in the West Bank” (Hamas Telegram channel, August 28, 2024). The PIJ claimed that “the objective of the attack is to shift the weight of the conflict to the West Bank, in an attempt to impose a new reality on the ground that is intended to subdue and annex the West Bank” (Safa News Agency Telegram channel, August 28, 2024).  Palestinian social media featured posts and cartoons expressing support for the “resistance” in Judea and Samaria, drawing connections between the war in the Gaza Strip and the “resistance” in Judea and Samaria, particularly in Jenin (a name that means “embryo” in Arabic). Right: The “resistance” in Judea and Samaria “smashes” the Israeli rifle (Emad Hajjaj’s Instagram account, September 2024). Center: Jenin as a womb for the “resistance” (Mohammad Sabaaneh’s Instagram account, September 1, 2024). Left: “Gaza and the West Bank, the wound is one,” cartoon of Mahmoud Abbas (Quds News Agency Telegram channel, August 28, 2024) Processes and trends in terrorist activity in Judea and Samaria during 2024 Hamas and Iran are working to ignite Judea and Samaria Since the beginning of the Iron Swords War on October 7, 2023, the Hamas leadership has been working to ignite Judea and Samaria by carrying out terrorist attacks, including inside Israeli territory, and clashes with the Israeli security forces.[2] The effort is led by Zaher Jabarin, who has served as Hamas’ de facto head of Judea and Samaria since his predecessor, Salah al-Arouri, deputy chairman of Hamas’ political bureau, was killed in an attack attributed to Israel in Beirut on January 2, 2024. Following are prominent statements by Jabarin: On April 11, 2024, he called on the residents of Judea and Samaria to “rise up against the occupier and confront him with all your might.” He added that “the residents of the West Bank must continue on the path of resistance” and that “the West Bank is the heart of the battle and the conflict with the enemy” (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, April 11, 2024). On July 25, 2024, in an interview with al-Jazeera, he said that “the West Bank is the soft underbelly of the occupation” and that “the West Bank has a pool of struggle and jihad.” He said, “All the resistance groups on the ground are coordinated and most of them are coordinated and cooperating” and called on all Palestinians to “be involved in the inevitable confrontation” (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, July 25, 2024). Zaher Jabarin (Quds News Agency, January 3, 2024) Concurrently with the public statements, activity was identified on the ground of Hamas’ “West Bank Headquarters” from the Gaza Strip and Turkey to transfer funds to terrorist operatives in Judea and Samaria and carry out terrorist attacks from Judea and Samaria (ISA Spokesperson’s Unit, May 31, 2024). In addition, several terrorist attacks that were in the planning stages were thwarted: Anas Shurman, a Palestinian from Tulkarm who lives in Jordan, was detained in Nablus on suspicion of planning a bombing attack on Israeli territory. The interrogation revealed that he was recruited to Hamas in December 2023 by Imad Obeid, a Hamas operative from Turkey, and agreed to carry out a suicide bombing attack on behalf of Hamas. In addition, several Hamas operatives who belonged to the network in Nablus and were involved in preparing the IED for the attack were detained (ISA Spokesperson’s Unit, June 3, 2024). The Israeli security forces detained a squad of students in a Hamas cell at Birzeit University who were planning to carry out an attack. The interrogation revealed that the suspects acted on behalf of Hamas headquarters in Turkey to provide an infrastructure for activity against Israelis and were engaged in preparing to carry out an attack and transferring money to operatives on the ground. All the suspects were detained, and weapons and large sums of money transferred from Hamas headquarters were found in their possession (ISA Spokesperson’s Unit and Israeli media, July 21, 2024). Iran is working intensively to smuggle weapons and money and carry out terrorist attacks from Judea and Samaria using the IRGC’s Qods Force, to ignite and launch a campaign against Israel from this sector as well, alongside the Gaza Strip and the other fronts of the “axis of resistance.”[3] In recent years, senior IRGC officials have publicly addressed the expansion of the “Palestinian resistance” in Judea and Samaria and the growing challenges facing Israel and the IDF in this arena, and attempts to establish Iranian intelligence infrastructure in Israel and Judea and Samaria, establish terrorist infrastructure under the guise of civilian organizations, and transfer explosives by UAVs have been exposed, including after the outbreak of the Iron Swords War. In March 2024, it was revealed that a large quantity of weapons smuggled into Judea and Samaria had been seized, including fragmentation charges, anti-tank mines, shoulder-fired anti-tank missiles, RPG rockets, and explosives (IDF Spokesperson, March 25, 2024). The activity is led by Munir al-Maqdah, a Fatah operative from Lebanon who works in the service of the Qods Force and Hezbollah together with his brother, Khalil al-Maqdah, who was killed in an Israeli attack in Sidon on August 21, 2024 (ISA Spokesperson’s Unit, August 21, 2024). Perpetrators of the terrorist attacks Terrorist activity in Judea and Samaria is usually carried out by the military wings of the “established” organizations – Hamas’ Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the PIJ’s al-Quds Brigades, and Fatah’s al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. However, there are local networks in which operatives from several organizations collaborate, both in fighting against the Israeli security forces in the communities and in the refugee camps and in carrying out terrorist attacks.