Empirical SCOTUS is a recurring series by Adam Feldman that looks at Supreme Court data, primarily in the form of opinions and oral arguments, to provide insights into the justices’ decision making and what we can expect from the court in the future. It’s no secret that all three of President Donald Trump’s Supreme Court nominees – consisting of Justices Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett – are judicial conservatives. This does not mean, of course, that all three vote for a conservative outcome in each case before them. Indeed, for much of the last decade, certain Supreme Court commentary has revolved around which of these conservative justices has been most likely to side with the court’s liberal bloc (consisting of Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, Ketanji Brown Jackson, and formerly Justice Stephen Breyer) in a given case. Each term seems to produce a new candidate, often prompted by a single, high-profile decision that defies ideological expectations. Gorsuch’s authorship of Bostock v. Clayton County remains perhaps the most prominent example. The 2020 decision extending anti-discrimination protections to gay and transgender employees cemented Gorsuch’s reputation as a justice willing to part ways with conservative orthodoxy. More recently, Kavanaugh and Barrett have drawn similar attention after joining liberal justices in closely divided cases involving voting rights, immigration, administrative law, and economic regulations. Anecdote, however, is a poor substitute for systematic analysis. This article takes a data-driven approach to the question. Using Supreme Court voting information collected by the Supreme Court Database from the 2020-21 term onward – when Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett all began serving together – it examines who really is the “weakest link” among Trump’s Supreme Court nominees. Same-side voting The most intuitive way to measure ideological alignment is to ask how often a justice votes on the same side as the liberal justices, regardless of whether that vote is in the majority or dissent. This produces the following results (in blue): This metric suggests that Kavanaugh is the conservative justice most frequently aligned with liberals, while Gorsuch is the least. But this measure has an important limitation: it treats dissent alignment and majority alignment as equivalent. In other words, a justice who regularly joins liberal dissents – no matter how futile – will appear more aligned under this metric than a justice who joins liberals only when they win (that is, when it really mattered). Shifting the focus to outcomes Given this, it makes some sense to shift our focus to outcomes, or where the conservative justice voted with liberals in the majority (represented by the red bar). To put it simply: when this justice is on the winning side, how often are liberals on that side as well? This majority-only metric removes dissenting behavior from the analysis and thus asks not whether a justice sympathizes with liberal positions, but whether they participate in winning coalitions that liberals actually join. Under this measure, the differences among the three justices narrows considerably: Kavanaugh did so approximately 74% of the time Gorsuch did so approximately 73% of the time Barrett did so approximately 72% of the time All three conservative justices frequently sit in broad majorities that include liberals. But Kavanaugh is again in the lead, remaining slightly more likely than his colleagues to do so. And this also foreshadows a recurring theme: Gorsuch’s reputation as a crossover justice is driven less by outcome coalitions and more by his frequency of joining the liberal bloc in losing cases. Close cases: where alignment matters most Broad majorities tell only part of the story. In 9-0 or 8-1 decisions, ideological alignment often reflects consensus rather than genuine coalition-building. Rather, the cases that most shape perceptions of who is the “swing justice” are close decisions – especially 5-4 and 6-3 splits. Looking at these yielded the following: Across all 5–4 cases: Gorsuch joined the liberal bloc approximately 44% of the time Kavanaugh joined the liberal bloc approximately 37% of the time Barrett joined the liberal bloc approximately 21% of the time   Interestingly, across all 6–3 cases, this pattern reversed itself: Barrett joined the liberal bloc approximately 32% of the time Kavanaugh joined the liberal bloc approximately 31% of the time Gorsuch joined the liberal bloc approximately 14% of the time These