[4] In addition, there are inter-regional collaborations between the networks. The following are some examples of collaborations: On the evening of August 18, 2024, a powerful IED exploded on Lehi Street in Tel Aviv. As a result, the terrorist carrying the IED on his back was killed, and an Israeli civilian sustained minor injuries (Israel Police X account and Israeli Media, August 18-19, 2024). The Hamas military wing and the PIJ military wing claimed joint responsibility for carrying out the suicide bombing attack in Tel Aviv (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, August 19, 2024). Subsequently, Hamas’ military wing announced that the perpetrator of the attack, Ja’far Saad Manna, was its operative (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, August 22, 2024). On July 27, 2024, Lua’i Masha was killed in an Israeli Air Force airstrike on the Balata refugee camp in Nablus. Both the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and the al-Quds Brigades announced that he was their operative (al-Quds Brigades in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, July 27, 2024). On July 23, 2024, the Israeli security forces killed the commander of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades in the Tulkarm camp, Ashraf Nafe’, who headed Hamas’ military wing in the camp, Muhammad Awad, commander of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in the camp, and Mohammad Badie, an al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades operative. From right to left: Mohammad Badie, Mohammad Awad, and Ashraf Nafe’ (Quds News Agency Telegram channel, July 23, 2024) On June 22, 2024, an Israeli civilian was shot dead in a shooting attack in Qalqilya. The perpetrators of the attack, Jamal Ibrahim Abu Haniya and Ali Khalil Abu Bakr, were operatives of Hamas’ military wing and were killed in an Israeli Air Force airstrike in Tulkarm on August 3, 2024. Muhammad Jaber (Abu Shuja), who was the head of the network in Nur Shams, directed the attack. On April 12, 2024, Muhammad Omar Daraghmeh, commander of the Tubas Battalion of the al-Quds Brigades, was killed in an Israeli security force operation in Tubas. Daraghmeh was commander of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades in Tubas before moving to the Tubas Battalion of the al-Quds Brigades along with operatives of other organizations in the town (al-Jazeera TV website, April 12, 2024). The terrorist networks also use social media, mainly TikTok, WhatsApp, and Telegram, to convey their messages. As a result, the leaders of the networks also become “popular heroes” who receive widespread support. Such an example was on July 26, 2024, when the Palestinian security services tried to detain Muhammad Jaber (Abu Shuja) at the hospital in Tulkarm, but local residents clashed with the security services operatives and Jaber managed to escape to the Nur Shams refugee camp, where he was greeted with cheers (Quds News Agency Telegram channel, July 26, 2024). There is also considerable involvement of operatives of the Palestinian Authority security services in terrorist activity, partly due to Israel’s withholding of funds, which has impacted the salaries of Palestinian Authority employees, including security personnel. On March 28, 2024, three Israeli civilians were wounded in a shooting attack against an Israeli bus and two vehicles on Route 90. The perpetrator of the attack was Abu Rida al-Saadi, a resident of Jenin and an operative in the Palestinian National Security Service; On January 15, 2024, Fares Khalifa, a resident of Tulkarm and a Preventive Intelligence officer, was killed during an exchange of fire with Israeli forces in the Nur Shams refugee camp; On March 27, 2024, Hamza Ararawi from the al-Ein refugee camp in Nablus was killed in an Israeli Air Force airstrike. Ararawi was a policeman in the Palestinian customs police and an operative in the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. Characteristics of the terrorist attacks Since the beginning of 2024, terrorist activity has focused on northern Samaria, originating mainly from Jenin and the Jenin refugee camp, Tulkarm and the Nur Shams refugee camp, and Nablus and the Balata refugee camp. There was also an increase in terrorist activity in the Qalqilya and Tubas areas. The most common form of attacks has been shooting attacks and IED attacks. The following are examples of prominent terrorist attacks:[5] On August 12, 2024, an Israeli civilian was seriously wounded by gunfire in a garage in Qalqilya (IDF Spokesperson, August 12, 2024). Hamas’ military wing claimed responsibility for the attack, noting that the perpetrator, Tareq Ziad Daoud, was the commander of Izz al-Din al-Qassam in the Qalqilya district (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, August 12, 2024). On the afternoon of August 11, 2024, a drive-by shooting targeted Israeli vehicles at the Mehola junction in the Jordan Valley. An Israeli civilian was killed and another was moderately wounded. The Israeli security forces searched for the perpetrators (IDF Spokesperson and Israeli media, August 11, 2024). The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades in Judea and Samaria claimed responsibility for the shooting attack (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, August 11, 2024). On July 23, 2024, two Israeli Defense Ministry contract workers were wounded in an IED explosion near the fence in the Seam Zone, near the community of Merav. Hamas’ military wing in Jenin claimed responsibility for the attack, claiming that three IEDs had been activated against Israeli security forces (Hamas in Judea and Samaria Telegram channel, July 23, 2024). On April 27, 2024, Palestinian terrorist operatives fired at the Salem camp (northwest of Jenin). An IDF force killed two of the attackers and the rest fled the scene. Two M-16 rifles used by the terrorists were found at the site (IDF spokesperson, April 27, 2024). Another prominent feature of terrorist activity in northern Judea and Samaria was planting powerful IEDs under and alongside traffic routes in Palestinian communities and refugee camps to target Israeli security forces. The following are notable cases: On the night of June 26-27, 2024, an IDF soldier was killed and 16 others were wounded in an operation in Jenin when two IEDs planted deep underground exploded. The PIJ’s Jenin Battalion claimed responsibility (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, June 27, 2024; Jenin Battalion Telegram channel, June 27, 2024). On July 1, 2024, an IDF soldier was killed and an officer was wounded when an IED detonated against an armored military vehicle exploded in an operation at Nur Shams camp in Tulkarm. The Tulkarm Battalion of the al-Quds Brigades claimed responsibility (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, July 1, 2024; Tulkarm Battalion Telegram channel, July 1, 2024). In addition, there was increasing terrorist activity in the Seam Zone, mainly in the Tulkarm area. The activity was characterized mainly by attempts to carry out shooting attacks against Israeli communities, but in most cases, there were no casualties or damage. Here are some notable examples: On July 23, 2024, Israeli security forces located rockets inside a vehicle in the Tulkarm refugee camp, along with explosives and IEDs. According to “sources” in the Palestinian security services, PIJ operatives tried to launch rockets at Israel from the Tulkarm area but failed. The Palestinian security service personnel located the launcher (Israeli media, July 23, 2024). On June 23, 2024, shots were fired at the Israeli community of Bat Hefer from the Tulkarm area, after which two IEDs exploded near the wall separating the communities (Israeli media, June 23, 2024). The IDF Spokesperson said an IED had exploded from the Palestinian side of the Seam Zone, hundreds of meters from the wall, to draw the Israeli security forces to the scene. There were no casualties and no damage was reported (IDF Spokesperson’s website, June 24, 2024). The Tulkarm Battalion of the PIJ’s military wing claimed that its operatives had ambushed IDF forces in Bat Hefer and detonated remote-controlled IEDs against them (Tulkarm Battalion of the al-Quds Brigades Telegram channel, June 24, 2024). On the night of June 3-4, 2024, two armed terrorist operatives were identified approaching the fence in an attempt to carry out a shooting attack against Israeli communities. IDF soldiers killed them (IDF Spokesperson’s website, June 4, 2024). On May 29, 2024, three Hamas operatives from the Tulkarm refugee camp documented themselves firing at the community of Bat Hefer (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades in the Tulkarm refugee camp Telegram channel, May 29, 2024). The Israeli security forces detained Omar Nasr Allah, from the Tulkarm refugee camp, who admitted that he was a member of a terrorist squad that carried out shooting attacks at Israeli communities near the fence (IDF Spokesperson, June 26, 2024). Izz al-Din al-Qassam operatives document themselves allegedly shooting at Bat Hefer (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades in the Tulkarm refugee camp Telegram channel, May 29, 2024) The terrorist activity in southern Judea and Samaria focuses on the Hebron area, including perpetrators of terrorist attacks inside Israel. The following are prominent incidents (apart from the terrorist attacks on August 31 and September 1, 2024): On July 31, 2024, an Israeli civilian was seriously wounded in a shooting and stabbing attack on Route 60, between Kiryat Arba and the Beit Einun junction (IDF Spokesperson and Israeli media, July 31, 2024). Hamas’ military wing in Hebron claimed responsibility for the shooting attack near Kiryat Arba and for shooting at IDF forces near the Cave of the Patriarchs (Hamas Telegram channel, July 31, 2024). On April 22, 2024, three Israeli civilians were injured in a vehicular ramming attack in Jerusalem. One of two Palestinians in the vehicle attempted to fire an improvised submachine gun but experienced a malfunction. The two were detained a short time later in possession of knives (Israel Police Force Spokesperson’s Unit, April 22, 2024). The Palestinian media reported that the perpetrators of the attack were Hatem al-Qawasmeh and Mu’tazz Abu Gholmeh, residents of Hebron and sons of well-known families in Hamas’ military wing (Ma’an, April 22, 2024). On January 15, 2024, a combined vehicular and stabbing attack was carried out in Ra’anana, in which a woman was killed and about 20 others were wounded (Israeli media, January 15, 2024). The perpetrators of the attack were Mahmoud Ali Zidat and Ahmad Muhammad Ali Zidat, relatives from Bani Na’im, east of Hebron, who were in Israel without permits (Ma’an, January 15, 2024). The post Escalation and Thwarting of Terrorism in Northern Samaria appeared first on The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center.