figures explain why Gorsuch often appears as the most liberal-aligned justice in the closest cases. But they still mask a crucial distinction: whether the liberals are winning or losing those cases. Wins versus losses The next move was to separate 5-4 cases into two categories: those in which the liberal justices were in the majority, and those in which the liberal justices dissented along with one of the Trump appointees. When liberals win 5-4 In 5-4 cases where a liberal justice was in the majority, they necessarily did so with the help of at least two conservative justices. These cases are the strongest evidence of a justice functioning as an outcome-determinative swing vote. In this subset: Kavanaugh joined the liberal majority in 52% of the cases Gorsuch joined the liberal majority in 43% of the cases Barrett joined the liberal majority in 22% of the cases This pattern is striking but the results are clear: When liberals win narrowly, Kavanaugh is the conservative justice most likely to be part of the winning coalition. When liberals lose 5-4 In contrast, when liberals lost 5-4, the question becomes which conservative justices were willing to join the liberal dissent. Here the ranking flips: Gorsuch joined the liberal dissent in 40% of the cases Barrett joined the liberal dissent in 20% of the cases Kavanaugh joined the liberal dissent in 7% of the cases This, again, is the source of Gorsuch’s distinctive profile. He is far more likely than his conservative colleagues to side with liberals in close losses – even when doing so has no effect on the outcome. Why salient cases skew our perceptions High-profile decisions can obscure these broader patterns. Bostock v. Clayton County remains the paradigmatic example. The decision, authored by Gorsuch and joined by the liberal justices (and Chief Justice John Roberts), looms large in the public imagination and continues to shape perceptions of Gorsuch’s jurisprudence. But Bostock predates Barrett’s tenure and, based on the data above, has proven atypical of Gorsuch’s role in the post-2020 court. In the Barrett era, Kavanaugh has joined liberal majorities in a larger number of closely divided cases. What actually distinguishes Gorsuch is not the frequency with which he joins liberals in outcomes, but the frequency with which he joins them in dissent. Kavanaugh is most closely associated with liberal outcomes and Gorsuch is most closely associated with liberal dissents. The disagreement over the court’s “weakest link,” in other words, turns not on degree but on which kind of alignment one chooses to prioritize. The bottom line Taken together, the composite indices clarify a common source of confusion in Supreme Court commentary, especially regarding Gorsuch. Unlike what occurred in Bostock, Gorsuch is the conservative justice most likely to side with liberals in close dissents. Indeed, he has done so in such areas as tribal law (e.g., Arizona v. Navajo Nation and Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta) and certain criminal cases (such as in Pulsifer v. United States and Diaz v. United States (although note that the liberal bloc itself was split in these cases)), in which he has more of a tendency to part ways with his conservative colleagues. It is Kavanaugh who is the conservative justice most likely to side with liberals in outcomes. This is perhaps not surprising: He is the Trump-appointed justice most frequently in the majority. His liberal-majority votes in close cases are perhaps best explained less by a single subject area (as in the case of Gorsuch) than by a repeatable posture, as he appears most likely to cross over when the liberal position can be framed as institutionally stabilizing and incremental – preserving existing decision rules, cabining remedies, or avoiding structural leaps. Barrett falls between the two. Her rate in the majority by term is a touch lower than Kavanaugh’s but has been greater than Gorsuch’s. Her cross-ideological alignments are (somewhat like Kavanaugh) often about favoring restraint, in interpreting doctrinal or interpretive moves she views as too aggressive relative to existing law. But to return to where we began: which justice appears most “liberal-aligned” depends on whether one values dissent as much as outcomes. If one values dissent, it is Gorsuch. If one values outcome, it is Kavanaugh. This makes understanding the “weakest link” of Trump’s Supreme Court appointees more complex – but also more accurate. The post Which of Trump’s Supreme Court nominees is the “weakest link”? appeared first on SCOTUSblog.