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Overview[1] On August 29, 2024, an editorial in the ISIS al-Nabā’ weekly called on Muslims in Europe to carry out “lone wolf” attacks on Jews and Christians in retaliation for the war in the Gaza Strip and European governmental support for Israel. The editorial was published in the wake of two terrorist attacks, one in Germany and the other Russia, for which ISIS claimed responsibility, stating they were carried out “to avenge the Muslims in Palestine.” Editorial Encourages Terrorist Attacks in Europe On August 29, 2024, Issue #458 of ISIS’ weekly al-Nabā’ magazine published an editorial entitled “Jihad in Europe” calling for lone wolf attacks on Jews and Christians in Europe. It came after two attacks in Germany and Russia on August 23, 2024, for which ISIS claimed responsibility, relating them to the war in the Gaza Strip (see Appendices A and B for information about the attacks). The article said the following (al-Nabā’, August 29, 2024): Protests and demonstrations in Europe against Western governments which support Israel are ineffective. The most effective mode of action is to carry out jihad “lone wolf” attacks on Jews and Christians (“Crusaders”), especially in support of Muslims who are unable to wage jihad” in “Palestine.” The attacks in Germany and Russia were in revenge for harm done to Muslims in “Palestine,” Iraq, Syria, Bosnia and other places, and prove that Muslims are united and determined to avenge their religious brothers without national or other differences. Muslims are called on to attack Jewish neighborhoods, synagogues and pubs [sic], to kill and burn the Jews. Jews and Christians in Europe can be attacked with simple weapons such knives and hammers, since local security personnel find it difficult to identity and investigate that type of attack. The article criticized Arab regimes which protect their Jews and Christians. The article “Jihad in Europe” (al-Nabā’, August 29, 2024) Appendix A: Stabbing in Germany Late in the evening on August 23, 2024, a terrorist carried out a stabbing in Solingen, a city in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia in northwestern Germany. The attack was carried out during a festival marking the 650th anniversary of the founding of the city. The attacker stabbed random festival participants and then fled. Three people were murdered and eight injured, four of them seriously (Reuters, August 24, 2024). A few hours later the terrorist turned himself in to the police. He was identified as Issa al-Hassan, 26 years old, a Syrian who had arrived in Germany in December 2022 and requesting asylum. He was supposed to be deported to Bulgaria, but German immigration authorities were unable to locate him at the refugee center where he was staying (Reuters, DW and AFP, August 26, 2024). ISIS’s A’maq news agency issued a statement claiming responsibility for the attack. It stated that the stabber was an ISIS operative and had carried out the attack “as revenge for the Muslims in Palestine and everywhere” (A’maq, Telegram, August 24, 2024). A’maq claim of responsibility (Telegram, August 24, 2024) According to the editorial about the attack in al-Nabā’ Issue #458, it was carried out against “the Christians of crusading Europe as revenge for the Muslims in Palestine.” It stated that the A’maq agency had issued a video in which the terrorist said, “the action is revenge for the Muslims, especially after the recent massacres in Palestine, which were carried out with the help of Crusaders.” It accused the European countries of having committed crimes against Muslims in Bosnia, Palestine, Syria and Iraq, adding, “Do you think you will be spared [revenge]? By Allah, I will chop off your limbs with the help of Allah, may he be praised and exalted. I embarked on this action to please Allah, may he be praised and exalted, to take revenge for our people in Palestine, against whom massacres are being committed by the Jews. I will hack off their limbs as revenge for our people in Palestine and our people in Syria, Iraq, Bosnia and Afghanistan.” According to the editorial, Germany is one of the most supportive countries of Israel and plays a key role in the international coalition against ISIS (al- Nabā’, August 29, 2024). The editorial about the terrorist attack in Germany (al-Nabā’, August 29, 2024) Appendix B: ISIS Attack in a Russian Prison On August 23, 2024, four prisoners affiliated with ISIS attacked prison staff in Volgograd, in southwestern Russia, with knives, held them hostage and killed four of them. The terrorists, from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, were shot dead by Russian security force snipers. According to reports, one of the attackers was wearing an explosive belt but did not have time to activate it (Reuters, Tass and NBC, August 23, 2024). ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack and said the hostages were stabbed to death by knives smuggled into the prison compound, adding that one of the dead was a senior officer. The al-Nabā’ article stated that the four had received religious instruction inside the prison which “strengthened their faith.” It also stated that al-Nabā’ had received a video from the planner of the attack, in which he called on the Muslims to “take revenge on the Jews for the massacres they commit in Palestine,” adding that “we see how the Jews, the enemies of Allah, kill the Muslim women and their children” and “the crimes of the Russian Crusader against the Muslims in Syria, and especially against the pious women [of ISIS operatives] in the prisons” (al-Nabā’, August 29, 2024). Two of the terrorists in the prison in Volgograd, with an improvised ISIS flag hanging on the wall behind them (al-Nabā’, August 29, 2024) The post ISIS calls for jihad in Europe to avenge Muslim deaths in the Gaza Strip appeared first on The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center.

Highlights[1] Senior Iranian officials condemned the IDF’s activity in Judea and Samaria and accused Israel of striving to expand the scope of the “killings and crimes” against the Palestinians. Senior Iranian officials continued to threaten to respond to the killing of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran but stressed that the response would be calculated and would not play into Israel’s hands. The defense ministers of Iran and Syria discussed expanding cooperation between the two countries, including against Israel. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met in Tehran with Hezbollah’s representative in Iran. The meeting took place as part of the new foreign minister’s ongoing efforts to reaffirm Iran’s continued support for its proxies amidst the backdrop of the change of government in Tehran. The United Kingdom imposed new sanctions on Qods Force’s Unit 700 and three IRGC members for their involvement in destabilizing activities in the region and Britain. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for two drone attacks against targets in the Haifa area. The IDF Spokesperson reported the downing of UAVs approaching Israel from the direction of Syria and the east. The Houthis claimed responsibility for two attacks against vessels in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Hits were reported, but there were no casualties. There are delays at the start of the rescue operation of the tanker MV Sounion, which is on fire in the Red Sea after being hit in a Houthi attack. According to the Houthi leader, preparations are ongoing for a retaliation against Israel, and the Houthis also intend to increase their activities in support of the Palestinians. Iranian involvement in the Palestinian arena Mohammad Bagheri, chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces, said at a ceremony to introduce the new deputy chief of staff that the “Zionist regime” is in existential danger and is therefore determined to continue its crimes. He noted that even the Americans are hesitant whether to support Israel in view of the dangerous conditions in which it finds itself. Referring to the killing of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, Bagheri said Iran would definitely respond in a calculated manner to the “crimes of the Zionist regime” (snn.ir, August 28, 2024). Iranian Chief of Staff Mohammad Bagheri (snn.ir, August 28, 2024) General Mohsen Chizari, IRGC Qods Force deputy operations chief, said the “waiting period” for retaliation for Haniyeh’s killing could be long and would occur “only when the conditions are right.” Chizari stressed that how the retaliation would be carried out “will depend on the circumstances that will lead to the achievement of the goal,” adding that “this time, the retaliation will be different, and we will not reveal its method” (al-Jazeera, September 4, 2024). Brigadier General Esmail Ahmadi-Moqaddam, the president of Tehran’s Supreme National Defense University and former commander of the law enforcement forces, referred to Iran’s possible response to Haniyeh’s killing, saying that Iran would respond wisely, taking into account the complex developments and equations and in a way that would not play into the hands of the “enemy.” Referring to Hezbollah’s retaliation for the killing of Fuad Shukr, the organization’s military commander, Ahmadi-Moqaddam said the organization had inflicted “lethal blows” on the “Zionist regime,” which it hid. He added that keeping the “Zionist regime” in fear was no less significant than a military attack and that it had negative strategic implications for Israel (Khabar Online, September 2, 2024). Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Nasser Kanani condemned the IDF’s activity in Judea and Samaria.[2] He said the activity was a continuation of the “genocide” carried out by Israel in the Gaza Strip and proved that it sought to expand the scope of the killings and crimes against the Palestinian residents. Kanani praised the “steadfastness” of the Palestinian people and the “resistance groups” against “the killing machine of the criminal Zionist regime in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.” He called on the international community, especially the UN Security Council, to fulfill their responsibility and take immediate and effective action to stop the “genocide of the Palestinian people by the Zionist regime” (Iranian Foreign Ministry website, August 29, 2024). Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi spoke with his Jordanian counterpart, Ayman al-Safadi, to discuss bilateral issues and developments in the Palestinian arena. Araghchi accused Israel of being the main factor preventing a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and increasing tensions in the region and stressed the need for action by the international community to stop the “genocide” in the Gaza Strip. He added that Iran would support any agreement acceptable to the people and the “resistance” in “Palestine” (Iranian Foreign Ministry website, August 30, 2024). Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi accused Israel of pushing the region to the brink of a dangerous crisis, continuing its “crimes” in the Gaza Strip and sending its “killing machine” to Judea and Samaria. He noted that if Prime Minister Netanyahu’s supporters in the West failed to curb the continuation of Israel’s “criminal provocations,” they would share responsibility for their consequences (Abbas Araghchi’s X account, September 2, 2024). Iranian involvement in Lebanon and Syria Iranian Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh spoke with Syrian Defense Minister Ali Mahmoud Abbas and stressed Iran’s support for Syria’s security and territorial integrity. He called for the implementation of the agreements signed between the two countries and the expansion of cooperation between them, which, he claimed, would lead to the defeat of the “Zionist regime.” The Syrian defense minister stressed the need for continued cooperation between Iran, Syria, and the “axis of resistance” against Israel (Fars, September 1, 2024). The defense ministers of Iran (right) and Syria (Fars, September 1, 2024) The IRGC has begun constructing a network of tunnels around Damascus International Airport to link its headquarters to its weapons depots. According to a report by a Syrian news channel, over 50 IRGC members and around 30 members of the Syrian regime have been recruited to participate in the excavation operations on the outskirts of the airport. In addition, Iranian