Courtly Observations is a recurring series by Erwin Chemerinsky that focuses on what the Supreme Court’s decisions will mean for the law, for lawyers and lower courts, and for people’s lives. The Supreme Court’s recent rulings allowing Texas and California to engage in mid-decade gerrymandering of congressional districts show the urgent need for reconsideration of Rucho v. Common Cause, where the justices held that federal courts cannot hear challenges to partisan gerrymandering. After the court in December upheld the Texas legislature’s gerrymandering, intended to benefit Republicans, it did the “right” thing on Feb. 4 in dismissing the challenge to California’s gerrymandering which was to benefit Democrats. But by allowing unchecked partisan gerrymandering, the court is encouraging ever more extreme efforts and undermining democracy. How we got here Partisan gerrymandering occurs when the political party that controls a legislature draws election districts to maximize safe seats for that party. Gerrymandering is not new. The practice of gerrymandering takes its name from an early governor of Massachusetts, Elbridge Gerry. In 1812, Gerry led the drawing of districts in Massachusetts to help his party gain seats. During this process, Gerry apparently remarked that one district looked like a salamander – and the name “gerrymandering” took hold. (In the March 26, 1812, edition of the Boston Gazette, the newspaper ran a cartoon of this district with the caption: “The Gerry-Mander: A new species of Monster.”) Although gerrymandering has been done throughout American history, the method has changed dramatically. For most of American history, those engaging in gerrymandering would choose between several maps based on their predictions of which would yield the greatest partisan advantage. Today, they have computers generate thousands of maps and choose the one that provides the best chance of partisan success. Intricate computer algorithms and detailed data about voters allow map draw­ers to engage in partisan gerrymandering with surgical preci­sion.  The Supreme Court first considered partisan gerrymandering in 1986 in Davis v. Bandemer. A fractured court concluded that challenges to partisan gerrymandering could be heard in federal court. But the court did not articulate a standard for when gerrymandering becomes unconstitutional.   The court returned to the issue of partisan gerrymandering in 2004, in Vieth v. Jubelirer, where the court dismissed a challenge to this practice. A plurality opinion – written by Justice Antonin Scalia and joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Clarence Thomas – said that there are no judicially discoverable or manageable standards and no basis for courts to decide when partisan gerrymandering offends the Constitution. Justice Anthony Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, provided the fifth vote for the majority. He agreed to dismiss the case because of the absence of judicially manageable standards, but he said that he believed that such standards could be developed in the future and then such cases could be heard. For the next decade and a half, litigation focused on whether there were standards that courts could use to determine when partisan gerrymandering violated the Constitution. Then, in 2019, in Rucho v. Common Cause, the court resolved the issue by ruling that challenges to partisan gerrymandering are “political questions” that cannot be decided by the courts. Roberts (joined by Thomas, and Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh) wrote the majority opinion and said that the ultimate question with partisan gerrymandering is how much is too much, but there are no judicially manageable standards for determining this. The court held that, although many possible tests had been proposed for “evaluating partisan gerrymandering claims, [] none meets the need for a limited and precise standard that is judicially discernible and manageable.” The court declared: “We conclude that partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts.  Federal judges have no license to reallocate political power between the two major political parties, with no plausible grant of authority in the Constitution, and no legal standards to limit and direct their decisions.” Justice Elena Kagan wrote a vehement dissent, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor. Kagan said that “[p]artisan gerrymandering of the kind before us not only subverts democracy (as if that weren’t bad enough).  It violates individuals’ constitutional rights as well.” In answer to Roberts’ argument that it is impossible to determine what is too much, Kagan wrote that there are many possible legal tests that might be used to determine when gerrymandering violates the Constitution. The recent gerrymandering rulings At the urging of President Donald Trump, the Republican controlled state legislature redrew congressional districts in Texas to create five additional likely Republican seats. Texas Governor Greg Abbott signed this into law on Aug. 29. Immediately, a challenge was brought. Pursuant to federal law, this was heard by a three-judge federal court. The judges conducted a nine-day hearing, involving the testimony of nearly two dozen witnesses and the introduction of thousands of exhibits. There is a factual record of more than 3,000 pages. In a 160-page opinion, the federal court found that Texas impermissibly used race as a basis for drawing the election districts. The Supreme Court has held for over 30 years that it violates equal protection for