engineers specializing in tunneling and fortifications have been brought in to design the plans and oversee the work. The tunnels are reportedly being equipped with spaces designated for storing weapons and housing advanced air defense systems (Ayn al-Furat, August 31, 2024). On September 1, 2024, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met in Tehran with Hezbollah’s representative to Iran, Abdullah Safieddine, to discuss the latest developments in the region, especially in Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, Judea, and Samaria. Araghchi stressed Iran’s continued support for the “resistance” and the struggles of the peoples of the region against the “Zionist occupation.” Safieddine conveyed to Araghchi the congratulations of Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah and other senior members of the organization on his appointment as foreign minister (Iranian Foreign Ministry website, September 1, 2024). The Iranian foreign minister meets with Hezbollah’s representative in Tehran (Iranian Foreign Ministry website, September 1, 2024) UK sanctions against the IRGC On September 2, 2024, the United Kingdom’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) and Treasury imposed new sanctions on individuals and entities linked to the Iranian government for hostile activities by Iran and its proxies in the region. The sanctions were imposed on the IRGC Qods Force’s Unit 700, which is responsible for transferring equipment and supplies to pro-Iranian militias in the region, as well as three IRGC members: Abdolfattah Ahvazian, Behnam Shahriari, and Mohammad Fazeli, accused of supporting actions by Iran and its proxies aimed at destabilizing Britain, Israel, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon (United Kingdom government website, September 2, 2024). Following the United Kingdom’s decision to impose the sanctions, the United Kingdom ambassador to Tehran was summoned for a reprimand at the Iranian Foreign Ministry (ISNA, September 3, 2024). Activities of the Shiite militias Iraq Claims of responsibility of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq This week, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for two attacks against targets in Israel (Islamic Resistance in Iraq Telegram channel, August 28-September 4, 2024). The targets of the attacks were the following: September 4, 2024 – Haifa Port, using UAVs. The IDF Spokesperson said air defense fighters had successfully intercepted a UAV that was making its way into Israeli territory from the east. The UAV did not cross into Israeli territory and there were no casualties (IDF Spokesperson, September 4, 2024). August 29, 2024 – “Alon Tavor power station in the Haifa area”, using UAVs. According to the IDF Spokesperson, air defense fighters successfully intercepted a UAV that was making its way into Israeli territory from the direction of Syria. The UAV did not penetrate Israel and there were no casualties (IDF Spokesperson, August 29, 2024). Attacks against American targets in Iraq A “source” in the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee said that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq would continue to attack American interests in Iraq. He reiterated the warning that the soldiers at the American bases “will soon return to the United States in coffins” (shahokurdy X account, August 31, 2024). According to a senior Iraqi militia official, the lull between the militias and the American forces in Iraq is temporary, and they are waiting for Iran’s retaliation for the killing of Ismail Haniyeh to continue operations against the American forces (1news-iq.com, August 30, 2024). Coordination between the militias in Iraq and the Houthis Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq’s secretary-general Qais al-Khazali met in his office in Baghdad with the Yemeni cleric Mohammed Abdul-Adhim al-Hassan al-Houthi al-Hasani. The meeting was also attended by Abu Idris al-Sharafi, the Houthi representative in Iraq. Al-Khazali expressed his great appreciation for the heroism and courage displayed by the Yemeni people and for the Houthis’ role in supporting the Palestinian people and standing up against “the massacres of the Zionists in the Gaza Strip.” Al-Hasani praised al-Khazali for “embodying the ‘resistance’ concept of the unity of the arenas” (Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq website, September 1, 2024). The meeting between Qais al-Khazali and Mohammed Abdul-Adhim al-Hassan al-Houthi al-Hasani (Hossein Ali al-Houthi’s X account, September 2, 2024) Hadi al-Amiri, secretary-general of the Badr Organization, said the United States was unable to stop Houthi operations in the Red Sea and that the path of the “Islamic resistance” was clear and honorable (Shafaq News, September 3, 2024). Yemen Houthi military activity Over the past week, the Houthis continued to report attacks against vessels. Houthi armed forces spokesman Yahya Saria reported on the attacks (Yahya Saria’s X account, August 28 – September 4, 2024): August 31, 2024: An attack on the ship Groton in the Gulf of Aden. According to Saria, the hit was accurate. He said it was the second attack on the ship, which had already been attacked on August 3, 2024. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) confirmed that the ship Groton reported that two missiles exploded near the vessel, but no damage or casualties were reported (UKMTO X account, August 31, 2024). September 2, 2024: An attack on the ship Blue Lagoon 1 in the Red Sea, using several missiles and UAVs. Saria claimed the hit was accurate. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) stated that the Houthis attacked the Greek-owned MV BLUE LAGOON I and Saudi-owned MV AMJAD oil tankers using two ballistic missiles and a UAV and hit both. CENTCOM warned that the hits on the tankers posed a threat to marine environmental systems, in addition to endangering the lives of sailors (CENTCOM X account, September 3, 2024). The company operating the tanker, Bahri, announced that it was not attacked but was near Blue Lagoon 1 during the attack and was not damaged (Seatrade Maritime News, September 4, 2024). A “Houthi maritime source” also denied hitting a Saudi vessel (Al-Akhbar, September 3, 2024). CENTCOM reported that during the past week, they destroyed four UAVs, a USV, and four missile launch systems in Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen (CENTCOM X account, August 28-September 4, 2024). Attack on the oil tanker MV Sounion On August 29, 2024, Houthi forces released a video that they claimed documented a raid by Houthi fighters on the oil tanker MV Sounion, which was first attacked on August 21, 2024. The footage shows the tanker bridge from the inside and other rooms in the vessel, as well as planting explosive devices on board and detonating them from a distance. It should be noted that the documentation of the detonation of the IEDs is not the one released by the Houthis on August 23, 2024. In the new documentation, there appear to be fire sites on board the tanker, indicating that the fighters raided the tanker after it had already been severely damaged and abandoned in the previous days (the Houthi armed forces’ media arm X account, August 29, 2024). On August 28, 2024, Houthi spokesman Mohammad Abdeslam said that following requests from several “parties,” the Houthis approved towing the tanker to safety. He noted that the attack on the tanker was an example of “Yemen’s seriousness to attack any ship that violates Yemen’s decision to prevent the passage of ships destined for Israel” (Mohammad Abdeslam’s X account, August 28, 2024). Houthi political council member Mohammad Ali al-Houthi issued a statement saying, “We hold America and Britain responsible for any oil spill from the Sounion, even if it occurs while it is being towed, for reasons that we will explain if necessary” (Mohammad Ali al-Houthi’s X account, September 1, 2024). On September 2, 2024, the European Union Red Sea Task Force announced that private companies were involved in efforts to tow the MV Sounion from its location and that the operation would begin soon. It was also reported that the European task force would secure the towing operation. Regarding the condition of the tanker, it was reported that several fire sites were still burning on board, but it was not drifting and there was no oil spill (EU Task Force EUNAVFOR Aspides X account, September 2, 2024). However, on September 3, 2024, the task force reported that the private companies had concluded that the conditions required to tow the tanker had not yet been met and that it was not safe to move forward. Therefore, it was decided to examine alternative solutions (EU Task Force EUNAVFOR Aspides X account, September 3, 2024).     Photos from the video that allegedly documented the raid and the detonation of IEDs aboard the oil tanker Sounion (the Houthi armed forces’ media arm X account, August 29, 2024) Statements by senior Houthi officials On August 29, 2024, the leader of Yemen’s Houthi movement, Abd al-Malik al-Houthi, delivered his weekly speech, in which he said that “preparations for a response against the Israeli enemy are continuing and the time will be a surprise.” He added that they were also “working hard to increase operational activity supporting Palestine to a more significant level,” and clarified that “we have no political ceiling and no other considerations that could affect the level of our actions supporting the Gaza Strip.” Al-Houthi claimed that at least 40% of shipping traffic to Eilat had been halted due to the complete closure of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait to the “enemy.” However, he also admitted that damage to vessels in the Red Sea had become rarer because the number of ships “linked to the enemies” had been greatly reduced. According to him, the shipping companies transported the vessels over vast distances from Yemen, bearing extremely high costs. Regarding the attack on the oil tanker Sounion, al-Houthi said it was a “daring and courageous operation” and that two different forces raided the tanker and detonated IEDs on board (al-Masirah, August 30, 2024). The Houthis’ political bureau issued a statement expressing “great concern over the military escalation and aggression of the Israeli enemy in the West Bank and its invasion of refugee camps.” The announcement also praised “the unity of the Palestinian resistance, which is in a period of perfection and coordination” (al-Masirah, August 31, 2024). The post Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (August 28 – September 4 , 2024) appeared first on The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center.

Overview[1] During August 2024, the ISIS weekly al-Nabā’ published two editorials referring to Hamas in connection with the war in the Gaza Strip. ISIS rejected Hamas’ methods, accusing the Sunni movement of cooperating with the Iranian-led Shi’ite axis and stating that the only way to deal with Israel and the Jews was a jihad (according to ISIS’s perception). In ITIC assessment, the editorials are an ISIS attempt to exploit the war in the Gaza Strip, and especially criticism of Hamas, to recruit supporters and operatives. They also indicate ISIS’s fear of Iranian expansion in the region and of its Shi’ite allies. ISIS Relates to the War in the Gaza Strip Since the Hamas attack and massacre against Israel on October 7, 2023, ISIS has found itself in a complex situation. On the one hand, it supports a war of attrition against Israel and against Jews in general;[2] on the other, the war in Gaza is led by ISIS’s bitter rivals, Hamas, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, often referred by ISIS as al-Ikhwan al-Murtaddin, the “Apostate Brotherhood;” and Hezbollah, regularly called by ISIS Hizb al-Shaytan, the Party of Satan. Also participating in the war are branches of Iran’s Shi’ite axis, ISIS’s sworn enemies (ISIS considers Shi’ites as infidels and calls them rawafid, “refusers,” a derogatory Sunni term for Shi’ites) In August 2024, al-Nabā’, the ISIS weekly magazine, published two editorials stating the organization’s rejection of Hamas’ methods and actions, and accusing the movement of collaborating with the “Shi’ite axis.” ISIS stated that the only way to deal with Israel and the Jews was by waging jihad and the application of Islamic law (Sharia) according to the organization’s perception. On August 1, 2024, al-Nabā’ Issue #454, published an editorial entitled, “Those who would perish”[3] (al-Nabā’, Telegram, August 1, 2024): Hamas, which cooperates with Iran in the “rejection front”[4] [“resistance axis”[5]], worsens the situation of the Palestinians and causes the destruction of the Gaza Strip while serving Iranians interests. Referring to the killing of Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau (called “tyrant”, “leader of the appeasers” and “icon of polytheistic democracy”), in Tehran on July 31, 2024, the editorial stated it could testify to the fact that Iran was incapable of protecting its proxies, and speculated that Iran was