the government to use race as a predominant factor in districting. But in Abbott v. League of United Latin American Citizens, on Dec. 4, 2025, the Supreme Court overturned the district court’s decision and allowed Texas to use its new districts. The court gave three reasons for its decision. First, it said that the lower court “failed to honor the presumption of legislative good faith.” Second, the court said that the district court erred by not producing “a viable alternative map that met the State’s avowedly partisan goals.” This means that the only way the court could have declared race-based districting unconstitutional would be for the district court to devise a map that would create five more Republican-controlled congressional districts. (But what if there was no way to draw a map that created five more Republican districts except by impermissibly using race? As Kagan said in her dissent, “the map’s absence does not make the direct evidence of race-based decisionmaking go away.”) Finally, the court said that the challenge to the new districts came too soon before the election. It stated: “This Court has repeatedly emphasized that lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an election.” This is the so-called Purcell principle – from a Supreme Court order in the 2006 case of Purcell v. Gonzalez  – that federal courts cannot strike down laws regarding an election too soon before the election. But the Supreme Court never has explained the basis for the Purcell principle and did not do so here.    In response to the Texas redistricting, California voters approved an initiative, Proposition 50, to suspend use of an independent commission to draw congressional districts and to adopt a new map for the 2026 elections that would likely give Democrats five additional congressional seats. A three-judge federal court, in a 2-1 decision, rejected a challenge to that map. And on Feb. 4, the court, in Tangipa v. Newsom, denied review, allowing the new gerrymandering districts to be used in the coming elections. Time to reconsider Rucho Gerrymandering rigs elections. The central precept of democracy is that voters choose their elected officials, but partisan gerrymandering means that elected officials are choosing their voters. As the Supreme Court itself once observed, the “core principle of republican government” is “that the voters should choose their representatives, not the other way around.”  As a result of partisan gerrymandering, each voter also does not have the same chance to influence the outcome of an election. Partisan gerrymandering means that not all voters are treated the same, as those voters of the party that is controlling the districting are much more likely to have representatives of their party elected. That is a quintessential denial of equal protection of the laws. Partisan gerrymandering infringes First Amendment freedoms as well. Those of the minority political party, solely by virtue of their party association, are at a significant disadvantage in electing representatives. In 2004, Kennedy said that partisan gerrymandering is a “burden [on] a group’s representational rights” of their “political association,” “participation in the electoral process,” “voting history,” or “expression of political views.” Those of the minority political party are at an enduring disadvantage solely because of how the districts were drawn. The court’s decision in Rucho was based on the assumption that it is impossible to develop judicially manageable standards for when partisan gerrymandering violates the Constitution. But the court often has devised standards for drawing difficult lines. In fact, the same argument had been made that challenges to malapportionment – where districts for a legislative body varied greatly in population – should not be heard by federal courts. The Supreme Court, though, fashioned the rule of one-person one-vote, requiring all districts for a legislative body be about the same size in population. Likewise, many scholars have developed standards that could be used for determining when partisan gerrymandering goes too far.  Conclusion The mid-decade partisan gerrymandering in Texas and California – as well as in Missouri, North Carolina, and Utah – is the direct result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rucho v. Common Cause. The Supreme Court’s allowing this to happen is sure to encourage constant redistricting and ever more extreme partisan gerrymandering. The court should overrule Rucho and put an end to this assault on our democracy. The post The gerrymandering mess appeared first on SCOTUSblog.

THE WIZARD OF OZ will finally be broadcast on air for the first time in three decades. MeTV will air the MGM musical this fall...

NFL broadcaster and Super Bowl champion Tony Dungy preached the gospel on the streets of San Francisco, California, before Super Bowl LX.

“Silence may be a survival strategy for students navigating immigration-related stress” The post Viterbo University Instructs Staff to Lower Academic Expectations for Illegal Alien Students first appeared on Le·gal In·sur·rec·tion.

The White House attributed the sudden closure of US airspace over El Paso, Texas, to drone activity linked to Mexican drug cartels. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) lifted the ban hours after suddenly closing the region Tuesday evening for ‘security concerns’ until February 20. ‘Mexican cartel drones breached US airspace. The Department of War took […]

The round was led by FPV Ventures co-founder and managing partner Wesley Chan.