even willing to sacrifice its “tail” [that is, the leader of a proxy] in order to save itself by not getting involved in a comprehensive war. According to the editorial, Haniyeh was loyal to the “axis of reluctance” until his last breach while irritating and annoying the Sunni community, and therefore he received his punishment from Allah. The editorial accused the operatives of the Palestinian organizations loyal to the “axis of reluctance” of destroying the Gaza Strip for the sake of Iranian interests, adding that swallowing Iranian bait brings destruction to the Sunni community, whose members must adhere to Islamic law (Sharia) and their faith. The editorial pointed out that the killing Haniyeh was part of a chain, first Saleh al-‘Arouri, deputy head of Hamas’ political bureau, was killed in Beirut on January 2, 2024 [and then Haniyeh]. According to the article, Iran is not a true partner for the Palestinians, it is incapable of protecting them and is causing their situation to deteriorate. As for Hezbollah (Hizb al-Shaytan, “the party of Satan”), the editorial claimed it did everything in its power to evade and deny its responsibility for the rocket attack which killed the Druze children and youth in Majdal Shams,[6] fearing to violate “the rules the confrontation” and international law, and fearing that blame would tarnish the image of the “resistance axis.” Hezbollah, because of its desire to serve Iranian interests, is prepared for the Gaza Strip to burn to the ground along with all its inhabitants. At the head of the editorial was a picture of Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, in front of Haniyeh’s coffin in Tehran, accompanied by other senior figures of the Iranian regime. “Those who would perish” (al-Nabā’, August 1, 2024) On August 14, 2024, al-Nabā’ Issue #456, published an editorial entitled, “At the time of the massacre,” with a photograph of a rescue worker carrying a girl who was killed in the Gaza Strip (al-Nabā’, August 14, 2024). According to the editorial: No peace settlement or reconciliation with Israel is possible and such a solution will lead to more massacres of Muslims. Every Israeli “act of massacre” in “Palestine” torments hearts, but then people move on to their normal agenda. Neither nationalism, appeasement nor “resistance” [i.e., Hamas and the “resistance axis”] can assuage the Muslims’ pains, the only solution is “divine law” based on jihad in the spirit of [ISIS]. The faithful Muslim should view the “massacres” of the Palestinians as a link in the chain of “massacres” carried out by the “enemies of Islam” against Muslims throughout time and in different places around the world, such as Iraq, Syria, Yemen, etc. The leaders of the Arab countries (“the Arab dictators”) are accused of cooperating with Israel and the United States and defending Israel’s borders. The editorial ends by claiming that when “massacres” are committed against Muslims, the response should be a massacre of “infidels.” “At the time of the massacre” (al-Nabā’, August 14, 2024) The post ISIS’s attitudes towards Hamas according to editorials in recent issues of ISIS’ al-Nabā’ weekly appeared first on The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center.

Instrumental to their musical direction. The post Bono discusses the two artists that shaped U2: “That’s where we were” first appeared on Far Out Magazine.

"A hangout pal." The post Rock and roll widsom: the musician Tom Petty called his musical “older brother” first appeared on Far Out Magazine.

Jessica Pegula, the all-American girl from Buffalo, N.Y., now a young woman of 30 and a model of persistence, work ethic, and the cool style in American manners (“I had a good tournament? eh, whatever … “), lost a hard-fought two-set match in the women’s singles finals of the U.S. Open, closing a brilliant week on a disappointment that soon enough she will put in perspective as she tries again for the ultimate prize. However, they applauded and at the end they cheered, wildly and truly, for Aryna. Indeed, she can look to her nemesis, the all-Russian girl from Minsk, who got to the final last year, on the court in this stadium named for Arthur Ashe, and walked off it with the same bitter taste in her mouth after a three-set loss to the young star Coco Gauff despite a dominant first. This time, Aryna Sabalenka kept her Dostoevskian (wildly fluctuating) emotions in check to hold off Miss Pegulia’s Emersonian (ever-positive) surge in the second set to claim her first, long-sought U.S. Open trophy, the dream of a lifetime, she said (without disrespect to the Australian Open, which she has won twice including this year.) Minsk is the capital of Bielorussia, which is not Russia, no, but they are neighbors and about as close as can be in culture and language, certainly Dostoevsky thought so. The tyrant Lubachenko sides with the tyrant Putin in the war of aggression against Ukraine. These are terrible evils, but they are not burdens that should be borne by young athletes, and there is something phony about the sports world’s banning their countries’ names and flags even as they themselves are allowed to compete. What good are gestures meant to punish tyrants who could not care less, other than humiliate individuals whose virtues sport celebrates? The crowd at Ashe, I would like to think, understands this. They know Aryna, for having seen her here before, but cheer Jessica their neighbor, who never before has got past a quarter-final in a major, and rightly so. But it is not nice to cheer when the tall Slav misses. The New York fans do this. However, they applauded and at the end they cheered, wildly and truly, for Aryna and for her shots that flew to the baselines and sidelines and the big overhead smashes and the shrewd drop shots that she followed to the net for volleyed put-aways, should Jessica win a race to reach them and manage to send them back. They cheered for her smile, well-earned, her tears, deep-felt.  And of course, they cheered Jessica too, the tenacious, shrewd shot maker who had a sensational run, whose grace in a match against a stronger player (“best hard court player in the world,” she herself noted) was apparent to all, even when she gave points away at the worst moments, double faulting on game point. Graceful young women, blessings in a time when grace is in short supply. READ MORE from Roger Kaplan: Twentysomethings Into Men’s Finals at US Open Americans in U.S. Open Finals! The post A Touch of Grace at US Open appeared first on The American Spectator | USA News and Politics.